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Sr. No. 80
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
LPAOW No. 83/2017
Reserved on
: 05.03.2026
Pronounced on: 12.03.2026
Uploaded on : 12.03.2026
Sh. Mohd Umar Nizami,
S/o Late Sh. Haji Shamas-ud-Din,
R/o Village Maitra, Tehsil & District Ramban.
.....Appellant(s)
Through :- Mr. R K S Thakur, Advocate with
Ms. Anandita Thakur, Advocate
v/s
1. Collector Land Acquisition
(Assistant Commissioner Revenue), Ramban.
.....Respondent(s)
2. Abdul Qayoom Nizami,
S/o Late Sh. Haji Shamas-ud-Din,
R/o Village Mehar, Tehsil & District Ramban.
Through :- Mr. P N Raina, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. J A Hamal, Advocate
Ms. Nazia Fazal, Assisting counsel to
Mrs. Monika Kohli, Sr. AAG
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR, JUDGE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PARIHAR, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
[Sanjeev Kumar J]
1.
This appeal, under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent of this Court, is
directed against the order dated 18.08.2017 passed by the learned
Single Judge of this Court in OWP No. 1061/2012 titled “Abdul
Qayoom Nizami Vs. Collector Land Acquisition (ACR), Ramban &
Anr.”, whereby the learned Single Judge has allowed the petition
filed by Respondent No. 2 herein under Section 104 of the
Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir and set aside the order passed by
the learned District Judge, Ramban [“the Reference Court”] on
24.05.2012 in a reference pending before it under Section 18 and 31
of the Jammu & Kashmir Land Acquisition Act, 1990 [“the Act”].
LPAOW No. 83/2017
2.
Mr. P N Raina, learned Senior counsel appearing for Respondent
No. 2 has taken a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the
Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment impugned on the ground
that an appeal under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is not
maintainable against an order passed by the learned Single Judge in
the exercise of powers of superintendence vested in the Court under
Section 104 of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir.
3.
Before we advert to the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Raina,
a brief narration of facts leading to the filing of this appeal would
be necessary:
4.
The appellant and the Respondent No. 2 are real brothers and have
a dispute with regard to land measuring 32 Kanals comprising in
Khasra Nos. 727, 728, 731, 747 and 729 in Village Maitra
Govindpora, Tehsil Ramban [“the subject land”]. The subject land
has been acquired by the State Government for public purpose. In
view of the dispute having arisen between the parties with regard to
the apportionment of the compensation, a reference has been made
by the Collector Land Acquisition, Ramban/the Respondent No. 1
herein to learned District Judge, Ramban. During the pendency of
reference, the appellant herein moved an application seeking release
of the amount deposited by the Respondent No. 1 in the Reference
Court as 80% of the compensation for the acquisition of subject
land. On the application moved by the appellant, the Reference
Court released the sum of ₹ 38,10,640/- in his favour vide order
dated 04.05.2012 as an amount purportedly falling in the share of
the appellant as per the award.
LPAOW No. 83/2017
5.
Feeling aggrieved, the Respondent No. 2 filed a petition under
Section 104 of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir which was
registered as OWP No. 1061/2012. The petition was contested by
the appellant, however, the learned Single Judge vide order
impugned dated 18.08.2017 allowed the petition and set aside the
order dated 24.05.2012 passed by the Reference Court and directed
the appellant to deposit in the Reference Court, the amount released
in his favour, within a period of two weeks. It is this order which is
called in question before us in an appeal filed under Clause 12 of
the Letters Patent.
6.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record, we deem it appropriate to extract
Clause 12 of the Letters Patent hereinbelow:
“12….. And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the
said
High Court of judicature from the judgment (not being a
judgment
passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in
respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said
High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of
revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed
or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence) of one
judge of the said High court or one judge of any Division Court
and that notwithstanding anything herein before provided an
appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of “one
Judge of the said High Court or one judge of” any Division Court,
a consistently with the provisions of the civil procedure code,
made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a
decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a
court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court where
the judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit
one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments
LPAOW No. 83/2017
of the judges of the said High Court or of such division court shall
be to us, our Heirs or Successors and be heard by our Board of
Judicial Advisers for report to us.”
From perusal of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, it is crystal
clear that an appeal from the judgment of learned Single Judge
passed in the exercise of power of superintendence is not
maintainable.
7.
It is not disputed before us that this Court was vested with the
power of superintendence under Section 104 of the Constitution of
Jammu & Kashmir which is in pari materia with Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. That being the trite law, it cannot be gainsaid
that if the order impugned passed by the learned Single Judge is
taken to be an order passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise
of the power of superintendence vested in it under Section 104 of
the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir, further appeal before the
Division Bench under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent would be
barred. However, a question has been raised by Mr. R K S Thakur,
learned counsel appearing for the appellant, who would submit, that
the order impugned is though purported to have been passed by the
learned Single Judge under Section 104 of the Constitution of
Jammu & Kashmir, yet, from its contents and substance, it is clearly
discernible that the order is one passed by the learned Single Judge
under Section 103 of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir/Article
226 of the Constitution of India.
8.
