Specific Relief Act, 1963 – s. 10 – Specific performance of contract – Appellant (original plaintiff) filed a suit for specific performance of agreement to sale – Respondent no. 1 (original defendant no. 1) admitted the execution of agreement to sell and specifically stated that she is ready and willing to perform her part of contract – Respondent no. 2 holding power of attorney and other respondents disputed the contention of respondent no. 1 on the ground that the agreement was done without cancelling the registered power of attorney and without the knowledge of respondent no. 1 – Trial Court decreed the suit in favour of appellant – High Court set aside the decree passed by the trial Court – On appeal, held: The High Court, was not required to go into the aspect of the execution of the agreement to sell and the payment/receipt of substantial advance sale consideration, once the vendor had specifically admitted the execution of the agreement to sell and receipt of the advance sale consideration; thereafter no further evidence and/or proof was required – High Court has committed a grave error in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court by ignoring the vital facts of the case which are either admitted or proved in the instant case.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Considering the fact that original defendant No.
1 – vendor – original owner admitted the execution of agreement to sell dated 12.04.2005 and even admitted the receipt of substantial advance sale consideration, the Trial Court decreed the suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 12.04.2005. Once the execution of agreement to sell and the payment/receipt of advance substantial sale consideration was admitted by the vendor, thereafter nothing further was required to be proved by the plaintiff – vendee. Therefore, as such the Trial Court rightly decreed the suit for specific performance of agreement to sell. The High Court, was not required to go into the aspect of the execution of the agreement to sell and the payment/receipt of substantial advance sale consideration, once the vendor had specifically admitted the execution of the agreement to sell and receipt of the advance sale consideration; thereafter no further evidence and/or proof was required. [Para 5.2][1010-E-G]
1.2 So far as the sale deeds executed by original defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant Nos. 3 and 4 and the decree passed by the Trial Court that the sale deeds executed by original defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant Nos. 3 and 4 are not binding on defendant No. 1. The High Court has erred in setting aside the decree passed by the Trial Court by observing that as there was no specific relief/prayer of cancellation of sale deeds dated 03.05.2010 executed by the original defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant Nos. 3 and 4, therefore, the Trial Court could not have passed the decree that the said sale deeds are not binding on defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff. As such, there was a lis between the parties in respect to sale deeds dated 03.05.2005 executed by original defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant Nos. 3 and 4 and even specific issues were framed, which on appreciation of evidence were held against defendant Nos. 2 to 4. Therefore, the High Court is not justified in quashing and setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court declaring that sale deeds dated 03.05.2010 are not binding on defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff. [Para 5.3][1010-G-H; 1011-B-E]
1.3 The High Court has set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court on the ground that the relief under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, is a discretionary relief and therefore, in view of the fact that original defendant No. 2 had executed sale deeds in favour of defendant Nos. 3 and 4, the learned Trial Court ought not to have exercised discretion in favour of the plaintiff for passing the decree for specific performance. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case narrated hereinabove and when the learned Trial Court specifically gave the findings that defendant No. 1 – vendor specifically admitted the execution of agreement to sell dated 12.04.2005 in favour of the plaintiff by accepting a substantial advance consideration. The High Court has committed a grave error in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court by ignoring the vital facts of the case which are either admitted or proved in the instant case. [Para 5.8][1013-C-D, F] Lala Durga Parsad and Anr. Vs. Lala Deep Chand and Ors. [1954] SCR 360; Soni Lalji Jetha & Ors. Vs. Soni Kalidas Devchand & Ors., [1967] 1 SCR 873; R.C. Chandiok & Anr. Vs. Chuni Lal Sabharwal & Ors. [1971] 2 SCR 573: AIR 1971 SC 1238; Dwarka
Prasad Singh & Ors. Vs. Harikant Prasad Singh & Ors., [1973] 2 SCR 1064 ; (1973) 1 SCC 179 ; Rathnavathi & Anr. Vs. Kavitha Ganashamdas, [2014] 13 SCR 120 : (2015) 5 SCC 223 – referred to
Vasantha Viswanathan Vs. V.K. Elayalwar, (2001) 8 SCC 133 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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