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Form No. J(1)
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Present :
The Hon’ble Justice Rajasekhar Mantha
And
The Hon’ble Justice Rai Chattopadhyay
CRA 614 OF 2014
Md. Abdul Mottalab Mia @ Abdul Mottalab
Vs.
The State of West Bengal
For the Appellant
: Mr. Imtiaz Ahmed,
Mrs. Ghazala Firdaus,
Sk. Saidullah,
Mr. Mithun Mondal,
Md. Arsalan.
For the State
: Mr. Debasish Roy, ld. P.P.,
Ms. Faria Hussain,
Mr. Anand Keshari..
Last Heard on
:10.03.2026
Judgment on
:12.03.2026
Rajasekhar Mantha, J.:
1.
The subject appeal is directed against the judgement and order of
conviction dated 29th May, 2014 and 30th May, 2014 respectively passed
by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, 1st Fast Track Court,
Alipurduar in Sessions Trial no.53 of 2011 arising out of Trial Case no. 49
of 2011.
The appellant was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian
Penal Code and was sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs
5,000. In default thereof to further undergo rigorous imprisonment of a
further 6 months.
THE PROSECUTION CASE AND THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD:2. The Jaigaon Police Station received the complaint dated 3rd November
2010, from PW 11, Md. Rahul Islam. The complainant stated about
the death of his mother (the victim) at a house owned by PW 8, Abdul
Rahaman at Jharna Busty, District Jalpaiguri. PW 11 stated that the
appellant brought the victim to Jharna Busty about 18 months prior to
the incident from the house of the father of victim, PW 12.
The
victim appears to have abandoned her husband one Jamir Ali due to
torture and started to live with her father, PW 12.
3. PW 11 is stated to have received a telephone call from the appellant in
the evening that the victim was not in a good physical condition. He
then rushed to Jharna Busty from his house, which is an hour by bus.
He found the door of the house locked. It has later transpired from the
other witnesses that the locals and in the presence of the police, broke
open the window of the house and a strong foul smell was emanating
therefrom. The victim could be seen lying motionless on a cot covered
with a mosquito net. The local people along with the police personnel
broke open the door and found the victim lying on the bed with blood
oozing out of her nose and mouth.
4. Inquest was conducted at about 06:25 p.m. There were blackish blister
marks on different parts of the body of the victim. The Jaigaon PS
registered FIR no.364 of 2010 dated 3rd November, 2010. The appellant
was named as accused.
5. The body of the victim was sent for post mortem, which was conducted
on the same day at North Bengal Medical College Hospital in Siliguri.
6. After investigation was completed charge sheet was filed against the
appellant. Charges were framed on 6th April, 2011 under Section 302 of
the Indian Penal Code.
7. PW 1, was Hamidul Mia, who arrived at the P.O after the body of the
victim was transferred via a police vehicle for post mortem.
8. PW 2 was Asmat Ali, a local resident and brother-in-law of the PW 8.
PW 2 was the employer to the appellant. PW 8, Abdul Rahman, was
the owner of the house where the PO being, a tenanted room was
located. The appellant and victim obtained the tenancy and were
residing there from 1st of November 2010 till the death of the victim.
PW 2 was the owner of a furniture shop, where the appellant used to
work as a carpenter for six month before the death of the victim.
9. PW 2 has deposed that the appellant originally resided in a place called
Darogaon prior to his induction as a tenant at the PO. The appellant
along with the victim became the tenant at the PO two or three days
prior to the incident. PW 8 allowed the appellant and victim to stay at
the PO since PW 2 was his brother-in-law. Abeda Bibi, PW 9, was the
sister of PW 2. PW 8 was married to PW 2.
10.
PW 2 has deposed that since after 2nd November, 2010, the
appellant did not return for duty at his furniture shop. On the 3rd of
November, 2010 around 5 a.m. in the morning, the appellant called
Idul Islam, PW5 who is the nephew of PW 2 and told him that the
victim had died in an accident. PW 5 was the co-worker of the
appellant at the furniture shop of PW 2. PW 5 is stated to have
informed PW 2 of the same. PW 2 later got information from PW 11,
the son of the victim, over the phone that appellant informed PW 11
that the victim was seriously unwell.
11.
Becoming suspicious of the contradictory versions of the appellant,
PW 2 and the Imam of a local masjid and one Manjima Bibi went to the
P.O and found it under lock and key. PW 2 thereafter went to a
panchayat member, PW 1, namely Hamidul Mia.
