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2026:BHC-AUG:48082
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
919 APPLICATION FOR CANCELLATION OF BAIL NO. 204 OF 2026
RAJKUMAR RANGNATH KUTE
VERSUS
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS
…
Mr. S. S. Kulkarni, Advocate for the Applicant
Mr. S. B. Jadhav, APP for the Respondent/State
CORAM : R. M. JOSHI, J.
DATED
: 7th OCTOBER, 2026
PER COURT :1.
This application is filed under Section 483(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking cancellation of the pre-arrest bail granted to
Respondent Nos. 2 to 20 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Basmathnagar, in Bail Application No. 123 of 2026, in connection with Crime
No. 107 of 2026 registered with Hatta Police Station, Tq. Basmathnagar,
District Hingoli, for the offences punishable under Sections 189(2), 191(2),
221, 223, 285, 303, 324(4), 324(5), 329(3) and 351(3) of the Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
2.
At the outset, the learned APP drew the attention of the Court to the
fact that the present Applicant is neither the Informant nor the victim and, as
such, has no locus standi to take exception to the order granting pre-arrest
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bail to the Respondents. In this regard, it is submitted on behalf of the
Applicant that, irrespective of fact that applicant is neither the first Informant
nor the victim of the crime, he is within his rights to prefer an application
seeking cancellation of the bail granted to the accused persons. In support of
his submission, learned Advocate for the Applicant placed reliance upon the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dhanraj N. Asawani v.
Amarjeetsingh Mohindersingh Basi and Others in Criminal Appeal No. 2093
of 2023, decided on 25.07.2023. He also referred to the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in R. Rathinam v. State and Others, AIR 2000 SC
1851, wherein practicing Advocates were held to have locus standi to move
an application for cancellation of bail. A reference is made to the judgments of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagjeet Singh and Others v. Ashish Mishra and
Others, AIR 2022 SC 1918, and Amanullah and Others v. State of Bihar and
Others, AIR 2016 SC 1871, to buttress his contention.
3.
In alternative, it is his submission that in the capacity of administrator
of the village panchayat he has right to prefer the application. On merit, he
claims cancellation of bail on the ground that in the facts of the case, no prearrest bail could have been granted to the accused. He seeks cancellation
thereof on the ground of subsequent conduct of accused persons.
4.
At the outset, it is required to be noted that the present Applicant is
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neither the Informant nor the victim of the crime. In such circumstances, the
question as to whether it would be open for any individual, other than the
Informant or the victim (aggrieved party) to invoke the relevant provisions of
criminal law and seek cancellation of bail granted to the accused requires
determination. In the judgment in the case of Dhanraj N. Asawani (supra) in
paragraph 19 thereof, the Hon’ble Supreme Court took note of the judgment
in A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500, and held that,
except in cases where the statute creating an offence provides for the
eligibility of a complainant, the concept of locus standi of a complainant is not
recognized in criminal jurisprudence. The said observations are pertinent in
cases where any individual seeks to set the law in motion in respect of an
offence which does not prescribe any particular eligibility for the complainant.
Applicant herein does not seek setting law into motion and hence, this
judgment does not support contention of Counsel for Applicant.
5.
Having regard to the aforesaid observations, if the present Applicant
was the Informant, nothing would have prevented him from registering the
First Information Report in respect of the incident in question. However, the
question that arises for consideration is whether it would be open to him to
seek cancellation of the bail granted by the competent Court in connection
with a crime wherein the Applicant is neither the Informant nor the victim. In
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the considered view of this Court, the answer to the said question must be in
the negative, more particularly in the facts and circumstances of the present
case, wherein no extraordinary circumstances have been brought on record to
justify interference at the instance of the present Applicant, which existed in
the case of R. Rathinam (supra). In the backdrop of the fact that six persons
belonging to a scheduled caste community were done to death. In the Petition
filed by 75 advocates for cancellation of bail, an issue came up for the
consideration of High Court about locus standi of a person to challenge order
of grant of bail. In the said facts, following observations were made in
paragraph 8 of the judgment, which read thus:
“8. It is not disputed before us that the power so vested in the
High Court can be invoked either by the State or by any
aggrieved party. Nor is it disputed that the said power can be
exercised suo motu by the High Court. If so, any members of
the public, whether he belongs to any particular profession or
otherwise, who has a concern in the matter can move the High
Court to remind it of the need to invoke the said power suo
motu. There is no barrier either in Sec 439 of the Code or in
any other law which inhibits a person from moving the High
Court to have such powers exercised suo motu. If the High
Court considers that there is no need to cancel the bail for the
reasons
stated
in
such
petition,
after
making
such
considerations it is open for the High Court to dismiss the
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petition. If that is the position, it is also open to the High Court
to cancel the bail if the High Court feels that the reasons stated
in the petition are sufficient enough for doing so. It is,
therefore, improper to refuse to look into matter on the premise
that such a petition is not maintainable in law.”
