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SUNITA
GOSWAMI
Digitally signed
by SUNITA
GOSWAMI
Date: 2026.02.05
14:58:12 +0530
2026:CGHC:6504-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
FA No. 208 of 2023
Reserved on 23/01/2026
Pronounced on 05/02/2026
Nayan Dutta S/o Late Tappan Dutta, Aged About 42 Years, R/o Near Station
Pond Manendragarh, District : Koriya, Chhattisgarh
... Appellant/Defendant
versus
Dr. K.K. Agrawal S/o Late Pardesi Lal Agrawal, Aged About 65 Years, R/o Dr.
K. K Agrawal Heart Centre Ameri Road, Nehru Nagar Bilaspur, Tehsil And
District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent
For Appellant
: Mr. Shakti Raj Sinha, Advocate
For Respondent
: Mr. H.B. Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel
appears along with Ms. A. Sandhya Rao,
Advocate
DB: Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal &
Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
C A V Judgment
Per Sanjay S. Agrawal, J
1)
This appeal has been preferred by the appellant/defendant under
Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, questioning the
legality and propriety of the judgment and decree dated 20.10.2023
passed by the First Additional District Judge, Bilaspur (C.G.) in Civil
Suit No.5-B/2017, whereby, the plaintiff’s claim, has been decreed
entitling him to a sum of Rs.56,00,000/- (Rs. Fifty six lacs only) payable
by the defendant along with the interest @ 6% per annum from the
date of institution of the suit, i.e. 24.01.2017, till the delivery of the
judgment, within a period of two months, else it shall carry interest @
7.5 % per annum till its realization. Parties shall be referred hereinafter
as per their description before the concerned trial Court.
2)
Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the plaintiff instituted a suit
claiming refund of Rs.56,00,000/- along with the interest, alleging inter
alia, that the defendant- Nayan Dutta assured him to get the admission
of his son, namely, Hemang Agrawal, who has passed his M.B.B.S.
(Bachelor of Medicine, Bachelor of Surgery) course, for pursuing P.G.
(Post Graduate) course in Government Medical College at Kolkata, as
he had linked with Hon’ble the Chief Minister and, based upon the
alleged assurance, he got a sum of Rs.56,00,000/- from him on
different dates. It is pleaded by him that in pursuance to the alleged
assurance, he obtained a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- on 10.05.2012 and
thereafter, paid him Rs. 25,00,000/- on 06.10.2012 in presence of Dr.
Badri Jaiswal and Bhagwati Prasad Saraf and, has given him further a
sum of Rs.13,70,000/- on 29.08.2013 from his locker of Bank of
Maharashtra, which was counted by its employee, namely, Lalchand
Soni. It is pleaded further by the plaintiff that based upon his alleged
assurance, he again paid him Rs.3,00,000/- and Rs.1,50,000/- on
31.08.2013 and 01.10.2013, respectively through the Cheque bearing
No.0744215 and 0744216 drawn from the State Bank of India and
thereafter, paid him Rs.4,70,000/- through the Cheque bearing
No.042380 drawn from the Union Bank of India from his wife’s account
on 03.09.2013 and on the same day, he again paid him Rs.2,10,000/through the Cheque bearing No.0149973 drawn from the Axis Bank,
which was issued by his son- Hemang Agrawal. The alleged Cheques
were given to the defendant in the name of his proprietorship firm,
known as “Abhay Chhattisgarh”. It is pleaded further that the
defendant, later on, informed him that, despite the instructions of
Hon’ble the Chief Minister, the D.M.E. is not providing the admission to
his son and has demanded additional sum of Rs.5,00,000/- and,
therefore, he again gave him a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- from his locker, on
18.10.2013 in presence of Dr. Badri Jaiswal. It is pleaded further that
the defendant while assuring him to get his son’s admission in
Government Medical College for pursuing his P.G. course, has
obtained a total sum of Rs.56,00,000/- on different dates, therefore,
upon knowing that he was defrauded by him, a Criminal Case was filed
by him for the offence punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 and
471 of IPC in connection with Crime No.75/2016 and has constrained
to institute the suit in the instant nature for the recovery of the alleged
amount of Rs.56,00,000/- along with the interest from the date of
institution of the suit, till its realization.
