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2026:HHC:41118
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 558 of 2026
Reserved on: 17.09.2026
Date of Decision: 24.09.2026.
Rajender Singh
...Petitioner
Versus
Shriram Transport Finance Company Ltd.
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr R.S.Chandel, Advocate.
For the Respondent
:
Nemo
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revision is directed against the judgment
dated 18.08.2026, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Shimla,
District Shimla, H.P. (learned appellate Court), vide which the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 07.10.2025,
passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate-Shimla, District
Shimla, H.P. (learned trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:41118
hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed
before the learned trial Court for convenience).
2.
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the complainant filed a complaint against the
accused before the learned Court for the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act (NI Act). It was asserted that the complainant is
engaged in the business of financing heavy commercial vehicles
on hire-purchase agreement and on a lease basis. The accused
approached the complainant for financing of the vehicle bearing
registration No. HP-63B-1173, Mahindra Bolero (Maxi truck).
The complainant sanctioned a loan of ₹ 2,60,000/- in favour of
the accused. The accused was to pay ₹2,60,000/- as the
principal amount and ₹1,38,632/- as finance charges and
interest on the loan amount. This amount was repayable in 47
monthly instalments. The accused defaulted in the payment of
the instalments. When the complainant demanded the money
from the accused, the accused issued a cheque of ₹2,60,000/- to
the complainant to discharge his liability. The complainant
presented the cheque, but it was dishonoured with an
endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. The complainant sent a legal
2026:HHC:41118
notice to the accused asking him to repay the money. The notice
was duly served upon the accused, but the accused failed to
repay the money. Hence, the complaint was filed for taking
action against the accused as per the law.
3.
The Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of
accusation was put on him, to which he pleaded not guilty and
claimed to be tried.
4.
The complaint examined Vikas Chandel (CW-1) to
prove the complaint.
5.
The accused, in his statement recorded under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), stated that
his bank security cheque was misused. He has no liability
towards the complainant. He examined himself (DW-1) and
Suresh Sharma (DW2).
6.
Learned trial Court held that the issuance of the
cheque was not disputed. The accused admitted that he had
taken the loan from the complainant. He claimed that an amount
of ₹70,000/- was due, which was realised by the sale of his
vehicle; however, this claim was not proved. The cheque carried
with it a presumption that it was issued for consideration to
2026:HHC:41118
discharge the debt/liability. The accused failed to produce any
receipts of the repayment of the loan amount. His statement
that the vehicle was seized was also not proved. Hence, the
learned trial court convicted the accused of the commission of
an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and
sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for one year
and pay a compensation of ₹4,10,000/- to the complainant.
7.
Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by
the learned trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was
decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Shimla District, Shimla,
H.P. (learned Appellate Court). The learned appellate court
concurred with the findings recorded by the learned trial Court
that the issuance of the cheque was not disputed, and a
presumption would arise that the cheque was issued for
consideration to discharge the debt/liability. The accused failed
to rebut the presumption. The plea taken by him that he had
repaid the loan or that the vehicle was seized was not proved on
record. The evidence produced by the accused was not sufficient
to rebut the presumption. The complaint was not barred by
limitation as the loan was repayable within 47 months. The
statement of account showed that the accused was a persistent
2026:HHC:41118
defaulter. The cheque was dishonoured with an ednorsment
insufficient funds. The notice was served upon the accused, but
the accused failed to repay the money. Hence, the learned trial
Court had rightly convicted the accused. The sentence imposed
by the learned Court was adequate, and no interference was
required with it. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
8.
Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed
by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present
revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in
appreciating the material on record. It was wrongly held that the
amount would become payable on the last scheduled instalment.
A period of 3 years has been provided for recovery of the amount
commencing from the date of default. The creditor cannot
present the cheque after the expiry of the period of limitation.
The plea taken by the accused regarding the repayment of the
loan and repossession of the vehicle was highly probable, and
learned Courts below erred in rejecting this plea. Therefore, it
was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the
judgments and order passed by the learned courts below be set
aside.
2026:HHC:41118
9.
Mr R.S. Chandel, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the loan was taken in the year 2012, as per the
complaint, and the cheque was issued in the year 2019.
