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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Rai Chattopadhyay
C.O. 4187 of 2025
Rajesh Kumar Choudhury & Ors.
Versus
Srimatya Arati Bhunia & Ors.
For the Petitioners
: Mr. Amit Baran Dash
: Ms. Sharmi Das
For the opposite party No. 8
: Mr. Rejaul Alam, ld. Sr. Adv.
: Mr. S.M. Hassan
: Ms. Anupama Yasmin
Heard on
: 15.09.2026
Judgment on
: 17.09.2026
Uploaded on
: 17.09.2026
Rai Chattopadhyay, J. :(1)
This revision is directed against an order of the Civil Judge,
Senior Division, 2nd Court at Contai, Purba Medinipur, dated
October 29, 2025, in the Title Suit No. 16 of 2016. The
present petitioners are the defendant Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 9 to 11
in the said suit. By dint of the said impugned order the Court
has allowed the plaintiff’s prayer under Order I Rule 10 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, allowing addition of the legal heirs of
the deceased plaintiff No. 2, as the party defendants in the
suit.
(2)
The petitioners’ grievance is that the said order amounts to
be in gross violation of the law and settled principles under it,
in so far as the same has an effect of non-suiting the present
petitioners, who have filed counter-claims before the Trial
Court, in the said suit. The petitioners’ grievance is that the
said impugned order in effect nullifies their counter-claims,
as a counter-claim would not be maintainable against the codefendant, in accordance with law.
(3)
Hence, this revision.
(4)
Mr. Dash has appeared for the petitioners whereas Mr. Rejaul
Alam,
learned
Senior
Advocate
has
represented
the
plaintiff/opposite party No.8.
(5)
Mr. Dash learned advocate for the petitioners has submitted
that the plaintiffs file the said suit seeking partition of the
suit property by metes and bound. He submits that the
defendants contest the said suit due to the reason that
according to the defendants, the suit property is not a
property
under
joint
ownership,
but
belongs
to
the
defendants by way of purchase, through a duly executed deed
of conveyance.
(6)
Hence, the two sets of defendants have filed two different
counter-claims in the suit before the Trial Court. The
plaintiffs have also filed written statements with respect to
the
said
two
counter-claims,
filed
by
the
present
petitioners/defendants, in the Trial Court.
(7)
At this stage the 2nd plaintiff died. The other plaintiffs
therefore filed application under Order I Rule 10 of CPC, in
order to add the legal heirs of the said deceased 2nd plaintiff,
as party-defendant in the suit, who for some reason, did not
come forward to be substituted in place of their predecessor/
2nd plaintiff (now deceased), as substituted plaintiffs in the
suit.
(8)
Mr. Dash’s first argument is with regard to defect in the
plaintiff’s application under Order I Rule 10 CPC. He refers to
a copy thereof annexed with the revisional application to
submit that the plaintiff has failed to mention the date of
death of the 2nd plaintiff, in the same. According to him, such
omission has made the said prayer of the plaintiffs as vague
and unsubstantiated.
(9)
Further, with reference to Order VIII Rule 6A of the CPC, he
has submitted that it is the statutory right of the present
petitioners/defendants, to file a counter-claim in any suit
against
them,
which
cannot
be
defeated
barring
in
accordance with law. He says that it is the statutory provision
and
the
law
is
well
settled
that
a
counter-claim
is
maintainable in a suit against the plaint and the same shall
not be maintained against a co-defendant. According to him,
it is only mala fide and motivated on part of the plaintiffs,
that they intend to frustrate the counter-claims of the
petitioners, by adding the legal heirs of the deceased 2nd
plaintiff, as defendants in the suit.
(10)
He submits that specific statutory provisions govern as to
what happens when a plaintiff dies. In this regard he has
referred to provisions under Order XXII Rules 3 and 9 of the
CPC.
He
submits
that
the
statute
has
provided
for
substitution of the legal heirs of the deceased plaintiff in a
suit or otherwise for abetment of the suit against that plaintiff
or his legal heirs. According to him this is the only statutory
and legal way to introduce legal heirs of deceased plaintiff in
a suit, that is by way of substitution in place of their
predecessor-in-interest. That, if the legal heirs cannot be
introduced by way of substitution, in place of their deceased
predecessor, there is no other way in accordance with the law
to do the same. Hence, according to him the impugned order
is misconceived and illegal.
(11)
Mr. Dash learned advocate for the petitioners has relied on a
judgment of this Court in Eden Consultancy Services
Private
Limited
versus
Kerala
State
Electronics
Development Corporation Limited and Others reported at
2026 (1) Indian Civil Cases (Cal), wherein the Court
reiterates the well settled proposition of law that a counterclaim is not maintainable against the co-defendant.
(12)
Mr. Rejaul Alam, learned Senior Advocate has on the contrary
supported the impugned order and stated that the same calls
for no interference by this Court.