3)
While contesting the aforesaid claim, it was pleaded by the defendant
that he never received the alleged amount of Rs.56,00,000/- from the
plaintiff while assuring him to get his son admitted into the Government
Medical College at Kolkata for his P.G. course. According to him, he
received Rs.3,00,000/- on 31.08.2013 from the plaintiff, while
Rs.1,50,000/-,
Rs.4,70,000/-
and
Rs.2,10,000/-
on
01.10.2013,
03.09.2013 and 03.09.2013, respectively, as shown in plaint para 8 and
9, but the same was, in fact, borrowed by him for the construction of his
house and, not for the alleged assurance, as alleged by him and it was
pleaded further that the said amount, so received, has already been
refunded to him.
4)
After considering the evidence led by the parties, it was held by the trial
Court that the defendant while alluring the plaintiff to get his son
admitted into the Government Medical College at Kolkata for pursuing
his P.G. course has obtained the alleged amount of Rs.56,00,000/-, on
different dates. It held further that since the defendant has denied to
receive the alleged amount while assuring him to get his son’s
admission in Government Medical College for pursing his P.G. course,
therefore, it cannot be said that, it was paid contrary to any unlawful
agreement. In consequence, the plaintiff’s claim has been decreed.
5)
Mr. Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the
finding of the trial Court holding that the defendant has taken an
amount of Rs.56,00,000/- from the plaintiff even in absence of any
cogent and reliable evidence to this effect, is apparently contrary to the
materials available on record. While referring to paras 4 and 5 of the
plaint, it is contended further that since the claim is made based upon
the alleged assurance which is unlawful, therefore, claim as made
ought to have been dismissed. In support, he placed his reliance upon
the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Kuju
Collieries Ltd. Vs. Jharkhand Mines Ltd. and Ors., reported in
(1974) 2 SCC 533 and N.V.P. Pandian, Vs. M.M. Roy, reported in AIR
1979 Madras 42.
6)
On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff has
supported the impugned judgment and decree as passed by the trial
Court.
7)
We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused
the entire record.
8)
From perusal of the evidence of the plaintiff- Dr. K.K. Agrawal (PW-1), it
appears that though, it was stated by him that the alleged amount was
given to the defendant, but neither any receipt to this effect was
obtained from him, nor even has shown the said facts in his Income
Tax Return. It, however, reveals from the written statement, as well as,
the evidence of the defendant- Nayan Dutta, wherein, it was admitted
by him regarding the receiving of an amount of Rs.11,30,000/-, that it
was received as a loan for the construction of the house. The burden
is, therefore, shifted upon him to establish the fact that this much of
amount, i.e. Rs.11,30,000/-, was received by him as a loan from the
plaintiff on different dates as pleaded by him in his written statement,
but no evidence to this effect has, however, been placed on record, so
as to hold that the alleged amount of Rs.11,30,000/- was taken by him
as a loan for the construction of his house. It, thus, appears that neither
the plaintiff has placed any material evidence on record in order to
prove that he paid Rs.56,00,000/- to the defendant, nor the defendant
has led any evidence that he received the alleged amount of
Rs.11,30,000/- from the plaintiff as a loan for the construction of his
house.
9)
Be that as it may, it, however, appears from a bare perusal of the
pleadings made at paras 4 and 5 that, the entire case of the plaintiff is
based upon the fact that he was assured by the defendant- Nayan
Dutta to obtain a ‘seat’ for his son’s admission in Government Medical
College at Kolkata for pursuing his P.G. course, if he would lend him
the alleged amount of Rs.56,00,000/-, as he was a strong link with
Hon’ble the Chief Minister of the State. It, however, appears from the
record that since he could not get the ‘seat’ in the Government Medical
College at Kolkata for pursuing the P.G. course of his son, despite the
alleged assurance given by the defendant, an FIR (Ex.P-11) in
connection with Crime No.75/2016 was registered against him for the
offence punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of IPC and,
simultaneously, a suit in the instant nature for recovery of the alleged
amount of Rs.56,00,000/-, has been instituted on 24.01.2017.
