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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
Case No: HCP No. 44/2026
Reserved on : 10.09.2026
Pronounced on : 18.09.2026
Uploaded on:18.09.2026
Mohd. Yousuf, age 49 years,
S/O Hakim Din, R/O Salwah, Tehsil
Mendhar, District Poonch through his
wife Farida Bi, age 42 years W/O
Mohd. Yousuf, R/O Salwah, Tehsil
Mendhar, District Poonch.
…Petitioner(s)/Appellant(s)
Through: Mr. C.M.Koul, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. A.R.Bhat, Advocate
Vs.
1. Union Territory of Jammu and
Kashmir through Additional Chief
Secretary Home, Civil Secretariat,
Jammu/Srinagar.
2. District Magistrate Poonch (J&K).
3. Senior Superintendent of Police,
Poonch.
4. Screening Committee of District
Poonch
through
Senior
Superintendent of Police (Chairman)
Poonch.
Through:
…. Respondent(s)
Mr. Dewakar Sharma, Dy.AG
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1. The petitioner, through the medium of the present petition, has
challenged the detention order bearing no. DMP/PSA/01 of 2026
dated 27.04.2026 issued by respondent No.2-District Magistrate,
Poonch (hereinafter referred to as “the detaining authority”) whereby
Mohd. Yousuf, S/O Hakim Din, R/O Salwah, Tehsil Mendhar,
HCP No.44/2026
District Poonch (hereinafter referred to as “the detenue” has been
taken into preventive detention with a view to prevent him from
acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
2. The petitioner has challenged the impugned order on the grounds that
the allegations made in the grounds of detention, even if taken to be
true at their face value, do not amount to a situation that would
endanger public order. It has been contended that the activities in
which the petitioner is allegedly found to be involved can, at best, be
a problem of “law and order”; therefore, it was not open to the
detaining authority to pass the impugned order of detention on the
basis of the said activities. It has been contended that there has been
non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority,
inasmuch as the grounds of detention are identical to the averments
made in the dossier submitted by the Senior Superintendent of Police,
Poonch, and there has been no independent application of mind by
the detaining authority while issuing the impugned order of
detention.
3. It has been contended that the petitioner has not been provided with
the translated version of the material relied upon by the detaining
authority, as a result of which he was unable to make an effective
representation against the impugned order of detention. It has been
further contended that the representation made by the petitioner
against the impugned order of detention has not been considered by
the respondents.
4. The respondent-detaining authority has filed its affidavit in
opposition to the writ petition. In the affidavit, it has been submitted
HCP No.44/2026
that, keeping in view the prejudicial activities of the petitioner, his
preventive detention had become imperative so as to deter him from
acting or indulging in prejudicial activities. It has been further
submitted that all the constitutional and statutory safeguards have
been adhered to by the detaining authority while passing and
executing the impugned order of detention. It has been submitted that
the impugned order of detention has been passed on the basis of the
criminal antecedents of the petitioner, which is apparent from the
material placed before the detaining authority. According to the
respondents, the detention order has been passed after due
consideration of the continuing prejudicial activities of the detenue
and on the basis of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining
authority derived from the material available on record. It has been
submitted that the detenue has been supplied with all the material on
the basis of which the grounds of detention have been framed and he
has also been informed about his right to make a representation. In
order to lend support to their contentions, the respondents have
produced the detention record.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and I have also gone
through the material on record including the detention record.
6. Although learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has raised
numerous grounds for assailing the impugned order of detention, his
main thrust was on the argument that the activities mentioned in the
grounds of detention cannot form a basis for passing order of
preventive detention, as the same, even if taken to be true, do not
have the potential of disturbing “public order”.
HCP No.44/2026
7. In the above context, the grounds of detention bear reference to four
FIRs; FIR No. 129/2018 for the offences under Sections 353/382
RPC, registered with Police Station Mendhar; FIR No. 24/2019 under
Sections 341/147/336/323/382 RPC, registered with Police Station
Mendhar; FIR No. 217/2024 for the offences under Sections
109/191(2), 191(3)/115(2)/307 BNS and 4/25 Arms Act, registered
with Police Station Mendhar; and FIR No. 38/2026 for the offences
under Sections 126(2)/115(2)/191(2)/307/351(2) BNS, registered with
Police Station Mendhar.