(13)
Having regard to the pleadings and the rival submissions as
stated, this Court is of the considered view that the Trial
Court fell into an error of law in invoking Order I Rule 10 of
the Code, for bringing the legal heirs of the deceased 2nd
plaintiff on record as party-defendants. The scheme of the
Code makes a clear distinction between substitution of the
legal representatives of a deceased party and addition of a
person as a party in a pending suit. The former is specifically
governed by Order XXII. In the case of a deceased plaintiff,
Order XXII Rule 3 provides the statutory mechanism for
bringing his legal representatives on record where the right to
sue survives; and sub-rule (2) expressly contemplates
abatement of the suit, so far as the deceased plaintiff is
concerned, where no such application is made within the
period prescribed by law. The statutory scheme thus contains
a complete mechanism governing the consequence of death of
a plaintiff and the manner in which his legal representatives
may continue the proceeding.
(14)
The power under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC, which is
intended
to
secure
the
presence
participation
is
necessary
adjudication
of
the
for
controversy,
of
a
effective
cannot
person
and
whose
complete
ordinarily
be
employed as a substitute for the specific machanism of
substitution prescribed under Order XXII. The two provisions
operate in different fields and upon different juridical
situations. The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that
a specific statutory procedure governing substitution cannot
be circumvented by resort to a general provision relating to
impleadment.
The
present
case,
therefore,
has
to
be
examined primarily within the framework of Order XXII Rules
3 and 9 of CPC, and not by treating Order I Rule 10 of the
Code as an alternative route for introducing the heirs of the
deceased plaintiff into the suit.
(15)
The record itself discloses that, after the death of the 2nd
plaintiff, his legal heirs did not come forward to be
substituted in his place as plaintiffs. The distinction assumes
still greater significance in the peculiar factual setting of the
present case. The legal heirs of the deceased 2nd plaintiff are
not persons whose presence is shown to be indispensable
merely because they happen to succeed to the estate of the
deceased. The law itself recognises the consequence where
the legal representatives do not seek substitution: the
proceeding may abate, so far as the deceased plaintiff is
concerned, subject of course to the statutory provisions
governing setting aside of abatement. The Court cannot, by
invoking Order I Rule 10 of CPC, convert persons who have
declined to continue the proceeding in the capacity of
plaintiffs, into defendants against whom the contesting
defendants are thereafter compelled to litigate. Such an
approach would effectively permit the general power of
impleadment to override the structured and well defined
provisions
of
Order
XXII
of
CPC.
The
principle
that
procedural provisions must be construed harmoniously and
that a general procedural power cannot be utilised to defeat
or circumvent a specific statutory mechanism are too well
settled and of particular relevance in this case.
(16)
In the present suit, the petitioners/defendants have already
filed their respective counter-claims and the plaintiffs have
filed written statements in answer thereto. The counterclaims thus constitute an integral part of the adjudicatory
field of the suit. Order VIII Rule 6A of the CPC permits a
defendant to set up, by way of counter-claim, a claim against
the plaintiff in respect of a cause of action accruing to the
defendant. The Supreme Court in Rohit Singh v. State of
Bihar reported in (2006) 12 SCC 734, authoritatively held
that although a counter-claim may be founded upon a cause
of action different from that of the original suit, it must
necessarily be directed against the plaintiff; a counter-claim
directed solely against a co-defendant is not maintainable.
The principle has not merely survived but has been
emphatically reiterated by the Supreme Court in Rajul Manoj
Shah alias Rajeshwari Rasiklal Sheth v. Kiranbhai
Shakrabhai Patel, at 2025 INSC 1109, and again in
Sanjay Tiwari v. Yugal Kishore Prasad Sao, at 2025
INSC 1310, where the Supreme Court held that a counterclaim under Order VIII Rule 6A CPC cannot be converted into
a claim exclusively against a co-defendant and that such a
counter-claim cannot survive.
(17)
The aforesaid principle has a direct bearing upon the
impugned order in this case. If the legal heirs of the deceased
2nd plaintiff are converted into party-defendants merely
because they are the heirs of the deceased plaintiff, the
defendants' existing counter-claims would, to that extent, be
deprived of their statutory foundation, since the persons
against whom the counter-claims are intended to operate
would cease to occupy the position of plaintiffs and would
become co-defendants. The consequence would not be a mere
alteration in the nomenclature of parties; it would materially
and in all likelihood, prejudicially affect a substantive
procedural right already exercised by the petitioners under
Order VIII Rule 6A of the CPC. The Court cannot adopt an
interpretation of Order I Rule 10 of the Code which, as an
incidental consequence, destroys or renders infructuous a
right which the Code itself confers upon a defendant. The
procedural law is not intended to operate in such a manner
that one provision is invoked to nullify the substantive
procedural consequences flowing from another.
