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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
W.P.(C)No.203 of 2025
No.08121114 Rfn (GD)
Sonvir Singh
S/O-Shri Indrapal Singh
Vill- Rampur Sywali, P.O.- Rampur Sywali,
P.S.- Shlampur, Dist- Bulandshahar,
State- Uttar Pradesh, PIN-203150
….Petitioner(s).
Versus
1. The State of Tripura
Represented by the Comissioner-cum-Secretary
to the Government of Tripura,
Home Department, New Capital Complex,
P.O.- Kunjaban, Agartala, Dist- West Tripura.
2. The Deputy Inspector General of Police (AP),
Government of Tripura,
Agartala West Tripura.
3. The Inspector General of Police (TSR & OPS),
Government of Tripura
Agartala, West Tripura.
4. The Commandant, 3rd Bn TSR,
Kachuchara Ambassa, Dhalai Tripura.
5. The Deputy Commandant, 3rd Bn TSR,
Kachuchara Ambassa, Dhalai Tripura.
For Petitioner(s)
:
….. Respondents.
Mr. Arjun Acharjee, Adv,
Ms. Moon Basu, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Karnajit De, Addl. G.A.
Date of Hearing
:
31.03.2026
Date of delivery of
Judgment and Order :
22.04.2026
Whether fit for
Reporting
YES
:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order
Heard Learned Counsel, Mr. A. Acharjee appearing
on behalf of the petitioner and also heard Learned Additional
G.A., Mr. K. De appearing on behalf of the respondents.
02.
The petitioner has filed the writ petition seeking the
following relief/reliefs:
(i) Issue Rule, calling upon the respondents
and each one of them to show as to why a
writ of certiorari and/or in the nature there
of, shall not be issued.
(ii) ISSUE RULE, calling upon the respondents
and each one of them to show cause as to
why a writ of certiorari and/or in the nature
there of, shall not be issued, for directing the
respondents to reinstate the petitioner in his
service AND for quashing or setting aside the
punishment
order
No.F.DP.06/15/TSR3/S.S/08/18258-86 dated 31.08.2016 and
the
order
vide
No.F.DP.06/15/TSR3/Estt/S.S/08/4876 dated 04.03.2016
(iii) ISSUE NOTICE upon the Respondents
AND Call FOR THE RECORDS appertaining to
the writ petition.”
03.
Taking part in the hearing, Learned Counsel for the
petitioner drawn the attention of the Court that the petitioner
joined as a Rifle Man under TSR vide No.08121114 Rfn (GD)
and was posted at Kachucherra, Dhalai District. He took
holiday from this authority w.e.f. 23.12.2014 to 21.01.2015
but in the meantime, he was involved in a criminal case vide
No.207/2014
in
Salempur
P.S.
under
Section
147/149/302/307/504 of the IPC and also in another criminal
Case vide No.39 of 2015 Salempur P.S. under Section 25 of
Arms Act 1959 and as such he could not join to his duty.
It was further submitted that the petitioner was
arrested in connection with Criminal case No.207 of 2014 along
with others and as such he could not submit his written
statement of defence, nor he could appear before the Inquiry
Authority to contest the departmental proceeding and was
languishing in Salempur District Jail. In the meantime, the
Commandant, 3rd Bnt, TSR started preliminary inquiry against
him as he was unauthorized absent from his duty. Notice was
served for overstaying on leave w.e.f. 22.01.2015. It was
further submitted that the Inquiry Authority had sent notice on
four occasions i.e. on 12.06.2015, 24.06.2015, 03.07.2015 &
25.07.2015 and lastly on 05.08.2015 the petitioner was asked
to appear before the Inquiry Authority. After that O/C,
Salempur P.S. on 22.06.2015 had sent one report to the
Inquiry Authority that the petitioner was detained in District
Jail in Salempur in connection with Crime No.207/14 under
Section 147/148/149/302/307/304B of the IPC. The Inquiry
Authority conducted preliminary inquiry. Thereafter, article of
charges were framed against him. The Inquiry Authority had
sent a letter on 14.12.2015 and requested the Superintendent
of jail Buland Shahar to serve the notice upon the petitioner in
connection with DP No.06 of 2015. After that the Departmental
Authority, i.e. the Commandant, 3rd Bn TSR, on the basis of
Inquiry report passed one provisional dismissal order vide
Memo
04.03.2016
No.F.DP.06/15/TSR-3/Estt/S.S/08/4876
and
asked
the
petitioner
to
dated
submit
his
representation against the proposed punishment within 15
(fifteen) days which was also served upon him and after that
the Departmental Authority passed the final order and imposed
a major penalty of dismissal from service as per Section 12(1)
of the TSR Act, 1983. The operative portion runs as follows:
“Now, therefore, the undersigned being the
Disciplinary Authority, in exercise of power
confers upon the Disciplinary Authority under
section 12(1) of the TSR Act, 1983 impose a
major penalty “Dismissal of Service” under
section 12(1) (J) of the said Act upon
No.08121114 Rfn (GD), Sonvir Singh of ‘D’
Coy, 3rd Bn TSR with immediate effect. The
period of his OSL, w.e.f. 21.01.2015 (AN) to
30.08.2016 is treated as ‘Dies-Non’. His name
is struck off from the strength of 3rd Bn TSR
w.e.f 30.08.2016 (AN).”
