Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
SHAMURAILATPAM SUSHIL
SHARMA
SHARMA
Date: 2023.09.12 12:59:24 +05'30'
Page |1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
Smt. R.K. Ibemhal Devi (alias R.K. Lembisana Devi)
aged about 71 years, wife of late Ngangom Tomba Singh
resident of Sagolband Moirangmayum Leirak, P.S. &
P.O. Imphal, District Imphal West, Manipur, expired on
22-4-2005,
Represented by:
1. Ngangom Ibochou Singh, aged about 58 years,
2. Ngangom Ibomcha Singh, aged about 51 years,
-
both sons of late R.K. Ibemhal Devi
(-impleaded as L.Rs of the Petitioner, vide order dt. 1-92005 passed in CMA No. 283/05)
… … PETITIONER.
-versus1.
The Secretary (Revenue) to the Govt. of Manipur,
Secretariat, Imphal,
2.
The Under Secretary (Revenue) to the Govt. of
Manipur, Secretariat, Imphal,
3.
The State of Manipur, - through the Commissioner/
Secretary (Revenue), Govt. of Manipur, Imphal.
4.
Smt. Naorem Ongbi Ibemhal alias Leimahal Devi,
aged about 55 years, daughter of late Ngangom
Tomba Singh and wife of late Naorem Bbubon
Singh, resident of Uripok Polem Leikai, P.S. & P.O.
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
Page |2
Imphal, also sometimes residing at Phumlou Awang
Leiaki, P.O. & P.S. Lamshang, both in District
Imphal West, Manipur.
… … RESPONDENTS.
BEFORE
HON’BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE M.V. MURALIDARAN
For the Petitioners
.
For the Respondents
::
Mr. A. Golly, Adv.
::
Mr. HS Paonam, Sr. Adv.
Mr. N. Bipin, Adv.
Mr. Sh. Shyam Sharma, GA
Date of Hearing and
reserving Judgment & Order ::
11.08.2023
Date of Judgment & Order
05.09.2023
::
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
(CAV)
This writ petition has been originally filed by one
Ibemhal Devi alias Lembisana Devi before the Imphal Bench of
Gauhati High Court to quash the impugned Corrigendum dated
12.6.2001
issued
by
the
Under
Secretary
(Revenue),
Government of Manipur, the second respondent herein.
2.
Pending writ petition, Ibemhal Devi died and her
legal heirs were substituted as petitioners 1 and 2. By the order
dated 8.11.2007, on contest, the writ petition was dismissed by
the learned Single Judge of Imphal Bench of Gauhati High Court.
Aggrieved by the order dated 8.11.2007, a Writ Appeal in
W.A.No.4 of 2008 was preferred by the petitioners/legal heirs of
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
Page |3
the original writ petitioner.
By the judgment dated 14.5.2013, a
Division Bench of this Court allowed the writ appeal and set aside
the order of the learned Single Judge dated 8.11.2007 and
remanded the matter to the learned Single Judge to decide the
writ petition in accordance with law. Pursuant to the judgment
dated 14.5.2013, the writ petition is restored on file.
3.
After restoration and pending writ petition, the
second petitioner died and his legal heirs were sought to be
impleaded as petitioners 2(a) to 2(f), for which, the legal heirs of
the second petitioner have filed M.C.No.142 of 2021.
After
hearing the respective parties, this Court allowed M.C.No.142 of
2021.
4.
Brief facts, which led to the filing of the writ petition,
are as follows: In the year 1984, when some pieces of
Government land in the area of Dry Fish Market within
Kwairamband Bazar, Imphal were opened for settlement to
persons doing small business, the deceased original petitioner
applied to the Manipur Government for allotment of small plot of
land for running her small business there. After considering her
application and making necessary enquiry about her eligibility for
allotment and her genuine need therefor, the Manipur
Government allotted the Government land covered by C.S. Dag
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
Page |4
No.2538(P) of Sheet No.16 admeasuring .01487 acre under
order dated 22.12.1984. The deceased original writ petitioner
without delay paid the premium of Rs.7,395.80p for the said
allotment as required under the allotment order.Thereafter, a
deed of allotment dated 8.1.1985 was executed between the
deceased original writ petitioner and the State Government and
the same was registered on 9.1.1985 and formal delivery of
possession of the allotted land was made to the deceased
original writ petitioner by the concerned Revenue Officer.The
relevant record of rights was prepared in the name of the
deceased original writ petitioner in the Jamabandi under Patta
No.911 comprised C.S. Dag No.16/2538/3141 having an area
of .01487 acre and a certified copy of the Jamabandi was
furnished to the deceased original writ petitioner on 11.1.1985.
The deceased original writ petitioner was paying the land
revenues of the allotted land and she had constructed three
storied pucca building with GCI roof and having one underground
room soon after she had taken formal possession of the allotted
land.
4.1.
The fourth respondent is the eldest daughter of the
deceased original writ petitioner and being the eldest daughter of
a Rajkumari (as the petitioner is) the fourth respondent name is
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
Page |5
popularly known as “Leimahal or Ibemhal” meaning the eldest
daughter of a Rajkumari. She was married to Naorem Bhubon
Singh of Awang Phymlou Village and they used to reside there
for a number of years and occasionally staying at Uripok Polem
Leikai, Imphal.
4.2.
A small room with an area of 17 x 4 feet in the
ground floor of the abovementioned building was set apart in
1994 for the fourth respondent and her children for vending dry
fishes and other sundry goods to eke out her livelihood and the
maintenance of her children. The rest of the building has been
rented out by the deceased original writ petitioner to her tenant
while she herself along with her sons has been carrying on the
usual business in another shop of her late husband.
4.3.
On 19.1.1998, the fourth respondent made an
application to the first respondent praying for correction of her
surname in the revenue records in respect of Plot No.6 on the
eastern bank of Naga River. On the basis of the said application,
the Under Secretary (Revenue), vide letter dated 19.5.1998,
asked the Deputy Commissioner, Imphal West and the Director
of Settlement and Land Records to make an enquiry into the
matter and submit a report to the Government. On 23.11.1998,
the Director of Settlement and Land Records submitted a report
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
Page |6
to the second respondent stating that the applicant (fourth
respondent) is not the pattadar/allottee and a decision may be
taken by the Government as it deem fit.
On receipt of the
aforesaid report dated 23.11.1998, the second respondent
informed the fourth respondent vide letter dated 8.6.1999 that her
application dated 19.1.1998 for correction of name in the
allotment order dated 22.12.1984 had been examined by the
Government and she may approach the competent authority for
change of title over the land as the land was allotted to
R.K.Ibemhal Devi and not to Naorem Ongbi Ibemhal Devi.
