Mohd. Asif Naseer vs West Watch Company through Its Proprietor

1.2 The Prescribed Authority, while recording the finding that the tenant was given notice for eviction, has considered the various facts leading to the recording of such finding. It is not that the Prescribed Authority has drawn a presumption of the notice having been served merely because it was said to have been sent under certificate of posting. The Prescribed Authority has held that the “respondent (tenant) while admitting the applicant as landlord had filed the application under Section 30(1) to deposit the rent in the Court”. The Prescribed Authority recorded that it was after the notice had been sent in the year 2006 that an application under Section 30(1) of the Rent Control Act was filed by the respondent (tenant) in the year 2007 for deposit of rent in Court, after which, the suit was filed by the appellant in the year 2008. The said suit was admittedly after three years of the Sale Deed, which was executed on 29.10.2004. It was in this factual background that the Prescribed Authority held that the notice of six months required under Section 21 of the Rent Control Act was duly given by the landlord to the tenant before filing of the suit in the year 2008. The respondent-tenant had admitted the appellant as his landlord and filed an application to deposit rent in Court in the year 2007. It is not disputed that photocopy of the receipt dated 25.07.2006 of having sent the notice under certificate of posting was filed by the appellant (landlord) along with an affidavit before the Prescribed Authority; and the application of the respondent (tenant) for filing the carbon copy (instead of photocopy) of the receipt of under certificate of posting, was rejected by the Prescribed Authority on 21.04.2011, which Order had become final, as the same had not been challenged by the tenant and, thus, there was no occasion for the appellant to file the carbon copy of the receipt of under certificate of posting. [Para 13] [1180-E-H; 1181-A-B]

1.3 Section 34 of the Rent Control Act provides for the Prescribed Authority to receive evidence on affidavit. Therefore, the evidence adduced on affidavit was admissible before the Prescribed Authority. In the facts of the present case, when the appellant (landlord) had filed the photocopy of the receipt of having sent the notice under certificate of posting, along with an affidavit, which was accepted by the Prescribed Authority, and coupled with the attending circumstances as noticed by the Prescribed Authority, a specific finding of fact was recorded that due notice, as required under Section 21 of the Rent Control Act, had been sent by the appellant (landlord) and received by the respondent (tenant), which is fully justified in law. Such finding of fact was duly affirmed by the Appellate Authority. Such finding of fact having been arrived at on the basis of valid reasons in the facts of the case, ought not to have been upset by the Writ Court.[Paras 14 and 15] [1181-C; 1182-A-C]

1.4 It may be so that mere receipt of notice having been sent under certificate of posting, in itself, may not be sufficient proof of service, but if the same is coupled with other facts and circumstances which go to show that the party had notice, the same could be held to be sufficient service on the party. In the present case, the law permits filing of a document (receipt of under certificate of posting in this case) to be filed along with an affidavit, which has been done so. Further, there was clear admission of the respondent (tenant) that the appellant was his landlord (for which sale deed had been supplied to the tenant) and subsequent act of the respondent (tenant) depositing the rent under Section 30(1) of the Rent Control Act in the Court and other attending circumstances, as have been considered by the Prescribed Authority, would all clearly go to show that there was sufficient proof of service of notice, which finding of fact has been affirmed by the Appellate Authority, and there was no reason for the Writ Court to have unsettled such concurrent findings of fact. [Para 18] [1183-G-H; 1184-A-B]

Sumitra Devi v. Sampuran Singh (2011) 3 SCC 556 : [2011] 2 SCR 196 ; Ranju v. Rekha Ghosh (2007) 14 SCC 81 : [2007] 13 SCR 763 ; V.S. Krishnan

v. Westfort Hi-Tech Hospitals (2008) 3 SCC 363 : [2008] 3 SCR 184 – relied on.

Ram Suresh Singh vs. Prabhat Singh (2009) 6 SCC

681 : [2009] 7 SCR 451 ; U. Sree v. U. Srinivas (2013)

2 SCC 114 : [2012] 11 SCR 256 ; Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana (1994) 4 SCC 445 – distinguished.

2. Further, the Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority have given clear finding of fact that the hardship of the appellant (landlord) was greater than that of the respondent (tenant) and, thus, allowed the release application, which finding has not been specifically considered or categorically upset by the Writ Court. Such finding of fact also does not require any interference by this Court. [Para 19] [1184C-D]