U.P. Fundamental Rules – r.56(c) – Compulsory Retirement of a Judicial Officer – Appellant while posted as a Chief Judicial Magistrate granted acquittal to the accused u/ss.467, 468, 471, 474, 420, 406 and 120B of IPC – A complaint was lodged against the appellant with regard to the acquittal – A vigilance enquiry was initiated and the report was adverse to the appellant – A censure entry was recorded in his character roll and order of punishment was accepted by the appellant without any challenge – Screening Committee recommended compulsory retirement of the appellant – Thereafter, appellant was compulsorily retired which was endorsed by the Full Court of the High Court – Held: The service records of the appellant were examined by the Screening Committee, the Full Court as also by the Division Bench of the High Court – The scope for Judicial review of an order of compulsory retirement based on the subjective satisfaction of the employer is extremely narrow and restricted – Only if it is found to be based on arbitrary or capricious grounds, vitiated by malafides, overlooks relevant materials, could there be limited scope for interference – The Full Court scrutinised the service records of the appellant and arrived at the conclusion that it was in public interest to compulsory retire the appellant – Further, punishment of censure meted out to the appellant was never assailed by him – Therefore, the order of the compulsory retirement of the appellant required no interference. Service Law – Judicial Services – Held: A judge holds the office of a public trust – Impeccable integrity, unimpeachable independence with moral values embodied to the core are absolute imperatives which brooks no compromise – A judge is the pillar of the entire justice system and the public has a right to demand virtually irreproachable conduct from anyone performing a judicial function – Judges must strive for the highest standards of integrity in both their professional and personal lives.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The service records of the appellant have been examined by the Screening Committee, the Full Court as also by the Division Bench of the High Court. The scope for judicial review of an order of compulsory retirement based on the subjective satisfaction of the employer is extremely narrow and restricted. Only if it is found to be based on arbitrary or capricious grounds, vitiated by malafides, overlooks relevant materials, could there be limited scope for interference. The court, in judicial review, cannot sit in judgment over the same as an Appellate Authority. Principles of natural justice have no application in a case of compulsory retirement. [Para 6] [824H; 825-A-B]
2. The complaint against the appellant with regard to the acquittal granted by him was first considered by the Administrative Judge, who was satisfied that it is a matter for further enquiry. The comments of the appellant were called for. A vigilance enquiry was recommended by the Administrative Judge, who obviously was not satisfied with the explanation furnished. The officer holding the vigilance enquiry was also a judicial officer who opined that the act of acquittal by the appellant was not above board. The comments of the appellant were again called for. The Screening Committee consisting of three Hon’ble Judges, on an overall assessment of the appellant’s service record, recommended his compulsory retirement. The Full Court scrutinised the service records of the appellant again while considering the recommendation of the Screening Committee and arrived at the conclusion that it was in public interest to compulsory retire the appellant. It is undisputed that the punishment of censure meted out to the appellant was never assailed by him. [Para 8] [825-E-G]
3. A person entering the judicial service no doubt has career aspirations including promotions. An order of compulsory retirement undoubtedly affects the career aspirations. Having said so, it is also cautioned that judicial service is not like any other service. A person discharging judicial duties acts on behalf of the State in discharge of its sovereign functions. Dispensation of justice is not only an onerous duty but has been considered as akin to discharge of a pious duty, and therefore, is a very serious matter. The standards of probity, conduct, integrity that may be relevant for discharge of duties by a careerist in another job cannot be the same for a judicial officer. A judge holds the office of a public trust. Impeccable integrity, unimpeachable independence with moral values embodied to the core are absolute imperatives which brooks no compromise. A judge is the pillar of the entire justice system and the public has a right to demand virtually irreproachable conduct from anyone performing a judicial function. Judges must strive for the highest standards of integrity in both their professional and personal lives. [Para 13] [828-A-D]
4. It has to be kept in mind that a person seeking justice, has the first exposure to the justice delivery system at the level of subordinate judiciary, and thus a sense of injustice can have serious repercussions not only on that individual but can have its fall out in the society as well. It is therefore absolutely necessary that the ordinary litigant must have complete faith at this level and no impression can be afforded to be given to a litigant which may even create a perception to the contrary as the consequences can be very damaging. The standard or yardstick for judging the conduct of the judicial officer therefore has necessarily to be strict. Having said so, it is also observed that not every inadvertent flaw or error that will make a judicial officer culpable. The State Judicial Academies undoubtedly has a stellar role to perform in this regard. A bona fide error may need correction and counselling. But a conduct which creates a perception beyond the ordinary cannot be countenanced. For a trained legal mind, a judicial order speaks for itself. [Para 14] [828-E-G]
Union of India & Ors. v. K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC
56 : [1993] 1 SCR 296 ; Union of India & Ors. v. Duli Chand, (2006) 5 SCC 680 [2003] 3 Suppl. Pyare Mohan Lal v. State of Jharkhand and Ors., (2010) 10 SCC 693 : [2010] 11 SCR 216 ; Syed T.A. Naqshbandi & Ors. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., (2003) 9 SCC 592 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 114 ; Rajendra Singh Verma (D) thr. Lrs. v. Lt. Governor (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 10 SCC 1 : [2011] 12 SCR 496 ; High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil & Anr., (2000) 1 SCC 416 : [1999] 4 Suppl. SCR 205 – relied on.
Ram Ekbal Sharma v. State of Bihar and Anr., (1990)
3 SCC 504 : [1990] 2 SCR 679 ; P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P. and Ors., (2001) 6 SCC 491 : [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 369 ; Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad and Anr., (2007) 4 SCC 247 : [2007]
3 SCR 198 – distinguished.
Baikuntha Nath Das and Anr. v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and Anr., (1992) 2 SCC 299 : [1992]
1 SCR 836 ; Nawal Singh v. State of U.P. and Another, (2003) 8 SCC 117 : [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 1046 ; R.C. Chandel v. High Court of M.P. and Anr., (2012) 8 SCC
58 : [2012] 7 SCR 205 ; Punjab State Power Corpn. Ltd. and Ors. v. Hari Kishan Verma, (2015) 13 SCC
156 : [2015] 3 SCR 555 ; Registrar General, Patna High Court v. Pandey Gajendra Prasad and Ors., (2012) 6 SCC 357 : [2012] 5 SCR 994 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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