4.4.
Having failed in her attempt to have her name
substituted as allottee in the allotment order and the relevant
records, the fourth respondent fraudulently managed to have her
name mutated as pattadar of the allotted land under the order of
the Revenue Officer behind the back and without any notice to
the deceased original writ petitioner. The said mutation in favour
of the fourth respondent was granted on 6.7.1999 by the
Assistant Survey and Settlement Officer-V of Manipur on the
basis of her application dated 5.7.1999. After obtaining the illegal
mutation
order
dated
6.7.1999,
the
fourth
respondent
approached the first respondent with an application on 18.5.2001
for issuing Corrigendum for substituting her name as the allottee
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
Page |7
in the place of the deceased original writ petitioner in the
allotment order dated 22.12.1984. In the application, the fourth
respondent alleged that the name of the allottee had been
wrongly recorded as R.K.Ibemhal Devi wife of Tomba Singh in
the place of the correct name as Naorem Ongbi Ibemhal Devi
daughter of Tomba Singh. According to the petitioners, in the
application dated 18.5.2001, the fourth respondent had
concealed the factum of earlier application and its rejection.
While so, without issuing any notice about the application of the
fourth respondent to the deceased original writ petitioner, the
second
respondent
straightaway
issued
the
impugned
Corrigendum dated 12.6.2001 for replacing the name of the
fourth respondent as allottee in the place of the deceased original
writ petitioner in the allotment order dated 22.12.1984.
Challenging the same, the deceased original writ petitioner has
filed the present writ petition.
After the demise of the original
writ petitioner, her sons were substituted as petitioners and the
second petitioner died leaving behind the petitioners 2(a) to (f)
and now the aforesaid petitioners are prosecuting the writ
petition.
5.
The respondents 1 to 3 have filed affidavit-in-
opposition stating that the fourth respondent has filed a
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
Page |8
representation dated 18.5.2001 to the Government for correction
of the name of the allottee “R.K.Ibemhal Devi” appearing at
Sl.No.1 of the allotment order dated 22.12.1984 by issuing
corrigendum. The fourth respondent sought corrigendum on the
ground that she is in possession of shop No.6 since 1969 and
the Executive Officer of the Imphal Municipality has given a
certificate dated 18.9.1998 certifying that she was one of the
lessees of 25 shops up to the year 1982; while issuing allotment
order dated 22.12.1984, the name of the allottee has been
wrongly written as R.K.Ibemhal Devi.
5.1.
It is stated that acting upon the said representation
dated 18.5.2001, the Government issued the corrigendum dated
12.6.2001 thereby correcting the name of the allottee as Naorem
Ongbi Ibemhal Devi. Being aggrieved by the said corrigendum,
the deceased original writ petitioner filed an application dated
14.8.2001 to the State Government requesting for stay of the
operation of the corrigendum.
In the meantime, the fourth
respondent had also filed representation dated 3.9.2001 to the
Government in respect of her claim. Considering the nature of
dispute between the mother and daughter, both were called for
discussion and settlement with the Secretary (Revenue) on
18.9.2001. After hearing both the parties, on 18.9.2001, the
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
Page |9
Secretary (Revenue) passed an order to the effect that the
Secretary (Revenue) is not competent to decide the case and it
should be taken to competent court by the parties concerned.
Hence, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
6.
The fourth respondent filed affidavit-in-opposition
stating that firstly, the deceased original writ petitioner has made
active concealment of material, vital and relevant fact in her writ
petition. Secondly, the subject matter of the writ petition involves
determination of complicated questions of facts and disputes
which can appropriately be resolved on taking oral and
documentary evidence by a competent civil court in a civil suit.
Thirdly, the prayer made in the writ petition if allowed would lead
to reversion to a name as allottee which does not ex facie pertain
to the deceased original writ petitioner and, hence, she has no
locus standi to file the writ petition.
6.1.
It is stated that in the allotment order dated
22.12.1984, there are two allottees. The allottee at Sl. No.1 is
the fourth respondent and the allottee at Sl. No.2 is the father of
the fourth respondent. At the time when the allotment order was
issued, the fourth respondent had become a member of her
husband’s family and the deceased original writ petitioner was
member of the family of the allottee at Sl. No.2 being his wife.
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 10
The name appearing in the allotment order was mistaken
description of the name of the real allottee, namely the fourth
respondent.
6.2.
It is stated that on 19.1.1998 the fourth respondent
submitted an application for correction of description of her name
to the Secretary (Revenue). But no result of the application was
communicated to her. Therefore, the fourth respondent filed
another application on 18.5.2021 to the Secretary (Revenue),
Government of Manipur and by the impugned Corrigendum
dated 12.6.2001, necessary corrections had been ordered. As
per the corrigendum, the name and description of allottee was
made as Naorem Ongbi Ibemhal Devi. While so, the deceased
original writ petitioner, who is the mother of the fourth
respondent, has falsely claimed that she is the allottee of the land
possessed by the fourth respondent.
6.3.
It is stated that the prayer made in the writ petition
if allowed would lead to reversion to a name as allottee which
does not ex facie pertain to the deceased original writ petitioner
and, hence, the deceased writ petitioner has no locus standi to
file the writ petition. Hence, prayed for dismissal of the writ
petition.
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 11
7.
Assailing the impugned corrigendum, Mr. A. Golly,
the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the
deceased original writ petitioner has been unheard by the second
respondent or the other official respondents while issuing the
impugned corrigendum dated 12.6.2001, which in violation of the
principles of natural justice. The second respondent and its
related officers acted arbitrarily and unfairly in issuing the
impugned corrigendum without even ascertaining the truth or
falsity of the frivolous claim made by the fourth respondent and
without even hearing the deceased original writ petitioner.
8.
The learned counsel for the petitioners further
submitted that the official respondents were deliberately ignored
the earlier decision of the Government conveyed in the letter
dated 8.6.1999, which was communicated rightly based on the
truthful report of the Director of Settlement and Land Records,
dated 23.11.1998.
9.
The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted
that the second respondent acted collusively and fraudulently in
issuing the impugned corrigendum by merely basing it on the
unverified and unsustainable claim made by the fourth
respondent that too in the secrecy of the official file and behind
the back of the deceased original writ petitioner. The impugned
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 12
corrigendum purporting to an order of the State Government,
contravenes the mandatory provision of Article 166 of the
Constitution of India, inasmuch as the impugned corrigendum
shown to be an executive action of the State Government is not
expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. Such being
the case, the impugned corrigendum is not only bad in law, but
is also ultra vires the Constitution of India.
