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Page No.# 1/26
GAHC010265332023
2026:GAU-AS:8775DB
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : CRL.A(J)/131/2023
MD. MAINUL HOQUE
R/O- VILL.- BHAKAT GAON, P.S. AND DIST. NAGAON, ASSAM
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM
REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, ASSAM
–B E F O R E–
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE NELSON SAILO
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH MAZUMDAR
For the Appellant
: Mr. M H Laskar, Advocate
and Amicus Curiae.
For the Respondent No. 1 : Mr. R.R.Kaushik, APP
Page No.# 2/26
Date on which judgment is reserved : 03.06.2026
Date of pronouncement
of judgment
: 17.06.2026
Whether the pronouncement
is of the operative part of the
judgment?
: Not applicable.
Whether the full judgment
has been pronounced?
: Yes.
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER(CAV)
(Rajesh Mazumdar, J)
This appeal has been preferred assailing the judgment dated 09.05.2023,
passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Nagaon, in Sessions (T-1) Case
No.03(N)/2014, by which the appellant has been convicted under Section 302
IPC to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of ₹10,000, in
default, to suffer Simple Imprisonment for another six months. The appellant
had spent 1251 days in custody till the date of judgment by the learned Trial
Court.
Incidents leading to the conviction:
2.
An investigation was initiated on the death of one Jamaluddin, which was
reported as an unnatural death on 2.11.2012. The formal FIR was lodged by the
Page No.# 3/26
brother of the deceased on 4.11.2012, to the effect that on 2.11.2012, at
around 6:30 p.m., the two named accused had called the elder brother of the
informant to settle a domestic dispute. When he went there, the accused no. 2
ordered the accused no. 1 to finish off the elder brother of the informant,
whereupon the accused no. 1 struck the victim on his head with a bamboo stick,
knocking him to the ground. It was stated that although the witness had taken
him to the Nagoan Civil Hospital, the victim was declared to have been “brought
dead”.
The delay in the FIR was explained by referring to the autopsy
conducted and the burial procedures.
3.
The investigation resulted in Charge Sheet no. 65 of 2013, prepared on
31.01.2013. The present appellant had been put up as an accused to be sent up
for trial, while the other accused named in the FIR had not been put up for trial.
The learned Trial Court framed the following charge against the present
appellant on 20.03.2014:
“That you, on 2.11.12 at around 6:30 PM at Bhakatgaon, committed murder,
intentionally causing the death of Jamaluddin.”
4.
The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. During the trial,
the Prosecution examined 10 witnesses, and the Defence did not adduce any
evidence. During his statement recorded under the provisions of Section 313 of
the Cr.P.C., the accused stated that he was not present at the place of
occurrence and that he is innocent.
EVIDENCE LED:
Page No.# 4/26
5.
PW-1 was the informant in the matter, and he stated that he knew the
accused. He stated that the deceased was his own brother and the occurrence
took place about three years ago at about 6:30 PM on the day. He stated that
while he was returning home from the market, he heard commotion coming
from the house of the accused as well as the deceased, whose houses were
situated adjacent to one another. When he rushed to the house of the
deceased, he saw the deceased lying in the courtyard and many people were
gathered there. He came to know from the family members of the deceased and
other people gathered that the accused had assaulted the deceased with a lathi
on his head. By the time he reached, his brother had already expired, and he
was taken to the BP Civil Hospital, Nagaon, where the doctor declared him
dead. Accordingly, he had lodged the FIR.
In his cross-examination, he stated that his son-in-law, Rustom Ali, wrote
the FIR, and he did not know where the FIR was written. He did not know the
contents of the FIR, and the FIR had not been read over to him. Also, he did
not accompany the dead body to the hospital. When he reached the courtyard
of Jamaluddin, it was evening, and many people were gathered there.
6.
PW-2 is the son of the deceased, and he stated that he knew the accused
person, who belonged to the same village and that the informant was his
paternal uncle. He stated that the occurrence had taken place about three years
ago at about 6:30 PM. On the date of the occurrence, a ‘Bichar’ was held in the
house of the accused, and his father was called upon to appear in that Bichar.