10)
According to the averments made at para 4 of the plaint, it appears that
the plaintiff wanted to get the admission of his son in Government
Medical College at Kolkata for pursuing his P.G. course based upon the
alleged assurance given by the defendant. The plaintiff and defendant,
both are, thus, involved in unlawful activities for the admission of
plaintiff’s son in Government Medical College at Kolkata for pursuing
his P.G. course, though, were aware that it was not possible to be done
according to the law. Therefore, such an assurance made by the
defendant for the alleged purpose cannot be held to be lawful or any
action could even be made for its breach being contrary to the public
policy, as held by the Supreme Court in the matter of Kuju Collieries
Ltd. Vs. Jharkhand Mines Ltd. and Ors., reported in (1974) 2 SCC
533, wherein, it has been held at para 8 as under :-
“8.
A Full Bench of five Judges of the
Hyderabad High Court in Budhulal v. Deccan
Banking Company (AIR 1955 Hyd. 69 (FB))
speaking through our brother, Jaganmohan Reddy
J., as he then was, referred with approval to these
observations of the Privy Council. They then went
on to refer to the observations of Pollock and
Mullah in their treatise on Indian Contract and
Specific Relief Acts, 7th Edn. to the effect that
Section 65, Indian Contract Act does not apply to
agreements which are void under Section 24 by
reason of an unlawful consideration or object and
there being no other provision in the Act under
which money paid for an unlawful purpose may be
recovered back, an analogy of English Law will be
the best guide. They then referred to the reasoning
of the learned authors that if the view of the Privy
Council
is
right
namely
that
“agreements
discovered to be void” apply to all agreements
which are ab-initio void including agreements
based on unlawful consideration, it follows that the
person who has paid money or transferred
property to another for an illegal purpose can
recover it back from the transferee under this
section even if the illegal purpose is carried into
execution and both the transferor and transferee
are in pari delicto. The Bench then proceeded to
observe:
"In our opinion, the view of the learned authors is
neither supported by any of the subsequent Privy
Council decisions nor is it consistent with the
natural meaning to be given to the provisions of
Section 65. The section by using the words 'when
an agreement is discovered to be void' means
nothing more nor less than: when the plaintiff
comes to know or finds out that the agreement is
void. The word 'discovery' would imply the preexistence of something which is subsequently
found out and it may be observed that Section 66,
Hyderabad Contract Act makes the knowledge
(11m) of the agreement being void as one of the
pre-requisites for restitution and is used in the
sense of an agreement being discovered to be
void. If knowledge is an essential requisite even an
agreement ab-initio void can be discovered to be
void subsequently. There may be cases where
parties enter into an agreement honestly thinking
that it is a perfectly legal agreement and where
one of them sues the other or wants the other to
act on it, it is their that he may discover it to be
void. There is nothing specific in Section 65 Indian
Contract Act or its corresponding section of the
Hyderabad Contract Act to make it inapplicable to
such cases”.
“A person who, however, gives money for an
unlawful purpose knowing it to be so, or in such
circumstances that knowledge of illegality or
unlawfulness can as a finding of fact be imputed to
him, the agreement under which the payment is
made cannot on his part be said to be discovered
to be void. The criticism that if the aforesaid view is
right then a person who has paid money or
transferred property to another for illegal purpose
can recover it back from the transferee under this
section even if the illegal purpose is carried into
execution, notwithstanding the fact that both the
transferor and transferee are in pari delicto, in our
view, overlooks the fact that the courts do not
assist a person who comes with unclean hands. In
such
cases,
the
defendant
possesses
an
advantage over the plaintiff- in pari delicto potior
est conditio defendentio”.