12.
In the presence of the aforesaid persons, initially the window of the
house was broken and the body of the victim was seen lying in the bed
under a mosquito net with foul smell emanating therefrom. The police
thereafter broke open the main door of the house and found the victim
had died.
13.
In cross examination, PW 2 confirmed that there was an oral
tenancy agreement between the appellant and PW 8. He reiterated that
PW 11 arrived at the P.O at about noon. He described the P.O and its
surround areas.
14.
PW 3 was one Afsaruddin. He arrived at the PO after the police
recovered the body.
15.
PW 4 was Rahim Haque who wrote the written complaint on
instruction of PW 2 and PW 11.
16.
PW5 was Idul Islam, nephew of PW 2. He worked in the furniture
shop of PW 2. On the 3rd and 4th of November, he received a telephone
call from the appellant at 6:30 p.m. in the morning stating that the
victim had died. He immediately called PW 2 and informed other
friends. He confirmed that the appellant took possession of the rented
house on 1st of November, 2010 and entered therein. He gave a
statement before a Magistrate under Section 164 of the CrPC. He
denied having been tutored by anybody in course of his deposition.
17.
PW 6 was Khokan Chandra Das, a police constable. PW 7 is
another police constable who took the dead body of the victim from P.O
to P.S and for post mortem examination to North Bengal Medical
College and Hospital. He identified the cloths that the deceased was
wearing.
18.
PW 8 was Abdul Rahaman, the owner of the house in question
where the deceased was found dead. He confirmed that on the 1st of
November, 2010 he came to know from his wife that PW 2 had
admitted the appellant in the house as a tenant. He found the
appellant the next day morning while he was attending the nature's
call. He was informed by the appellant that he had woken up early to
collect drinking water. He was examined by the police.
19.
PW 9 was Abeda Bibi, wife of PW 8 and sister of PW 2. She
deposed that on the 1st of November, 2010 at about 8 PM. the appellant
along with the victim representing herself as the appellant's wife took
possession of a room in their house as tenants. She further deposed
that she had some conversation with the appellant and the victim and
went back upstairs to her own residence.
20.
PW 9 has deposed that she saw the appellant next day morning at
5:30 am on her way to toilet. She was also informed by the appellant
that he had woken up early to collect drinking water. PW 9 was an
attendant at a local school. She confirmed that the appellant was
brought to the P.O by PW 2 and took possession of the room as a
tenant.
21.
PW 10 received the complaint from PW11. PW 11, Rahul Islam, the
complainant was son of the victim from her first husband. He deposed
that on the 3rd of November, 2010, he received a call from the appellant
that his mother was extremely sick and needed attention. He arrived at
Jharna Busty in Jaigaon and received a call from PW 2 that the victim
had died. He immediately returned back to the P.O and found the room
of the appellant locked from outside.
22.
PW 11 has deposed that a number of persons gathered at the house
of PW 8. The appellant was not to be found anywhere. He confirmed in
cross-examination the names of the victim’s father and mother. He
confirmed that he lived with his grandfather and the appellant had
taken away his mother on the pretext of getting married to her.
23.
PW 11 reiterated that neither his grandfather nor his father lodged
any complaint with the police when the appellant took away the victim.
He confirmed that he filed the complaint with the police as regards the
death of his mother.
24.
PW 12 was the father of the victim Jhantu Dey Sarkar. He further
confirmed that the victim was married to one Jamir Ali and due to the
latter's torture in her matrimonial home started living with him.
25.
PW 12 has deposed that the appellant brought the victim to Jaigoan
to give her a job. The victim was living with the appellant for more than
three months prior to the incident. The victim visited her father’s house
a few times while living with the appellant.
26.
PW 12 confirmed that PW 11 had informed him about his visit to
the victim’s house on the 3rd of November, 2010 in the morning. He
denied that the victim was engaged in the flesh trade and working out
of a hotel call Tripti in Cooch Behar.
27.
PW 13 was Jalaluddin, a carpenter who also worked in the
furniture shop of PW 2. He confirmed that the appellant did not turn
up for work on the 1st and 2nd of November, 2010 and PW 2 asked him
to look out for the appellant. He went to the house of appellant on 2nd
November, 2010 and found it locked from outside with a padlock.
28.