Page No.# 5/26
Accordingly, his father went to the house of the accused, and he also went after
his father. When his father arrived at the courtyard of the accused, he attacked
the victim and assaulted the head of the victim with the lathi made of bamboo,
and as a result, his father fell on the ground. Just then, he arrived at the spot,
and the accused fled away from there. At that time, there was some gathering
in the courtyard of the accused.
He carried his father to the Civil Hospital by boarding in a tempo,
accompanied by Ramjan Ali, Rustom Ali and some others. On arriving at the
hospital, the victim was declared to have been brought dead. After conducting
the post-mortem, the dead body was handed over to them, and subsequently,
the paternal uncle lodged the FIR before the police in connection with the
incident.
7.
PW-3 knew the accused, and he also knew the informant, who was the
younger brother of the deceased. He stated that the incident took place in the
year 2012 at about 6.30 to 7 PM and that at the time of the occurrence, he was
present in the house of the deceased. The elder brother of the accused had
called the witness and the victim to their house to intervene regarding a dispute
that had occurred among the brothers. This witness had accompanied the victim
and the PW no.2 to the house of the accused, and when they reached there,
the accused asked as to why they were there and in reply, the victim asked the
accused the reason for the quarrel with his brothers. Being furious, the accused
gave a blow on the head of the victim with a bamboo stick. The victim fell on
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the ground and sustained an injury to his head. Accordingly, the witness, along
with PW no.2 and PW no.4, took the injured victim to the Nagaon Civil Hospital.
At the Civil Hospital, the doctor examined the victim and declared him dead.
8.
PW-4 is the son-in-law of the deceased. He stated that on the date of the
occurrence, he was present in the house of the victim and just then, he heard
somebody raising hulla in the nearby house of the accused. He rushed to the
house of the accused, and when he reached there, he saw the accused giving a
blow on the head of the victim with a bamboo stick. On being assaulted, the
victim fell on the ground, and he saw blood oozing out from the ears, nose, and
head of the victim. He stated that many people had gathered at the place of
occurrence, and he and another person took the victim to the Civil Hospital by
boarding a tempo. After arriving at the civil Hospital, the doctors examined the
victim and declared him to have been brought dead. In his cross-examination,
He stated that he found around 20 to 25 people at the house of the accused
when the occurrence took place, but he could not remember the names of the
people who had gathered there.
9.
PW-5 was a resident of the same village who knew the accused, the
informant and the victim. He stated that the occurrence took place about two
years ago, and he was not at home. He had heard that there was some quarrel
between the deceased and somebody, and in the course of the quarrel, the
victim was killed. He did not hear the name of the person who killed the victim.
He was accordingly declared hostile and was cross-examined both by the
Page No.# 7/26
Prosecution and the Defence.
10.
PW-6 had stated that in the evening of the incident, he was returning
home from the daily market when he heard a commotion at the house of the
accused. When he saw the victim, who was being brought by people from the
accused house, holding him in support, he heard from people that the accused
had assaulted the victim. People fetched a tempo to take him to the hospital,
but the victim had died on the way before he reached the hospital. In crossexamination, he stated that the victim had died because of a fight in connection
with the son of the elder brother of the accused.
11.
PW-7, a relative of the accused and the informant, stated that he was not
at home at the time of the incident, and in the evening, when he came home,
he learnt that the accused had killed the victim. He did not know how the
incident happened.
12.
The Doctor, who conducted the autopsy, was examined as PW-8. In his
evidence, he stated that there was a scalp hematoma about 12 cm in diameter
over the right parietal bone of the victim, as well as a fracture. There was
bleeding from the nose and the right ear. The membrane was torn over the right
parietal lobe, and contusion was present in the right parietal bone and the
spinal cord. He described the injuries as antemortem in nature, and the
approximate time of death was less than 24 hours from the postmortem
examination. In his opinion, the cause of death was due to brain injury. As a
result of injuries, sustained injury was sufficient to cause death.
Page No.# 8/26
13.
PW-9 was the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, who was on duty at the
Civil Hospital, when the victim was brought in dead to the hospital, and he was
asked for follow-up action. As it was night, he had kept the dead body in the
morgue. The next day, he intimated to the officer in charge of the Nagaon Police
Station over the telephone, who instructed him to perform an inquest over the
dead body. He had conducted the inquest over the dead body in the presence of
witnesses, namely Ramzan Ali and Naser Ali. Thereafter, he had sent the dead
body for post-mortem examination.
