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THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM: GANGTOK
(Civil Extra Ordinary Jurisdiction)
DATED: 13th APRIL, 2017
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------S.B.: HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, JUDGE
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RFA No. 06 OF 2016
Appellants :
1.
Smt. Naina Kala Sharma,
W/o Shri Deepak Kumar Rai
2.
Miss Shriya Rani Rai,
D/o Shri Deepak Kumar Rai
3.
Miss Shiksha Rani Rai,
D/o Shri Deepak Kumar Rai,
All residents of Jorethang Road, Namchi,
P.O. and P.S. Namchi, South Sikkim.
(Plaintiffs/Appellants No.2 & 3 being minors are
represented by their mother & next friend Plaintiff/
Appellant No.1)
Versus
Respondent:
Shri Deepak Kumar Rai,
S/o Late Dhan Bahadur Rai,
R/o Jorethang Road,
Near Manav Utthan Seva Samity,
P.O. and P.S. Namchi, South Sikkim.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. Rajendra Upreti, Advocate for the Appellants.
Mr. A.K. Upadhyaya, Senior Advocate with Ms. Aruna Chettri,
Advocate,
for the Respondent.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.
The Plaintiffs are the Appellants before this Court,
assailing the Judgment and Decree dated 29.02.2016 passed by the
learned District Judge, South Sikkim at Namchi, in Title Suit No. 43
of 2013, dismissing the Suit filed by the Plaintiffs.
2.
The case of the Appellants is that the Appellant No.1
was married to the Respondent in the year 1993 and Appellants No.
2 and 3 were born from the wedlock. They led a peaceful married
life initially, both being government servants and posted in different
places. In 1995, they rented accommodation in Namchi and started
living in the same house. It is alleged by the Appellant No.1 that
their marriage then entered a turbulent phase with the Respondent
ill-treating her both physically and mentally. In May 2008, the house
constructed on the disputed landed property was completed,
therefore, they shifted residence there. Both the land and the house
thereon are the subjects of dispute.
3.
The Appellant No.1 asserts that the plot of land bearing
Khasra No. 814 and Khatiyan No. 375 (described in the Schedule to
the Plaint as Plot No. 320, measuring an area of .0230 hectares)
situated at Tinjer Block, South Division, South Sikkim, was in fact
owned by her father, who gifted it to her as ‘Daijo’ (Marriage gift).
The Respondent being landless pressurized her to transfer the land
in his name, to which she succumbed under threats of abandonment
held out by the Respondent. A Sale Deed was accordingly executed
by her father in favour of the Respondent, showing a token payment
of money by the Respondent for transferring the aforesaid land,
when in fact, no money exchanged hands. Accordingly, the Suit land
was registered in the name of the Respondent. In the year 2013,
the Appellant No.1 moved an Application for divorce under Section
13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which was accordingly
allowed by the Family Court on 17.06.2013, consequent to which
the Respondent turned hostile. A Petition was also filed by the
Appellant No.1 under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 leading to a compromise on 18.07.2013.
4.
Relying
on
Exhibit-9,
which
is
the
Panchayat
recommendation addressed to the District Collector informing
therein that the land claimed by the Respondent was in fact the
‘Daijo’ land given to the Appellant No.1, it was requested therein
that the land be transferred and registered in the name of
Appellants No.2 and 3. It is the Appellant’s case that the said
document clearly indicated that the disputed land was her ‘Daijo’
property. She seeks to fortify her case by averring that her sisters
were also given ‘Daijo’ property by her father. It was also averred
that she has contributed to construction of the disputed building by
availing of loan. Thus, the Appellants, inter alia, sought for a decree
declaring that the Suit land is ‘Daijo’ property of the Appellant No.1
and the Respondent has no right, title and interest over it, while
Appellants No.2 and 3 are entitled to partition and registration of the
Suit property in their names.
5.
The Respondent opposed the allegations and contended
that the Suit property is his self-acquired property, purchased by
him in the year 1998, from the father of the Appellant No.1 at a
consideration value of Rs.30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand) only,
and denies that the Suit property was gifted as ‘Daijo’ to the
Appellant No.1. That, the Suit land has been registered in his name
duly following the procedure for registration of land, prevalent at the
material time with the consent of the family members of the
Appellant No.1, the executor of the Sale Deed being the Appellant’s
father himself. That, plots of land were gifted to the sisters of the
Appellant No.1, only in the year 2007, whereas the Respondent
purchased the disputed plot of land in the year 1998, whereupon he
constructed a two and a half storied building by obtaining a housing
loan from the State Bank of India, Ravangla Branch, which has been
duly repaid by deductions made from his salary. The allegation of
the Appellant that she had obtained loan for construction is denied
and it is put forth that whatever was obtained by her was for her
personal use and not for construction of the property. Nevertheless,
he has no plans to dispose of the property as alleged by the
Appellant, hence the Suit being devoid of merit, deserves dismissal.