10.
The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that
there is no reason given for issuing the impugned corrigendum is
a hap-hazard and highly objectionable manner, jeopardizing the
right and property of the deceased original writ petitioner and
injuriously causing prejudice to her. The fourth respondent has
absolutely no right and no locus standi to approach the official
respondents for substitution of her name in the allotment order
as allottee after the lapse of 17 years to satisfy her greed for
wealth at the cost of her own mother.
11.
Adding further, the learned counsel for the
petitioners submitted that the fourth respondent as well as the
official respondents are utterly silent and mummed regarding the
registered deed of allotment
dated 8.1.1985 registered on
9.1.1985 executed by the State in favour of the deceased original
writ petitioner or payment of premium of Rs.7,395.80p by the
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 13
deceased original writ petitioner. No challenge or request to
change or amend thereof is made by neither of the respondents.
12.
The learned counsel for the petitioners further
submitted that the Government’s decision had already been
made and communicated to the fourth respondent under letter
dated 8.6.1999 and, such a decision of the Government cannot
be overruled by the impugned corrigendum dated 12.6.2001
which was issued without any authority or by the null and void
order dated 18.9.2021 passed by the Revenue Secretary. The
impugned corrigendum would no longer survive and, hence, the
same is liable to be quashed.
In support, the learned counsel
for the petitioners placed reliance upon the following decisions:
Carana Bank and others v. Debasis Das,
(2003) 4 SCC 557
Canara Bank v. V.K.Awasthy, (2005) 6
SCC 321
Mangilal v. State of M.P., (2004) 2 SCC
Prakash Ratan Sinha v. State of Bihar
and others, (2009) 14 SCC 690
13.
Mr. Sh. Shyam Sharma, the learned Government
Advocate appearing for the official respondents submitted that
acting upon the representation of the fourth respondent dated
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 14
18.5.2001, the Government issued the impugned corrigendum
dated 12.6.2001 thereby correcting the name of the allottee as
Naorem Ongbi Ibemhal Devi.
Aggrieved by the impugned
corrigendum, both the deceased original petitioner and the fourth
respondent filed representations before the Government. Since
the dispute is between the mother and the daughter, both were
called for discussion and settlement, however, the settlement
failed.
Therefore, on 18.9.2001, the Secretary (Revenue)
passed an order holding that the dispute should be taken to
competent court by the parties concerned.
Arguing so, the
learned Government Advocate submitted that the writ petition is
not maintainable, as it involves disputed questions of facts which
can only be decided by the competent civil court.
14.
Mr. HS Paonam, the learned senior counsel for the
fourth respondent, inter alia, submitted that the subject matter of
the present writ petition involves determination of complicated
question of fact which can appropriately be done by the
competent civil court. It also involves determination of the true
identify and the correct name of the real allottee and also the
genuineness of certain documents not pertaining to Revenue
Department.
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 15
15.
The learned counsel further submitted that in the
allotment order dated 22.12.1984 issued to the deceased original
writ petitioner, there are two allottees. The allottee at Sl.No.1 is
the fourth respondent and the allotee at Sl.No.2 is the father of
the fourth respondent. The allottee at Sl.No.1 is the daughter of
the allottee at Sl.No.2. The name appearing in the allotment
order was mistaken description of the name of the real allottee
and on 19.1.1998, the fourth respondent filed an application for
correction of description of her name to the Secretary (Revenue).
Since no order has been passed, the fourth respondent filed
another representation on 18.5.2001 to the Secretary (Revenue)
and upon perusing the relevant documents, the Secretary
(Revenue) issued corrigendum dated 12.6.2001 ordering
necessary corrections in the allotment order.
Since the
corrigendum dated 12.6.2001 has been issued after perusing the
relevant documents, the same cannot be questioned by the writ
petitioners.
According to learned counsel since disputed
question of fact involved, the writ petition is not maintainable.
Thus, a prayer has been made to dismiss the writ petition.
16.
This Court considered the rival submissions and
also perused the materials available on record.
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 16
17.
The writ petition was originally filed by the deceased
original writ petitioner before the Gauhati High Court, Imphal
Bench to set aside the impugned corrigendum dated 12.6.2001
issued by the second respondent. Pending writ petition, the
original writ petitioner died and her legal heirs, namely her sons,
were substituted as petitioners. The learned Single Judge of the
Imphal Bench of Gauhati High Court dismissed the writ petition
vide order dated 8.11.2007. The operative portion of the order
dated 8.11.2007 reads thus:
“11. Considering the above settled law and in
view of the facts and nature of the case in the
present writ petition, in my considered opinion
the dispute involves disputed question of facts
requiring elaborate enquiry and investigation
and therefore, this court under Article 226 of the
Constitution
cannot
go
into
the
disputed
question of facts and accordingly this writ
petition is rejected.”
18.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petition, the
petitioners have filed W.A.No.4 of 2008 before this Court. A
Division Bench of this Court, under judgment dated 14.5.2013,
set aside the order of the learned Single Judge. In paragraphs 8
to 10, the Division Bench observed as under:
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 17
“8. In our view, therefore, we can not concur
with the view taken by the writ court and
hence allow the appeal on the reasons given
above and set aside the impugned order. As
a consequence, the writ petition is remanded
to the writ court for deciding it on merits after
affording an opportunity of being heard to the
respondents by filing their return in answer to
the writ petition.
9. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal
thus, succeeds and is hereby allowed.
Impugned judgment is set aside. The writ
petition is now restored to its file. It is also,
now, formally admitted for final hearing. It be
now listed before the Writ Court (Single
Judge)
for
its
decision
on
merits
in
accordance with law.
10. We however, make it clear that we have
purposefully made no observation on the
merits and demerits involved in the writ
petition.
The Writ Court would, therefore,
decide the writ petition strictly in accordance
with law uninfluenced by any of our
observation son merit.”
19.
As against the judgment dated 14.5.2013 passed in
the writ appeal, no further appeal has been preferred by the
respondents. After restoration of the writ petition, the same was
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 18
listed from time to time.
Pending writ petition, the second
petitioner died, his legal heirs were brought on record as
petitioners 2(a) to 2(f).
This Court had given reasonable
opportunity to the respective parties to argue the matter and the
respective counsels have also placed their submissions.
20.