It was also submitted that the petitioner thereafter
filed an appeal against the conviction passed by the Trial Court
before High Court of judicature at Allahabad which was
dismissed by the High Court of Allahabad and after that the
petitioner preferred Special Leave to Appeal (Crl) No(s).1824
of 2024 where the Supreme Court of India by order dated
06.02.2025 directed the petitioner to be released on bail. It
was further submitted that challenging the order of dismissal
dated 31.08.2016 the petitioner preferred appeal to the
Departmental
Appellate
Authority
but
according
to
the
petitioner the appeal has not been disposed of and no
communication was made to him by the Department. Hence,
the petitioner filed this writ petition.
Learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of his
contention referred one citation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
of India in Harbanslal Sahnia & Anr. v. Indian Oil Corpn.
Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2003) 2 SCC 107 in para No.7,
Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:
“7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the
remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was
available to the appellants and therefore the writ
petition filed by the appellants was liable to be
dismissed is concerned, suffice it to observe that the
rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of
an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not
one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of
availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court
may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three
contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks
enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii)
where there is failure of principles of natural justice;
or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly
without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is
challenged. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade
Marks [(1998) 8 SCC 1] .) The present case attracts
applicability of the first two contingencies. Moreover,
as noted, the petitioners' dealership, which is their
bread and butter, came to be terminated for an
irrelevant
and
non-existent
cause.
In
such
circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have
been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of
driving them to the need of initiating arbitration
proceedings.”
04.
The State-respondents have contested the writ
petition by filing counter-affidavit. In para Nos.3 to 10 the
State-respondents submitted as under:
“3. That, the petitioner has made a most
misleading statement in para 15 that he had
filed an appeal before the competent
authority for setting aside the order of
dismissal whereas the Petitioner did not file
any such appeal before the competent
Appellate Authority. The petitioner submitted
only a joining application for joining in the
service
and
the
said
application
was
addressed to the Commandant 3rd Bn TSR. It
is pertinent to mention here that The
Commandant 3rd Bn TSR is not the Appellate
authority even. Thus, the Petitioner without
filing appeal as prescribed by the statute
before the Appellate authority has come
directly before the Hon'ble High Court which
is not tenable in the eye of law and hence the
instant case is liable to be dismissed forthwith
4. That, with regard to the statements made
in para 1 of the Writ Petition, I say that, this
is fact that the petitioner is an Indian citizen
as per service record available with the office
of the Commandant, 3rd Battalion TSR and
the address as mentioned in the petition is
tallied with the service record of the
petitioner.
5. That, with regard to statements made in
paragraph 4 of the writ petition, I say that,
the petitioner joined Tripura State Rifles on
28.11.2008 as a Rifleman(GD) against the
existing vacancy in the 12thBn Tripura State
Rifles vide order No.13425-38/F.332/TSR12(IR-VIII)/Estt/2008 dated 15.12.2008. On
completion of his recruitment he underwent
basic training under A. Ch. Rama Rao TSR
Training Centre, R.K Nagar. Thereafter, he
joined 3dBn TSR, Kachucherra on 18.10.2009
on transfer from 12th Bn TSR. His total
service tenure in TSR is 07 years, 01 month &
02 days as on date of issuance of the
dismissal order. Out of which, 01 year 07
months & 10 days is non-qualifying service.