8. According to learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, all
these FIRs relate to incidents pertaining to personal enmity between
the petitioner and the complainant/injured, and these incidents do not
have the potential of disturbing “public order”.
9. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has
contended that this Court, while exercising its writ jurisdiction,
cannot undertake a judicial review of the subjective satisfaction
arrived at by the detaining authority on the basis of the material
available before it, and that it is not open to this Court to go into the
sufficiency or otherwise of the material on the basis of which the
order of detention has been passed.
10.The scope and power of the court in deciding the legality of an order
of preventive detention has been discussed by the Supreme Court in
the case of Ameena Begum Vs. The State of Telangana and
others, 2023 INSC 788. In the said case, the Supreme Court after
surveying its previous judgment on the issue has observed as under :-
HCP No.44/2026
“25. Be that as it may, culling out the principles of law
flowing from all the relevant decisions in the field, our
understanding of the law for deciding the legality of an order of
preventive detention is that even without appropriate pleadings
to assail such an order, if circumstances appear therefrom
raising a doubt of the detaining authority misconceiving his
own powers, the Court ought not to shut its eyes; even not
venturing to make any attempt to investigate the sufficiency of
the materials, an enquiry can be made by the Court into the
authority’s notions of his power. Without being remotely
concerned about the sufficiency or otherwise of the materials
on which detention has been ordered, the Court would be
justified to draw a conclusion, on proof from the order itself,
that the detaining authority failed to realize the extent of his
own powers. This is quite apart from questioning the action for
want of sufficient materials that were before the detaining
authority. The authority for the detention is the order of
detention itself, which the detenu or the Court can read. Such a
reading of the order would disclose the manner in which the
activity of the detenu was viewed by the detaining authority to
be prejudicial to maintenance of public order and what exactly
he intended should not be permitted to happen. Any order of a
detaining authority evincing that the same runs beyond his
powers, as are actually conferred, would not amount to a valid
order made under the governing preventive detention law and
be vulnerable on a challenge being laid. In the circumstances of
a given case, a Constitutional Court when called upon to test
the legality of orders of preventive detention would be entitled
to examine whether
(i)
the order is based on the requisite satisfaction, albeit
subjective, of the detaining authority, for the absence of
such satisfaction as to the existence of a matter of fact or
law, upon which validity of the exercise of the power is
HCP No.44/2026
predicated, would be the sine qua non for the exercise of
the power not being satisfied;
(ii)
in reaching such requisite satisfaction, the detaining
authority has
applied
its
mind
to all
relevant
circumstances and the same is not based on material
extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute;
(iii)
power has been exercised for achieving the purpose for
which it has been conferred, or exercised for an
improper purpose, not authorised by the statute, and is
therefore ultra vires;
(iv)
the detaining authority has acted independently or under
the dictation of another body;
(v)
the detaining authority, by reason of self-created rules of
policy or in any other manner not authorized by the
governing statute, has disabled itself from applying its
mind to the facts of each individual case;
(vi)
the satisfaction of the detaining authority rests on
materials which are of rationally probative value, and
the detaining authority has given due regard to the
matters as per the statutory mandate;
(vii) the satisfaction has been arrived at bearing in mind
existence of a live and proximate link between the past
conduct of a person and the imperative need to detain
him or is based on material which is stale;
(viii) the ground(s) for reaching the requisite satisfaction
is/are such which an individual, with some degree of
rationality and prudence, would consider as connected
with the fact and relevant to the subject-matter of the
inquiry in respect whereof the satisfaction is to be
reached;
HCP No.44/2026
(ix)
the grounds on which the order of preventive detention
rests are not vague but are precise, pertinent and
relevant which, with sufficient clarity, inform the detenu
the satisfaction for the detention, giving him the
opportunity to make a suitable representation; and
(x)
the timelines, as provided under the law, have been
strictly adhered to.