Therefore, the cheque was issued towards the payment of timebarred debt, and no action lies based on a cheque to pay timebarred debt. The signature of the accused is in Hindi in black
pen, and the cheque was filled in English with blue pen, which
makes it highly probable that the cheque was issued as a security
cheque and was misused by the complainant. The complainant
asserted in para 11 that the cause of action had arisen on
18.07.2019,
when
the
complainant
received
information
regarding the dishonour of the cheque, and the complaint was
filed on 28.09.2019, which is barred by limitation. The
complainant had repossessed the vehicle and sold it. The
amount was not adjusted. The learned Courts below had not
appreciated these aspects. Therefore, he prayed that the present
revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the
learned Courts below be set aside. He relied on the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay vs. Laxman & Anr. 2013(3)
SCC 86, in support of his submission.
2026:HHC:41118
10.
I
have
given
a
considerable
thought
to
the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records
carefully.
11.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1485, that a
revisional court does not act as an appellate court and it can only
determine the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings
and sentence recorded by the lower court. It was observed: “7. Before parting, we would like to accentuate the
revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts and the
contours and inherent limits while exercising powers as a
revisional authority. Section 397 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 (now, Section 438 of Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) encapsulates the power
of High Courts and Sessions Courts to examine the
correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by
an inferior criminal court. The said Section is extracted as
hereunder:
“438. Calling for records to exercise powers of
revision.—(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge
may call for and examine the record of any proceeding
before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or
his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself
or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety
of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed,
and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such
inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record,
direct that the execution of any sentence or order be
suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that
he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending
the examination of the record.
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Explanation. —All Magistrates, whether Executive
or Judicial, and whether exercising original or
appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to
the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection
and of section 439.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section
(1) shall not be exercised in relation to any
interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial
or other proceeding.
(3) If an application under this section has been
made by any person either to the High Court or to the
Sessions Judge, no further application by the same
person shall be entertained by the other of them.”
Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction
should be exercised within the four corners of this section
whenever there has been miscarriage of justice. However,
while exercising power under this section, the Court does
not act as an appellate Court and therefore, while
considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a
finding or a conclusion, the revisional court does not and
should not dwell upon the facts and the evidence of the
case as an appellate Court. The court, in revision,
considers the material only to satisfy itself about the
correctness, legality and propriety of the findings,
sentence and order recorded by the lower court, and
should refrain from substituting its conclusion on an
elaborate consideration of evidence, and the findings of
the lower courts should not be reversed merely on the
ground that an alternative view is possible on the facts of
the case. In this case, such a position did not also emanate
from the evidence on record.
7.1. This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan
Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659: 2004 SCC (Cri)
2003, observed that the High Court, in exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth
roving re-examination of the oral evidence and medical
evidence and come to a conclusion contrary to the
consistent one reached by two courts below. In the facts
2026:HHC:41118
of the present case, in the impugned judgment, the High
Court gravely erred in upsetting the concurrent findings
of conviction of the trial court and the Appellate Court by
substituting its own conclusions and reasoning on the
merits of the case and thereby erred in setting aside the
well-reasoned and correct judgment and orders of the
trial and appellate courts.
7.2. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order
dated 06.10.2023, it is apparent that the High Court went
into great detail into each of the testimonies, documents
and merits of the case which could have been avoided,
especially when the subject matter had come under its
revisional jurisdiction. Instead, acting as an appellate
Court, the High Court deemed it fit to go into the merits of
the case, something which is generally impermissible
unless a glaring contradiction is apparent on the face of
the record. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath
Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri)
275, while considering the scope of the revisional
jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down
the following:
“5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court
can call for and examine the record of any proceedings
for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding,
sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is
one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High
Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the
said revisional power cannot be equated with the
power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even
as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily,
therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High
Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own
conclusion on the same when the evidence has already
been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the
Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is
brought to the notice of the High Court which would
otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of
justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the
2026:HHC:41118
High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no
hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the High
Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the
conviction of the Respondent by reappreciating the
oral evidence. …”
7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction
have been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court
wherein time and again it has been observed that the
High Court shall not interfere with the orders of the lower
court unless:
i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse,
grossly erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or
wholly unreliable or untenable in law.
ii. The lower court has passed the impugned order
after considering immaterial or irrelevant material
or no material at all.
iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant
material or the judicial discretion has been
exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.
7.4. This Court, in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025
INSC 1158, in similar facts and circumstances wherein the
High Court had reversed concurrent findings of
conviction under Section 138 of NI Act, while setting aside
the impugned order, observed as under:
“27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional
jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of
perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. This
Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional
Court to reanalyse and re-interpret the evidence on
record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales &
Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH,
(2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of
law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if
a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction,
in the absence of a jurisdictional error.
28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in
the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High
2026:HHC:41118
Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to
upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and
the Sessions Court.”
7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High
Court has failed to highlight any reason or material
satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring
contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the
record so as to justify the exercise of the powers under
revisional jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering
with the judgment and orders of the courts below.
