Prahlad Raut vs All India Institute of Medical Sciences

Limitation: Object of – Held: Law of limitation is founded on public policy – Object of limitation is to put a quietus on stale and dead disputes – Person ought not to be allowed to agitate his claim after a long delay – When retiral benefits are withheld without cause, there would be a continuing cause of action – However, when retirement benefits are withheld by way of disciplinary action, the order would necessarily have to be challenged within the period of limitation or alternatively there would have to be sufficient cause for the delay.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 Sub–Section (3) of Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is attracted when there is sufficient cause for the delay in filing an appeal beyond the period of limitation. The finding of the tribunal that the Original Application had been filed within limitation, is patently erroneous and has rightly not been accepted by the High Court. It is well settled that successive representations do not save limitation and certainly does not justify delay of about thirteen years in approaching the tribunal. [Para 27, 28][821-A, C]

1.2 Removal under Rule 19(i) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 entails the consequence of forfeiture of retiral benefits such as pension. The order of 6.01.2000 necessarily had to be challenged before the Tribunal within the period of limitation or alternatively the appellant would have to show sufficient cause for the delay in filing the Original Application beyond the period prescribed by limitation. The question of entitlement, if at all, of the appellant to gratuity and provident fund, notwithstanding his removal by the Memorandum dated 6.01.2000 was neither raised before nor considered by the Tribunal. Nor was the question considered by the High Court. The question cannot be raised at the stage of this appeal. [Para 32][823-E, F]

1.3 The High Court has very rightly taken note of the fact that the first FIR had been quashed pursuant to a settlement between the parties in terms whereof the appellant paid an amount of Rs.2 lakhs and another amount of Rs.2,46,130/– by way of bankers’ cheque, by way of compensation for the loss caused to the Cooperative Society. [Para 34, 35][824-C]

1.4 The order of dismissal dated 6.1.2000 under Rule 19(i)of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1985 was challenged on 2013 after almost 13 years. Even assuming that the appeal was never decided, the cause of action for filing an application before the tribunal would have arisen on expiry of six months from the date of filing the appeal, in view of Section 20(2)(b) of the Act. The application to the tribunal would have to be filed within the period of limitation as prescribed in Section 21(1)(b) of the Act, which would start running from the date of expiry of six months from the date of filing of appeal. The contention of the appellant that the quashing of the first FIR gave rise to afresh cause of action is completely misconceived. The High Court rightly declined to accept the finding of the tribunal that the O.A. was within the period of limitation. [Para 37, 39][824-E-F; 825-B,F]

1.5 The High Court rightly held that the law of limitation is founded on public policy. The object of limitation is to put a quietus on stale and dead disputes. A person ought not to be allowed to agitate his claim after a long delay. There can be no doubt that when retiral benefits are withheld without cause, there would be a continuing cause of action. However, when retirement benefits are withheld by way of disciplinary action, the order would necessarily have to be challenged within the period of limitation or alternatively there would have to be sufficient cause for the delay. Once there is cessation of employer–employee relationship by an order of termination, the cause of action would necessarily arise when the order of termination is passed. The forfeiture of pensionary benefits by reason of a punitive order of termination is not a continuing cause of action. [Para 44][827-E-G]

1.6 It cannot be said that this Court take a sympathetic view of the plight of the appellant considering that the first FIR was quashed and after the conviction pursuant to the second FIR the appellant was released on probation of good conduct after which there was no further complaint against him. The first FIR was quashed pursuant to a settlement between the appellant and the respondent in terms whereof the appellant compensated the pecuniary loss caused by him to the Cooperative Society. The FIR was not quashed on the ground that the same did not disclose any offence or was otherwise frivolous, vexatious or harassive. While under suspension in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings for misconduct related to the first FIR, the appellant committed theft of a bag containing money at a public place for which he was convicted under Section 379 IPC. It cannot be said that absolute penury led him to commit the offence since the appellant was receiving subsistence allowance while under suspension. Any sympathy for the appellant would be completely misplaced. Thus, the judgment and order of the High Court does not call for any interference. [Para 45, 46, 47][827-H; 828-A-D] Sardar Singh v. Union of India (1991) SCC Online P&H 1943; Union of India and Others v. Tarsem Singh (2008) 8 SCC 648 : [2008] 12 SCR 104; Union Bank of India and Others v. C.G. Ajay Babu and Another (2018) 9 SCC 529 : [2018] 9 SCR 995; S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1989) 4 SCC 582 : [1989] 1 Suppl. SCR 43; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Syed Qamarali (1967) 1 SLR 228; State of Punjab and Others vs. Gurdev Singh (1991) 4 SCC 1 : [1991] 3 SCR 663 – referred to.