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06.02.2026
Court No. 06
Item No. 07
Sandip
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CIVIL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
C.O. 4236 of 2025
Nemai Chandra Modak
-VersusSmt. Kabita Ghosh & Anr.
Mr. Sounak Bhattacharya,
Mr. Souma Bhattacharya,
Mr. Anirban Saha Roy,
Mr. Debjit Mukherjee
…..for the petitioner
Mr. Amitabrata Roy,
Ms. Deboleena Ghosh
….for the opposite parties
1)
This is an application challenging an order
dated November 19, 2025 passed by the
learned Civil Judge, (Junior Division) 1 st Court
at Chandannagar, District – Hooghly.
2)
By the order impugned, the learned Court
rejected the applications under Sections 7(1)
and 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy
Act, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as the said
Act).
3)
Mr.
Sounak
Bhattacharya,
learned
advocate for the petitioner submits that the
order is misconceived. The learned Court failed
to take into consideration that the applications
under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the said Act
were both filed within a period of one month
from the receipt of summons. The learned
advocate for the tenant filed an application for
condonation of delay in filing the applications
under Sections 7(1) and 7(2). The learned Court
ought to have looked into the records and held
that the application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing
the applications under Section 7 of the said Act
was redundant. Thus, the learned Court should
have disposed of the applications on merits.
4)
Having perused the order impugned, it
appears that the learned Court recorded that
an application for condonation of delay of 28
days in filing the applications had been filed. It
was stated that summons were received by
registered post on September 27, 2022. Later,
the
defendant
wanted
to
withdraw
the
application, on the ground that summons
through the Court were delivered on November
17, 2022 and the petitions were filed on
November 24, 2022, that is, within seven days
from the receipt of the summons through court.
5)
The defendant also filed an application for
amendment
of
certain
portions
of
the
applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2)
seeking deletion of the date of service of
summons
and deletion
of the
prayer for
condonation of delay in filing the applications
beyond the statutory period.
6)
The plaintiff opposed such applications on
the ground that the applications were belated.
Condonation
of
delay
in
preferring
the
applications under Section 7 of the said Act
was not permissible in law and the Court did
not have any power to condone such delay. The
only option left to the court was to strike off the
defence.
7)
The
Court
held
that,
admittedly
an
affidavit was sworn by the defendant that, as
he was unwell he could not take steps prior to
the first week of November 2022, despite
receiving the summons on September 2022.
The said admission could not be withdrawn by
the defendant.
8)
As there were discrepancies with regard to
date of delivery of summons, the plaintiff filed
an application before the Superintendent of
Post regarding the date of service of summons
upon
the
tenant
by
registered
post.
The
Superintendent of Post issued a letter, inter
alia, stating that the summons were delivered
by the Post Office on September 27, 2022. The
plaintiff filed the postal receipt and the letter by
firisti, which disclosed that the addressee,
namely, the defendant Nemai Chandra had
received the summons on September 27, 2022
and
the
September
postal
23,
article
2022.
was
The
booked
Court
on
drew
a
presumption of service by applying decisions of
the Hon’ble Apex Court with regard to delivery
of summons on the basis of the postal report.
9)
Under such circumstances, by relying on
the various judgements of this Court and the
Hon’ble Apex Court, the learned Court was
cosntrained to hold that the petitioner did not
comply with the provisions of Sections 7(1) and
7(2), inasmuch as, those applications were filed
belatedly and not within the period of limitation
which had been provided in the sections itself.
The defendant did not approach the court
within one month from the date of receipt of
summons. Under such circumstances, finding
no other alternative the applications were
rejected and the consequential effect of such
rejection was striking off the defence of the
tenant.
10) Although
it
is
submitted
by
Mr.
Bhattacharya that the summons were delivered
through the Court bailiff only on November 22,
2022 and the applications under Sections 7(1)
and 7(2) were filed within a month, that is, on
November 24, 2022, the Court relied on the
documents furnished by the plaintiff which
contained a report from the post office that the
summons were received on September 27, 2022
by registered post. This fact was also accepted
in
the
original
applications
filed
by
the
petitioner under Section 7(1) and 7(2).
11) This Court is required to see whether the
petitioner had complied with the provisions of
Sections 7(1) and 7(2) in its letter and spirit.