The petitioners who are the legal heirs of the
deceased original writ petitioner assailed the impugned
corrigendum on the ground that without hearing the deceased
original writ petitioner, the impugned corrigendum has been
issued thereby violating the principles of natural justice. Without
even ascertaining the truth or falsity of the frivolous claim of the
fourth respondent, the impugned corrigendum was issued. While
issuing the impugned corrigendum, the second respondent
ignored the earlier decision of the Government dated 8.6.1999
which was issued based on the report of the Director of
Settlement and Land Records dated 23.11.1998. The official
respondents acted collusively and fraudulently in issuing the
impugned corrigendum based on the unsustainable claim made
by the fourth respondent. There is no reason whatsoever given
for issuing the impugned corrigendum in a haphazard manner,
thereby jeopardizing the right and property of the deceased
original writ petitioner. The fourth respondent has no locus standi
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 19
to approach the official respondents for substitution of her name
as the allottee after the lapse of more than 17 years to satisfy her
greed for wealth at the cost of her own mother.
21.
Mr. HS Paonam, the learned senior counsel for the
fourth respondent contended that since there are disputed
questions of fact involved in the present matter, the writ petition
is not maintainable. Therefore, the petitioners cannot invoke the
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
22.
In reply, Mr. A. Golly, the learned counsel for the
petitioners submitted that the writ petition is very well
maintainable, as the petitioners are challenging the action of the
second respondent in issuing the impugned corrigendum, that
too, behind the back of the deceased original writ petitioner.
23.
Circa 1984, some pieces of Government land in the
area of Kwairamband Bazar, Imphal, where the deceased
original writ petitioner was carrying on dry fish market, were
opened for settlement. Accordingly, the deceased original writ
petitioner applied for allotment of plot of land. After considering
her application and upon enquiry about the eligibility for allotment
and also her need, the State Government allotted the
Government land covered by C.S. Dag No.2538(P) of Sheet
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 20
No.16 admeasuring an extent of .01487 acre under the order
dated 22.11.1984 in the name of the deceased original writ
petitioner.
24.
On a perusal of the allotment order dated
22.11.1984, it is seen that the Secretary (Revenue), Government
of Manipur, allotted 0.01487 acre of land in C.S. Dag No.2538(P)
of Sheet No.16 in favour of R.R.Ibemhal Devi, wife of Tomba
Singh. The said allotment order also reveals that an area of
0.01159 acre in C.S.Dag No.2578 of Sheet No.16 was allotted in
favour of NgangomTomba Singh, son of Ibotom Singh.
In
respect of the allotment made in favour of R.R.Ibemhal Devi, she
was required to pay the premium of Rs.7,395.80p. The deceased
original writ petitioner has paid the premium of Rs.7,395.80p. A
deed of allotment was executed by the Government in favour of
R.K.Ibemhal Devi and the same was registered on 8.1.1985.
Delivery of possession of the allotted land was made to the
deceased original writ petitioner.
After allotment, the relevant
record of rights was also prepared in favour of the deceased
original writ petitioner and, thereafter, the deceased original writ
petitioner has been paying necessary taxes in respect of the
allotted to the Government.
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 21
25.
It is the case of the petitioners that the deceased
original writ petitioner had constructed a three storied building
with GCI roof in the allotted land and the fourth respondent who
is her daughter was married to one Naorem Bhubonsingh of
Awang Phumlou Village and she used to reside her matrimonial
home for number of years. In the year 1994, a small room with
an area of 17 x 4 feet in the ground floor of the abovementioned
building was set apart for the fourth respondent for vending dry
fishes and other sundry goods to eke out her livelihood and the
rest of the building has been rented out by the deceased original
writ petitioner to the tenant while she herself along with her sons
has been carrying on her usual dry fish business in the another
shop of her late husband.
26.
It is the further case of the petitioners that on
19.1.1998 the fourth respondent made an application for
correction of her name in the revenue records in respect of Plot
No.6 on the eastern bank of Naga river. On the basis of the
application, the Secretary (Revenue) directed the Deputy
Commissioner of Imphal West and the Director of Settlement and
Land Records to enquire into the matter and submit a report.
Pursuant to the direction of the Secretary (Revenue), the Director
of Settlement and Land Records conducted enquiry and
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 22
submitted a report dated 23.11.1998stating that the applicant is
not the pattadar/allottee of the land in question and the applicant
is occupying small portion of the plot under C.S. Dag No.2538(P)
of Sheet No.16 of Imphal Municipality according to their family
arrangement/agreement. Based on the report dated 23.11.1998,
the second respondent informed the fourth respondent vide letter
dated 8.6.1999 that as the land was allotted to R.K.Ibemhal Devi,
correction as requested by the fourth respondent cannot be
made.
27.
The further case of the petitioners is that having
failed to have her name substituted in the allotment order and the
relevant revenue records, the fourth respondent had managed to
have her name mutated as pattadar of the allotted land under the
order of Revenue Officer behind the back of the deceased
original writ petitioner and without notice to her. Mutation in
favour of the fourth respondent was done on 6.7.1999 by the
Assistant Survey and Settlement Officer.
28.
On the other hand, it is say of the fourth respondent
that fourth respondent had submitted an application dated
19.1.1998 praying for correction of her name in the Revenue
records in respect of Plot No.6, which was involved in thepresent
writ petition.
The report of Director of Settlement and Land
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 23
Records under dated 23.11.1998 is forged one. The further case
of the fourth respondent is that under the letter dated 8.6.1999
the second respondent informed the fourth respondent to
approach the competent authority for change of title over the
land, as the land was allotted to R.K. Ibemhal Devi and not to
Naorem Obgbi Ibemhal Devi.
respondent
submitted
an
On 18.5.2001, the fourth
application
for
corrigendum.
Accordingly, on 12.6.2001, the Under Secretary (Revenue),
Government of Manipur, had issued corrigendum thereby
substituting the name of Naorem Ongbi Ibemhal Devi in the place
of R.K.Ibemhal Devi appearing at schedule of land at Sl. No.1 of
the allotment order dated 22.12.1984.
29.
This Court perused the impugned corrigendum
dated 12.6.2001 and the same is quoted hereunder for ready
reference:
“No.21/287/84-R : Please read as “Naorem
Ongbi Ibemhal Devi, D/o. Tomba Singh,
Sagolband Meirangmayua Leirak at present
Uripok Polem Leikai, Imphal” in place of “Smt
T.K.
Ibemhal
Devi,
W/O
Tomba
Singh,
Sagolband Meirangmayua Leirak” appearing at
schedule of land of SL. No.1 of the orders issued
vide this Government order of even number
dated the 22nd December, 1984.”