14.
PW-10 was posted as the in-charge of the Haiborgaon TOP under
Nagaon Police Station at the time of the incident. He had received an FIR
lodged by the PW no. 1. Upon receipt of the FIR, he had made a GD Entry and
forwarded the same to the Nagaon Police Station for registration. He identified
the signatures and stated that one SI Chakradhar Roy was assigned to
investigate the case. He stated that the Investigating Officer of the case was his
colleague in the Haiborgaon TOP, and the investigation was conducted by the
said Chakradhar Roy, who was then paralyzed and therefore unable to come to
depose before the court. He identified the signatures of Chakradhar Roy on the
exhibited documents. He stated that Roy had visited the place of occurrence,
drew the sketch map, recorded statements of the witnesses and collected the
Post-mortem report. He arrested the accused on 14.11.2012.
STATEMENT OF ACCUSED UNDER SECTION 313, Cr.P.C
Page No.# 9/26
15.
On completion of the Prosecution evidence, the accused was examined
under the provisions of section 313 of the CrPC on 16.02.2023. The case of the
defence was that he was not present in the house, and he was on his way from
his brother's house and had come to the place of occurrence only upon hearing
the hue and cry. He stated that he was innocent. He refused to adduce defence
evidence. The arguments were thereafter heard, and the judgment was
reserved on 23.03.2023 and 29.04.2023, and the same was delivered on
09.05.2023.
Reasoning and conclusion of Learned Trial Court:
16.
The learned Sessions Judge was of the view that PW no.1 did not see the
occurrence. In his cross-examination, he had identified the PW no.2, PW no.3,
PW no.4 and two others, namely, Sultan Ali and Tahed Ali. Besides, the female
members of the house of the deceased told him that the accused had caused
the death of the victim. The learned Sessions Judge was therefore of the view
that the fact that PW no.1 heard from the people present there, that the
accused assaulted the deceased, is relevant under section 6 of the Indian
Evidence Act as it forms part of res gestae.
17.
The learned Trial Court found that since the PW no.1 had referred to the
PW no.3 as the person who had taken the victim to the hospital, PW no.3 was
present at the time of the occurrence, and he was a vital witness. The learned
Sessions Judge noticed that the PW no.3 had also deposed that he was present
there when the deceased had been called to settle a dispute between the
Page No.# 10/26
accused and his brother, and he had accompanied the deceased and the son of
the deceased to the house of the accused. The PW no.3 had deposed that he
heard the accused ask, as to why they had come to his house, and when the
deceased asked him not to quarrel with his brother Jalil, the accused got
furious. PW no.3 had stated that he, along with PW no.2, PW no.4 and the sonin-law of the deceased, had taken the deceased to the hospital, where he was
declared to have been brought dead.
18.
The Learned Trial Court also found from the evidence of PW no.2 and PW
no.3 that the deceased reached the house of the accused and the accused gave
a blow on the head of the deceased with a bamboo lathi. The deceased had
gone to the house of the accused to intervene in a dispute between the accused
and his brother, and therefore, there was no dispute of any kind between the
accused and the deceased. The deceased had done nothing to provoke the
accused. However, the accused assaulted him on the head, which is a vital part
of the body, with a lathi with such force that his parietal bone got fractured. The
statement of PW no.2 and PW no.3, regarding the attack on the deceased on
his head, was supported by medical evidence and the evidence of PW2 and PW3
was not shaken in their cross-examinations.
19.
The learned Sessions Judge discarded the submissions regarding
discrepancies in the evidence of PW no.2 and PW no.3 to the extent that the
PW no.2 did not state before the police that the accused fled away after
committing the offence, that the occurrence took place at 6:30 PM, etc., and
Page No.# 11/26
that, PW no.3 did not state before the police that he was present in the house
of the deceased, and the elder brother of the accused, Jalil, had called the
deceased to his house to intervene in a quarrel with the accused; that both of
them went to his house and that when the accused asked the deceased as to
why he had come to his house, the deceased enquired about the reason of the
quarrel.
20.