12) The application under Section 7(1) has
been perused. There are averments where
default of rent is admitted. In paragraphs 5 and
6 of the application, the petitioner admitted
non-payment of rent from October 2021 till
October 2022 and prayed for an order allowing
deposit of the said arrears in instalments. This
itself shows that the petitioner has violated the
provisions of Section 7 of the said Section. The
provisions of the said Act are set out below :
“Section 7(1) provides as follows :
7 When a tenant can get the benefit of
protection against eviction.(1) (a) On a [suit] being instituted by the
landlord for eviction on any of the grounds
referred to in section 6, the tenant shall,
subject to the provisions of sub-section (2)
of this section, pay to the landlord or
deposit with [the Civil Judge] all arrears of
rent, calculated at the rate at which it was
last paid and upto the end of the month
previous to that in which the payment is
made together with interest at the rate of
ten per cent per annum.
(b)Such payment or deposit shall be made
within one month of the service of
summons on the tenant or, where he
appears in the [suit] without the summons
being served upon him, within one month of
his appearance.
(c)The tenant shall thereafter continue to
pay to the landlord or deposit with [the Civil
Judge] month by month by the 15th of
each succeeding month, a sum equivalent
to the rent at that rate.
(2) If in any [suit] referred to in sub-section
(1), there is any dispute as to the amount of
the rent payable by the tenant, the tenant
shall, within the time specified in that subsection, deposit with [the Civil Judge] the
amount admitted by him to be due from
him together with an application for
determination of the rent payable. No such
deposit shall be accepted unless it is
accompanied
by
an
application
for
determination of the rent payable. On
receipt of the application, [the Civil
Judge] shall, having regard to the rate at
which rent was last paid and the period for
which default may have been made by the
tenant, make, as soon as possible within a
period not exceeding one year, an order
specifying the amount, if any, due from the
tenant and, thereupon, the tenant shall,
within one month of the date of such order,
pay to the landlord the amount so specified
in the order:
Provided that having regard to the
circumstances of the case, an extension of
time may be granted by [the Civil Judge]
only once and the period of such extension
shall not exceed two months.
(3) If the tenant fails to deposit or pay any
amount referred to in sub-section (1) or subsection (2) within the time specified therein
or within such extended time as may be
granted, [the Civil Judge] shall order the
defence against delivery of possession to be
struck out and shall proceed with the
hearing of the [suit].”
13) In the decision of Seventh Day Adventist
Senior Secondary School v. Ismat Ahmed
and Others., reported in 2025 SCC Online SC
1696, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:“12. Bare reading of the aforesaid
provisions makes it clear that as per sub
section (1) of Section 7, in a suit for eviction
filed by the landlord on any grounds as
specified in Section 6 of the WBPT Act, the
tenant shall, subject to provisions of subsection (2), pay to the landlord or deposit in
the Court, all arrears of rent calculated at
the rate at which it was last paid together
with interest at the rate of ten per cent per
annum. As mandated by Section 7(1)(b),
the said payment or deposit shall be made
within one month from the date of service
of the summons on tenant or from the date
of appearance in case the tenant appears
without service of summons. The said two
provisions apply in a case where arrears of
rent are admitted. Thereafter, Section 7(1)
(c) puts a further condition that after the
admitted arrears are paid, the tenant shall
continue to pay or deposit with the landlord
or Civil Judge, as the case may be, a
monthly sum of rent at that rate on or
before fifteenth day of consecutive month.
13. As per sub-section (2), if there is a
dispute as to the amount of rent payable by
the tenant, he is required to deposit the
admitted amount due from him in the Court
within the time as specified [one month as
per Section 7(1)(b)] ‘together’ with an
application for determination of the rent
payable. It is emphasised that deposit of
rent shall not be accepted unless the said
prayer is accompanied with an application
for determination of the rent. Meaning
thereby, to seek protection against eviction,
the tenant is required to deposit the
admitted amount of rent within the time as
specified, i.e., within one month from the
date of summons served or where tenant
appears in the suit without the summons
being served upon him, along with an
application for determination of the rent so
payable. As such, in case where there is no
dispute as to arrears of rent, it ought to be
paid within a month and, in case it is in
dispute, even then, tenant would be
required to deposit within the same time
coupled with an application as discussed
above.
14. To supplement the aforesaid, word
‘together’ used in Section 7(2) preceding
‘with an application for determination of
the rent payable’ emphasises that the
deposit of admitted amount of rent within a
period of thirty days as specified must
accompany
the
application
for
determination of rent payable. At this
stage, we can profitably refer to ‘P.
Ramanatha
Aiyar’s
Advanced
Law
Lexicon’5 to understand the meaning of
‘together’. According to the same, ‘together’
means “in company” or “conjointly” or
“simultaneously”.
