Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid vs The State of Manipur & Ors.

Held: The words “for the removal of doubts” in Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, throw light on the clarificatory nature of the said Explanation – Although Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act does not explicitly mention that the term of a Muslim Member of the Bar Council in the Board, is also co-terminus with their term in the Bar Council, this must be understood to be implied, upon a reading of the provision as a whole – This is because the eligibility of persons under the categories listed in s.14(b)(i), 14(b)(ii), and 14(b)(iii) of the 1995 Act, hinges on their membership in either the Parliament, or the State Legislative Assembly, or the Bar Council respectively – Without such membership in the Parliament, or the State Legislative Assembly or the Bar Council, the very basis for their membership in the Board ceases to exist – There is no satisfactory justification to exclude the applicability of Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, to a Member of the Bar Council – Such an exclusion would, in fact, run contrary to the legislative intent behind the statute – The implied inclusion, is also supported by the two provisos appended to s.14(2) of the 1995 Act – Therefore, respondent No. 3, who is no longer holding the said post of a Muslim Member of the Bar Council, cannot be allowed to contend that even after he had ceased to be a Member of the Bar Council, he would be entitled to continue as a Member of the Board – Presently, the appellant is the only Muslim Member in the concerned Bar Council – There is no dispute with respect to the appellant’s eligibility to be a Member of the Board by virtue of his membership in the Bar Council – Thus, the impugned judgment set aside. [Paras 11, 12, 18, 19]

Constitution of India – Art.14 – Doctrine of reasonable classification – Applicability on Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act:

Held: Extending the applicability of Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, even to a Muslim Member of the Bar Council, is only but natural even in light of the doctrine of reasonable classification that has evolved from the jurisprudence on Art.14 of the Constitution of India, 1950, which provides for equality before the law and equal protection of the law – A classification would be reasonable only when there is an intelligible differentia which has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved through the statute – In the instant case, giving an overreaching interpretation to Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, to imply that a Muslim Member of the Bar Council shall continue to hold membership in the Board, despite losing their position in the former post, would amount to treating Members of Parliament and Members of the State Legislative Assembly differently from Members of the Bar Council – No intelligible differentia is discernible for such a classification from the scheme of the provision – In fact, it is tantamount to rewriting the provision in its entirety – Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act must be given a harmonious construction and purposive interpretation to mean that the term of a Member of the Bar Council serving on the Board, is co-terminus with their membership in the Bar Council itself. [Para 15]

Interpretation of Statutes – Object of any provision – A proviso or an explanation may be used for several purposes: Held: The object of any provision must be seen in light of the provisions surrounding it, which includes the proviso(s) and the explanation(s) appended to it – When a right accrues to a person pursuant to a position that they hold, it ultimately becomes a qualification – Once such qualification ceases to exist, that person would not be eligible to hold any other post based on his earlier position, unless the statute categorically facilitates the same – An explanation, which is simply in the nature of a clarification as regards certain categories, cannot be read in a manner which is violative of the substantive part of the provision – Although normally, a proviso cannot be used to understand the substantive part of the provision, there is no absolute bar in doing so, particularly in cases where the statute is peculiar and the proviso does not create any exception – For the aforementioned purpose, an explanation can also be understood through the proviso – In other words, if a proviso or an explanation, as the case may be, is phrased in a manner which throws more light on the objective behind the substantive part of the provision, there would be no difficulty in appreciating the same – Ultimately, a proviso or an explanation may be used for several purposes – Therefore, what is required is that Courts appreciate the context of such usage before rendering an interpretation to a provision vis-a-vis the proviso or explanation contained therein. [Para 14]

Legal Maxim – “Expressio unius est exclusion alterius” – Not applicable. [Para 16]