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 24
30.
It is pertinent note that before issuance of the
impugned corrigendum dated 12.6.2001, on 19.1.1998, the
fourth respondent, submitted an application for correction in the
allotment order dated 22.12.1984 issued in favour of the
deceased original writ petitioner.
The said application was
forwarded to the Director of Settlement and Land Records for
enquiry and submit a report.
After conducting enquiry, the
Director of Settlement and Land Records submitted a report
dated 23.11.1998 to the respondent authorities to the effect that
the fourth respondent is not the pattadar/allottee of the disputed
land.
Based on the report dated 23.11.1998, the second
respondent informed the fourth respondent that she may
approach the competent authority for change of title over the
land, as the land was allotted to the deceased original writ
petitioner.
31.
If really the fourth respondent is aggrieved by the
allotment of the disputed land in favour of the deceased original
writ petitioner or any grievance over the allotment order dated
22.12.1984, she ought to have challenge the allotment order in
accordance with law within the period of limitation. However, the
fourth respondent has failed to do so. On the other hand, having
waited for 13 longs years, all of a sudden, the fourth respondent,
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 25
in the year 1998 made application to the respondent authority
stating that the allotment order dated 22.12.1984 needs
correction by way of substituting her name in the place the
deceased original writ petitioner.
Upon examination, the
respondent authority has rightly informed the fourth respondent
to approach the competent authority for change of title over the
land, if she is aggrieved by the allotment order.
32.
When the first attempt of the fourth respondent to
change the name and address of the allottee of allotment order
dated 22.12.1984 failed, the fourth respondent second time
applied to the Assistant Survey and Settlement Officer for
mutation of her name as pattadar of the allotted land on 5.7.1999.
Vide order dated 6.7.1999, mutation of the revenue records in
the name of the fourth respondent in respect of the allotted land
was effected. Admittedly, the mutation was effected behind the
back of the deceased original writ petitioner and it appears that
no notice was served on the deceased original writ petitioner
before issuing the mutation order.
33.
It appears that aggrieved by the order dated
6.7.1999 of the Assistant Survey and Settlement Officer, the
deceased original writ petitioner has filed Revenue Revision
Case No.49 of 1999 before the Revenue Tribunal and, by the
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 26
order dated 18.4.2006, the Revenue Tribunal set aside the
mutation order dated 6.7.1999 of the Assistant Survey and
Settlement Officer.
34.
It also appears that during the pendency of the
Revenue Revision Case, the fourth respondent has filed an
application dated 18.5.2001 for issuing corrigendum for
substituting her name as the allottee in the place of the deceased
original writ petitioner’s name in the allotment order dated
22.12.1984 alleging that the name of the allottee had been
wrongly recorded as R.K. Ibemhal Devi in the place of the correct
name as Naorem Ongbi Ibemhal Devi.
35.
It is pertinent to note that while submitting the
application dated 18.5.2001, the fourth respondent has
concealed the factum of the earlier application dated 19.1.1998
and the report of the Director of Settlement and Land Records
dated 23.11.1998 and also the decision dated 8.6.1999 rejecting
the request of the fourth respondent.
36.
On a perusal of the records, more particularly, the
allotment order, it is clear that while executing the allotment order
and its registration, the name of the allottee i.e. the deceased
original writ petitioner, has been clearly mentioned by stating her
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 27
husband name with address. Pursuant to the allotment made,
the deceased original writ petitioner has also paid the premium
amount. Nothing has been produced by the fourth respondent
to show that the allotment of the disputed land has to be made in
her favour and she only paid the premium amount for the land.
As stated supra, if really the fourth respondent is aggrieved by
the allotment order, she ought to have taken steps to cancel the
allotment order in accordance with law before the appropriate
forum that too within the period of limitation. However, the fourth
respondent has failed to do so. On the other hand, behind the
back of the deceased original writ petitioner/allottee of the
disputed land, the fourth respondent obtained mutation of
revenue records colluding with the revenue officials. Having
found that the mutation in favour of the fourth respondent is not
legally sustainable, the Revenue Tribunal has rightly cancelled
the mutation effected in favour of the fourth respondent.
37.
As could be seen from the records, the second
respondent, without giving any notice and/or heard the original
allottee i.e. the deceased original writ petitioner in whose name
the allotment was made way back in the year 1984, has issued
the impugned corrigendum dated 12.6.2001 for replacing the
name of the fourth respondent as the allottee in place of the
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 28
name of the original allottee. Such an action of the second
respondent is admittedly in violation of the principles of natural
justice.
38.
In Carana Bank and others v. Debasis Das, (2003)
4 SCC 557, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held:
“13. Natural justice is another name for
commonsense justice. Rules of natural justice
are not codified canons. But they are principles
ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural
justice is the administration of justice in a
commonsense liberal way.
Justice is based
substantially on natural ideals and human
values. The administration of justice is to be
freed
from
the
narrow
and
restricted
considerations which are usually associated
with a formulated law involving linguistic
technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the
substance of justice which has to determine its
form.
14. The expressions “natural justice” and “legal
justice” do not present watertight classification.
It is the substance of justice which is to be
secured by both, and whenever legal justice
fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural
justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural
justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 29
technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical
prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a
formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no
form or procedure should ever be permitted to
exclude the presentation of a litigant’s defence.
15. The adherence to principles of natural
justice as recognized by all civilized States is of
supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body
embarks on determining disputes between the
parties, or any administrative action involving
civil consequences is in issue. These principles
are well settled. The first and foremost principle
is what is commonly known as audi alteram
partem rule.
It says that no one should be
condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of
this principle.
It must be precise and
unambiguous.
It should apprise the party
determinatively of the case he has to meet.
Time given for the purpose should be adequate
so as to enable him to make his representation.
In the absence of a notice of the kind and such
reasonable opportunity, the order passed
becomes wholly vitiated.
Thus, it is but
essential that a party should be put on notice of
the case before any adverse order is passed
against him. This is one of the most important
principles of natural justice. It is after all an
approved rule of fair play. The concept has
gained significance and shades with time.
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 30
When the historic document was made at
Runnymede
in
1215,
the
first
statutory
recognition of this principle found its way in to
the “Magna Carta”. The classic exposition of Sir
Edward Code of natural justice requires to
“vocate, interrogate and adjudicate”.
In the
celebrated case of Cooper v. Wandsworth
Board of Works2 the principle was thus stated:
(ER p.420)
“Even God himself did not pass sentence
upon Adam before he was called upon to
make his defence. ‘Adam’ (says God),
‘where art thou? Has thou not eaten of the
tree whereof, I commanded thee that thou
shouldest not eat?”