Accordingly,
on
contextual
application
of the
word
‘together’, it is clear that the application for
determination of rent must be filed within
the same period which is provided for
‘deposit’ or ‘pay’, i.e., thirty days.
15. On receiving such application, the
Court having regard to the rate of rent last
paid and period of which default has been
made by the tenant shall make an order on
such application not later than one year
and thereupon the tenant shall within the
period of one month of the date of such
order, pay to the landlord the amount so
specified in the order. That is to say, the
determination of the rent on the parameters
as specified in the latter part of sub-section
(2) and on such determination within one
month of the date of the order, the amount
as specified in the order is to be paid. The
proviso thereto deals with the extension of
time, which can only be once and not
beyond period of two months.
16. Having perused Section 7 of WBPT Act,
it is apparent that sub-section (1) is subject
to sub-section (2). Further, sub-section (3)
specifies consequences of non-compliance
of sub-sections (1) and (2) by the tenant,
leading to striking out of defence against
delivery of possession and the Court shall
proceed with the hearing of the suit. Subsection (4) of Section 7 of WBPT Act makes
it clear that in a proceeding of eviction, no
order for delivery of possession of the
premises to the landlord shall be passed by
the Court on the ground of default of
payment if the tenant deposits the rent
under sub-sections (1) or (2), but the Court
may allow such cost to the landlord as
deemed fit. As per proviso, it is clear that if
tenant was allowed the relief as indicated
hereinabove, but later he makes default in
payment of rent for four months within one
year or in case three successive rental
periods, where the rent is not payable
monthly, the relief of protection against
eviction available under sub-section (4)
cannot be allowed granting benefit of
protection against eviction to the tenant.
17. In view of the foregoing, while bringing
the said Section, the legislative intent was
to provide protection to the tenant against
eviction, subject to compliance of deposit of
arrears of rent if there is no dispute as to
amount of rent, within one month from the
date of service of summons, along with
interest at the rate of ten per cent per
annum. The tenant is further required to
deposit the regular rent as prescribed in
Section 7(1)(c). In case, there is a dispute of
the amount of rent payable, the tenant is
required to deposit the amount due as
admitted by him within thirty days and file
an application conjointly for determination
of rent within the same period. The said
application may possibly be entertained
and decided by the Court thereafter only.
This Court in the case of Bijay Kumar
(supra) had an occasion to consider the
scope of Section 7(2) of the WBPT Act
wherein the tenant had not deposited or
paid the admitted rent while moving an
application seeking determination of rent.
Trial Court while allowing such application
granted time to pay the admitted rent, but
High Court set-aside the order of the Trial
Court. While confirming the order of the
High Court on the issue of deposit of rent
admitted by tenant under Section 7(2) on
the application for determination of rent,
this Court observed as under – “21. …the
deposit of rent along with an application for
determination of dispute is a precondition
to avoid eviction on the ground of nonpayment of arrears of rent. In view thereof,
tenant will not be able to take recourse to
Section 5 of the Limitation Act as it is not
an application alone which is required to be
filed by the tenant but the tenant has to
deposit admitted arrears of rent as well.”
18. Thus, in case of disputed rent, this
Court was of the view that to avail the
benefit of protection against eviction under
the WBPT Act, the tenant has to do the
following to avoid eviction, first, to deposit
rent admitted by him to be due; second, an
application for determination of rent
payable be filed along with. The tenant had
neither deposited, nor paid the admitted
rent and had only filed the application for
determination of rent belatedly along with
an application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963.
***
***
29. In addition, Section 7(1) and first part
of sub-section (2) of Section 7 are
comparable, both requiring deposit/pay
admitted/undisputed amount of rent.
However, Section 7(2) casts an additional
obligation on the tenant to file an
application for determination for rent along
with such deposit within the specified time
frame. The Legislature in its wisdom did
not provide for any extension of time for
payment or deposit under Section 7(1),
making it clear that no such extension was
intended in the corresponding part in
Section 7(2). Since the deposit and
application are to be made together by the
tenant mandatorily within a specific time,
in our considered view, extension of time as
given in proviso to Section 7(2) is not
applicable to either. Therefore, the proviso
can only be construed to permit extension
in payment of amount so specified in order
of determination passed by the Civil Judge
as envisaged in the latter part of subsection (2) of Section 7. Stated differently,
the word ‘may’ used in the proviso of
Section 7(2) would only relate to extension
of time, which is a discretion vested with
the Civil Judge and it would not construe
any other meaning. Moreover, it can be
said that since in subsection (3) of Section
7, the consequence of non-compliance has
been specified, therefore, use of the word
‘shall’ in Sections 7(1)(a), 7(1)(b) and 7(2) is
a mandatory compliance for the tenant,
failing which, his defence against eviction
shall be struck off.