6.
On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned
Trial Court settled nine Issues for determination as follows;
“1. Whether the suit is maintainable? (OPP)
2. Whether the suit is barred by the law of
limitation? (OPD)
3. Whether the suit land is the „daijo‟ property of
the Plaintiff No.1? (OPP)
4. Whether the building standing on the suit land
was constructed by the Plaintiff No.1? (OPP)
5. Whether there was only a sham transaction
(and not actual sale transaction) pertaining to the
suit land between the father of the Plaintiff No.1
and the Defendant? (OPP)
6. Whether the Defendant pressurized the Plaintiff
No.1 for the concerned transaction? (OPP)
7. Whether the Plaintiffs have any right, title or
interest over the suit land and the building
constructed thereon? (OPP)
8. Whether the Defendant can be regarded as
having no right, title and interest over the suit
land and the building standing thereon? (OPP)
9. Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs
as prayed for by them? (OPP)”
The learned Trial Court on consideration of the evidence
furnished by the parties decided all Issues against the Plaintiffs and
dismissed the Suit of the Plaintiffs by the impugned Judgment,
hence this Appeal.
7.
Before this Court, the averments made in the learned
Trial Court were reiterated in the arguments of the learned Counsel.
Assailing the Judgment of the learned Trial Court, it was urged by
the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the Suit cannot be barred
by limitation, as it is for partition and correction of records of rights,
for which no limitation has been prescribed. Apart from the above
argument, it was contended that the Appellants No. 2 and 3 are the
daughters of the Respondent and have to be treated as coparceners
capable of demanding partition. That, it is unimaginable that the
building was constructed alone by the Respondent as both the
Respondent and the Appellant No.1 are government employees and
she has contributed to the construction.
8.
Per contra, the arguments advanced by learned Senior
Counsel for the Respondent was that no issue was settled before the
learned Trial Court for partition of the Suit properties, neither was
any issue framed as to whether it was a joint property and
therefore, these matters cannot now be raised in appeal. That, the
Appellants have not sought for cancellation of the land records of
the Suit property registered in the Respondent’s name and
therefore, no reliefs as prayed can be granted. It was further argued
that the period of limitation for filing a Suit to cancel or set aside an
instrument or decree or for the recession of a contract is three years
as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, while the Respondent
has been in uninterrupted possession of the Suit property from the
year 1998 and hence, the Suit is clearly barred by the aforesaid
provisions of Law, apart from Article 65 of the same Act. That, the
Appellant has failed to produce any gift deed or any other document
to establish her claim that the property was ‘Daijo’ property and she
failed to raise any objection against the registration or mutation of
the Suit land in favour of the Respondent till the filing of the present
Suit in the year 2013. The building on the Suit land was constructed
by the Respondent by availing of bank loan duly supported by
evidence. Besides, the Appellant No.1 has failed to show that either
the vendor late Dilli Ram Sharma her father, or she herself were
pressurized by the Respondent to sell the Suit land to him and
register it in his name. The property is therefore, clearly self-
acquired property of the Respondent and hence the Appeal be
dismissed.
9.
I have heard the parties at length and given due consideration
to their submissions. I have also carefully perused all documents on
record and the pleadings.
10.
The only questions for consideration before this Court are;
(i)
Whether
the
Suit
property
is
the
‘Daijo’
property of the Appellant No.1 gifted to her on
her marriage or whether it is the self acquired
property of the Respondent?
(ii)
Ancillary thereto, it has to be considered
whether the Appellants have any right, title or
interest over the Suit land and the building
constructed thereon and whether the Suit is
barred by limitation?
11.
The constant refrain of the Appellant No.1 is that the
property is her ‘Daijo’ property, in other words, the plot of land
bearing No. 320 measuring an area of .0230 hectares at Namchi
Bazar Block was gifted to her by her father on her marriage. To
buttress this claim, she draws strength from Exhibit-9, a document
allegedly prepared by her brothers, neighbours, friends and wellwishers. It is indeed relevant to point out that this document
although addressed to the District Collector, South Sikkim, was
never submitted before him. It is evident that Exhibit-9 is not
substantiated by any documentary evidence to the effect that the
Suit property was indeed gifted to the Appellant No.1. How the
document is of assistance to the Appellant is indeed unfathomable.
