Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 – ss. 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 52A, 53(1A) – Stamp Duty – Refund of – The appellant booked a residential flat – He purchased e-SBTR stamp paper for amount of Rs.8,44,500/- – Dispute arose with the builder – Appellant filed consumer complaint before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) – Complaint was allowed – The developer refunded the entire consideration – Appellant claimed refund of stamp duty – The said claim was rejected by the Deputy Inspector of Registration on the ground that the application for refund was not made within six months as mandated by s.48(3) of 1958 Act – The High Court affirmed the view of the Revenue Authorities that the application for refund was barred by limitation – On appeal, held: Revenue Authorities rejected the application on the ground that the application was not filed within six months, treating the case to fall within the residuary provision in s.48 of the Act – What this view missed is, if the application for refund is not with reference to the provisions of s.47, the period of limitation in s.48 clearly has no application – Since the application of the appellant does not fall within the purview of s.47, the six month limitation period prescribed in s.48 would not be applicable – The application filed by the appellant does not fall within the ambit of ss.47, 52 and 52A – Appellant’s application for refund was titled with reference to the provisions of s.47 – It is well settled that a reference of a wrong statutory provision, cannot oust the citizen of an entitlement to refund which otherwise follows in terms of a statutory provision – In the instant case, the stamp paper was purchased bona fide, and the conduct of the appellant was not unreasonable nor was there any intentional or wanton delay – As a general rule of law, the right to refund is a statutory creation – A refund can be sought in terms envisaged by statute – The case of the appellant is not specifically barred by any substantive provision – In the case of an eventuality such as the instant case where the facts of the case are not covered by the statute, the Supreme Court u/Art.142 will have the power to condone delay – Since the delay in filling the application for refund in the instant case was due to the prolonged proceedings before the NCDRC, the application cannot be rejected on the ground of delay – As a consequence, the appellant is entitled to a refund of stamp duty which was paid at the time of purchase of the e-stamp paper, conditional on the appellant returning the e-stamp paper to the collector of stamps.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Section 48 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 begins with the statement that the application for relief under Section 47 shall be made within the periods which are indicated in clauses (1), (2) and (3). In other words, the periods of limitation which are prescribed in clauses (1), (2) and (3) are in respect of those cases which are governed by Section 47. The revenue authorities rejected the application filed by the appellant on the ground that the application was not filed within six months from the date of the purchase of the stamp paper, treating the case to fall within the residuary provision in Section 48 of the Act. This view has been accepted by the Single Judge of the Bombay High Court. What this view misses is that Section 48 in its entirety applies only to those cases where the application for relief is governed by Section 47. If the application for refund is not with reference to the provisions of Section 47, the period of limitation in Section 48 clearly has no application. Since the application of the appellant does not fall within the purview of any of the clauses in Section 47, the 6 month limitation period prescribed in Section
48 would not be applicable to the application for allowance filed by the appellant. [Paras 17 and 18][634-E-H; 635-A-B]
2. The application filed by the appellant did not fall within the ambit of Sections 47, 52 and 52A. It is true that the application for refund was titled with reference to the provisions of Section
47. But, it is well settled that a reference of a wrong statutory provision, cannot oust the citizen of an entitlement to refund which otherwise follows in terms of a statutory provision. [Para 28][640-B-C]
3. In the present case, the stamp paper was purchased bona fide in view of the agreement to sell which was to be executed by the appellant with the developer. There was a dispute with the developer which led to the institution of the proceedings before the NCDRC. There was nothing untoward in the conduct of the appellant and certainly no unreasonable delay on the part of the appellant in awaiting the outcome of the proceedings. The NCDRC allowed the complaint giving the option to the appellant of either going ahead with the agreement along with an award of compensation or, in the alternative, to seek a refund with interest. The appellant having exercised the latter option applied within two months from the order of the NCDRC for the grant of refund. The conduct of the appellant, therefore, cannot be held to be unreasonable nor was there any intentional or wanton delay on the part of the appellant in applying for a refund of stamp duty. Such an application must be filed within a reasonable period. [Para 29][640-C-F]
4. As a general rule of law, the right to refund is a statutory creation. A refund can be sought in terms envisaged by statute. As discussed above, the case of the appellant is not specifically barred by any substantive provision. It is an established principle that this Court while exercising its power under Article 142 of Constitution must not ignore and override statutory provisions but must rather take note of the express statutory provisions and exercise its discretion with caution. Therefore, if a statute prescribes a limitation period, this Court must be slow to interfere with the delay under Article 142. However, in the case of an eventuality such as the instant case where the facts of the case are not covered by the statute, this Court under Article 142 will have the power to do complete justice by condoning the delay. This Court is of the view that since the delay in filling the application for refund in the instant case was due to the prolonged proceedings before the NCDRC, the application cannot be rejected on the ground of delay. A litigant has no control over judicial delays. A rejection of the application for refund would violate equity, justice and fairness where the applicant is made to suffer the brunt of judicial delay. Therefore, this is a fit case for the exercise of the power under Article 142 of the Constitution. [Para 31][641-C-F]
5. As a consequence, it is directed that the appellant would be entitled to a refund of the stamp duty which was paid at the time of the purchase of the e-stamp paper, conditional on the appellant returning the e-stamp paper to the Collector of Stamps, Mumbai. The refund shall be processed within a period of one month of the delivery of the e-stamp paper to the Collector. [Para 32][641-G; 642-A]
Committee-GFIL vs Libra Buildtech Private Limited and Others (2015) 16 SCC 31: [2015] 11 SCR 420; AR
Anthulay v. RS Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602: [1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 1; Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584: [1991] 1 Suppl. SCR 251; Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998)
4 SCC 409: [1998] 2 SCR 795 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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