***
***
32. In the said context, if we see the intent
of legislature as discussed and relying
upon two cases of three-Judge Bench of
this Court, we intend to explain that Section
7 of the WBPT Act prescribes when a
tenant can get the benefit of protection
against eviction. The opening word of subsection (1) i.e., ‘on a suit being instituted by
the landlord for eviction’ makes it clear that
in case the tenant defaults in payment of
rent and the suit is brought as specified in
the WBPT Act, then on deposit/payment of
admitted rent, an opportunity ought to be
provided to get the benefit of protection
against eviction. Therefore, for availing
such benefit, some pre-requisites are there,
which is of deposit of the rent, either
disputed or undisputed as admitted, within
the specified time. In case, the rent is
disputed, the tenant has to mandatorily file
an application, by virtue of word ‘shall’
used to such extent either in Section 7(1)(a)
(b)(c) or first part of Section 7(2). However,
in the latter part of Section 7(2), which is for
payment of amount on determination by
the Civil Judge within the time as specified
after compliance of the pre-deposit and on
filing an application for determination
within the specified time, such payment
has to be made by the tenant within one
month of date of order passed by Civil
Judge. The proviso refers to extension of
time with an intent to grant one more
opportunity
to
the
tenant
after
determination of rent for deposit.
33. At this juncture, we also deem it
relevant to refer sub-section (3) of Section 7,
wherein it is specified that if tenant fails to
deposit or pay any amount referred in subsection (1) or sub-section (2) within the time
specified therein or within such extended
time as may be granted by the Court, his
defence against delivery of possession
shall be struck out. So it deals with the
following contingencies; first is of Section
7(1)(a)(b)(c), second is of former part of
Section 7(2) and third is of latter part of
Section 7(2) and in default of either of the
situations, the Judge shall order the
defence against delivery of possession to
be struck out and shall proceed with the
hearing of the suit specifying the
consequences of failure to do any of the
three situations. While using the word
extended time in sub-section (3), the word
shall has been used, therefore, this would
also be referable to the provision which
leads to the conclusion that in case the
tenant fails to deposit the determined
amount within the time specified or within
the extended time. In that contingency the
order of striking out of defence be passed
and suit be proceeded for hearing. As
explained from above discussion, we are
constrained to say that the arguments as
advanced by the learned counsel for the
appellant relying upon the paragraphs 17,
18 and 19 of the judgment in Debasish
Paul (supra) are not germane, hence
repelled.”
14) The law casts a duty upon a tenant to file
an application under Section 7(1) of the said
Act within 30 days from receipt of summons,
by depositing the admitted arrears and then to
go on paying the monthly rent under Section
7(1)(c). The arrears are to be deposited within
30 days from the date of receipt of summons.
Moreover, payment of admitted arears cannot
be done in instalments. It has to be done at one
time. The tenant had not only failed to deposit
the arrears, but also waited for an order
allowing
deposit
of
admitted
arrears
in
instalments. The application under Section 7(2)
was filed, praying for an order to determine the
arrears and allow the petitioner to pay back the
said arrears in easy instalments. Such prayer
was
also
misconceived.
Under
such
circumstances, even if this Court discounts the
factual discrepancy with regard to the date of
receipt of summons, the tenant’s obligation to
deposit the admitted arrear is a mandate of law
and the only recourse available to the tenant,
to protect himself from suffering an order of
delivery of possession in a suit for eviction. This
revisional application is dismissed.
15) The order striking out the defense is a
natural consequence for non-compliance of 7(1)
and
7(2).
Under
such
circumstances,
the
validity or legality of the order striking out the
defence need not be further dewelled upon.
However, striking out the defence will not
prevent the tenant from cross-examining the
plaintiff, in order to demolish the plaint case.
However, the petitioner shall not be entitled to
raise his own defence or advance his case
through such cross-examination. He is only
entitled to demolish the plaint case by pointing
out the falsities or defects or weaknesses in the
plaint case.
16) Accordingly, the revisional application is
disposed of without any order as to costs.
17) Urgent photostat certified copy of the
order, if applied for, be given to the parties,
upon usual undertakings.
(Shampa Sarkar, J.)
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