(18)
The recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Sanjay Tiwari
versus Yugal Kishore Prasad Sao & others reported at
2025 INSC 1310, is particularly instructive in this regard.
There, the Supreme Court rejected the reasoning that
impleadment of additional defendants and permitting a
counter-claim against a co-defendant could be justified on
the ground of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings. The Court
reaffirmed that the statutory scheme of Order VIII Rule 6A
CPC cannot be enlarged by judicial ingenuity so as to permit
a counter-claim against a co-defendant. The same doctrinal
discipline must operate in the present case in the reverse
situation: that Order I Rule 10 of the CPC cannot be
employed in a manner which changes the status of a person
from plaintiff to co-defendant and thereby defeats a counterclaim which is otherwise directed against the plaintiff.
Procedural convenience or an apprehension of multiplicity of
proceedings cannot furnish a justification for defeating an
express statutory scheme.
(19)
The expression “necessary party” has a
specific legal
meaning. A person is not to be impleaded as a necessary
party merely because he or she may have some interest in the
subject
matter.
The
necessity
must
arise
from
the
requirement of an effective and complete adjudication of the
controversy in the suit. Here, the Code itself supplies the
consequence where the legal representatives of a deceased
plaintiff do not seek substitution. If they are uninterested in
prosecuting the claim of their deceased predecessor and the
law permits the suit to abate so far as that plaintiff is
concerned, their presence as defendants cannot be treated as
imperative merely to ensure that every person having a
possible interest in the estate, is physically before the Court.
The jurisdiction under Order I Rule 10 CPC is discretionary
and procedural; it cannot be exercised mechanically or
merely because the proposed parties are legal heirs.
(20)
The principle underlying Order I Rule 10 of CPC is effective
adjudication, not compulsory enlargement of the array of
parties at the expense of an existing statutory right. The
Court must therefore examine not merely whether the
proposed party has some conceivable interest in the subject
matter, but whether his presence is indispensable for
granting an effective and complete adjudication of the dispute
actually brought before the Court. In the present case, that
test is not satisfied in the manner contemplated by the
impugned order. The legal heirs did not seek to continue the
deceased plaintiff's cause in accordance with Order XXII; the
surviving plaintiffs sought to introduce them as defendants;
and, more importantly, such conversion would directly
prejudice the counter-claims already instituted by the
contesting defendants. The circumstances therefore do not
justify exercise of the discretionary power under Order I Rule
10 of the Code.
(21)
The error committed by the Trial Court is thus not merely one
of procedural form. The
Court has misconstrued the
relationship between Order XXII and Order I Rule 10 of the
Code and has failed to appreciate the legal consequences of
converting the legal representatives of a deceased plaintiff
into co-defendants in a suit, in which counter-claims have
already been filed against the plaintiff. The statutory
mechanism of substitution cannot be displaced by resort to
Order I Rule 10 of the Code; the consequence of nonsubstitution, where applicable, is governed by Order XXII of
CPC; and the status of the parties cannot be altered in a
manner which defeats the operation of Order VIII Rule 6A of
CPC. The impugned order, if permitted to stand, would
produce precisely such a consequence and would effectively
defeat the petitioners' counter-claims by a procedural device,
which the Code does not contemplate. The Supreme Court’s
judgments in Rajul Manoj Shah (supra), Sanjay Tiwari
(supra)
and
Rohit
Singh
(supra)
are
decisive
and
authoritative, in this aspect.
(22)
In such circumstances, the finding of the Trial Court that the
legal heirs of the deceased 2nd plaintiff ought to be added as
party-defendants under Order I Rule 10 CPC cannot be
sustained. The impugned order, to the extent it allows the
application under Order I Rule 10 of the Code and directs
addition of the legal heirs of deceased 2nd plaintiff, as partydefendants,
has
been
rendered
upon
an
erroneous
construction and application of the relevant provisions of the
Code and has occasioned serious prejudice to the petitioners
in respect of their pending counter-claims. The said portion of
the order, therefore, calls for interference in exercise of the
revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
(23)
Accordingly, the revisional application succeeds. The portion
of the impugned order dated October 29, 2025, passed by the
Civil Judge, Senior Division, 2nd Court at Contai, in Title
Suit No. 16 of 2016, whereby the application under Order I
Rule 10 of the Code has been allowed and the legal heirs of
deceased 2nd plaintiff have been directed to be added as
party-defendants, is hereby set aside. The Trial Court shall
proceed with the suit in accordance with law, bearing in mind
the statutory consequences flowing from Order XXII of CPC
and without permitting the array of parties to be altered in a
manner inconsistent with the petitioners' rights in their
pending counter-claims.
(24)
The instant revision No. CO 4187 of 2025 is allowed and
disposed of.
(25)
Urgent certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite
formalities.
(Rai Chattopadhyay, J.)
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