6.
These observations make it clear that after accepting the position of law
with regard to invocation of powers by state or aggrieved party, it is held that
the same can also be exercised suo motu by the High Court. It is further held
that there is no prohibition against a person approaching the High Court for
exercise of such power suo motu, and it would be for the High Court to
consider whether there is a need to cancel the bail or not. These observations,
therefore, clearly indicate that, at the instance of a person who is neither the
Informant nor the victim, cancellation of bail would not be permissible though
in appropriate cases, High Court could be requested to exercise such power
suo motu.
In case of Jagjeet Singh and Ors (supra) issue before Supreme Court
7.
was as to who is victim of crime. Supreme Court in case of Amanullah and
Ors (supra) has made following observations in paragraph 23, which reads
thus:
“23. The term ‘locus standi’ is a latin term, the general meaning of which
is ‘place of standing’. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 10th Edn., at
page 834, defines the term ‘locus standi’ as the right or capacity to bring
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an action or to appear in a court. The traditional view of ‘locus standi’ has
been that the person who is aggrieved or affected has the standing before
the court, i.e., to say he only has a right to move the court for seeking
justice. Later, this Court, with justice-oriented approach, relaxed the strict
rule with regard to ‘locus standi’, allowing any person from the society not
related to the cause of action to approach the court seeking justice for
those who could not approach themselves. Now turning our attention
towards the criminal trial, which is conducted, largely, by following the
procedure laid down in the CrPC. Since, offence is considered to be a
wrong committed against the society, the prosecution against the accused
person is launched by the State. It is the duty of the State to get the culprit
booked for the offence committed by him. The focal point, here, is that if
the State fails in this regard and the party having bonafide connection with
the cause of action, who is aggrieved by the order of the court cannot be
left at the mercy of the State and without any option to approach the
appellate court for seeking justice. In this regard, the Constitution Bench
of this Court in the case of P.S.R. Sadhanantham’s case (supra) has
elaborately dealt with the aforesaid fact situation. The relevant paras 13,
14 and 25 of which read thus:
“13. It is true that the strictest vigilance over abuse of the process of the
court, especially at the expensively exalted level of the Supreme Court,
should be maintained and ordinarily meddlesome bystanders should
not be granted “visa”. It is also true that in the criminal jurisdiction this
strictness applies a fortiori since an adverse verdict from this Court may
result in irretrievable injury to life or liberty.
14. Having said this, we must emphasise that we are living in times
when many societal pollutants create new problems of unredressed
grievance when the State becomes the sole repository for initiation of
criminal action. Sometimes, pachydermic indifference of bureaucratic
officials, at other times politicisation of higher functionaries may result
in refusal to take a case to this Court under Article 136 even though the
justice of the lis may well justify it. While “the criminal law should not
be used as a weapon in personal vendettas between private
individuals”, as Lord Shawcross once wrote, in the absence of an
independent prosecution authority easily accessible to every citizen, a
wider connotation of the expression “standing” is necessary for Article
36 to further its mission. There are jurisdictions in which private
individuals — not the State alone — may it statute criminal
proceedings. The Law Reforms Commission (Australia) in its Discussion
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Paper No. 4 on “Access to Courts — I Standing: Public Interest Suits”
wrote:
“The general rule, at the present time, is that anyone may
commence proceedings and prosecute in the Magistrate court. The
argument for retention of that right arises at either end of the
spectrum — the great cases and the frequent petty cases. The great
cases are those touching Government itself — a Watergate or a
Poulson. However independent they may legally be any public
official, police or prosecuting authority, must be subject to some
government supervision and be dependent on Government funds; its
officers will inevitably have personal links with government. They
will be part of the ‘establishment’. There may be cases where a
decision not to prosecute a case having political ramifications will be
seen, rightly or wrongly, as politically motivated. Accepting the
possibility of occasional abuse the Commission sees merit in
retaining some right of a citizen to ventilate such a matter in the
courts.”
Even the English System, as pointed by the Discussion Paper permits a
private citizen to file an indictment. In our view the narrow limits set in
vintage English Law, into the concept of person aggrieved and “standing”
needs liberalisation in our democratic situation. In Dabholkar case this
Court imparted such a wider meaning. The American Supreme Court
relaxed the restrictive attitude towards “standing” in the famous case of
Baker v. Carr. Lord Denning, in the notable case of the Attorney-General of
the Gambia v. Pierra Sarr N’jie, spoke thus:
“... the words “person aggrieved” are of wide import and should not be
subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not include, of course, a
mere busybody who is interfering in things which do not concern him;”
Prof. S.A. de Smith takes the same view:
8.
“All developed legal systems have had to face the problem of adjusting
conflicts between two aspects of the public interest — the desirability
of encouraging individual citizens to participate actively in the
enforcement of the law, and the undesirability of encouraging the
professional litigant and the meddlesome interloper to invoke the
jurisdiction of the courts in matters that do not concern him.”
