Rajeev Gupta & Ors. vs Prashant Garg & Ors.

Held: Subject suit of the plaintiffs could not have succeeded – Trial court, was right in dismissing the suit – Impugned second appellate judgment and decree of the High Court and the first appellate judgment and decree of the first appellate court, both set aside and that of the trial court restored, dismissing the subject suit – As regards limitation, the limitation period would have to be adjudged from the primary relief of cancellation which is 3 (three) years, and not the ancillary relief of possession which is 12 (twelve) years – Limitation period prescribed for suits seeking cancellation of documents being 3 (three) years, despite the cause of action having arisen in 1992, the plaintiffs chose to institute the suit 11 (eleven) years later, the suit of the plaintiffs having been instituted in 2003, was hopelessly barred by limitation and s.3 of the Limitation Act essentially entails its dismissal – Appellants had been put in possession of the suit property in furtherance of the sale deeds executed by and between third son and the former after the same were registered – Hence, suit seeking declaration of status or right simplicitor would not have sufficed for the plaintiffs since admittedly, they were required to seek further relief – Composite suit seeking cancellation, recovery of possession and injunction is what was required to be instituted, as distinguished from a suit seeking only recovery of possession – Thus, cancellation was the primary relief in the circumstances with recovery of possession being the ancillary relief – Plaintiffs did have knowledge-constructive as well as actual during the pendency of the second suit or soon thereafter of transfer of the suit property in favour of the appellants effected by the third son by way of execution of the sale deeds – It is from such date of knowledge in June, 1992 that the said transfer effectively did invade or jeopardize the plaintiffs’ interest in respect of the suit property – As regards sale deeds being void documents, submission of the plaintiffs that the third son had no right in the property, and being devoid of any ownership rights, was in no position to transfer title of the same to the appellants, and the sale deeds having been executed when an ad-interim injunction order was in operation, the bar in s.52 of the ToP Act would render the sale deeds void ab initio, cannot be accepted – Appellants submission that third son having been portrayed to the world at large as owner, the plaintiffs could not emerge from out of the woodwork to claim a secret title accepted – High Court’s finding that the sale deeds would be rendered void solely on account of the operation of an injunction order has necessarily to be set aside – s.52 of the ToP Act does not ipso facto render a sale transaction as inoperative, it merely subjects it to the outcome of the pending proceedings – Transfer, subject to the result of the suit, could remain valid – There being no proof that the appellants had knowledge of this injunction order, the transaction could not have been declared void ab initio – Thus, the appellants would have be held to be bona fide purchaser for value and, thus, entitled to the benefit of s.41 of the ToP Act – As regards whether the Will stood admitted in the previous suits and was no longer required to be proved, the requirement of proof of a Will in accordance with s.68 is not done away with, even if the Will is not disputed by the opposite party – In light of the vague descriptions about the WILL, it is difficult to accept that there was deemed admission due to non-denial in the first place – Plaintiffs were specifically put on notice by the appellants that they were disputing the WILL – Burden was on the plaintiffs to prove the WILL – List of documents sought to be relied on by the plaintiffs included certified copy of the registered Will of the father but there was no pleading in the plaint as to whether the WILL was lost or misplaced – Certified copy was only sought to be produced – First appellate court proceeded on the basis that the WILL was accepted by the parties to the first and the second suit and, thus, res judicata applied without, however, realising that the appellants were not parties to any of those two suits and neither was there any occasion for them to be bound by any admission or acceptance of the WILL by their predecessor-in-interest nor did the appellants ever make any such admission – Thus, the plaintiffs’ title to the suit property could not have been traced to the WILL of the testator – As regards whether the First Appellate Court was right in decreeing the suit without the plaintiffs seeking relief of declaration/cancellation, the first appellate court acted illegally in the exercise of its jurisdiction in granting relief to the plaintiffs by passing a decree for recovery of possession without there being any decree for declaration of rights/cancellation of deeds – At the stage of exercise of jurisdiction by the appellate court u/s.96 CPC, the plaint in the form it was there before such court was incurably defective and no relief could have been granted to the plaintiffs. [Paras 32-69]

Limitation Act, 1963 – Art.58 and 59 – Meaning of the word “first” under the column ‘Time from which period begins to run’ in Articles 58 and 59 – Interpretation – Explained. [Paras 30-31]