Therefore, the present appeal has to be allowed by setting
aside the impugned order of the High Court. In view of the
aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the High
Court committed an error in setting aside the order of
conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No
sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court
in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional
jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction.
12.
The ingredients of the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were explained in
Kuntegowda (supra) as under:
5.3. At this juncture, it is pertinent to highlight the key
ingredients as highlighted by this Court in the case of
Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Pennar Peterson Securities
Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 745; 2000 SCC (Cri) 546: (2000) 100
COMP CAS 755.
“10. On a reading of the provisions of Section 138 of
the NI Act, it is clear that the ingredients which are to
be satisfied for making out a case under the provision
are:
(i) a person must have drawn a cheque on an
account maintained by him in a bank for
payment of a certain amount of money to
another person out of that account for the
discharge of any debt or other liability;
2026:HHC:41118
(ii) that cheque has been presented to the bank
within a period of six months from the date on
which it is drawn or within the period of its
validity, whichever is earlier;
(iii) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid,
either because the amount of money standing to
the credit of the account is insufficient to
honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount
arranged to be paid from that account by an
agreement made with the bank;
(iv) the payee or the holder in due course of the
cheque makes a demand for the payment of the
said amount of money by giving a notice in
writing to the drawer of the cheque, within 15
days of the receipt of information by him from
the bank regarding the return of the cheque as
unpaid;
(v) the drawer of such cheque fails to make
payment of the said amount of money to the
payee or the holder in due course of the cheque
within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice.
11. If the aforementioned ingredients are satisfied,
then the person who has drawn the cheque shall be
deemed to have committed an offence. In the
explanation to the section, clarification is made that
the phrase “debt or other liability” means a legally
enforceable debt or other liability.
5.4. The ingredients of the offence under Section 138 are
as follows:
i. The drawing of a cheque by a person on an account
maintained by him with the banker for the payment
of any amount of money to another from that
account.
ii. The cheque being drawn for the discharge in whole
or in part of any debt or other liability.
2026:HHC:41118
iii. Presentation of the cheque to the bank within the
period of six months or within the period of its
validity.
iv. The return of the cheque by the drawee bank as
unpaid either because the amount of money
standing to the credit of that account is insufficient
to honour the cheque or because it exceeds the
amount arranged to be paid from that account.
v. A notice by the payee or the holder in due course
making a demand for the payment of the amount to
the drawer of the cheque within thirty days of the
receipt of information from the bank in regard to
the return of the cheque.
vi. Failure of the drawer of the cheque to make
payment of the amount of money to the payee or
the holder in due course within fifteen days of the
receipt of the notice.
vii. Filing of the complaint within a month from the
date of expiry of the grace period of fifteen days
before a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial
Magistrate not below first class.
13.
The present revision has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
14.
The accused Rajender Singh (DW-1) admitted his
signatures inside the red circle ‘A’ on the cheque (Ext.C-2/CW1).
He stated in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) that he had issued a signed
blank cheque at the time of taking the loan. Therefore, the
accused has not disputed the issuance of the cheque and his
signatures on the cheque. It was laid down by the Hon'ble
2026:HHC:41118
Supreme Court in Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1275: (2023) 10 SCC 148, that admission of the signatures on the
blank cheque is sufficient to trigger the presumption under the
NI Act. It was observed at page 162:
36. Recently, this Court has gone to the extent of holding
that presumption takes effect even in a situation where
the accused contends that a blank cheque leaf was
voluntarily signed and handed over by him to the
complainant. [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar [Bir Singh v.
Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309:
(2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40] ]. Therefore, mere admission of the
drawer's signature, without admitting the execution of
the entire contents of the cheque, is now sufficient to
trigger the presumption.
37. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to
prove that the instrument, say a cheque, was issued by
the accused for discharge of debt, the presumptive device
under Section 139 of the Act helps shift the burden on the
accused. The effect of the presumption, in that sense, is to
transfer the evidential burden on the accused of proving
that the cheque was not received by the Bank towards the
discharge of any liability. Until this evidential burden is
discharged by the accused, the presumed fact will have to
be taken to be true, without expecting the complainant to
do anything further.
15.
It was held in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025
SCC OnLine SC 2069, that the admission of signatures on the
cheque will attract the presumption. It was observed:
“ONCE EXECUTION OF A CHEQUE IS ADMITTED,
PRESUMPTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF THE NI
ACT ARISE
2026:HHC:41118
15. In the present case, the cheque in question has
admittedly been signed by the Respondent No. 1-Accused.