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Prof. H.W.R. Wade strikes a similar note:
“In other words, certiorari is not confined by a narrow conception of locus
standi. It contains an element of the actio popularis. This is because it
looks beyond the personal rights of the applicant; it is designed to keep the
machinery of justice inproper working order by preventing inferior
tribunals and public authorities fromabusing their powers.”
In Dabholkar case, one of us wrote in his separate opinion:
“The possible apprehension that widening legal standing with a public
connotation may unloose a flood of litigation which may overwhelm the
Judges is misplaced because public resort to court to suppress public
mischief is a tribute to the justice system.”
This view is echoed by the Australian Law Reforms Commission.
XX XX XX
25. In India also, the criminal law envisages the State as a prosecutor.
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the machinery of the State is set in
motion on information received by the police or on a complaint filed by a
private person before a Magistrate. If the case proceeds to trial and the
accused is acquitted, the right to appeal against the acquittal is closely
circumscribed. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the State was
entitled to appeal to the High Court, and the complainant could do so only
if granted special leave to appeal by the High Court. The right of appeal
was not given to other interested persons. Under the Code of Criminal
Procedure 1973, the right of appeal vested in the States has now been
made subject to leave being granted to the State by the High Court. The
complainant continues to be subject to the prerequisite condition that he
must obtain special leave to appeal. The fetters so imposed on the right to
appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a person, who has been
acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and
tension of a further examination of the case, even though it is held by a
superior court. The Law Commission of India gave anxious thought to this
matter, and while noting that the Code recognised a few exceptions by way
of permitting a person aggrieved to initiate proceedings in certain cases
and permitting the complainant to appeal against an acquittal with special
leave of the High Court, expressed itself against the general desirability to
encourage appeals against acquittal. It referred to the common law
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jurisprudence obtaining in England and other countries where a limited
right of appeal against acquittal was vested in the State and where the
emphasis rested on the need to decide a point of law of general
importance in the interests of the general administration and proper
development of the criminal law. But simultaneously the Law Commission
also noted that if the right to appeal against acquittal was retained and
extended to a complainant the law should logically cover also cases not
instituted on complaint. It observed:
“Extreme cases of manifest injustice, where the Government fails to act,
and the party aggrieved has a strong feeling that the matter requires
further consideration, should not, in our view, be left to the mercy of
the Government. To inspire and maintain confidence in the
administration of justice, the limited right of appeal with leave given to
a private party should be retained, and should embrace cases initiated
on private complaint or otherwise at the instance of an aggrieved
person.”
However, when the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 was enacted the
statute, as we have seen, confined the right to appeal, in the case of
private parties to a complainant. This is, as it were, a material indication of
the policy of the law.”
(emphasis supplied by this Court)
9.
No doubt, the right to set the law in motion is permissible to be
exercised by any individual unless there is a specific embargo under the
statute, however, the same cannot be equated with a right to seek cancellation
of bail once bail has been granted by the competent Court. For that purpose,
the individual needs to pass test to be a victim of crime. It cannot be accepted
that any individual would be allowed to challenge order of bail granted to an
accused without any control. Our experience tells us that even provisions of
law are often misused by unscrupulous persons and if any right is recognized
of any individual to seek cancellation of bail irrespective of the facts and
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circumstances of the case, it would open a Pandora’s box and encourage the
filing of applications for cancellation of bail even with an ulterior motive to
pressurize the person in whose favour bail has been granted to achieve
personal gains. This Court, therefore, is not in agreement with the contention
of the learned Advocate that any individual could be permitted to move an
application for cancellation of bail even if he is not victim or aggrieved
person.
10.
As far as the present case is concerned, the Applicant claims to be
the Administrator of the Village Panchayat. He seeks cancellation of bail not
only on merits but also on the ground of the subsequent conduct of the
accused persons. According to him, they are not entitled to continue to enjoy
the benefit of pre-arrest bail granted in their favour. Perusal of the record, and
more particularly, the First Information Report and the order passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge granting pre-arrest bail to the Respondents,
clearly indicates that this is a fit case wherein pre-arrest bail ought to have
been granted by Court. There is nothing on record to indicate that there has
been any breach of the conditions imposed by the said Court while granting
bail to the accused persons. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the
present application is not bona fide and the same deserves to be dismissed.
11.
At this stage, learned Advocate for the Applicant makes a voluntary
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statement that the Applicant is ready and willing to deposit an amount of
Rs.5,000/- with the High Court Legal Services Authority, Sub-Committee,
Aurangabad.
12.
In view of the voluntary statement made by the learned Advocate for
the Applicant, this Court finds no reason to pass any further order. The
Applicant is, however, directed to deposit the said amount within a period of
four weeks from today. It is clarified that the amount shall not be paid from
government treasury but individually by applicant.
13.
The application stands dismissed in the above terms.
( R. M. JOSHI, J.)
ssp
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