Should the Court find the exercise of power to be bad
and/or to be vitiated applying any of the tests noted above,
rendering the detention order vulnerable, detention which
undoubtedly
visits
the
person
detained
with
drastic
consequences would call for being interdicted for righting the
wrong.”
11.From the foregoing analysis of the legal position, it is clear that,
while considering the legality of an order of preventive detention, the
Court can make an inquiry into the authority’s notion of its power,
without being concerned about the sufficiency or otherwise of the
material on the basis of which the detention order has been passed. If,
upon perusing the grounds of detention, it appears to the Court that
the detaining authority has acted beyond its power, it would be open
to the Court to interfere with the detention order. While testing the
legality of the detention order, the Court has to see whether the
requisite satisfaction has been arrived at by the detaining authority
with some degree of rationality and prudence.
12.As already stated the star ground that has been raised by learned
Senior counsel for the petitioner for assailing the impugned order of
detention is that the activities mentioned in the grounds of detention,
by no stretch of reasoning, can pose a danger to public order. In view
HCP No.44/2026
of the legal position discussed hereinbefore, it would be open to this
Court to go into the issue as to whether, on the basis of rational
consideration of the grounds of detention, the incidents mentioned
therein have the potential of disturbing public order or whether the
said incidents are only an issue of law and order. Before undertaking
such an exercise, it would be necessary to understand the distinction
between “public order” and “law and order”. While activities
amounting to disturbance of “public order” give power to a detaining
authority under the provisions of the J&K Public Safety Act to pass an
order of preventive detention, the activities which merely pose a threat
to “law and order” cannot form the basis for passing an order of
preventive detention.
13.The Supreme Court in the case of Ram Manohar Lohia Vs. State of
Bihar, 1966 (1) SCR 709 has properly explained the difference
between “law and order” and “public order” in the following words:“54.***Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder.
Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder.
When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not
public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to
maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground
that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two
fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to
raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and
order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other
examples can be imagined. The contravention of law always
affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it
must affect the community or the public at large. A mere
disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not
HCP No.44/2026
necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act
but disturbances which subvert the public order are.
55. It will thus appear that just as ‘public order’ in the rulings
of this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders
of less gravity than those affecting ‘security of State’, ‘law and
order’ also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those
affecting ‘public order’. One has to imagine three concentric
circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within
which is the next circle representing public order and the
smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see
that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as
an act may affect public order but not security of the State.”
14.In the same judgment, the Supreme Court has further explained as
under:
“3. *** Public order was said to embrace more of the
community than law and order. Public order is the even tempo
of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or
even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be
distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do
not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general
disturbance of public tranquillity. It is the degree of
disturbance and its affect upon the life of the community in a
locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts
only to a breach of law and order. ... It is always a question of
degree of the harm and its affect upon the community. ... This
question has to be faced in every case on facts. There is no
formula by which one case can be distinguished from another."
15.Again in the case of Kuso Sah Vs. State of Bihar, 1974 (1) SCC 185
the Supreme Court explained the two concepts in the following
manner:-
HCP No.44/2026
“4. *** The two concepts have well defined contours, it
being well established that stray and unorganised crimes of
theft and assault are not matters of public order since they
do not tend to affect the even flow of public life. Infractions
of law are bound in some measure to lead to disorder but
every infraction of law does not necessarily result in public
disorder. ***
6.*** The power to detain a person without the safeguard of
a court trial is too drastic to permit a lenient construction
and therefore Courts must be astute to ensure that the
detaining authority does not transgress the limitations
subject to which alone the power can be exercised. ***”
16.From the foregoing analysis of legal position, it becomes clear that if
the offending acts relate to disturbance of flow of life of the
community, it amounts to an act prejudicial to maintenance of public
order, but if the offending acts are merely directed against an
individual without disturbing the public order, it may be a case of
disturbance of “law and order” warranting no action under the
preventive detention laws.
17.Turning to the facts of the case, the incidents pertaining to the four
FIRs mentioned above need to be noticed to ascertain whether the said
incidents would fall within the category of danger to “public order” or
whether the same can be categorized merely as incidents of “law and
order” problem.