This Court is of the view that once the execution of the
cheque is admitted, the presumption under Section 118 of
the NI Act that the cheque in question was drawn for
consideration and the presumption under Section 139 of
the NI Act that the holder of the cheque received the said
cheque in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or
liability arise against the accused. It is pertinent to
mention that observations to the contrary by a two-Judge
Bench in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde,
(2008) 4 SCC 54, have been set aside by a three-Judge
Bench in Rangappa (supra).
16. This Court is further of the view that by creating this
presumption, the law reinforces the reliability of cheques
as a mode of payment in commercial transactions.
17. Needless to mention that the presumption
contemplated under Section 139 of the NI Act is
rebuttable. However, the initial onus of proving that the
cheque is not in discharge of any debt or other liability is
on the accused/drawer of the cheque [See: Bir Singh v.
Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197].
16.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Kuntegowda (supra) that a statutory presumption arises on the
admission or proof of the execution of the negotiable
instrument, and the burden is upon the accused to rebut this
presumption. It was observed:
5.7. A conjoint and harmonious reading of the aforesaid
provisions clearly indicates towards the statutory
presumption that every negotiable instrument was made
or drawn for consideration and that it was executed for
discharge of debt or liability once the execution of the
negotiable instrument is either proved or admitted. As
soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove
2026:HHC:41118
that the instrument was executed by the drawer, the rules
of presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act
help him and shift the burden of rebutting the said
presumptions upon the said drawer. Since these
presumptions are rebuttable, the accused has the burden
of disproving the same by leading evidence, either direct
or indirect, to the effect that there did not exist any
consideration or debt or that the non-existence of the
said debt or consideration is so probable that a prudent
man ought to suppose that no consideration or debt
existed. However, a bare denial of the passing of any
consideration or existence of any debt does not support
the defence of the accused and, therefore, to disprove the
presumptions, something which is probable has to be
brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted
back to the complainant. The accused has to bring on
record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration
of which the court may either believe that the
consideration and the debt did not exist or their nonexistence was so probable that a prudent man would,
under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea
that it did not exist.
17.
The accused admitted that he had taken a loan of
₹3,00,000/-from
the
complainant.
Thus,
the
transaction
between the parties is not disputed. The accused claimed that he
had returned a substantial amount and he was to pay ₹70,000/to the complainant. He stated in his cross-examination that he
could not produce any receipt regarding the repayment of the
loan. He volunteered to say that the company officials used to
collect the cash amount from him and no receipts were issued to
2026:HHC:41118
him. He stated that he had not made any complaint regarding
the non-issuance of the receipt.
18.
The cross-examination of the accused makes his
version highly doubtful that he had deposited a substantial
amount of the loan. His plea that no receipts were issued by him
is not believable. He had taken a loan and was paying the loan
instalments to the company. He was aware of the fact that not
taking the receipt would not result in the reduction of the loan
amount. He had not protested regarding the non-issuance of the
receipt, which is cannot be accepted.
19.
Suresh Sharma (DW2) stated that the complainant
used to come to the village of the accused for taking payment of
the instalment. The company had taken the pickup vehicle of the
accused and sold it for ₹2,85,000/-. He stated in his crossexamination that 3 or 4 instalments were paid in his presence,
but he was not aware of the amount or the name of the person to
whom the payment was made. He claimed that the officials had
taken the vehicle in the year 2020 or 2021.
20.
Therefore, Suresh Sharma has also stated about the
payment of 3 or 4 instalments by the accused. It was suggested
to the accused in his cross-examination that the accused had
2026:HHC:41118
paid only 5 instalments, showing that even the company is not
disputing the receipt of the 5 instalments. Therefore, learned
Courts below had rightly discarded the defence taken by the
accused that he had deposited a substantial part of the loan.
21.
The accused claimed that his vehicle bearing
registration no. HP 63B-1173 was seized and sold by the
company for ₹2,85,000/-. He stated in his cross-examination
that he had not participated in the auction of the vehicle, which
shows that the auction was not conducted in his presence. He
has not explained how he found out that the vehicle was sold for
₹ 2,85,000/-. Suresh Sharma (DW2) has not stated anything
about the sale of the vehicle. Hence, the plea taken by the
accused that the complainant had repossessed the accused
vehicle and sold it for ₹ 2,85,000/- is not proved.
22.
It was submitted that the cheque was issued in the
year 2019, whereas the loan was taken in the year 2014;
therefore, the cheque was towards a time-barred loan. The
learned Appellate Court had rightly pointed out that the loan was
to be repaid in 47 monthly instalments. The first instalment was
due on 20.01.2015, and the last instalment was due on 20.11.2018.