So, his total qualifying service in TSR is 06
years 01 month and 22 days as per service
record.
Copy
of
the
vide
order
No.1342538/F.332/TSR-12(IR-VIII)/Estt/2008 dated
15.12.2008 is annexed hereto and marked as
Annexure R/1.
6. That, with regard to the statements made
in paragraph 5 writ petition, I say that, the
petitioner went on 30(thirty) days commuted
leave on medical ground w.e.f. 23.12.2014 to
21.01.2015 when he was posted in 'D' Coy,
3rd Bn TSR. He was supposed to resume his
duty on 21.01.2015 (AN), but he did not
resume his duty and was on unauthorized
leave without informing the authority w.e.f.
21.01.2015(AN) till the date of dismissal from
the Govt. service. During his leave period, he
was involved with Shlampur P.S Case
No.207/2014
U/S
147/148/149/302/307/504 IPC as reported
to this office by one Shri Omveer Singh, S/O
Jawahar Singh of Ramanpur Sywali., P.S
Shlampur, (UP).
Copy of leave certificate dated 24.12.2014 is
annexed hereto and marked as Annexure R/2.
Copy of report is annexed hereto and marked
as Annexure R/3.
7. That, with regard to the statements made
in paragraph 6 of the writ petition, I say that,
petitioner was arrested on 06.01.2015 by
Shlampur P.S. Bulandshahr (UP) in c/w Case
No.No.207/2014
U/S
147/148/149/302/307/504
IPC
as
per
record available with this office. As per
custody certificate issued by Superintendent,
Distt. Jail, Bulandhshahr Rifleman(GD) Sonvir
Singh, S/O Indarpal Singh of 3dBn TSR was in
Jail custody for a period of 09 years, 08
months & 18 days from 06.01.2015 to
23.09.2024 and remission awarded for a
period of 07 months & 10 days. So, the total
period of his custody was 10 years, 03 months
& 28 days. Due to this, the petitioner was
unable to submit his defence statement and
appear
before
the
E.O
during
the
departmental proceeding.
Copy of the custody certificate is annexed
hereto and marked as Annexure R/4.
08. That, with regard to para 7 of the Writ
Petition, I say that, a preliminary inquiry
officer
was
deployed
by
an
order
No.F.pers/TSR-3/Estt/S.S/08/6787-89 dated
22.04.2015 from 3dBn TSR to conduct a
preliminary enquiry into the matter of
unauthorized
leave
of
the
petitioner.
Accordingly, the preliminary inquiry officer
conducted
a
preliminary
enquiry
and
submitted his report dated 06.05.2015
establishing the charge of his unauthorized
leave
w.e.f-22.01.2015.
Thereafter,
an
enquiry appointed by 3rd Bn TSR vide Order
officer was appointed by 3rd Bn TSR vide
Order
No.F.DP.No.06/15/TSR3/Estt/S.S/08/9484-85 dated 11.06.2015.
During the course of enquiry, the Enquiry
Officer issued notices dated 12.06.2015,
24.06.2015, 03.07.2015, 25.07.2015 and final
notice on 05.08.2015 to the petitioner
directing him to appear before the Enquiry
Officer along with his defense assistance and
to submit his written statement of his
defense.
Copy
of
the
order
No.F.pers/TSR3/Estt/S.S/08/6787-89 dated 22.04.2015 is
annexed hereto and marked as Annexure R/5.
Copy of the preliminary enquiry report is
annexed hereto and marked as Annexure R/6.
Copy of the No.F.DP.No.06/15/TSR-Order
3/Estt/S.S/08/9484-85 dated 11.06.2015 is
annexed hereto and marked as Annexure R/7.
Copy of the notices dated 12.06.2015,
24.06.2015,
03.07.2015,
25.07.2015
is
annexed hereto and marked as Annexure R/8.
9. That, with regard to para 8 to 13, I say
that, these are all matter of facts which the
petitioner must prove by producing specific
documentary evidences.
10. That, with regard to para 15, I say that,
on 02.03.2025 the petitioner submitted an
application along with copy of the order dated
06.02.2025 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India in Case No.CRL 18262/2024
(IA No.298948/2024) addressed to the
Commandant, 3dBn TSR for reinstatement in
service. The said application was forwarded to
the DIGP, AP (Adm&Trg), vide instruction
Tripura
for
L/No.F.154/TSR3/R1/Estt/2011/3384 dated 06.03.2025. It is
pertinent to mention here that the said Order
dated 06.02.2025 of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court is related to the granting of bail to the
petitioner during the pendency of Appeal
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The said
order dated 06.02.2025 has got no relevancy
with the present case.
