West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 – s.2(h) – West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 – s.2(g) – Death of the original tenant in the year 1970, before the commencement of 1997 Act-prior to July 10, 2001 – Devolution of tenancy on the tenant’s widow and the appellants, children who were minor at the time of his death – Eviction suit by respondentlandlord – Application u/Ord. XII r.6 by the respondent seeking a ‘judgment on admission’ by relying on the deposition of the appellant, in another case where the appellant had admitted that the tenancy was in his mother’s name – Case of the respondent that since the mother died in 2009, the appellants not entitled to stay in the premises beyond the year 2014 in terms of s.2(g) of the 1997 Act, which protects the rights of the children and dependents of a tenant only for a limited period of five years – Case of the tenant that the tenancy was heritable as per s.2(h) of the 1956 Act, which was then in force, thus, could not be evicted based on the New Act; and that the appellants along with their mother had become tenants on the property in 1970 on the death of their father – Suit decreed by the trial court directing the tenant to vacate the suit property and hand over the possession to the respondent – Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court decreed the suit of the landlord on the basis of alleged admission by the appellant in another matter – Correctness:
Held: Courts below ought not to have decreed the suit of the landlord on the basis of alleged “admission” by the appellant made in another unconnected matter – It does not pass muster the test of “admission” visualised in Ord. XII r.6 – Question and its answer are both mixed question of fact and law, a so called ‘admission’ against the law can never be an “admission” as visualised u/Ord. XII r.6 – It is not a ‘clear admission’ as is being made out – What has been given to the appellants under law cannot be taken away on the basis of an unclear deposition – There cannot be an admission against law – Furthermore, enforcement of a new statute ipso facto will not take away the rights already accrued under a repealed statute, unless this intention is reflected in the new statute – Courts can, and must, differ from the literal meaning of words if the reading of any provision provides absurd results – Ambiguous drafting leads to manifold problems and generates lengthy litigations – There is no clarity in the 1997 Act to suggest that it extinguishes the rights of all tenants, who inherited tenancy rights under Old Act retrospectively – Statutory laws operate from the date of their enforcement i.e., prospectively – In case the legislature intends to make law retrospective then such an intention of legislature must be shown clearly and unambiguously in the statute itself – Division Bench’s mere interpretation of a statutory provision will not make the law retrospective and take away the heritable rights of a tenant – Mother and the appellants jointly inherited the tenancy from the father, in the year 1970 – Thus, the impugned judgment liable to be set aside as appellants’ tenancy did not expire in the year 2006, by the introduction of 1997 Act, in the absence of a clear and unequivocal intention in the 1997 Act to have a retrospective operation – Orders of the Single Judge and the Division Bench set aside – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Ord. XII r.6 – Interpretation of statutes. [Paras 17-22] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Ord. XII r.6 – Judgment on admission’ – Invocation of Ord. XII r.6, when: Held: It is not that a court cannot pass a judgment on the basis of an admission made in some other case – All the same, it has to be kept in mind that Ord. XII r.6 is an enabling provision conferring wide discretionary powers on the courts which cannot be claimed by any party as a matter of right – Courts can invoke Ord. XII r.6 only in cases where admissions are unconditional, unequivocal and unambiguous or when admission is based upon undisputed inferences – It is for the courts to see whether any statement in the pleadings or otherwise amounts to an admission of such a nature as to inspire the confidence of the court to pass judgment on admission u/Ord. XII r.6 – It will depend upon the content and kind of statement/admission which may vary from case to case – It would depend upon the totality of facts and circumstances of a particular given case – Ord. XII r.6 is meant for speedy disposal of the suits in some cases and unless there is a clear, unambiguous, unequivocal and unconditional admission, courts should not exercise their discretion under the Rule because judgment on admissions is without a trial which may even preclude a party to challenge the matter on merits in the court of appeal – Provision of law, which is meant for the expeditious disposal of appropriate cases, should therefore be cautiously exercised and it should never come in the way of any defendant denying him the valuable right of contesting the claim. [Para 3]
Constitution of India – Arts.136 and 141 – Special Leave Petition – Dismissal of SLP at the admission stage before issuance of notice – Effect:
Held: Dismissal of SLP at the admission stage before issuance of notice, with a non-speaking order, does not mean that this Court has affirmed the law laid down by impugned order – Dismissal of such SLP is no bar to decide the issue. [Para 14]
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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