Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 – Art.2(b) of the Schedule and ss.5 and 8 – Limitation of suits relating to alienation of ancestral immovable property – Gift Deed by one ‘U’ in favour of predecessor of the respondents in respect of the land in question – Suit filed by original appellant for declaration that the gift deed was void – Suit disposed of in terms of the compromise wherein the original appellant was to be given the land in question after the death of ‘U’ – Execution petitions filed by original appellant, dismissed – Eventually, original appellant filed fresh suit for possession – Plea of respondents that the suit was barred by limitation – Contested by appellants relying on the second part of Art.2(b) of the 1920 Act as also s.14 of the 1963 Act – Held: Second part of Art.2(b) postulates that the time from which limitation period would commence to file a suit for possession would be the date on which the “declaratory decree is obtained”– In execution proceedings, mere passing of the judgment by Court is not enough but a decree has to be drawn on the basis of declaratory judgment which is then put into execution – In the present case, even though the declaratory judgment was pronounced in the previous suit on
20 th August,1963, on the basis of compromise entered, the declaration could be given effect to only after the death of ‘U’– Decree being a conditional decree was enforceable only thereafter – Decree sheet drawn on 19 th August, 1972 and the suit for possession filed thereafter on 11th June, 1974, was thus, within the prescribed period of limitation in terms of Art.2(b) of the Schedule of 1920 Act – Further, s.14 of the 1963 Act is also attracted in the present case and the tests specified in s.14 are satisfied for showing indulgence to the plaintiff to exclude the period during which the plaintiff pursued execution proceedings for reckoning the period of limitation for filing the suit for possession – Trial Court and appellate court right in decreeing the suit in favour of the original appellant by rejecting the objection regarding the suit being barred by limitation – Limitation Act, 1963 – ss.14, 29(2) and Art.136 – Limitation Act, 1908 – ss.4 to 25.
Words & Phrases – ‘Obtained’ – Meaning of, in the context of Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 – Art.2(b) of the Schedule. Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 was enacted to amend and consolidate the law governing the limitation of suits relating to alienations of ancestral immovable property and appointments of heirs by persons who follow custom in the area to which the Act would apply. Section 8 of the 1920 Act postulates that when any person obtains a decree declaring that an alienation of ancestral immovable property or appointment of an heir is not binding on him according to custom, the decree shall enure for the benefit of all persons entitled to impeach the alienation or the appointment of an heir. For such a declaratory suit, the limitation is provided in the schedule. Article 2 of the Schedule also envisages that the period of limitation for a suit for possession of ancestral immovable property which has been alienated, on the ground that alienation is not binding on the plaintiff according to custom, inter alia, within three years from the date the declaratory decree is obtained. In the present case, the declaratory decree was passed on 20th August, 1963 on the basis of the compromise between the original appellant and the predecessor of the respondents. However, that being a conditional decree, the right to sue for possession would not have accrued until the death of ‘U’ which happened only on 14th January, 1971. [Paras 13, 14] [1040-D-F; 1041-F, G]
1.2 The expression “declaratory decree is obtained” would take within its fold the event of drawing of or preparation of the decree. Notably, the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court had accepted the stand taken by the plaintiff that the compromise decree was prepared or drawn on 19 th August, 1972. Even the High Court had not reversed that finding. [Para 15] [1042-C]
1.3 The expression “obtain”, as understood in common parlance and defined in Concise Oxford English Dictionary, would mean - “acquire, secure, have granted to one”. This may also encompass obtaining a copy of the decree. In central legislation, the expression is made explicit by providing “for obtaining a copy of the decree”. The expression “obtained”, therefore, would presuppose, in the context of reckoning limitation period for filing a suit for possession, of securing a certified copy of the decree (decree-sheet) on the basis of which, the suit for possession could be instituted. In other words, the date on which the decree is drawn would be the relevant date for commencement of limitation period. As in the case of execution proceedings, mere passing of the judgment by the Court is not enough but a decree has to be drawn on the basis of such declaratory judgment which is then put into execution. Applying the same analogy, if a suit for possession is founded on a declaratory decree it could proceed only after a drawn up decree on the basis of a declaratory judgment of the Civil Court is made ready and obtained by the decreeholder. The expression “the declaratory decree is obtained”, therefore, assumes significance. If the legislature intended to provide it differently, it could have couched the provision as “the date on which the declaratory judgment is passed”. The legislature in enacting 1920 Act, however, consciously used the expression “the declaratory decree is obtained”, which intrinsically includes the date on which a formal decree is drawn or prepared and not merely the date on which a declaratory judgment is passed by the Court. Taking any other view would be rewriting the expression “the declaratory decree is obtained” and doing violence to the legislative intent. Besides, the expression “obtained” in Article 2(b) is prefixed by expression “is”; and further it follows with expression “whichever is later”. Even this would reinforce the position that the date on which the declaratory decree is drawn could ignite the period of limitation for instituting a suit for possession and not a mere declaratory judgment rendered by the Court in the previous suit (for declaration simplicitor). Taking any other view will render the last part of Article 2(b), providing for “whichever is later” nugatory and otiose. [Paras 16, 17] [1042-F-G; 1043-A; 1043-B-E]
1.4 As in the present case, even though the declaratory judgment was pronounced by the Court in the previous suit on 20th August, 1963, on the basis of compromise that declaration could be given effect to only after the death of ‘U’. The decree as passed was enforceable only thereafter. The decree sheet having been made ready on 19th August, 1972 and the suit for possession filed three years thereafter on 11 th June, 1974, was thus within the prescribed period of limitation in terms of Article 2(b) of the Schedule to the 1920 Act. [Para 20] [1045-C, D]
1.5 The fact situation of the present case would certainly satisfy the tests specified in Section 14 of the 1963 Act, for showing indulgence to the plaintiff to exclude the period during which the plaintiff pursued execution proceedings for reckoning the period of limitation for filing the suit for possession on 11th June, 1974. The expanse of Section 14 of the Limitation Act,1963 is not limited to mere jurisdictional issue but also other cause of a like nature. What is posited by Section 14 of the 1963 Act is the exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, for which the concerned Court is unable to entertain the lis. [Paras 22, 23] [1047-F; 1048-A]
1.6 Section 5 of the 1920 Act is explicit and it unambiguously postulates that the suit referred to in the First Schedule to the said Act would be governed by the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 25 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act, 1908. Section
14 of the 1963 Act would be attracted in the fact situation of the present case, in light of Section 5 of the 1920 Act and also Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act coupled with the fact that there is no express provision in the 1920 Act, to exclude the application of Section
14 of the 1963 Act. Trial Court and the Appellate Court were right in decreeing the suit in favour of the predecessor of the appellants by rejecting the objection regarding the suit being barred by limitation. The High Court committed manifest error in overturning the decisions of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. [Para 24, 26 and 28] [1048-C; 1049-A; 1049-D, E]
Lala Balmukund (Dead) Through LRs. v.. Lajwanti and Ors. (1975) 1 SCC 725 : [1975] SCR 44 ; Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and Ors. (2008) 7 SCC 169 : [2008] 5 SCR 1108 ; Union of India and Ors. v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. and Anr. (2004) 3 SCC 458 : [2004] 2 SCR 642 – relied on.
W.B. Essential Commodities Supply Corpn. v..Swadesh Agro Farming & Storage Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. (1999) 8 SCC 315 : [1999] 2 Suppl. SCR 399 ; CST v. Parson Tools and Plants (1975) 4 SCC 22 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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