Section 84, Indian Trust Act, however, has
made an exception in a case - where the
owner of property transfers it to another for
illegal purpose and such purposes is not
carried it into execution or the transferor is
not as guilty as the transferee or the effect
of permitting the transferee to retain the
property might be to defeat the provisions of
any law the transferee must hold the
property for the benefit of the transferor.
“This specific provision made by the legislature
cannot be taken advantage of in derogation of the
principle that Section 65, Contract Act, is in
applicable where the object of the agreement was
illegal to the knowledge of both the parties at the
time it was made. In such a case the agreement
would be void ab initio and there would be no
room for the subsequent discovery of that fact”.
“We consider that this criticism as well as the view
taken by the Bench is justified. It has rightly
pointed out that if both the transferor and
transferee are in pari delicto the courts do not
assist them”.
11)
While placing reliance upon the aforesaid decision, the Madras High
Court in the matter of N.V.P. Pandian, Vs. M.M. Roy, reported in AIR
1979 Madras 42, while dealing with the similar question, as arises
herein, held at paras 10 to 12 as under :-
“10. The next question for consideration is whether
in such circumstances the respondent would be
entitled to maintain an action to refund of the
money. The learned trial Judge has granted a
decree for refund of the money in favour of the
respondent on the ground that she was a less
guilty party. There is absolutely no evidence at all
available in the case for this finding of the lower
court. There is no evidence except the ipse dixit of
P. W. 1 that the appellant volunteered to procure a
seat for the respondent's son in the Madras
Medical College provided the latter would pay him
Rs.15,000/-. It is the specific case of the
respondent that she was trying for a seat for her
son in the Madras Medical College and that it was
in that connection that she paid Rs. 15,000/- to the
appellant on the latter promising to get a seat. In
the circumstances, it could only be concluded that
only the respondent must have approached the
appellant for necessary help in the matter of
securing the seat for her son in the Medical
College. Therefore, both the appellant and the
respondent must be considered to be in pari
delicto. Where each party is equally in fault the law
favours him who is actually in possession. The
maxim in pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis
is founded on the principles of public policy, which
will not assist a plaintiff who has paid over money
or handed over property in pursuance of an illegal
or immoral contract, to recover it back, for the
Courts will not assist an illegal transaction in any
respect. In Sita Ram v. Radha Bai (AIR 1968 SC
534) it has been held thus : (at p. 537)
"The principle that the courts will refuse to
enforce an illegal agreement at the instance of a
person who is himself a party to an illegality or
fraud is expressed in the maxim 'in pari delicto
potior est conditio possidentis'.......... But there are
exceptional cases in which a man will be relieved of
the consequences of an illegal contract into which
he has entered-cases to which the maxim does not
apply. They fall into three classes : (a) where the
illegal purpose has not yet been substantially
carried into effect before it is sought to recover
money paid or goods delivered in furtherance of it;
(b) where the plaintiff is not in pari delicto with the
defendant; (c) where the plaintiff does not have to
rely on the illegality to make out his claim...........
Where the parities are not in pari delicto, the less
guilty party may be able to recover money paid or
property transferred, under the contract. This
possibility may arise in three situations: Firstly, the
contract may be of a kind made illegal by statute in
the interests of a particular class of persons of
whom the plaintiff is one. Secondly, the plaintiff
must have been induced to enter into the contract
by fraud or strong pressure. Thirdly, a person who
is under a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff will not be
allowed to retain property, or to refuse to account
for moneys received, on the ground that the
property or the moneys have come into his hands
as the proceeds of an illegal transaction."
The present case does not fall in any of the
exceptional cases referred to above.