16. Principles of natural justice are those rules
which have been laid down by the Courts as
being the minimum protection of the rights of the
individual against the arbitrary procedure that
may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and
administrative authority while making an order
affecting those rights. These rules are intended
to prevent such authority from doing injustice.
17. What is meant by the term “principles of
natural justice” is not easy to determine. Lord
Summer (then Hamilton, L.J.) in R.v. Local
Govt. Board3 (KB at p. 199) described the
phrase as sadly lacking in precision. In General
Council of Medical Education & Registration of
U.K. v. Spackman4 Lord Wright observed that it
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 31
was no desirable to attempt “toforce it into any
Procrustean bed” and mentioned that one
essential requirement was that the Tribunal
should be impartial and have no personal
interest in the controversy, and further that it
should give “a full and fair opportunity” to every
party of being heard.
18. Lord Wright referred to the leading case on
the subject.
The most important of them is
Board of Education v. Ricer where Lord
Loreburn, L.C. observed as follows: (All ER p.
38 C-F)
“Comparatively recent statutes have
extended, if they have not originated, the
practice of imposing upon department or
officers of State the duty of deciding or
determining questions of various kinds. It
will, I suppose, usually be of an
administrative kind: but sometimes it will
involve matter of law as well as matter of
fact, or even depend upon matter of law
alone. In such cases, the Board of
Education will have to ascertain the law
and also to ascertain the facts. I need not
add that in doing either they must act in
good faith and listen fairly to both sides, for
that is a duty lying upon everyone who
decides anything. But I do not think they
are bound to treat such a question as
though it were a trial. … The Board is in
the nature of the arbitral tribunal, and a
court of law has no jurisdiction to hear
appeals from their determination, either
upon law or upon fact. But if the court is
satisfied either that the Board have not
acted judicially in the way which I have
described, or have not determined the
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 32
question which they are required by the
Act to determine, then there is a remedy
by mandamus and certiorari:
Lord Wright also emphasized from the
same decision the observation of the Lord
Chancellor that “the Board can obtain
information in any way they think best,
always giving a fair opportunity to those
who are parties to the controversy for
correcting or contradicting any relevant
statement prejudicial to their view”. To the
same effect are the observations of Earl of
Selbourne,L.O.in Spackman v. Plumstea
d District Board of Works [(1885) 10 AC
229 : 54 LJMC 81 : 53 LT 151] where the
learned and noble Lord Chancellor
observed as follows:
“No doubt, in the absence of special
provisions as to how the person who is to
decide is to proceed, law will imply no
more
than
that
the
substantial
requirements of justice shall not be
violated. He is not a judge in the proper
sense of the word; but he must give the
parties an opportunity of being heard
before him and stating their case and their
view. He must give notice when he will
proceed with the matter and he must act
honestly and impartially and not under the
dictation of some other person or persons
to whom the authority is not given by law.
There must be no malversation of any
kind. There would be no decision within
the meaning of the statute if there were
anything of that sort done contrary to the
essence of justice.”
Lord Selbourne also added that the
essence of justice consisted in requiring
that all parties should have an opportunity
of submitting to the person by whose
decision they are to be bound, such
considerations as in their judgment ought
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 33
to be brought before him. All these cases
lay down the very important rule of natural
justice contained in the oftquoted phrase
“justice should not only be done, but
should be seen to be done”.
19. Concept of natural justice has undergone a
great deal of change in recent years. Rules of
natural justice are not rules embodied always
expressly in a statute or in rules framed
thereunder. They may be implied from the
nature of the duty to be performed under a
statute. What particular rule of natural justice
should be implied and what its context should
be in a given case must depend to a great
extent on the facts and circumstances of that
case, the framework of the statute under which
the enquiry is held. The old distinction between
a judicial act and an administrative act has
withered away. Even an administrative order
which involves civil consequences must be
consistent with the rules of natural justice. The
expression “civil consequences” encompasses
infraction of not merely property or personal
rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations
and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide
umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen
in his civil life.
20. Natural justice has been variously defined
by different Judges. A few instances will suffice.
In Drew v. Drew and Lebura [(1855) 2 Macq1 :
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 34
25 LTOS 282 (HL)] (Macq at p. 8), Lord
Cranworth defined it as “universal justice”.
In James Dunber Smith v. Her Majesty the
Queen [(1877-78) 3 AC 614 (PC)] (AC at p.
623) Sir Robort P. Collier, speaking for the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, used
the phrase “the requirements of substantial
justice”,
while
in Arthur
Spackman v. Plumstead
District
John
Board
of
Works [(1885) 10 AC 229 : 54 LJMC 81 : 53 LT
151] (AC at p. 240), the Earl of Selbourne, S.C.
preferred
requirement
the
phrase
of
“the
substantial
justice”.
In Vionet v. Barrett [(1885) 55 LJRD 39] (LJRD
at p. 41), Lord Esher, M.R. defined natural
justice as “the natural sense of what is right and
wrong”.
While,
however,
deciding Hookings v. Smethwick Local Board of
Health [(1890) 24 QBD 712] Lord Esher, M.R.
instead of using the definition given earlier by
him in Vionet case [(1885) 55 LJRD 39] chose
to define natural justice as “fundamental
justice”. In Ridge v. Baldwin [(1963) 1 QB 539 :
(1962) 1 All ER 834 : (1962) 2 WLR 716 (CA)]
(QB at p. 578), Harman, L.J., in the Court of
Appeal countered natural justice with “fair play
in action”, a phrase favoured by Bhagwati, J.
in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1
SCC 248 : (1978) 2 SCR 621] . In H.K. (An
Infant), Re [(1967) 2 QB 617 : (1967) 1 All ER
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 35
226 : (1967) 2 WLR 962] (QB at p. 630), Lord
Parker, C.J. preferred to describe natural justice
as
“a
duty
Investments
to
act
fairly”.
Ltd. v. Secy.
In Fairmount
of
State
for
Environment [(1976) 1 WLR 1255 : (1976) 2 All
ER 865 (HL)] Lord Russell of Killowen
somewhat
picturesquely
described
natural
justice as “a fair crack of the whip” while
Geoffrey Lane, L.J. in R. v. Secy. of State for
Home Affairs, ex p Hosenball [(1977) 1 WLR
766 : (1977) 3 All ER 452 (CA)] preferred the
homely phrase “common fairness”.
