Pimpri Chinchwad New Township Development Authority vs Vishnudev Cooperative Housing Society & Ors.

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.48 – Land acquired by the State Government for public purpose – After many rounds of litigations, the State partly released the land from acquisition – Original landowners transferred the land to respondent no.1 – Respondent no.1 filed application u/s.48(1) of the Act to Revenue Minister of the State to release remaining portion of land from acquisition – Revenue Minister allowed the application, deleting land in question from acquisition proceedings – Whether the order passed by the Revenue Minister created any right in favour of the landowners so as to enable them to claim mandamus for enforcement of such order against the State – Held: No – A mere noting in the official files of the Government while dealing with any matter pertaining to any person is essentially an internal matter of the Government and carries with it no legal sanctity – So long as the decision based on such internal deliberation is not proved and communicated by the competent authority as per the procedure prescribed in that behalf to the person concerned, such noting does not create any right in favour of the person concerned nor it partake the nature of any legal order so as to enable the person concerned to claim any benefit of any such internal deliberation – Such noting(s) or/and deliberations(s) are always capable of being changed or/and amended or/and withdrawn by the competent authority.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 gives liberty to the State to withdraw from the acquisition of any land “of which possession has not been taken” except in the cases which fall in Section 36. In other words, once the possession of the acquired land is taken, the State has no power to withdraw from the acquisition because as a result of taking over of the possession, the acquired land vests with the State absolutely free from all encumbrances. A fortiori so long as the possession is not taken of the acquired land, the State is at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition either partly or fully depending upon the facts of each case. [Paras 38, 39] [322-F-G]

2. The State did take possession of the acquired land in question as per the test laid down by this Court in Balwant Narayan Bhagde. It can be said so for the following reasons: First, the State gave notice to all the co-owners of the land in question and informed them to remain present at the time of taking possession by the SLAO; Second, out of all the co-owners, two were present at the time of taking possession. It was sufficient compliance; Third, possession was taken in the presence of two witnesses by the SLAO; Fourth, panchanama evidencing taking of the possession was duly signed by the witnesses; Fifth, the name of the State Government was duly entered in the revenue records after obtaining possession as an owner; Sixth, the Government, in turn, handed over the possession of the land to the appellant (PCNTDA); and Seventh, the name of PCNTDA was also entered in the revenue records of the land in question. [Paras 43, 44] [324-C, E-G]

3. Once it is held that the possession of the acquired land was with the State, the land stood vested in the State disentitling the State to release the land from the acquisition proceedings by taking recourse to the provisions of Section 48 of the Act. A fortiori, the then Revenue Minister had no power to deal with the land in question in any manner whatsoever and nor had any power to invoke the provisions of Section 48 of the Act for release of the land in question from the clutches of the acquisition proceedings. [Paras 45, 46] [324-G-H; 325-B]

4.1 The question is whether the order dated 10.06.2004 passed by the then Revenue Minister directing release of the acquired land in question has the attributes of an order within the meaning of Section 48 of the Act or, in other words, whether the order in question created any right in favour of the landowners so as to enable them to claim mandamus for enforcement of such order against the State. [Para 48] [325-C-D]

4.2 The answer to the aforesaid question is “no”. It is for the reasons that First, a mere noting in the official files of the Government while dealing with any matter pertaining to any person is essentially an internal matter of the Government and VISHNUDEV COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY

carries with it no legal sanctity; Second, once the decision on such issue is taken and approved by the competent authority empowered by the Government in that behalf, it is required to be communicated to the person concerned by the State Government. In other words, so long as the decision based on such internal deliberation is not approved and communicated by the competent authority as per the procedure prescribed in that behalf to the person concerned, such noting does not create any right in favour of the person concerned nor it partake the nature of any legal order so as to enable the person concerned to claim any benefit of any such internal deliberation. Such noting(s) or/and deliberation(s) are always capable of being changed or/and amended or/and withdrawn by the competent authority. Third, though Section 48 of the Act, in terms, does not provide that release of the land from any acquisition proceedings is required to be done by issuance of the notification by the State but, having regard to the scheme of the Act, which begins with the process of issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act for acquisition of any land, the release of land from such acquisition is complete only when a notification is issued by the State in that behalf. [Paras 49, 50 and 51] [325-D-H; 326-A]

5. The Revenue Minister, who passed the order dated 10.06.2004, had no power to deal with the matter relating to release of the land in question. He simply usurped the power under Section 48 of the Act, which he never possessed. It was an abuse of exercise of power by him while dealing with the State’s largesse. [Para 54] [327-E]

6.1 That apart, the filing of the writ petition by the landowners itself was an abuse of judicial process. It was for the simple reason that the earlier litigation having ended against the landowners, it was binding on the parties. It prevented the landowners to again raise the same issue. [Para 55] [327-F]

6.2 Indeed, the release of part of the land in landowners’ favour and retention of the remaining land for accomplishing the project vide notification dated 20.08.1994 was in the nature of a bargain. It disentitled the landowners to seek further release of the remaining land. This is apart from the fact that consequent upon obtaining the possession of the land by the State, the release of the remaining land under Section 48 of the Act was otherwise not legally possible. [Para 56] [327-G-H]

6.3 The High Court failed to examine the issues arising in the case in its correct perspective. One cannot, therefore, concur with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court which wrongly upheld the order dated 10.06.2004 passed by the concerned Revenue Minister. [Para 57] [328-A-B] Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat & Ors. (1976) 1 SCC 700 : [1975] Suppl. SCR 250 ;

Shanti Sports Club & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2009) 15 SCC 705 : [2009] 13 SCR 710

– relied on.

State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh AIR 1961 SC

493 : [1961] SCR 371 ; State of Bihar v. Kripalu Shankar (1987) 3 SCC 34 : [1987] 3 SCR 1 ; Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Krishan (1993) 2 SCC 84 : [1993] 1 SCR 269 ; Sethi Auto Service Station v. DDA (2009) 1 SCC 180 : [2008] 14 SCR 598

– referred to.