11. In Kuju Collieries v. Jharkhand Mines (AIR 1974
SC 1892) a mining lease was given in favour of the
plaintiff contrary to the provisions of Mines and
Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948
and the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949. There
was proof to show that the plaintiff could not have
been in ignorance of the legal position. On the
basis of the lease, the plaintiff did not get
possession of the leased property and, therefore
the plaintiff instituted the suit for recovery of
possession of the leased property along with
mesne profits or in the alternative for refund of the
sum of Rs. 80,000/- and certain other sums. After
the institution of the suit the relief in respect of
possession of the mines became unenforceable in
view of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. Therefore, the
only relief which was pressed by the plaintiff was
his claim for the refund of Rs. 80,000/-
Alagiriswami, J. on behalf of the Court held that
the lease in favour of the plaintiff was contrary to
the
provisions
of
the
Mines
and
Minerals
(Regulation and Development) Act, 1948 and the
Mineral Concession Rules, 1949 and as such void
from its inception. Consequently, payment of the
sum of Rs. 80,000/- was not made lawfully, nor was
it done under a mistake or under coercion and it
could not be recovered. An attempt was made
before the Supreme Court to bring the case within
Section 65, 70, or 72 of the Contract Act. In dealing
with this contention, it was observed that S. 65
makes a distinction between an agreement and a
contract. According to S. 2 of the Contract Act an
agreement which is enforceable by law is a contract
and an agreement which is not enforceable by law
is said to be void.
Therefore, when the earlier part of the section
speaks of an agreement being discovered to be
void it means that the agreement is not enforceable
and is therefore not a contract. It means that it was
void. It may be that the parties or one of the parties
to the agreement, knows that agreement was in law
not enforceable. They might have come to know
later that the agreement was not enforceable. The
second part of the section refers to a contract
becoming void. That refers to a case where an
agreement which was originally enforceable and
was therefore a contract becomes void due to
subsequent happenings.
In both these cases any person who has
received any advantage under such agreement or
contract is bound to restore such advantage, or to
make compensation for it to the person from whom
he received it. But where even at the time when the
agreement is entered into both the parties knew
that it was not lawful and, therefore, void, there was
no contract but only an agreement and it is not a
case
where
it
is
discovered
to
be
void
subsequently. Nor is it a case of the contract
becoming void due to subsequent happenings.
Therefore, S. 65 of the Contract Act did not apply."
It also ruled out the applicability of Sections 70 and
72 of the Contract Act on the ground that the
payment of the money was not made lawfully, nor
was it done under a mistake or under coercion. In
coming to this conclusion, the Supreme Court
approved the decision of the Hyderabad High Court
in Budhulal v. Deccan Banking Co. (AIR 1955 Hyd.
69) (FB).
12. Following these decisions, it has to be held that
the instant case falls clearly under the maxim pari
delicto
potior
est
conditio
possidentis.
The
respondent must have known when she paid Rs.
15,000, that she was paying the money for an
illegal object or an object opposed to public policy.
She cannot in any way be considered to be less
guilty party as none of the situations contemplated
in Sitaram v. Radha Bai AIR 1968 SC 534 is
present. I therefore follow the decisions in Kunju
Collieries v. Jharkhand Mines AIR 1974 SC 1892
and in Ratanchand v. Askar AIR 1976 An. Pra112,
and hold that the respondent is not entitled to a
refund of the money from the appellant. The
respondent herself could not get the relief she
wanted without setting up and proving the illegal
object for which she had paid the money. I therefore
set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court,
dismiss the suit and allow the appeal with costs”.
12)
The principles laid down in the the matter of Kuju Collieries Ltd.
(supra) has further been reiterated recently by the Supreme Court in
the matter of Loop Telecom And Trading Ltd. Vs. Union of India and
Anr., reported in (2022) 6 SCC 762, and, in the light of the principles
laid down in the above referred matters, the plaintiff would, therefore,
not be entitled to maintain the claim based upon the alleged assurance
given by the defendant for fulfillment of his unlawful purpose for
obtaining the admission of his son in the Government Medical College
at Kolkata for pursing P.G. course of his son.
13)
Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and
decree dated 20.10.2023 passed by the First Additional District Judge,
Bilaspur in Civil Suit No.5-B/2017, is hereby dismissed.
No order as to cost(s).
A decree be drawn accordingly.
Sd/(Sanjay S. Agrawal)
Judge
sunita
Sd/(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
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