Pappu Deo Yadav vs Naresh Kumar and Ors.

Held: 1.1 Courts should be mindful that a serious injury not only permanently imposes physical limitations and disabilities but too often inflicts deep mental and emotional scars upon the victim. The attendant trauma of the victim’s having to live in a world entirely different from the one she or he is born into, as an invalid, and with degrees of dependence on others, robbed of complete personal choice or autonomy, should forever be in the judge’s mind, whenever tasked to adjudge compensation claims. Severe limitations inflicted due to such injuries undermine the dignity (which is now recognized as an intrinsic component of the right to life under Article 21) of the individual, thus depriving the person of the essence of the right to a wholesome life which she or he had lived, hitherto. From the world of the able bodied, the victim is thrust into the world of the disabled, itself most discomfiting and unsettling. If courts nit-pick and award niggardly amounts oblivious of these circumstances, there is resultant affront to the injured victim. [Para 22][996-B-D]

1.2 This court has emphasized time and again that “just compensation” should include all elements that would go to place the victim in as near a position as she or he was in, before the occurrence of the accident. Whilst no amount of money or other material compensation can erase the trauma, pain and suffering that a victim undergoes after a serious accident, (or replace the loss of a loved one), monetary compensation is the manner known to law, whereby society assures some measure of restitution to those who survive, and the victims who have to face their lives.[Para 8][977-C-D]

Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Limited (2012) 6 SCC 421 : [2012] 3 SCR 1178 – relied on.

2.1 The factual narrative discloses that the appellant, a 20year-old data entry operator (who had studied up to 12th standard) incurred permanent disability, i.e. loss of his right hand (which was amputated). The disability was assessed to be 89%. However, the Tribunal and the High Court re-assessed the disability to be only 45%, on the assumption that the assessment for compensation was to be on a different basis, as the injury entailed loss of only one arm. This approach is completely mechanical and entirely ignores realities. Whilst it is true that assessment of injury of one limb or to one part may not entail permanent injury to the whole body, the inquiry which the court has to conduct is the resultant loss which the injury entails to the earning or income generating capacity of the claimant. Thus, loss of one leg to someone carrying on a vocation such as driving or something that entails walking or constant mobility, results in severe income generating impairment or its extinguishment altogether. Likewise, for one involved in a job like a carpenter or hairdresser, or machinist, and an experienced one at that, loss of an arm, (more so a functional arm) leads to near extinction of income generation. If the age of the victim is beyond 40, the scope of rehabilitation too diminishes. These individual factors are of crucial importance which are to be borne in mind while determining the extent of permanent disablement, for the purpose of assessment of loss of earning capacity. [Para 13][985-C-F]

2.2 Courts should not adopt a stereotypical or myopic approach, but instead, view the matter taking into account the realities of life, both in the assessment of the extent of disabilities, and compensation under various heads. In the present case, the loss of an arm, resulted in severe income earning impairment upon the appellant. As a typist/data entry operator, full functioning of his hands was essential to his livelihood. The extent of his permanent disablement was assessed at 89%; however, the High Court halved it to 45% on an entirely wrong application of some ‘proportionate’ principle, which was illogical and is unsupportable in law. What is to be seen, is the impact of the injury upon the income generating capacity of the victim. The loss of a limb (a leg or arm) and its severity on that account is to be judged in relation to the profession, vocation or business of the victim; there cannot be a blind arithmetic formula for ready application. The income generating capacity of the appellant was undoubtedly severely affected. Maybe, it is not to the extent of 89%, given that he still has the use of one arm, is young and as yet, hopefully training (and rehabilitating) himself adequately for some other calling. Nevertheless, the assessment of disability cannot be 45%; it is assessed at 65% in the circumstances of this case. [Para 20][995-A-D]

Neerupam Mohan Mathur v. New India Assurance

Company (2013) 14 SCC 15 : [2013] 8 SCR 15; Jakir Hussein v. Sabir (2015) 7 SCC 252 : [2015] 2 SCR 460; Anthony Alias Anthony Swamy v. Managing

Director, K.S.R.T.C (2020) SCC OnLine SC 493; Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343 : [2010] 13 SCR 179; Nagarajappa v. Divisional Manager,

Oriental Insurance Company Limited (2011) 13 SCC

323 : [2011] 6 SCR 70; Syed Sadiq & Ors. v. Divisional Manager, United Insurance Company Limited (2014) 2 SCC 735; Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (2010) 10 SCC 254 : [2010] 11 SCR 857; Mohan Soni v. Ram Avtar Tomar (2012) 2 SCC 267 : [2012] 2 SCR 921; Sandeep Khanduja v. Atul Dande (2017) 3 SCC 351 – relied on.

3. The High Court clearly erred in holding that compensation for loss of future prospects could not be awarded. In addition to loss of future earnings (based on a determination of the income at the time of accident), the appellant is also entitled to compensation for loss of future prospects, @ 40% . There was no justification for the High Court to have read the previous rulings of this court, to exclude the possibility of compensation for future prospects in accident cases involving serious injuries resulting in permanent disablement. Such a narrow reading of Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 860 is illogical, because it denies altogether the possibility of the living victim progressing further in life in accident cases - and admits such possibility of future prospects, in case of the victim’s death. [Paras 12 and 7] Jagdish v. Mohan & Ors. (2018) 4 SCC 571 : [2018] 3 SCR 20; Parminder Singh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (2019) 7 SCC 217 : [2019] 8 SCR 986; K. Suresh v. New IndiaAssurance Co. Ltd. (2012) 12 SCC 274 : [2012]

11 SCR 414; Kajal v. Jagdish Chand (2020) 4 SCC

413 – relied on.

*National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi & Ors. (2017) 16 SCC 860; Anant s/o of Sidheshwar Dukre v. Pratap s/o Zhamnnappa Lamzane & Anr. (2018) 9 SCC 450 : [2018] 10 SCR 11 – referred to.

4. The courts below needlessly discounted the evidence presented by the appellant in respect of the income earned by him. Working in the informal sector as he did, i.e. as a typist/data entry operator in court premises in Delhi, his assertion about earning ` 12,000/- could not be discarded substantially, to the extent of bringing it down to ` 8,000/- per month. Such self employed professionals, it is noticeable, were not obliged to file income tax returns for AY 2011-2012, when no levy existed for anyone earning less than ` 1,60,000/- per annum. If one takes into account contemporary minimum wages for skilled workers (which was in the range of ` 8,500/-) the realistic figure would be ` 10,000/- per month. Adding future prospects at 40%, the income should be taken as ` 14,000 for the purpose of calculation of compensation. Accordingly, this court finds that the compensation payable for the disability of loss of an arm (assessed at 65%) would be ` 19,65,600/- (i.e., ` 14,000/- × 12 × 65% × 18) or Rupees Nineteen lakhs sixty five thousand six hundred only. [Para 21] [996-A]

5. The High Court’s assessment of amounts payable under other heads (such as compensation for medical expenses, compensation for pain and suffering, compensation for special diet and attendant, conveyance charges, loss of amenities and enjoyment of life, disfigurement and loss of income during treatment), do not call for interference. In view of the above conclusions, the impugned judgment is hereby modified; the sum of ` 19,65,600/- shall be substituted in place of the amount of ` 7,77,600/-, considering the enhancement towards loss of earning capacity and future prospects. [Para 23][996-D-F]