The cheque was issued on 12.07.2019, within 8 months of the
2026:HHC:41118
date of the last payment. Therefore, the cheque cannot be said to
be barred by the limitation.
23.
It was submitted that the cheque was issued as a
security, which is apparent from the fact that the handwriting in
the body of the cheque is different from the signatures. This
submission will not help the petitioner/accused. It was laid down
by this Court in Hamid Mohammad Versus Jaimal Dass 2016 (1)
HLJ 456 that the accused is liable for the dishonour of the cheque
even if the cheque is issued towards security. It was observed:
“9. Submission of learned Advocate appearing on behalf
of the revisionist that the cheque in question was issued
to the complainant as security, and on this ground, the
criminal revision petition is rejected as being devoid of
any force for the reasons hereinafter mentioned. As per
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, if any
cheque is issued on account of other liability, then the
provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881 would be attracted. The court has perused the
original cheque, Ext. C-1 dated 30.10.2008, placed on
record. There is no recital in the cheque, Ext. C-1, that the
cheque was issued as a security cheque. It is well-settled
law that a cheque issued as security would also come
under the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881. See 2016 (3) SCC page 1 titled Don
Ayengia v. State of Assam & another. It is well-settled law
that where there is a conflict between former law and
subsequent law, then subsequent law always prevails.”
24.
It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao vs. Indian Renewable Energy
2026:HHC:41118
Development Agency Limited, 2016(10) SCC 458, that issuing a
cheque toward security will also attract the liability for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI
Act. It was observed: “10. We have given due consideration to the submission
advanced on behalf of the appellant as well as the
observations of this Court in Indus Airways Private Limited
versus Magnum Aviation Private Limited (2014) 12 SCC 53
with reference to the explanation to Section 138 of the Act
and the expression “for the discharge of any debt or other
liability” occurring in Section 138 of the Act. We are of the
view that the question of whether a post-dated cheque is
for “discharge of debt or liability” depends on the nature
of the transaction. If, on the date of the cheque, liability or
debt exists or the amount has become legally recoverable, the
Section is attracted and not otherwise.
11. Reference to the facts of the present case clearly shows
that though the word “security” is used in clause 3.1(iii)
of the agreement, the said expression refers to the
cheques being towards repayment of instalments. The
repayment becomes due under the agreement the
moment the loan is advanced, and the instalment falls
due. It is undisputed that the loan was duly disbursed on
28th February 2002, which was prior to the date of the
cheques. Once the loan was disbursed and instalments
had fallen due on the date of the cheque as per the
agreement, the dishonour of such cheques would fall
under Section 138 of the Act. The cheques undoubtedly
represent the outstanding liability.
12. Judgment in Indus Airways (supra) is clearly
distinguishable. As already noted, it was held therein that
liability arising out of a claim for breach of contract under
Section 138, which arises on account of dishonour of a
cheque issued, was not by itself at par with a criminal
liability towards discharge of acknowledged and admitted
2026:HHC:41118
debt under a loan transaction. Dishonour of a cheque
issued for the discharge of a later liability is clearly
covered by the statute in question. Admittedly, on the
date of the cheque, there was a debt/liability in praesenti
in terms of the loan agreement, as against the case of
Indus Airways (supra), where the purchase order had been
cancelled, and a cheque issued towards advance payment
for the purchase order was dishonoured. In that case, it
was found that the cheque had not been issued for the
discharge of liability but as an advance for the purchase
order, which was cancelled. Keeping in mind this fine, but
the real distinction, the said judgment cannot be applied
to a case of the present nature, where the cheque was for
repayment of a loan instalment which had fallen due,
though such a deposit of cheques towards repayment of
instalments was also described as “security” in the loan
agreement. In applying the judgment in Indus Airways
(supra), one cannot lose sight of the difference between a
transaction of the purchase order which is cancelled and
that of a loan transaction where the loan has actually
been advanced, and its repayment is due on the date of
the cheque.
13. The crucial question to determine the applicability of
Section 138 of the Act is whether the cheque represents
the discharge of existing enforceable debt or liability, or
whether it represents an advance payment without there
being a subsisting debt or liability. While approving the
views of different High Courts noted earlier, this is the
underlying principle as can be discerned from the
discussion of the said cases in the judgment of this
Court.” (Emphasis supplied)
25.