The learned Trial Court was of the view that all discrepancies in the
statement of witnesses made before the police as well as in the court are not
fatal for the prosecution, if the same do not shake the very backbone of the
Prosecution case. The learned Trial Court had further observed that the court is
required to come to a conclusion regarding the acceptance of evidence only
after exercising caution and care. The court observed that the Maxim falsus in
Uno, falsus in omnibus is not applicable to India when the credibility of the
witness is not shaken, even if some part of his evidence is not found to be true.
21.
The discrepancy sought to be relied upon by the defence had been dealt
with in detail by the learned Trial Court at paragraphs 22 and 23 of the
judgment. From the evidence of PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4, the learned Trial Court
found it proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had assaulted the
deceased on the head with a bamboo stick and as a result, the deceased fell on
the ground and died instantly. All the witnesses deposed similarly.
22.
The defence had also tried to raise the plea that the witnesses are
relatives of the deceased and hence their evidence could not have been relied
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upon. The submission was, however, rejected by the learned Trial Court by
observing the difference between a Related Witness and an interested witness.
The learned Trial Court found that merely because the PW2, PW3 and PW4 had
been found to be relatives of the deceased, the same would not make them
interested witnesses.
23.
The plea raised by the defence regarding the delay in lodging the FIR had
also been rejected by the Trial Court, since it found that the reason for the delay
had been explained in the FIR as well as in the evidence itself, that the delay
was caused as it took some time for funeral after conducting the Post Mortem
examination and that a delay of 52 (fifty-two) hours in the context of facts and
circumstances of the case is not fatal for the Prosecution.
24.
The learned Trial Court, therefore, found it to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused was the sole perpetrator of the crime and he
was guilty of committing an offence punishable under section 302 of the IPC.
Accordingly, he was held guilty, and after hearing the accused on the point of
sentence, the accused was sentenced to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for life
and to pay a fine of ₹10,000, in default, to suffer Simple Imprisonment for
another six months.
SUBMISSIONS FOR APPEALLANT:
25.
The submissions made on behalf of the appellant in this appeal do not
vary much in substance from the submissions already placed before the learned
Page No.# 13/26
Trial Court.
The learned Amicus appearing for the appellant has submitted that there
was an inconsistency between the evidence of PW2, PW3, and PW4. Therefore,
their evidence ought not to have been relied upon by the court to convict the
appellant. The learned Counsel has submitted that although the PW3 had stated
that he was present at the house of the deceased at the time of the occurrence,
neither PW2 nor PW4, who had also claimed to be present at the victim’s house,
referred to the presence of PW3 at the house of the victim. The learned Counsel
has submitted that such an omission would strike at the reliability of the
aforesaid witnesses, requiring the learned Trial Court to reject the evidence
given by the witnesses, and the conclusion of guilt of the accused could not
have been arrived at in the manner it has been done.
The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that PW2 and PW4
had also given contradictory evidence regarding the persons who had
accompanied them to the hospital along with the deceased. The learned Amicus
had submitted that the reliance placed by the learned Trial Court on the
corroborative value of the evidence of PW3 was erroneous since his presence at
the scene of the occurrence was doubtful. He has submitted that, in such a
situation, it was binding upon the prosecution to have brought in independent
witnesses to support the veracity of the evidence led by PW 2, PW3 and PW 4.
The learned Amicus had also submitted that the learned Trial Court had
committed an error in overlooking the delay in the lodging of the FIR, and that
Page No.# 14/26
the delay should have been held to be fatal to the prosecution's case when,
admittedly, the civil hospital was near the police station.
Finally, the learned Amicus had submitted that the learned Trial Court had
committed an error when the accused appellant had been convicted for
committing an offence under Section 302, IPC. He has submitted that even
assuming without admitting that the accused had caused the death of the
victim, the conviction ought to have been one under the provisions of Section
304 Part-I. He has submitted that the fact that there was no previous enmity
between the victim and the deceased and the fact that only a single blow had
been dealt with a bamboo stick, which is commonly found in village homesteads
and was not a weapon as such, were ignored by the learned Trial Court, leading
to the erroneous conviction. He has submitted that the learned Trial Court
failed to appreciate that, in the absence of any intention or preparation, a single
strike in the heat of the moment, without any premeditation, and with a stick
would not be sufficient to bring it within the realm of 302, IPC. He has
accordingly prayed for acquittal of the appellant on the ground that the
prosecution was not able to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt, and in
the alternative, has submitted that the conviction of the petitioner be modified
to one under the provisions of Section 304 IPC, with appropriate modification to
the sentence imposed.