Moreover, the petitioner has made a most
misleading statement in para 15 that he had
filed an appeal before the competent
authority for setting aside the order of
dismissal whereas the Petitioner did not filed
any such appeal before the competent
Appellate Authority. The petitioner submitted
only a joining application for joining in the
service
and
the
said
application
was
addressed to the Commandant 3rd Bn TSR. It
is pertinent to mention here that The
Commandant 3rd Bn TSR is not the Appellate
authority even. Thus, the Petitioner without
filing appeal before the Appellate authority
has come directly before the Hon'ble High
Court which is not tenable in the eye of law
and hence the instant case is liable to be
dismissed forthwith.”
And by the counter-affidavit the State-respondents
prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
05.
However at the time of hearing, Learned Counsel for
the appellant drawn the attention of the Court that during the
entire Departmental Proceeding the petitioner was in custody
in some other case and as such he could not appear before the
authority to take his proper defence. Thus, principles of natural
justice has been violated. So, Learned Counsel prayed for
setting aside the order of dismissal imposed by the Disciplinary
Authority.
06.
On the other hand, Learned Counsel for the State-
respondents submitted that in the entire proceeding on so
many occasions notices were served upon the petitioners
through the authority of the jail, but inspite of receipt of notice
no such communication was made either by the petitioner or
by
his
engaged
counsel
or
by
any
other
authorized
representatives. So, there was no infirmity in the order of the
Disciplinary Authority.
It was further submitted by Learned Additional G.A.
that the petitioner without approaching to the Appellate
Authority directly approached to the writ Court invoking the
jurisdiction of Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is
not permissible in the eye of law. So, his contention that he
preferred appeal was nothing but a misleading statement for
which the writ petition is liable to be dismissed henceforth with
costs.
07.
I have heard both the sides at length and perused
the writ petition and the documents submitted as well as the
counter-affidavit submitted by the State-respondents. It is on
record that the petitioner was an employee of TSR, Tripura. He
rendered
a
considerable
period
of
service,
thereafter,
proceeded on leave, but failed to resume his duty within time
and unauthorizedly remained absent for a long period. In the
meantime, it was reported that he was involved in a criminal
case and was languishing in jail at U.P. In the Departmental
Proceeding on so many occasions notices were issued upon him
through the authority of the jail, but inspite of that he did not
take any step nor did he engage any counsel or any other
authorized agent to defend his case. It was submitted that he
preferred
appeal
challenging
the
order/document
of
the
Disciplinary Authority, but he could not submit any order
before this Court of the Appellate Authority that he preferred
appeal.
08.
Thus, it appears that the petitioner gave misleading
statement before this Court. Since, the petitioner only took the
plea that he could not appear before the Inquiry authority as
such he could not take his proper defence, only this ground
cannot be a sole consideration for exercising writ jurisdiction.
Because the Inquiry Authority as well as the Departmental
Authority before imposition of punishment served several
notices upon him, but inspite of that no such effective steps
were taken by the petitioner.
In this regard in Leelavathi N. & Ors. v. State of
Karnataka & Ors. reported in (2025) SCC OnLine SC 2253,
in para Nos.36 and 37, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as
under:
“36. A careful perusal of the aforesaid
judgments leads us to the conclusion that
where an efficacious alternate remedy is
available, the High Court should not entertain
a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India in matters falling
squarely within the domain of the Tribunals.
37. Nevertheless, a writ petition under Article
226 may still be maintainable notwithstanding
the existence of such an alternative remedy in
exceptional circumstances, including the
enforcement
of
fundamental
rights
guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution;
instances of ultra vires or illegal exercise of
power by a statutory authority; violation of
the principles of natural justice; or where the
vires of the parent legislation itself is under
challenge. While these exceptions have been
carved out and reiterated by this Court in a
catena of decisions, the facts of the present
case do not fall within any of these exceptions
so as to warrant the maintainability of the
writ petitions before the High Court.”