This position was reiterated in Sripati Singh v. State of
Jharkhand, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1002: AIR 2021 SC 5732, and it was
held that a cheque issued as security is not waste paper and a
2026:HHC:41118
complaint under section 138 of the NI Act can be filed on its
dishonour. It was observed:
“17. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial
transaction cannot be considered a worthless piece of
paper under every circumstance. 'Security' in its true
sense is the state of being safe, and the security given for
a loan is something given as a pledge of payment. It is
given, deposited or pledged to make certain the fulfilment
of an obligation to which the parties to the transaction are
bound. If, in a transaction, a loan is advanced and the
borrower agrees to repay the amount in a specified
timeframe and issues a cheque as security to secure such
repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any other
form before the due date or if there is no other
understanding or agreement between the parties to defer
the payment of the amount, the cheque which is issued as
security would mature for presentation and the drawee of
the cheque would be entitled to present the same. On such
a presentation, if the same is dishonoured, the
consequences contemplated under Section 138 and the
other provisions of the NI Act would flow.
18. When a cheque is issued and is treated as 'security'
towards repayment of an amount with a time period being
stipulated for repayment, all that it ensures is that such a
cheque, which is issued as 'security ', cannot be presented
prior to the loan or the instalment maturing for
repayment towards which such cheque is issued as
security. Further, the borrower would have the option of
repaying the loan amount or such financial liability in any
other form, and in that manner, if the amount of the loan
due and payable has been discharged within the agreed
period, the cheque issued as security cannot thereafter be
presented. Therefore, the prior discharge of the loan or
there being an altered situation due to which there would
be an understanding between the parties is a sine qua non
to not present the cheque which was issued as security.
These are only the defences that would be available to the
2026:HHC:41118
drawer of the cheque in proceedings initiated under
Section 138 of the NI Act. Therefore, there cannot be a
hard and fast rule that a cheque, which is issued as
security, can never be presented by the drawee of the
cheque. If such is the understanding, a cheque would also
be reduced to an 'on-demand promissory note', and in all
circumstances, it would only be civil litigation to recover
the amount, which is not the intention of the statute.
When a cheque is issued even though as 'security ', the
consequence flowing therefrom is also known to the
drawer of the cheque and in the circumstances stated
above, if the cheque is presented and dishonoured, the
holder of the cheque/drawee would have the option of
initiating the civil proceedings for recovery or the
criminal proceedings for punishment in the fact situation,
but in any event, it is not for the drawer of the cheque to
dictate terms with regard to the nature of litigation.”
26.
Therefore, the accused cannot escape from the
liability by taking a plea that he had issued the cheque as
security. It is undisputed that the accused had taken a loan of ₹
3,00,000/- from the complainant. His plea that he had paid a
substantial amount is not proved. Hence, the accused had a
liability of more than ₹ 2,60,000/- and the accused would be
liable for the dishonour of the cheque of ₹ 2,60,000/27.
It was submitted that the accused had not filled the
body of the cheque and the cheque is bad. This submission
cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2
SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309; 2019 SCC OnLine SC 138, that
2026:HHC:41118
a person is liable for the commission of an offence punishable
under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act even if
some other person fills the cheque. It was observed:
“33. A meaningful reading of the provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, including, in particular,
Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply clear that a
person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the payee
remains liable unless he adduces evidence to rebut the
presumption that the cheque had been issued for
payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. It is
immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any
person other than the drawer if the cheque is duly signed
by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal
provisions of Section 138 would be attracted.
34. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a
payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill in the
amount and other particulars. This in itself would not
invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the
accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a
debt or liability by adducing evidence.
35. It is not the case that the respondent accused him of
either signing the cheque or parting with it under any
threat or coercion. Nor is it the case that the respondent
accused that the unfilled signed cheque had been stolen.
The existence of a fiduciary relationship between the
payee of a cheque and its drawer would not disentitle the
payee to the benefit of the presumption under Section 139
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of
evidence of exercise of undue influence or coercion. The
second question is also answered in the negative.
36. Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and
handed over by the accused, which is towards some
payment, would attract presumption under Section 139 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any
cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in
discharge of a debt.”
2026:HHC:41118
28.
This position was reiterated in Oriental Bank of
Commerce v. Prabodh Kumar Tewari, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1089,
wherein it was observed:
“12. The submission, which has been urged on behalf of
the appellant, is that even assuming, as the first
respondent submits, that the details in the cheque were
not filled in by the drawer, this would not make any
difference to the liability of the drawer.
xxxxxx
32. A drawer who signs a cheque and hands it over to the
payee is presumed to be liable unless the drawer adduces
evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque has
been issued towards payment of a debt or in the discharge
of a liability. The presumption arises under Section 139.