PW14 was a S.I of police who was present when the door of the
victim’s house was broken. He confirmed having conducted the
investigation after registration of the FIR. He prepared the sketch map
of the P.O and identified the inquest report. He seized the broken lock,
three pillows and pillow cover stained with blood and printed bed sheet
stained with blood. He further seized a dupatta of the victim and a red
gamcha. He recorded statements of several witnesses under Section
161 CrPC and that of PW5 before the Magistrate. The appellant is
stated to have surrendered before the trial court on 27th January, 2011
when he was arrested and remanded to Police Custody.
29.
PW-15 was one Bidhan Chandra Chakraborty, S.I of police of
Jaigaon P.S who entrusted the investigation of the case to PW-14. He
confirmed that he submitted the charge sheet in the case and sought
permission of the Magistrate to file supplementary charge sheet after
the receipt of the FSL report.
30.
The accused was examined under Section 313 CrPC and denied all
the circumstances put forth to him.
31.
Based on the evidence on record and the last seen theory the trial
judge convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code for life.
ANALYSIS OF THIS COURT:32.
The first link in the chain of circumstances is the pervasive control
of the appellant over the life and movement of the victim. PW 11, the
son of the victim, and PW 12, the father of the victim, have stated that
the appellant took away the victim after the latter returned to her
paternal home from her matrimonial home. PW 11 and 12 did not offer
any resistance to the same. PW 11 stayed in the maternal house of the
victim.
33.
PW 12 stated that the appellant promised to marry the victim. The
victim in fact lived with the appellant for 3 months before her death.
The victim and appellant therefore consensually lived together. The
victim was thus under the exclusive custody of the appellant. The
appellant therefore owed an explanation as to what happened to the
victim after they checked in at the PO.
34.
The motive of the appellant to end the life of the victim becomes
immaterial in view of that the victim was under the exclusive control of
the appellant. The victim was living with the appellant for last three
months before her death. The victim was thus virtually disconnected
from her son, PW 11 and her father, PW 12. In the present case
therefore, it was nearly impossible for PW 11 and 12 to be aware of the
conduct of the appellant towards the victim.
35.
In a given case, the motive of a person may remain with him and his
victim. The present is one of such cases where the victim did not reside
with her family. Thus, the prosecution could not have adduced the
evidence as regards the motive of the appellant. In Nusrat Parween v.
State of Jharkhand, reported in 2024 INSC 955, relied on by the
appellant, the Court indeed held that proof of motive in a case based on
circumstantial evidence assumes great significance.
36.
The proof of motive in a case based on circumstantial evidence is
however not an absolute rule. It only provides one more link to the case
of prosecution. In the present case, the pervasive and exclusive control
of the appellant over the life and movement of the victim makes up for
the absence of motive. The Nusrat Parween decision (supra) is thus
inapplicable to facts of the case.
37.
The next link in the chain of circumstances is the conduct of the
appellant just after the commission of the crime. The appellant has
given contradictory information to PW 11 and PW 5 respectively of the
condition of the victim. The appellant informed PW 11, the son of the
victim, that the victim needs medical attention. Whereas the appellant
informed PW 5, his co-worker in the furniture shop of PW 2, that the
victim had died in an accident.
38.
It is quite natural that the appellant would not have the courage to
inform PW 11 that his mother has died when she was in his custody.
PW 11 may be aware of the conduct of the appellant towards his
mother. Revealing the correct information to PW 11 may give rise to
immediate suspicion in the latter’s mind.
39.
On the contrary, PW 5 was the coworker of the appellant. The
appellant was sure that PW 5 would not immediately suspect that the
death of the victim was caused by the appellant. The said contradiction
reveals the nervousness of the appellant just after the commission of
the offense.
40.
There is another vital sub-link to the aforesaid link which also
reveals the state of mind of the appellant. In the morning, PW 8 and
PW 9 found the appellant outside the PO. On query by PW 8 and 9 as
to what the appellant is doing outside, he explained that he wanted to
collect drinking water.
41.
PW 8 and 9 have not gone out to respond to the nature’s call at the
same time. Thus, PW 8 and 9 have seen the appellant outside the PO
at different points in time. This indicates that the appellant was outside
the PO for a considerable period of time that he was seen by the PW 8
and 9, who came out to respond to the nature’s call at different points
in time. PW 8 and 9 have not stated that the appellant was having any
water drum to carry water. Therefore it can be reasonably inferred that
it is unlikely that the appellant had woken up early in the morning to
collect water.
42.