He has relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions:
1. Hem Raj and others versus State of Haryana and others,
Page No.# 15/26
reported in (2005) 10 SCC 614, wherein it was held that the
absence of explanation by prosecution for failure to examine
independent and material witnesses would assume importance when
evidence of the alleged eye witnesses raises a serious doubt about
their presence at the time of occurrence.
2. In Sunny @ Santosh Dharmu Bhosale v. The State of
Maharashtra, reported in 2024 INSC 878, wherein it was held that
unintentional homicide is not murder under Section 302 of IPC (Section
103(1) of BNS, 2023).
SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED APP:
26.
The learned APP, Mr. R.R. Kaushik, has supported the decision of the
learned Trial Court. The learned APP has submitted that the accused, during the
recording of his statement under Section 313. Cr.P.C. had stated that he was not
at the place of occurrence, but the defence had not adduced any evidence/alibi
in support of his contention. He has submitted that when the prosecution had
brought in evidence to prove both his presence and his act of striking the victim,
the onus shifted on him to lead evidence to the contrary. He has further
submitted that the minor discrepancies in the evidence led by the eyewitness
would not be fatal to the case of the prosecution. He has further submitted that
the learned Trial Court did not commit any error in holding that the delay in
lodging the FIR was adequately explained in the FIR, and has further submitted
that the delay in the present case in lodging the FIR would be wholly
Page No.# 16/26
inconsequential in determining the guilt or otherwise of the accused.
He has relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions:
1. M. Nageswara Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in
(2022) 5 SCC 791; where it was held that
“16. Having gone through the deposition of the relevant witnesses/eye-witnesses/injured
eye-witnesses, we are of the opinion that there are no major/material contradictions in the
deposition of the eye-witnesses and injured eye-witnesses. All are consistent insofar as
accused Nos. 1 to 3 are concerned. As observed hereinabove, PW-6 has identified Accused
Nos. 1 to 3. The High Court has observed that PW-1, PW-3 and PW-5 were planted
witnesses merely on the ground that they were all interested witnesses being relatives of
the deceased. Merely because the witnesses were the relatives of the deceased, their
evidence cannot be discarded solely on the aforesaid ground. Therefore, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the High Court has materially erred in discarding the
deposition/evidence of PW-1, PW-3, PW-5 and PW-6 and even PW-7.”
1.
Om Pal & Ors Versus, State of U.P. (Now State of
Uttarakhand), reported in 2025 INSC 1262,
“OCULAR EVIDENCE
33. The present case before us is not the one based on circumstantial evidence, but is
based on ocular evidence. Time and again this Court has held that ocular evidence is the
best evidence unless there are reasons to doubt it.
MOTIVE
42. Motive although is a relevant factor in all criminal cases, it, however, is not a sine qua
non for establishing the guilt of the accused persons. Motive even in a case which rests on
an eyewitness account, lends strength to the prosecution’s case and fortify the Court in its
ultimate conclusion. Thus, the fact of motive has to be seen in the light of the other
cogent evidence available.
Page No.# 17/26
DELAY IN FILING OF FIR IS NOT FATAL TO THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTION
46. The issue of delay in the filing of the FIR from the side of the complainant came up
during the hearing. It was argued that the cross FIR was lodged on 23.05.1988 which is
after three days of the incident. Thus, according to them, the second FIR was merely an
afterthought of the first FIR which was lodged by the appellants. This contention has been
dealt by both the Courts below holding that the delay was well explained by PW-1, who is
the son of deceased Dile Ram. It is a settled position that delay in filing of the FIR cannot
be considered to be fatal to the case of the prosecution when there is direct evidence and
when the delay in filing the FIR is well explained.