29.
Therefore, the cheque is not bad even if it is not filled
in by the drawer.
31.
There is no other evidence to show that the cheque
was not issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability.
Hence, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the
evidence
of
the
accused
was
insufficient
to
rebut
the
presumption attached to the cheque.
32.
Vikas Chandel (CW-1) stated that the cheque was
dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’; the
memo (Ext. C2/CW-1) mentions the reason for dishonour as
‘insufficient funds’ in the account. It was laid down by the
2026:HHC:41118
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. v.
Nimesh B. Thakore, (2010) 3 SCC 83; (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 625; (2010)
2 SCC (Cri) 1; 2010 SCC OnLine SC 155, that the memo issued by the
Bank is presumed to be correct and the burden is upon the
accused to rebut the presumption. It was observed at page 95:
“24. Section 146, making a major departure from the
principles of the Evidence Act, provides that the bank's
slip or memo with the official mark showing that the
cheque was dishonoured would, by itself, give rise to the
presumption of dishonour of the cheque, unless and
until that fact was disproved. Section 147 makes the
offences punishable under the Act compoundable.”
33.
In the present case, the accused did not claim that he
had sufficient funds in his account, and the cheque was wrongly
dishonoured by the bank. Therefore, learned Courts below had
rightly held that the cheque was dishonoured, with an
endorsement ‘funds insufficient’.
34.
Mr Vikash Chandel (CW-1) stated that he had issued
the legal notice (Ext. C-4/CW1), which was served upon the
accused, and acknowledgement (Ext.C-6/CW1) was received by
him. The accused admitted in his cross-examination that the
acknowledgement (Ext.C6/CW-1) bears his signature, which
shows that the notice was served upon the accused.
2026:HHC:41118
35.
In Vijay (supra), a post-dated cheque was issued
which was to be presented after 2 months; however, the
complainant presented the cheque on the same day. Hence, the
omission to mention the date of the loan was held to be material.
In the present case, the accused never claimed that the cheque
was a post-dated cheque and was to be presented after some
time. Therefore, the cited judgment does not apply to the facts of
the present case.
36.
It was submitted that the complaint mentions that
the cause of action accrued to the complainant on 18.07.2019
when the notice of dishonour was received and the complaint is
time-barred. This submission is only stated to be rejected. It was
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vishnoo Mittal v.
Shakti Trading Co., (2025) 9 SCC 417: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 558 that
the cause of action does not arise when the cheque is returned
but only when the accused fails to pay the money within fifteen
days of the receipt of the notice of demand. It was observed at
page 420:
“10. The return of the cheques dishonoured simpliciter
does not create an offence under Section 138 NI Act,
which reads as under:
“138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. of funds
in the account.—Where any cheque drawn by a person
2026:HHC:41118
on an account maintained by him with a banker for
payment of any amount of money to another person
from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or
in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the
bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money
standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to
honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount
arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement
made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to
have committed an offence and shall, without
prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may be
extended to two years, or with fine which may extend
to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall
apply unless—
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank
within a period of six months [Ed.: The period of
“six months” mentioned in Section 138 proviso (a)
remains unchanged as there has been no
amendment in this regard. However, RBI vide
Circular RBI/2011-12/251 DBOD AML BC No.
47/14.01.001/2011-12, dated 4-11-2011, in exercise
of the power under Section 35-A of the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949 has changed the default
period within which a cheque may be presented for
payment, from a period of six months from the date
of the instrument, to a period of only three months
from such date, w.e.f. 1-4-2012. The operative part
of the said Circular reads: “Accordingly, in exercise
of the powers conferred by Section 35-A of the
Banking Regulation Act, 1949, Reserve Bank hereby
directs that w.e.f. 1-4-2012, banks should not make
payment of cheques/drafts/pay orders/banker's
cheques bearing that date or any subsequent date, if
they are presented beyond the period of three
months from the date of such instrument.” The
result is that the impact of the above RBI Circular is
covered by the latter part of proviso (a), namely,
2026:HHC:41118
“or within the period of its validity, whichever is
earlier;” from the date on which it is drawn or
within the period of its validity, whichever is
earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the
cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the
payment of the said amount of money by giving a
notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque,
within thirty days of the receipt of information by
him from the bank regarding the return of the
cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the
payment of the said amount of money to the payee
or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of
the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the
said notice.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,
“debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable
debt or other liability.
Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 NI Act makes it
clear that cause of action arises only when demand notice
is served and payment is not made pursuant to such
demand notice within the stipulated fifteen-day period.