18.Subject matter of FIR No. 129/2018 is an incident dated 03.08.2018
relating to one Riaz Ahmed, an employee of the Panchayat, who was
attacked by the petitioner. After investigation of the case, it was found
that the petitioner had approached the said official in relation to some
HCP No.44/2026
Panchayat-related work and there was a verbal altercation between
them, which escalated into a physical fight. The offence under Section
353 RPC was found established against the petitioner.
19.The incident which is the subject matter of FIR No. 24/2019 relates to
an attack launched by the petitioner upon one Mohd Adrees Khan.
After investigation, it was found that there was prior enmity between
the petitioner and the injured. The allegations of snatching and theft
were not substantiated, and only the offences under Sections 341 and
323 RPC were found established against the petitioner.
20.The subject matter of FIR No. 217/2024 is an incident dated
18.11.2024. It was found, after investigation of the case, that during a
wedding event, while the guests were having meals, a verbal
altercation took place between the complainant party and the accused
persons, including the petitioner, which escalated into a fight between
the two parties. Offences under Sections 117(2), 115(2), 125, 228 and
2(5) of the BNS were found established against the petitioner, but the
offence of attempt to murder was not found established against him.
21.The subject matter of FIR No. 38 of 2026 relates to an incident dated
11.03.2026. After the investigation, it was found that the petitioner
and his associates assaulted the complainant party while they were
proceeding towards Jaba carrying their luggage. One of the injured
persons received grievous injuries. It is also mentioned in the grounds
of detention that the State has already applied for cancellation of bail
granted to the petitioner in the aforesaid FIR.
22.Besides this, the detaining authority has relied upon the DSP report, in
which it has been reported that the petitioner is repeatedly involving
HCP No.44/2026
himself in crimes and that multiple cases have been registered against
him. However, no particulars of the repeated activities of the
petitioner are mentioned in the DSP report.
23.A perusal of the particulars of the incidents, which form basis of the
four FIRs registered against the petitioner, would reveal that these
incidents are confined to personal enmity between the petitioner and
the complainant party. These incidents are individualistic in nature.
While the first incident is of the year 2018, the last one is of the year
2026. These activities of the petitioner affect private individuals. The
repetition of similar acts by the petitioner would not, by itself, affect
the flow of life of the community. Merely because the detenue has
been charged with multiple offences cannot, in isolation, be taken as a
basis for passing an order of detention, as these incidents are
individualistic in nature and do not have the potential to disturb public
order. These incidents, at best, in the inimitable words of Justice
Rahul Bharti, are a “pain in the neck” for the authorities responsible
for maintaining “law and order”, and do not disturb the flow of public
life.
24.On an overall consideration of the circumstances, it appears that the
existing legal framework for maintaining “law and order” is sufficient
to take care of the offences in which the petitioner is stated to have
indulged. The preventive detention is an extraordinary power which
can be used only to tackle emergent situation, and it cannot be
invoked in a situation which gives rise to a “law and order” problem.
It appears that the detaining authority, while passing the impugned
order of detention, has failed to appreciate the difference between
HCP No.44/2026
“public order” and “law and order”. The power of preventive
detention, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, could not
have been resorted to when ordinarily criminal law provides sufficient
means to address the situation leading to passing of the impugned
detention order. In fact, the respondents have already applied for
cancellation of bail of the petitioner, but without awaiting the
conclusion of the said proceedings, the impugned order of detention
has been passed, which, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is
indefensible.
25.For what has been discussed hereinbefore, the impugned order of
detention bearing No. DMP/PSA/01 of 2026 dated 27.04.2026, issued
by respondent No. 2-District Magistrate, Poonch, being unsustainable
in law, is quashed. The detenue is directed to be released forthwith, if
not involved in any other case.
26.The detention record be returned to the learned counsel for the
respondents.
(Sanjay Dhar)
Judge
Jammu
18.09.2026
Madan Verma-Secy
Whether order is speaking?
Whether order is reportable?
MADAN LAL VERMA
2026.09.18 16:36
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
HCP No.44/2026
Yes.
Yes.
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