When confronted with the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court
rendered in the case of “Radhey Sham Vs. Chhabi Nath”, [“(2015) 5
SCC 423”], wherein the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article
LPAOW No. 83/2017
226 against the judicial orders passed by the Civil Courts has been
held barred, Mr. R K S Thakur, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant would argue that the District Court hearing reference
under the Act does not pass any judicial orders as a Civil Court and,
therefore, such orders of the District Court/reference Court are
amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
9.
Having given our thoughtful consideration to the rival
arguments, we have arrived at a considered opinion that
Reference Court under the Act acts as a Civil Court and its
orders are judicial orders. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in
the case of “Custodian Evacuee Property Vs. Amar Nath & Ors.”
[“1981 KLJ 371”] has categorically held that the District Judge
hearing a reference under Section 18 or under Section 31 of the Act
is a Court and not a persona designata. The observations of the Coordinate Bench in the aforementioned case in Para 9 and 10 are
relevant and are, therefore, set out below:
“9….. Decree as defined in Section 2 (2) Civil Procedure Code
means formal expression of an adjudication which conclusively
determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the
matters in controversy between them in a suit. The word "suit" has
not been defined in the Code, though it is generally understood to
mean a civil proceeding that commence with the filing of a plaint.
A Land Acquisition Court in a reference u/s 31, there can be no
manner of doubt, conclusively decides important questions of the
apportionment of, or title to the compensation settled by the Land
Acquisition Officer, in so far as the said court is concerned. The
District Judge, or any other officer appointed in this behalf, acts
as a court and not as a persona designata. In case a restricted
LPAOW No. 83/2017
meaning were to be given to the word "suit", then the party
adversely affected by the court's decision on a reference made to
it u/s 31 would be inevitably deprived of a very valuable right of
appeal, which would be there in case the same decision, in similar
circumstances, and on the same material, were to be given by the
same court in a reference u/s 18. This would naturally mean
hardship to the aggrieved party for no specious reason. Surely,
this could not have been the intention of the legislation. Such an
intention can hardly survive the attack of Article 14 of the
Constitution. An extended meaning has, therefore, to be given to
the word "suit" with a view to carrying out the object of the Act.
We are in respectful agreement with the connotation given to the
word "suit" by Sir Barens Peacock in Hurro Chunder Roy
Chowdhury v. Sooradhones Debia, 9 W.R. 402:
"The word Suit" does not necessarily mean an action nor
do the words "cause of action" and "defendant"
necessarily mean cause upon which an action has been
brought, in the ordinary restricted sense of the words. Any
proceedings in a court of Justice to enforce à demand is a
suit; the person who applies to the court is a suitor for
relief; the person who defends himself against the
enforcement of the relief sought is defendant, and the
claim, if recoverable, is a cause of action."
10….. A similar view has been taken in A. Mahalinga Kudumban
and others v. Thectharrppa Mudalier, AIR 1929 Madras 223,
Chikkanna Chettia Vs. V.S Perumal Chettiar and another, AIR
1940 Madras 474 (FB), Loomchand Sait vs. The Revenue
Divisional Officer Trichy and others, AIR 1975 Madras 177 and
Rishiraj Singh and others v. Raghubar Singh and others, AIR
1968 Madhya Pradesh 1228. We are, therefore, clearly of the
opinion that a finding recorded by a Land Acquisition Court on
the question of apportionment of compensation settled by the
Collector, or on the question of title of the parties to receive it, is
a decree against which on appeal would lie by force of Section 95
Civil Pr. Code.”
LPAOW No. 83/2017
From the aforesaid judgment and also having regard to the
nature of adjudication that is required to be made by the District
Court acting as a Reference Court under the Act, there is no manner
of doubt that the District Court acts as a Civil Court and its orders
are the judicial orders. The disputes which are adjudicated by the
Reference Court inter alia include the disputes of title, quantum of
compensation and apportionment thereof and such adjudication can
only be done by putting the rival parties to evidence and deciding
the issues or questions on the basis of such evidence.
10.
Viewed from any angle, the jurisdiction of the District Judge
hearing reference is completely adjudicatory in nature, in which the
rights of the parties are determined, like any other Civil Court.
Once we concede that the District Judge acting as a Reference
Court under the Act acts as a Court and not a persona designata, the
orders passed by it cannot be said to be anything other than the
judicial orders. The judgment of Radhey Shyam (supra) would
clearly be attracted.
11.
Viewed thus, we find that invocation of Section 104 of the
Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir which is in pari materia with
Article 227 of the Constitution of India was rightly invoked by the
Respondent No. 2 and the power of superintendence vested in this
Court under the aforesaid provision was rightly exercised by the
learned Single Judge. Once, it is established that the impugned
order has been passed by the learned Single Judge in the exercise of
power of superintendence vested in it under Section 104 of the
Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir, it is an inescapable conclusion
LPAOW No. 83/2017
that the said order would not be amenable to challenge under
Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.
12.
For the foregoing reasons, the preliminary objection taken by
learned Senior counsel appearing for Respondent No. 2 succeeds
and, thus, the instant appeal under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent
is found not maintainable and, accordingly, dismissed.
(Sanjay Parihar)
Judge
(Sanjeev Kumar)
Judge
JAMMU
12.03.2026
Manan
Whether the order is speaking :
Whether the order is reportable :
Yes
Yes
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