All that the Appellant No.1 has been able to fortify her claim with is
the allegation that in terms of parity, two of her sisters were also
gifted property by her father. These claims, I am afraid are of no
assistance to her unless backed by documentary evidence. No
records exist to indicate transfer of the Suit land to the Appellant
No.1 by way of gift or otherwise by her father at any point of time.
In fact, by filing Exhibit No.10 and Exhibit No.11, she has given
substance to the claim of the Respondent, thereby fortifying the fact
that the Suit property was registered in his name, consequent to a
valid deed of transfer, being the Sale Deed document Exhibit-11,
indicating sale of the Suit land by Dilli Ram Sharma, admittedly the
father of the Appellant No.1, to the Respondent on 20.03.1998. It
thus carries a presumption that the transaction was genuine. The
witnesses furnished by the Appellant No.1 before the learned Trial
Court have failed to lend any credence to her claims.
12.
Thus, I have to disagree with the argument advanced by
learned Counsel for the Appellants, that there is over whelming
evidence to hold that the Suit property is the ‘Daijo property of the
Appellant No.1. To the contrary, there is an absence of any evidence
whatsoever to buttress her claims. All the evidence on record leads
to the untrammelled view that the property was indeed the self
acquired property of the Respondent duly supported by Exhibit-10
and Exbibit-11. It had been claimed by the Appellant No.1 that she
had contributed to the construction of the building standing thereto
but once again, it has to be propounded that this claim finds no
support of any documentary evidence. Exhibit-13 purporting to be
the loan deduction document of the Appellant No.1 has been filed to
substantiate her contention. Unfortunately, this document being
devoid of any details, save that the balance opened with loan
amount being transferred therein, has no bearing to the Appellants
case.
13.
It would thus be appropriate now to address the
question of the Appellants right, title and interest over the Suit land.
14.
It was vehemently contended by learned Counsel for the
Appellants that the Appellants No.2 and 3 being coparceners to the
property are entitled to seek partition thereof. In this regard, it may
be pointed out that the Mitakshara concept of coparcenary is based
on the notion of the birth right of son, son’s son and son’s son’s son
(See V. Venugopala Ravi Verma Rajah v. Union of India and
another1). It is pertinent to point out that the daughter has also
been made coparcener by virtue of Hindu Succession (Amendment)
Act, 2005. This Court having reached a finding that the property in
dispute was a self acquired property, we may refer to the decision of
C.N. Arunachala Mudaliar, Appellant v. C. A. Muruganatha
Mudaliar and another2, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court while
referring to the decision of Rao Balwant vs. Rani Kishori3 and
discussing the Law laid down in Mitakshara in regard to father’s
right of disposition of his self acquired property, held that the father
of a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law has full and
uncontrolled powers of disposition over his self-acquired immovable
property and his male issue could not interfere with these rights in
any way. Thus, in the light of the decision in C.N. Arunachala
Mudaliar (supra) and considering that daughters have been
included as coparceners in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, I have
to opine that no rights are conferred to Appellants No. 2 and 3 for
partition, in view of the property being the self acquired property of
the Respondent. In any event, it would be essential to clarify that
this Court is aware that the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 has not
been extended or enforced in Sikkim and the Sikkim Succession Act
promulgated in 2008, rules the roost.
15.
The question of partition having thus been settled, now
what remains for consideration is whether the Suit is barred by
limitation. Undoubtedly, the Suit is said to be one for Declaration,
Partition and Correction of documents. In this context, we may refer
to Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which deals with obtaining
declaration and indicates the period of limitation for seeking a relief
to be three years. That apart, assuming that the Appellant in fact
sought for setting aside of the records of rights of the Respondent,
here too, the limitation in terms of Article 59 of the Limitation, is
three years. In view of the above stated circumstances, it is clear
that the Suit is barred by limitation.
1. AIR 1969 SC 1094
2. AIR 1953 S. C. 495
3. 25 Ind App-54 (PC) (B)
16.
In the end result, I find that there is no reason to
interfere with the findings of the learned Trial Court.
17.
Appeal stands dismissed.
18.
No order as to costs.
19.
Records of the learned Trial Court be transmitted
forthwith.
Sd/-
( Meenakshi Madan Rai )
Judge
13-04-2017
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