The nervousness of the appellant after the commission of the crime
can also be inferred from his conduct in informing PW 5 that the victim
had died in an accident. The appellant was aware that PW 11, the son
of the victim, was known to PW 2, as a co-worker in a furniture shop of
PW 2.
43.
The appellant was aware that PW 5 being the employee of PW 2
would invariably inform PW 2 that the wife of the appellant had died.
PW 2 in turn would inform the death of the victim to PW 11. The lie of
the appellant to the PW 11 that his mother is ill would be easily
exposed. He, however, committed the said mistake since he was under
the stress of having committed the murder of the victim. The lie given
out by the accused just after the commission of the crime is a relevant
fact which calls for an adverse inference against him.
44.
Learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Imtiaz Ahmed, would argue
that there was no evidence on record to indicate that the appellant was
last seen with the victim. This Court is unable to accept the argument
as the evidence of PW 9 and PW 8 has clearly established that the
appellant took possession of the rented room on 1st of November, 2010
at about 8:30 a.m. PW 2 has confirmed that he introduced and was
responsible for the appellant and the victim to take the PO on rent. The
appellant and the victim were last seen by PW 9 entering the house.
The appellant was thereafter seen early in the morning the next day,
both by PW8 and PW9 at 5:30 a.m. alone.
45.
Further, PW 11, the son of the victim, PW 12, the father of the
victim were aware that the victim was residing with the appellant
before her death. PW 2, the employer of the appellant has deposed that
he was aware that the appellant is residing at PO with the victim. PW
in fact directed PW, 5, the coworker of the appellant to search for the
latter when the appellant did not turn up for work on November 2 nd
and 3rd, 2010.
46.
The prosecution therefore has discharged its burden of proof that
the appellant was last seen and stayed with the victim on the 1 st of
November, 2010 at about 8:30 p.m. In fact, it has been established that
the appellant last stayed with the victim at the PO.
47.
The evidence of PW 2, PW5, PW 13, establish that the appellant did
not turn up at his work place i.e. the furniture shop of PW 2 on the 2nd
and 3rd of November, 2010. The appellant was last seen by PW 8 and PW9
near about at 5:30 a.m. in the morning at the P.O and disappeared
thereafter.
48.
The burden therefore shifted on the appellant to demonstrate as to
what transpired at the PO. He was in possession of the rented
accommodation i.e. the PO. The events in the PO thus fell within his
exclusive knowledge. It was thus for the appellant to demonstrate that he
was elsewhere than the P.O since after 1st of November, 2010.
49.
Further, the disappearance of the appellant from the PO coupled
with his absence from his workplace on November 2nd and 3rd of 2010 was
required to be explained by the appellant. No explanation however has
come on record. The only eyewitness to the events at PO after the
appellant and victim checked in thereat was the appellant himself.
50.
The principles of the last seen theory clearly put the appellant at the
place and time when the victim must have died. The only conclusion that
is possible in the facts of the case is that the victim was strangulated by
the appellant. There is no other evidence to indicate that there was
anybody else present at the P.O on 1st and 3rd of November, 2010.
51.
The decisions in Padman Bibhar v. State of Odisha, reported in
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1190 and Krishnan Kumar & Anr v. The State
of Haryana, reported in 2023 INSC 679 are inapplicable to present
case. In Padman Bibhar (supra), the case of the prosecution was solely
based on last seen theory. In Krishnan Kumar (supra), the last seen
theory was not supported by any positive evidence in that none of the
prosecution witnesses deposed that they have last seen the accused with
the victim near or at the PO.
52.
In the present case as discussed hereinabove, the evidence as
regards the pervasive and exclusive control of the appellants over the
victim, the calls made by the appellant to PW 5 and PW 11 where he lied
to the said witnesses about the death of the victim, the induction of the
appellant and victim as tenants at the PO, the presence of the appellant
outside the PO in the morning of 2nd November 2nd, 2010 witnessed by PW
8 and PW 9, and the absence of the appellant from his workplace after the
commission of the crime furnish positive evidence that the victim was
under the exclusive control of the appellant; she stayed with the appellant
after which she was found dead at the place where the appellant brought
her and stayed with her.
53.
Learned counsel for appellant has next argued that the examination
of the accused under section 313 of the CRPC was inadequate. The
relevant circumstances have not been put forward to the appellant.
Inadequate examination under Section 313 of the CRPC is not fatal to the
prosecution case when the accused is represented by his counsel and the
evidence of the PWs has been recorded in the presence of the accused.
When the same is done, the accused gets the opportunity to hear the PWs
and can accordingly instruct his counsel.