NON- RECOVERY OF THE WEAPONS IS NOT FATAL TO THE CASE OF THE
PROSECUTION
49. Another contention raised by the appellants was that the weapons used during the
incident were never recovered from the site. However, this Court has many a times
reiterated that non-recovery of the weapons cannot be considered fatal to the case of the
prosecution if there is consistent medical and ocular evidence.”
3. Hariprasad @ Kishan Sahu Versus State of Chhattisgarh reported
in (2024) 2 SCC 557, where at paragraph 9 and 10, the Apex Court
held:
“9. It cannot be gainsaid that the First Information Report in a criminal case is an
extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of corroborating the oral
evidence adduced during the course of the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt
lodging of the report to the police in respect of the commission of an offence is to obtain
early information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, the
names of actual culprits and the part played by them as well as names of the eye
witnesses present at the scene of occurrence 2 [ Thulia Kali vs. The State of Tamil
Nadu; 1972 (3) SCC 393]. It is also an equally settled legal position that the receipt and
Page No.# 18/26
recording of information report by the police is not a condition precedent to set into
motion a criminal investigation 3 [ The King Emperor vs. Khawaja Nazir Ahmad; AIR 1945
PC 18]. The First Information Report under Section 154 of Cr.PC, as such, could not be
treated as a substantive piece of evidence. It can only be used to corroborate or
contradict the informant’s evidence in the Court. As held by three-Judge Bench of this
Court 4 [ Apren Joseph alias current Kunjukunju & Ors. Vs. State of Kerela; 1973 (3) SCC
114], FIR is very useful if recorded before there is time and opportunity to embellish, or
before the informant’s memory fades. Undue or unreasonable delay in lodging the FIR,
therefore, may give rise to suspicion which put the Court on guard to look for the possible
motive and the explanation for the delay and consider its effect on the trustworthiness or
otherwise of the prosecution version.
10. Of course, the delay in lodging an FIR by itself cannot be regarded as the sufficient
ground to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution case, nor could it be treated
as fatal to the case of prosecution. The Court has to ascertain the causes for the delay,
having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. If the causes are not
attributable to any effort to concoct a version, mere delay by itself would not be fatal to
the case of prosecution.”
4. Laxmibai (dead) through LRs versus Bhagwanthbuva (dead)
through LRs. (C.A. No.-002058-002058 / 2003 decided on : 2901-2013) where it was held
“30. In the matter of appreciation of evidence of witnesses, it is not the number of
witnesses but quality of their evidence which is important, as there is no requirement in
law of evidence that any particular number of witnesses is to be examined to
prove/disprove a fact. It is a time- honoured principle, that evidence must be weighed and
not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and
trustworthy or otherwise. The legal system has laid emphasis on value provided by each
Page No.# 19/26
witness, rather than the multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is quality and not quantity,
which determines the adequacy of evidence as has been provided by Section 134 of the
Evidence Act. Where the law requires the examination of at least one attesting witness, it
has been held that the number of witnesses produced, do not carry any weight. (Vide:
Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras; AIR 1957 SC 614; Jagdish Prasad v. State of
M.P. AIR 1994 SC 1251; Sunil Kumar v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi AIR 2004 SC
552; Namdeo v. State
of
Maharashtra AIR
SC
(Supp)
100; Kunju
@
Balachandran v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2008 SC 1381; Bipin Kumar Mondal v.
State of West Bengal AIR201O SC 3638; Mahesh & Anr. v. State of Madhya
Pradesh (2011) 9 SCC 626; Kishan Chand v. State of Haryana JT 2013( 1) SC 222).
5. Sadayappan @ Ganesan Versus State, Represented By Inspector
of Police, reported in (2019) 9 SCC 257, where it was held;
“12. With respect to the deposition of PWs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 which firmly establish the
prosecution version, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that they are
interrelated and interested witnesses, thus, making their evidence unreliable.
13. Criminal law jurisprudence makes a clear distinction between a related and interested
witness. A witness cannot be said to be an “interested” witness merely by virtue of being
a relative of the victim. The witness may be called “interested” only when he or she
derives some benefit from the result of a litigation in the decree in a civil case, or in
seeing an accused person punished. [See: Sudhakar v. State, (2018) 5 SCC 435”
ANALYSIS
27.