21. How then have the principles of natural
justice been interpreted in the courts and within
what limits are they to be confined? Over the
years by a process of judicial interpretation two
rules have been evolved as representing the
principles of natural justice in judicial process,
including
therein
quasi-judicial
and
administrative process. They constitute the
basic elements of a fair hearing, having their
roots in the innate sense of man for fair play and
justice which is not the preserve of any
particular race or country but is shared in
common by all men. The first rule is “nemojudex
in causasua” or “nemodebetessejudex in
propriacausasua” as stated in Earl of Derby's
case [(1605) 12 Co Rep 114 : 77 ER 1390] that
is, “no man shall be a judge in his own cause”.
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 36
Coke
used
the
form
“aliquis
non
debetessejudex in propriacausa, quia non
potestessejudexet pars” (Co. Litt. 1418), that is,
“no man ought to be a judge in his own case,
because he cannot act as judge and at the
same
time
be
a
party”.
The
form
“nemopotestessesimul actor et judex”, that is,
“no one can be at once suitor and judge” is also
at times used. The second rule is “audi alteram
partem”, that is, “hear the other side”. At times
and particularly in continental countries, the
form “audietur et altera pars” is used, meaning
very much the same thing. A corollary has been
deduced from the above two rules and
particularly the audi alteram partem rule,
namely
“qui
aliquidstatuerit,
auditaalteraacquum
licet
parte
in
dixerit,
haudacquumfecerit” that is, “he who shall
decide anything without the other side having
been heard, although he may have said what is
right, will not have been what is right”
[see Boswel's case [(1605) 6 Co Rep 48b : 77
ER 326] (Co Rep at p. 52-a)] or in other words,
as it is now expressed, “justice should not only
be done but should manifestly be seen to be
done”. Whenever an order is struck down as
invalid being in violation of principles of natural
justice, there is no final decision of the case and
fresh proceedings are left upon (sic open). All
that is done is to vacate the order assailed by
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 37
virtue of its inherent defect, but the proceedings
are not terminated.”
39.
In Canara Bank v. V.K.Awasthy, (2005) 6 SCC 321,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court held:
"8. Natural justice is another name for commonsense justice. Rules of natural justice are not
codified canons. But they are principles
ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural
justice is the administration of justice in a
common-sense liberal way. Justice is based
substantially on natural ideals and human
values. The administration of justice is to be
freed
from
the
narrow
and
restricted
considerations which are usually associated
with a formulated law involving linguistic
technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the
substance of justice which has to determine its
form.
9. The expressions “natural justice” and “legal
justice”
do
not
present
a
watertight
classification. It is the substance of justice which
is to be secured by both, and whenever legal
justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose,
natural justice is called in aid of legal justice.
Natural justice relieves legal justice from
unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry
or
logical
prevarication.
It
supplies
the
omissions of a formulated law. As Lord
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 38
Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should
ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of
a litigant's defence.
……..
14. Concept of natural justice has undergone a
great deal of change in recent years. Rules of
natural justice are not rules embodied always
expressly in a statute or in rules framed
thereunder. They may be implied from the
nature of the duty to be performed under a
statute. What particular rule of natural justice
should be implied and what its context should
be in a given case must depend to a great
extent on the fact and circumstances of that
case, the framework of the statute under which
the enquiry is held. The old distinction between
a judicial act and an administrative act has
withered away. Even an administrative order
which involves civil consequences must be
consistent with the rules of natural justice. The
expression “civil consequences” encompasses
infraction of not merely property or personal
rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations
and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide
umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen
in his civil life.
40.
In Mangilal v. State of M.P., (2004) 2 SCC 447, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held:
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 39
"10. Even if a statute is silent and there are no
positive words in the Act or the Rules made
thereunder, there could be nothing wrong in
spelling out the need to hear the parties whose
rights and interest are likely to be affected by
the orders that may be passed, and making it a
requirement to follow a fair procedure before
taking a decision, unless the statute provides
otherwise. The principles of natural justice must
be read into unoccupied interstices of the
statute, unless there is a clear mandate to the
contrary. No form or procedure should ever be
permitted to exclude the presentation of a
litigant's defence or stand. Even in the absence
of a provision in procedural laws, power inheres
in every tribunal/court of a judicial or quasijudicial
character,
to
adopt
modalities
necessary to achieve requirements of natural
justice and fair play to ensure better and proper
discharge of their duties. Procedure is mainly
grounded on the principles of natural justice
irrespective of the extent of its application by
express provision in that regard in a given
situation. It has always been a cherished
principle. Where the statute is silent about the
observance of the principles of natural justice,
such statutory silence is taken to imply
compliance with the principles of natural justice
where
substantial
considerably
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
rights
affected.
The
of
parties
are
application
of
P a g e | 40
natural justice becomes presumptive, unless
found excluded by express words of statute or
necessary intendment. (See Swadeshi Cotton
Mills v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC 664 : AIR
1981 SC 818] .) Its aim is to secure justice or to
prevent miscarriage of justice. Principles of
natural justice do not supplant the law, but
supplement it. These rules operate only in areas
not covered by any law validly made. They are
a means to an end and not an end in
themselves. The principles of natural justice
have many facets. Two of them are : notice of
the case to be met, and opportunity to explain."
41.
In Prakash Ratan Sinha v. State of Bihar and
others, (2009) 14 SCC 690, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
observed as under:
"13. The law in this regard has been settled by
several decisions of this Court. The principle
that emerge from the decisions of this Court is
that, if there is a power to decide and decide
detrimentally to the prejudice of a person, duty
to act judicially is implicit in exercise of such a
power and that the rule of natural justice
operates in areas not covered by any law validly
made.
14. Corollary principles emanating from these
cases are as to what particular rule of natural
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 41
justice should apply to a given case must
depend to an extent on the facts and
circumstances of that case and that it is only
where there is nothing in the statute to actually
prohibit the giving of an opportunity of being
heard and on the other hand, the nature of the
statutory duty imposed on the decision maker
itself implies an obligation to hear before
deciding. These cases have also observed,
whenever an action of public body results in civil
consequences for the person against whom the
action is directed, the duty to act fairly can be
presumed
and
in
such
a
case,
the
administrative authority must give a proper
opportunity of hearing to the affected person.
……
19. The Division Bench of the Court does not
dispute the fact of passing of the impugned
order without hearing the appellant, but
condones the procedural irregularity by bringing
it under the “doctrine of futile exercise”.
According to the Court, even if an opportunity of
showing cause was afforded to the appellant, it
would not have made any difference.