54.
The only incriminating circumstance not put to the appellant is the
calls made by the appellant to PW 5 and PW 11. The evidence of PW 5 and
11 were recorded in presence of the appellant. Hence the omission to put
the said question to the appellant is not fatal to the prosecution case.
55.
In fact, the decision in State of Punjab v. Naib Din, reported in
(2001) 8 SCC 578 cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, at
paragraph no. 12 that the accused must demonstrate prejudice by the
omission on part of the trial court to put a vital question to him. Omission
on part of the trial court to put a question does not ipso facto lead to
setting aside of a conviction.
56.
In the present case, the appellant has not demonstrated before this
Court that he was prejudiced by the omission on part of the trial court to
put the question to the appellant as regards the calls made by him to PW
5 and PW 11. The said calls were a link in the chain of circumstances. The
said calls by itself have not resulted in the conviction of the appellant.
Para no. 12 of Naib Din (supra) is set out below:12. That apart, the respondent failed to show that there was any
failure of justice on account of the omission to put a question
concerning such formal evidence when he was examined under
Section 313 of the Code. No objection was raised in the trial court on
the ground of such omission. No ground was taken up in the appellate
court on such ground. If any appellate court or revisional court comes
across that the trial court had not put any question to an accused
even if it is of a vital nature, such omission alone should not result
in setting aside the conviction and sentence as an inevitable
consequence. Effort should be made to undo or correct the lapse. If it is
not possible to correct it by any means the court should then consider the
impact of the lapse on the overall aspect of the case. After keeping that
particular item of evidence aside, if the remaining evidence is
sufficient to bring home the guilt of the accused, the lapse does not
matter much, and can be sidelined justifiably. But if the lapse is so
vital as would affect the entire case, the appellate or revisional
court can endeavour to see whether it could be rectified.
Emphasis applied
57.
The medical evidence clearly indicated that the victim was
strangulated and the neck muscles were crushed. Death had occurred due
to strangulation. In spite of this, post mortem doctor was not examined.
58.
The post mortem report, was, however taken on record. It was
exhibited albeit marked for identification. However no objection was raised
by the appellant to the same. The said document was thus liable to be
treated as an exhibit in the Trial in view of the evidence of the IO and the
constable who took the body of the victim for PM. While sub section 1 of
section 294 mandates that the genuineness of a document shall be proved
by the author thereof before the Court in the trial. Sub-section 3 of
Section 294 states that where the genuineness of a document is not
disputed, the same may read in evidence without the author thereof
deposing before the Court.
59.
One blood stained pillow cover and bed sheet have been recovered
from the PO. One gamcha (towel) and dupatta of a women (a longish scarf
worn by women) have also been recovered from the PO. The latter may
have been used to strangulate the victim. The appellant therefore had the
requisite accessories in the form one gamcha and dupatta to strangulate
and end the life of the victim. In view of that it was the appellant only who
was with the victim at the PO, the irresistible conclusion that flows is that
the appellant has killed the victim with the said gamcha and or dupatta
available at the PO.
60.
The case of prosecution was thus based on the aforesaid
circumstances in addition to the last seen theory. The aforesaid
circumstances leave no room for doubt in the last seen theory. It adds to
the authenticity and vigor of the last seen theory in the facts of the
present case.
CONCLUSION
61.
Having regard to the above, this Court is of the view that the
evidence on record clearly indicates the participation of the appellant in
the death of the victim. There is no other conclusion possible in the given
facts and circumstances of the case. The finding of the trial judge against
the appellant and the order of conviction and sentence therefore does not
call for any interference whatsoever.
62.
The subject appeal being CRA 614 of 2014 is hereby dismissed. All
pending applications shall stand dismissed.
63.
However there shall be no order as to costs.
64.
All parties shall act on the server copy of this order duly downloaded
from the official website of this Court.
(Rajasekhar Mantha, J.)
I Agree.
(Rai Chattopadhyay, J.)
Later:
1.
The judgment has been delivered in open Court.
2.
Mr. Imtiaz Ahmed, learned counsel for the appellant seeks time for
his client to surrender before Court in view of ongoing Ramadan.
3.
Having regard to the submissions, this Court directs the appellant
to surrender within a period of 10 days from date, mandatorily and
positively.
4.
The bail bonds are cancelled and sureties are discharged.
(Rajasekhar Mantha, J.)
I Agree.
(Rai Chattopadhyay, J.)
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