We have given anxious consideration to the submissions made on behalf
of the appellant and also the submissions of the learned APP. The Trial Court
Records have been perused, and the applicability of the judgments cited by the
Page No.# 20/26
learned counsel has been tested in the context of the facts of the present case.
28.
PW2 and PW4 had stated that they were present at the house of the
victim when he had gone to the house of the accused and his brother, upon
being asked to do so by the brother of the accused. These witnesses did not
refer to the presence of the PW3 in the house of the victim, though PW3 had
stated that he was present there. PW 2 and PW 4, i.e. the son and the son-inlaw of the victim, had omitted to state the presence of PW 3. This omission, in
our considered view, does not dim the evidence of any of the aforesaid
witnesses as regards the description of the incidents which led to the death of
the victim. The statement of the PW3 regarding the manner in which the victim
had met his death did not waver, and rather, as correctly held by the learned
Trial Court, the description stood fortified by the statements of PW 2 and PW 4.
These witnesses have not been shown to be ‘interested witnesses’, as
recognized in law, and the mere fact that two of these witnesses were related to
the victim cannot be grounds enough for this Court to discard their ocular
evidence.
In Leela Ram (D) through Duli Chand v. State of Haryana & Anr,
reported in (1999) Supp. 3 S.C.R 435, the Supreme Court held
9. Be it noted that the High Court is within its jurisdiction, being the first appellate court to reappraise the evidence, but the discrepancies found in the ocular account of two witnesses,
unless they are so vital, cannot affect the credibility of the evidence of the witnesses. There is
bound to be some discrepancies between the narrations of different witnesses when they speak
on details, and unless the contradictions are of a material dimension, the same should not be
Page No.# 21/26
used to jettison the evidence in its entirety. Incidentally, corroboration of evidence with
mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal cases. Minor embellishment, there may
be, but variations by reason therefor should not render the evidence of eye- witnesses
unbelievable. Trivial discrepancies ought not to obliterate an otherwise acceptable evidence. In
this context, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in the State of U.P. v. M.K.
Anthony2. In paragraph 10 of the report, this Court observed :
“While appreciating the evidence of a witnesses, the approach must be whether the
evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that
impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinise the evidence
more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and evaluate them to find
out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and
whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief.
Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hypertechnical
approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence,
attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not
going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a
whole. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form
the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness the appellate court
which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence
by the trial Court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be
proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor not be proper to reject the evidence
on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. Even honest
and truthful witness may differ in some details unrelated to the main incident because
power of observation, retention and reproduction differ with individuals.”
10. In a very recent decision in Criminal Appeal No. 61 of 1999 (Rammi alias Rameshwar
v. State of Madhya Pradesh3), with Criminal Appeal No. 33 of 1999 (Bhura alias Sajjan
Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh4), this Court observed :
“When eye-witnesses is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make
Page No.# 22/26
some discrepancies. No true witness can possibly escape from making some
discrepant details. Perhaps an untrue witness who is well tutored can successfully
make his testimony totally non-discrepant. But courts should bear in mind that it is
only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the
credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. But
too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an
incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two
statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny”.
This Court further observed :
“It is common practice in trial Courts to make out contradictions from previous
statement of a witness for confronting him during cross-examination. Merely
because there is inconsistency in evidence it is not sufficient to impair the credit of
the witness. No doubt Section 155 of the Evidence Act provides scope for
impeaching the credit of a witness by proof of inconsistent former statement. But a
reading of the section would indicate that all inconsistent statements are not
sufficient to impeach the credit of the witness. The material portion of the section
is extracted below :
“155. Impeaching credit of witness: The credit of a witness may be impeached in
the following ways by the adverse party, or, with the consent of the court, by the
party who calls him.......
(3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which
is liable to be contradicted.”
A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence need not necessarily be
sufficient to amount to contradiction. Only such of the inconsistent statement which is liable to
be “contradicted” would affect the credit of the witness. Section 145 of the Evidence Act also
enables the cross-examiner to use any former statement of the witness, but it cautions that if it
intended to “contradict” the witness the cross-examiner is enjoined to comply with the formality
prescribed therein. Section 162 of the Code also permits the cross-examiner to use the previous
Page No.# 23/26
statement of the witness (recorded under Section 161 of the Code) for the only limited purpose,
i.e. to “contradict” the witness.