20. We fail to understand the logic adopted by
the Division Bench. The reason being that it is
the
case
of
the
appellant
that
on
a
recommendation made by the Circle Promotion
Committee, he was regularly promoted to the
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 42
post of accounts clerk, since he had the
necessary qualification and experience and it is
his further case that though he was appointed
as a daily wager, right from his induction, he
was directed to discharge the work of accounts
clerk. It is also his case that on the
recommendation made by Circle Promotion
Committee,
the
incharge
Chief
Electrical
Engineer had passed an order approving the
recommendation and granting promotion to the
appellant to the post of accounts clerk.
21. However, it is the case of the respondents
that the Circle Promotion Committee had only
recommended the change of nomenclature
from that of daily wager to that of accounts clerk
and that it is not a case of regular promotion. It
is their further case, even assuming it is a case
of promotion, the same has been done without
following the prescribed procedure and also by
ignoring the claim of several other employees
and therefore, the respondents were justified in
cancelling the order passed by the incharge
Chief Electrical Engineer.
[Ed.: Para
corrected
vide
Official
Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./21/2010 dated
27-1-2010.] . In our view, these are all disputed
facts and the respondents without affording an
opportunity of hearing, could not have taken
any
administrative
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
decision
unilaterally.
P a g e | 43
Therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court
is not justified in concluding that under the
“useless formality theory” the rules of natural
justice need not have been followed by the
respondents."
42.
From the decisions supra, it is clear that the
principles of natural justice is one of the foremost product of
civilized jurisprudence that no action should be taken against a
person to affect his/her right or interest without giving reasonable
opportunity to him/her. A man cannot be deprived of his liberty
or property for any wrong, until he has had a fair opportunity of
answering the allegations against him. Therefore, the role of
natural justice casts a duty on all public authorities to decide
dispute in the exercise of legal power to follow the rule diligently.
The rule which is respected the world over cannot be immolated
or sacrificed at the altar of administrative celerity.
43.
When we consider the case of the petitioners in the
light of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, supra, this
Court is of the considered view that the impugned corrigendum
has been issued by the second respondent not only in violation
of the principles of natural justice, but also pending Revenue
Revision Case before the Revenue Tribunal. When the Revenue
Revision Case against the mutation order is pending before the
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 44
Revenue Tribunal, it is unfair on the part of the second
respondent in issuing the impugned corrigendum, that too, after
a gross delay of about 17 years.
44.
As rightly argued by the learned counsel for the
petitioners, the Secretary (Revenue) has no authority to usurp
the functions of the competent Revenue Court or Tribunal for
hearing the parties. Such being the position, any hearing made
and decision reached by the Secretary (Revenue) is null and
void.
As such, the decision of the Government cannot be
overruled by the impugned corrigendum dated 12.6.2001.
45.
As the present writ petition involves the legality and
correctness of the impugned corrigendum dated 12.6.2001, the
same could be decided under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
Therefore, the present writ petition is very well
maintainable. That apart, when the challenge to the impugned
corrigendum dated 12.6.2001 was on the ground of noncompliance of the principles of natural justice, as per the dictum
laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a catena of decisions, such
a challenge can always be examined by the High Court
exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India in a writ petition. It is well settled law that no one should be
condemned unheard.
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 45
46.
The fourth respondent sought correction in the
allotment order mainly on the ground that the mutation in respect
of the disputed land has been made in her favour and on the
strength of the mutation, she sought corrigendum for replacing
her name in the place of the deceased original writ petitioner in
the allotment order. As could be seen, the Revenue Tribunal has
set aside the mutation order dated 6.7.1999 issued in favour of
the fourth respondent under its order dated 18.4.2006.
47.
It is apposite to mention that the official respondents
are utterly silent and mummed qua the registered deed of
allotment dated 8.1.1985 executed in favour of the deceased
original writ petitioner and the payment of premium of
Rs.7,395.80p made by the deceased original writ petitioner on
7.1.1985, which was also counter-signed by the official
concerned on 11.1.1985.
When allotment in favour of the
deceased original writ petitioner, followed by the execution of
deed of allotment were done by the respondent authorities, the
second respondent cannot issue the impugned corrigendum.
48.
When the very mutation order dated 6.7.1999 itself
goes, automatically the impugned corrigendum also goes. Since
the impugned corrigendum dated 12.6.2001 has been issued
behind the back of the deceased original writ petitioner thereby
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 46
violating the principles of natural justice and without looking into
the rejection of the earlier request dated 19.1.1998 made by the
fourth respondent, this Court is of the view that the impugned
corrigendum dated 12.6.2001 is legally not sustainable in the eye
of law.
49.
At this juncture, the learned counsel for the fourth
respondent submitted that the fourth respondent is paying tax to
the Imphal Municipality in respect of the disputed land and she is
in continuous possession and enjoyment of the disputed land on
the strength as owner of the property. Merely because the fourth
respondent is paying tax to the Imphal Municipality, it does not
mean that the fourth respondent is the owner of the disputed
property. The receipts produced by the fourth respondents would
show that payment has been received from the fourth respondent
and no particulars have been mentioned in the said receipts qua
under what capacity she has paid the amounts. That apart, no
correlation record has been produced by the fourth respondent
to show that the said receipts are in connection with the disputed
property.
50.
It is reiterated that the documents produced by the
petitioners clearly prove that the allotment in question was made
in favour of the deceased original writ petitioner and not in favour
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 47
of the fourth respondent; the premium for allotment was paid by
the deceased original writ petitioner and not by the fourth
respondent; the allotment deed was executed and presented for
registration by the deceased original writ petitioner and not by the
fourth respondent; delivery of possession of the allotted land was
made and taken over by the deceased original writ petitioner and
not by the fourth respondent; the relevant patta and jamabandi of
the allotted land was prepared and recorded in the name of the
deceased original writ petitioner and not in the name of the fourth
respondent.
While so, with the influence of the respondent
authorities, the fourth respondent managed to obtain the
impugned corrigendum behind the back of the deceased original
writ petitioner. As stated supra, such corrigendum issued by the
second respondent is not legally sustainable and that too without
hearing the original allottee of the land in question. For all the
reasons stated above, this Court is of the view that the impugned
corrigendum dated 12.6.2001 is not sustainable in the eye of law
and, accordingly, the same is liable to be quashed.
51.
In the result,
(i)
The writ petition is allowed.
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
P a g e | 48
(ii)
The
impugned
12.6.2001
corrigendum
issued
by
the
dated
second
respondent is set aside.
(iii) There will be no order as to costs.
ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
FR/NFR
Sushil
WP(C) No. 2002 of 2001
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review