11. This Court in Jugesh Sehgal v. Shamsher Singh Gogi
[Jugesh Sehgal v. Shamsher Singh Gogi, (2009) 14 SCC 683:
(2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 482: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 218] has
explained the ingredients of Section 138 NI Act offence as
follows: (SCC pp. 687-88, para 13)
“13. It is manifest that to constitute an offence under
Section 138 of the Act, the following ingredients are
required to be fulfilled:
(i) a person must have drawn a cheque on an
account maintained by him in a bank for payment of
a certain amount of money to another person from
out of that account;
2026:HHC:41118
(ii) the cheque should have been issued for the
discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other
liability;
(iii) that cheque has been presented to the bank
within a period of six months from the date on
which it is drawn or within the period of its validity,
whichever is earlier;
(iv) that the cheque is returned by the bank unpaid,
either because the amount of money standing to
the credit of the account is insufficient to honour
the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged
to be paid from that account by an agreement made
with the bank;
(v) the payee or the holder in due course of the
cheque makes a demand for the payment of the said
amount of money by giving a notice in writing to
the drawer of the cheque, within 15 days of the
receipt of information by him from the bank
regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid;
(vi) the drawer of such cheque fails to make
payment of the said amount of money to the payee
or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15
days of the receipt of the said notice.
Being cumulative, it is only when all the
aforementioned ingredients are satisfied that the
person who had drawn the cheque can be deemed to
have committed an offence under Section 138 of the
Act.” (emphasis in original)
In other words, the cause of action arises only when the
amount remains unpaid even after the expiry of fifteen
days from the date of receipt of the demand notice.”
37.
Therefore, it was duly proved on record that the
accused had issued a cheque in favour of the complainant to
discharge
the
debt,
which
was
dishonoured,
with
an
endorsement ‘funds insufficient’. The notice was duly served
2026:HHC:41118
upon the accused, and the accused failed to repay the money,
despite the receipt of valid notice of demand. Thus, all the
ingredients of commission of an offence punishable under
Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied and learned trial
Court had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 138 of the N. I. Act.
38.
The learned trial Court had sentenced the accused to
undergo simple imprisonment for 1 year and pay compensation
of ₹4,10,000 /-. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197; (2019) 2 SCC (Cri)
40; (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309; 2019 SCC OnLine SC 138, that the penal
provision of Section 138 is deterrent in nature. It was observed at
page 203:
“6. The object of Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act is to infuse credibility into negotiable
instruments, including cheques, and to encourage and
promote the use of negotiable instruments, including
cheques, in financial transactions. The penal provision of
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is intended
to be a deterrent to callous issuance of negotiable
instruments such as cheques without serious intention to
honour the promise implicit in the issuance of the same.”
39.
Keeping in view the deterrent nature of the
punishment, a sentence of one year cannot be said to be
excessive.
2026:HHC:41118
40.
The accused issued the cheque of ₹2,60,000/- on
12.07.2019; the learned trial courts imposed a sentence on
07.10.2025, after the lapse of about 6 years from the date of
issuance of the cheque. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, (2021) 5 SCC 283:
(2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 25: (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC
75, that the Courts should uniformly levy a fine up to twice the
cheque amount along with simple interest at the rate of 9% per
annum. It was observed at page 291: 19. As regards the claim of compensation raised on behalf
of the respondent, we are conscious of the settled
principles that the object of Chapter XVII of NIA is not
only punitive but also compensatory and restitutive. The
provisions of NIA envision a single window for criminal
liability for the dishonour of a cheque as well as civil
liability for the realisation of the cheque amount. It is also
well settled that there needs to be a consistent approach
towards awarding compensation, and unless there exist
special circumstances, the courts should uniformly levy
fines up to twice the cheque amount along with simple
interest @ 9% p.a. [R. Vijayan v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260,
para 20: (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 79: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 520]”
41.
The complainant was deprived of the interest to
which it would have been entitled, had it advanced the money to
other persons. The complainant had to engage counsel and to
prosecute the complaint before the learned Trial Court; hence,
he was entitled to be compensated for it. Considering all these
2026:HHC:41118
circumstances, the compensation of ₹1,50,000/- on an amount
of ₹2,60,000/- cannot be said to be excessive and no
interference is required with the amount of compensation
awarded by the learned Trial Court.
42.
No other point was urged.
43.
In view of the above, the present revision fails, and it
is dismissed; so also the pending application(s), if any, also
stand disposed of.
44.
The record of the learned Courts below be returned
with a copy of the judgment.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
24th September, 2026
(ravinder)
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