Similarly in another case in Union of India & Ors.
v. Pranab Kumar Nath reported in (2025) SCC OnLine SC
2893, in para No.8, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as
under:
“8. None of the parties to this lis are alleging
that the enquiry and subsequent proceedings
till the High Court have transgressed the law
or its duly laid down procedure. We need not,
therefore, look into that aspect. The crux of
this appeal lies in appreciating the contours of
the power of the High Court vis-a-vis
disciplinary proceedings. It has long been
held that under Article 226 jurisdiction, the
court is not akin to an appellate Court, its
powers are limited to the extent of judicial
review. They cannot set aside punishment or
impose a different punishment unless they
find that there is substantial non-compliance
of the rules. For instance, in B.C. Chaturvedi v.
Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 749], it was
observed by a bench of three learned judges
of this Court that:
12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a
decision but a review of the manner in which
the decision is made. Power of judicial review
is meant to ensure that the individual receives
fair treatment and not to ensure that the
conclusion which the authority reaches is
necessarily correct in the eye of the court.
When an inquiry is conducted on charges of
misconduct
by
a
public
servant,
the
Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine
whether the inquiry was held by a competent
officer or whether rules of natural justice are
complied with. Whether the findings or
conclusions are based on some evidence, the
authority entrusted with the power to hold
inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority
to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But
that finding must be based on some evidence.
Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor
of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein,
apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the
authority
accepts
that
evidence
and
conclusion receives support therefrom, the
disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that
the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge.
The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial
review does not act as appellate authority to
reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its
own independent findings on the evidence.
The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the
authority held the proceedings against the
delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent
with the rules of natural justice or in violation
of statutory rules prescribing the mode of
inquiry or where the conclusion or finding
reached by the disciplinary authority is based
on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be
such as no reasonable person would have
ever
reached,
the
Court/Tribunal
may
interfere with the conclusion or the finding,
and mould the relief so as to make it
appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge
of facts. Where appeal is presented, the
appellate authority has coextensive power to
reappreciate the evidence or the nature of
punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the
strict proof of legal evidence and findings on
that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of
evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be
permitted to be canvassed before the
Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel
[(1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964)
1 LLJ 38] this Court held at p. 728 that if the
conclusion,
upon
consideration
of
the
evidence
reached
by
the
disciplinary
authority, is perverse or suffers from patent
error on the face of the record or based on no
evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be
issued.”
Similarly, in High Court of Judicature at
Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil [(2000) 1 SCC
416], it was observed:
“16. The Division Bench of the High Court
seems to have approached the case as though
it was an appeal against the order of the
administrative/disciplinary authority of the
High Court. Interference with the decision of
departmental authorities can be permitted,
while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution if such authority had held
proceedings in violation of the principles of
natural justice or in violation of statutory
regulations prescribing the mode of such
enquiry or if the decision of the authority is
vitiated by considerations extraneous to the
evidence and merits of the case, or if the
conclusion made by the authority, on the very
face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that
no reasonable person could have arrived at
such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to
the above. But we cannot overlook that the
departmental authority (in this case the
Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is
the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has
been properly conducted. The settled legal
position is that if there is some legal evidence
on which the findings can be based, then
adequacy or even reliability of that evidence
is not a matter for canvassing before the High
Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226
of the Constitution.”
(emphasis supplied)
Further, in Union of India v. K.G. Soni [(2006)
6 SCC 794], it was held:
“14. The common thread running through in
all these decisions is that the court should not
interfere with the administrator's decision
unless it was illogical or suffers from
procedural impropriety or was shocking to the
conscience of the court, in the sense that it
was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In
view of what has been stated in Wednesbury
case [Associated Provincial Picture Houses
Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., [1948] 1 K.B. 223
: [1947] 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the court would
not go into the correctness of the choice made
by the administrator open to him and the
court should not substitute its decision to that
of the administrator. The scope of judicial
review is limited to the deficiency in the
decision-making process and not the decision.
15. To put it differently, unless the
punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority or the Appellate Authority shocks
the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is
no scope for interference. Further, to shorten
litigations it may, in exceptional and rare
cases, impose appropriate punishment by
recording cogent reasons in support thereof.
In the normal course if the punishment
imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it
would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary
authority or the Appellate Authority to
reconsider the penalty imposed.”
(emphasis supplied)
We further notice that in Union of India v. P.