To contradict a witness, therefore, must be to discredit the particular version of the witness.
Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the present statement, even if the
latter is at variance with the former to some extent it would not be helpful to contradict
that witness, (vide Tahsildar Singh and Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 1012).”
Since PW2, PW3 and PW4 are not interested witnesses, the submission of
the learned amicus that their evidence had to be corroborated by evidence of
“independent witnesses” does not find favor with this Court.
29.
The second limb of the argument put forth by the learned amicus that the
delay in lodging the FIR would be fatal to the case of the prosecution has to be
considered in the light of the then prevailing circumstances. The victim was not
involved in any quarrel with the accused and had gone to the house of the
accused to participate in a meeting to settle disputes between two brothers on
the request of the elder brother of the accused. On him reaching the spot, he
was engaged by the accused in questions as to why he had come, and moments
later, a lethal blow was struck on him. Efforts to take the victim to a hospital
followed, and on his being declared to have been brought dead, the body was
kept in the morgue and on the next day, it was subjected to post-mortem
examination. After the rituals related to burial had been performed, the FIR
was lodged. The death had occurred on the 2nd of November at 6.30 pm, in
the evening, and the FIR was lodged on the 4th of November 2011 at 10.30 am,
and the cause of the delay was stated in the FIR itself. We find ourselves in
Page No.# 24/26
agreement with the view adopted by the learned Trial Court that the delay,
which was about 56 hours from the time of occurrence, in the present case,
would not be fatal to the case of the prosecution. This Court cannot lose sight
of the fact that the incident had occurred in a village in the wintery month of
November amongst rustic villagers. Therefore, we do not find force in the
submission of the learned amicus that the learned Trial Court had not
appreciated the delay in the present case in its true perspective.
In this regard, we find strength on the reliance is placed by the learned
APP on the case of Om Pal & Ors (supra) where the Trial Court found that the
rushing of the victim to the hospital to save his life instead of first going to the
Police station was a satisfactory explanation for the delay in making the
complaint and the same view was affirmed by the High Court.
30.
We find merit in the third limb of the submission projected by the learned
amicus, to the extent that the act of the accused would deserve a conviction
under Section 304, IPC and not under Section 302, IPC. The basic facts proved
by the Prosecution, that the victim had gone to participate in a meeting to bring
a settlement between the accused and his brother, indicate that the accused
was already in a fit of anger and this is also evidenced by the proved fact that
the accused had questioned the victim, when he had arrived at his courtyard by
asking why he had come and what could he do. It is also evident from the PWs
that the victim had asked the accused as to why he was fighting with his
brother, and at that moment, the accused had struck him with a bamboo stick.
Page No.# 25/26
It is not in the evidence of any of the PWs that the appellant had picked up a
quarrel or that he had procured a stick to attack the victim. There is also
nothing on record to indicate enmity between the victim and the accused or that
the accused had any reason to premeditate his action or intend either death or
fatal injury to the victim. He had struck the victim at the spur of the moment.
Having struck the single blow, the accused had, as per evidence, fled from the
place of occurrence, and there is no evidence to show that he took undue
advantage or had acted in brutality.
In the case of Ghapoo Yadav v State of M.P., reported in AIR 2003
SC 1620, the Apex Court held that, where the injuries sustained by the
deceased were in the course of a sudden quarrel, without premeditation and
without cruel intent, the conviction was altered from under Section 302 IPC to
Section 304 (Part I) of IPC.
31.
In view of the conclusions arrived at, we set aside the conviction of the
appellant under Section 302 of the IPC and convert the same to a conviction
under Section 304 of the IPC. Consequently, we also modify the sentence
awarded to the appellant and require him to suffer RI for a period of 10 years,
and to pay a fine of ₹10,000, in default, to suffer Simple Imprisonment for
another six months. Appellant shall be entitled to set off the period already
undergone in custody.
32.
Registry to send back the Trial Court records along with copies of this
order to all concerned.
Page No.# 26/26
33.
Both APP and learned amicus had rendered valuable assistance. Learned
Amicus shall be entitled to his remuneration as per the prevailing notification.
34.
Criminal appeal accordingly is disposed of.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
JUDGE
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