Gunasekaran
[(2015)
SCC
610],
a
coordinate Bench of this Court had spelt out
the scope of the High Court's function as
follows:
“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is
painfully disturbing to note that the High
Court has acted as an appellate authority in
the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating
even the evidence before the enquiry officer.
The finding on Charge I was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed
by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In
disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not
and cannot act as a second court of first
appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its
powers under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, shall not venture into
reappreciation of the evidence. The High
Court can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry
authority;
is
held by
a competent
(b) the enquiry is held according to the
procedure prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of
natural justice in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves
from reaching a fair conclusion by some
considerations extraneous to the evidence
and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves
to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous
considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very
face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious
that no reasonable person could ever have
arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously
failed to admit the admissible and material
evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously
admitted
inadmissible
evidence
which
influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13.
Under
Articles
226/227
of
the
Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the
enquiry, in case the same has been conducted
in accordance with law; (iii) go into the
adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence
on which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it
may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment
unless it shocks its conscience.”
Again in another case In K. Rajaiah v. High Court
for the State of Telangana reported in (2026) SCC OnLine
SC 190 in para No.38, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as
under:
“38. On the reverse side of this notice which
is available in the file, Dr. Bommaraveni had
acknowledged the receipt of the notice with
his signature, date and his rubber stamp. The
notice dated 26.10.2017 in original has been
exhibited as Ex. P-8. Immediately after the
original is a photocopy of the notice carrying
the acknowledgement in the reverse. This
document, though not specifically exhibited, it
is the document on which Dr. Bommaraveni
acknowledged and thereafter appeared on
28.10.2017. The original of Ex. P-8 also has
the following endorsement in the bottom.
“Through Sh. Devaraj, Police Constable,
Manakondur P.S. with a direction to cause
service of the notice to through Dr.
Bommaraveni Swamy Mudiraj and file the
acknowledgment before the undersigned.”
Further, in another case in Rikhab Chand Jain v.
Union of India & Ors. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC
2510 in para Nos.12 and 15, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed
as under:
“12. That apart, the majority view in a
previous
Constitution
Bench
in
A.V.
Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs v.
Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani [1961 SCC
OnLine SC 16; AIR 1961 SC 1506.] reads thus:
“14… ., we must express our dissent from
the reasoning by which the learned judges
of the High Court held that the writ
petitioner was absolved from the normal
obligation
to
exhaust
his
statutory
remedies before invoking the jurisdiction of
the High Court under article 226 of the
Constitution. If a petitioner has disabled
himself from availing himself of the
statutory remedy by his own fault in not
doing so within the prescribed time, he
cannot certainly be permitted to urge that
as a ground for the court dealing with his
petition under article 226 to exercise its
discretion in his favour. Indeed, the second
passage extracted from the judgment of
the learned C.J. in State of U.P. v.
Mohammad Nooh [1957 SCC OnLine SC 21;
AIR 1958 SC 86.] with its reference to the
right to appeal being lost ‘through no fault
of his own’ emphasizes this aspect of the
Rule.”
(emphasis ours)
In essence, this court was of the opinion that
once a petitioner has due to his own fault
disabled himself from availing a statutory
remedy, the discretionary remedy under
article 226 may not be available.
15. In our considered opinion, the appellant
having had a remedy before the High Court in
a separate jurisdiction which was equally
efficacious,
he
indulged
in
the
(mis)
adventure of invoking its writ jurisdiction
which was rightly not entertained.”
From the aforesaid observations of the Supreme
Court, it appears that the present petitioners did not prefer any
appeal to the statutory authority challenging the order of the
Disciplinary Authority and directly came to this Court for
seeking relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
09.
Furthermore, the petitioner in course of hearing also
has failed to satisfy the Court by showing any cogent materials
on record that principles of natural justice has been violated
against him in deciding the Departmental Proceeding. Thus, it
appears that the petitioner has failed to make out any case to
invoke the jurisdiction of Article 226 of the Constitution of India
in this writ petition.
10.
In the result, I do not find any scope to grant any
relief in favour of the present petitioner of this case. Thus, the
writ petition filed by the petitioner stands rejected being devoid
of merit. No order is passed as to costs.
With this observation, this petition stands disposed
of on contest.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed
of.
JUDGE
PURNITA
DEB
Purnita
PURNITA DEB
Date: 2026.04.23
18:32:36 +05'30'
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