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CRMC 17/2017
CrlM(1746/2020) IA(1/2017)
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
CRMC 17/2017 CrlM(1746/2020) IA(1/2017)
Reserved on: 10.09.2026
Pronounced on: 22.09.2026
Uploaded on: 24.09.2026
Whether the operative part or
full judgment is pronounced: Full
1)
2)
3)
Maxmed Life Sciences Pvt.ltd. and ors.
Plot No.5, Sector -2, D.C.SIDCUL,
Rudrapur, Uttarakhand
(Company under Companies Act,)
Sanjeev Wasan age 47 years,
s/o Kulbushan Kumar Wasan,
Director, Maxmed Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd. and ors.
Plot No.5, Sector -2, D.C.SIDCUL,
Rudrapur, Uttarakhand
Kulbushan Kumar Wasan, age 76 years
s/o Sh. Amar Nath Wasan
Director, Maxmed Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd. and ors.
Plot No.5, Sector -2, D.C.SIDCUL,
Rudrapur, Uttarakhand
…Petitioner(s)
Through:
Mr. Varut Gupta, Advocate.
VERSUS
State of Jammu and Kashmir,
Through Drug Inspector Jammu Zone-IV,
C/o Office of Deputy Controller,
Drugs and Food Control Organization,
Muthi, Jammu, J&K
…Respondent(s)
Through:
Mr. Raman Sharma, AAG. With Ms. Salika Shiekh, AC
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE WASIM SADIQ NARGAL, JUDGE
JUDGEMENT
Prayer:
1.
The petitioners, through the medium of the instant petition,
have called in question the complaint preferred by the
complainant before the Court of learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Jammu, and the proceedings arising therefrom,
which complaint has been filed under Section 18(a)(i) read
with Section 27(d) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940
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(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), as also all subsequent
orders passed therein. Learned counsel for the petitioners
has vehemently argued that the complainant has filed a
complaint under Section 18(a)(i) read with Section 27(d) of
the Act against the petitioners, who are the Directors of the
petitioner-company, and also against other persons, the
details whereof have been referred to in the impugned
complaint. Since the petitioner No. 3 has already left for
heavenly abode, therefore, the instant petition survives only
insofar as petitioner Nos. 1, 2 are concerned as petitioner
No.3 has already been deleted from the array of parties vide
order dated 28.12.2020. The instant petition has been filed
by the petitioners under Section 561-A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (section 528 of BNSS), challenging the
legality as well as the maintainability of the proceedings
arising out of the complaint filed before the Court of learned
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu, by virtue of which
process of summons was issued against the petitioners.
Brief Facts:
2.
The brief facts arising out of the case are that on
16.01.2014, the respondent/complainant lifted the sample
of the drug “Amzone” from the premises of M/s Chest and
Disease Hospital, Bakshi Nagar, Jammu, and the details of
the drug in question are as under:
Drug in Question
Amzone
Batch No.
MLI-386
Date of Manufacture
12/2013
Expiry Date
11/2015
Manufactured by
Maxmed Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd.
3.
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Further, the fact of the matter is that one sample portion of
the drug in question was sent to the Government Analyst,
Jammu, for test and analysis vide Form No. 18, in
conformity with Rule 56 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules,
1945. The Government Analyst, Jammu, vide report dated
11.02.2014, issued in Form No. 13 under Rule 46, declared
the drug in question as “Not of Standard Quality” on the
ground that the sample failed the test for particulate
matter.
4.
It
is
the
further
case
respondent/complainant
of
the
petitioners
thereafter,
as
that
alleged
in
the
the
impugned complaint, directed the Medical Officer, Chest
and Disease Hospital, Jammu, to disclose the source of
purchase of the drug in question, and in reply thereto, the
Medical Officer disclosed the name of M/s Hussain
Brothers,
Srinagar,
as
the
source
of
purchase
and
distribution. In reply thereto, the said firm disclosed the
name
of
the
petitioner-company
as
the
source
of
distribution and manufacturer of the drug in question.
Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that the
respondent
issued
a
statutory
DIJ/AB/NSQ/03-14/167-170
dated
notice
bearing
01.03.2014
No.
under
Section 25(2) of the Act, informing the petitioner-company
of the test report issued by the Government Analyst,
Jammu.
5.
The petitioner-company immediately replied to the said
notice and objected to and expressed its disagreement with
the report issued by the Government Analyst, Jammu, and
intimated its intention to adduce evidence against the said
report, requesting the respondent to re-analyse the sample
of the drug in question. It is further submitted that the
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intention to get the drug re-analyzed was conveyed within
the statutory period prescribed under the Act, i.e. 28 days,
as mandated under Section 25(3) of the said Act.
6.
The petitioner-company, through its reply, informed the
respondent that the mandatory control samples of the drug
“Amzone” lying in its manufacturing unit had been tested in
its in-house laboratory as well as in a Governmentapproved laboratory and, in both laboratories, the drug was
found to conform to the prescribed standards. The further
fact of the matter is that after communicating with the
petitioner-company,
the
respondent
issued
a
communication dated 28.04.2014 to the Deputy Controller,
Drugs
and
Food
Control
Organization,
Jammu,
and
informed her about the investigation conducted in the
matter in hand and also sought necessary directions in
view of the disagreement shown by the petitioner-company
with the report of the Government Analyst, as well as its
request for re-analysis of the drug.
7.
It is further pleaded that vide communication dated
19.05.2014, the office of the Controller, Drugs and Food
Control Organization, accorded prosecution permission in
favour of the respondent to file the complaint against the
petitioner-company and others, and it was further pleaded
that the sample of the drug in question be also sent for reanalysis/re-testing under the provisions of Section 25(4) of
the aforesaid Act.
Submissions on behalf of the petitioners:
8.
Mr. Varut Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners, has
vehemently argued and placed reliance upon Sections 25(3)
and 25(4) of the Act and submits that when a person
intimates his intention to adduce evidence against the
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report of the Government Analyst in terms of the aforesaid
statutory provisions, then, in that eventuality, the Drug
Inspector is under a legal obligation to institute a complaint
before the competent Court along with an application for
sending the drug for re-analysis and has to produce the
fourth sample portion of the drug lifted under Section 23(4)
before the said Court. The said Court is under a legal
obligation to forward the fourth sample portion to the
Director, Central Drugs Laboratory, for his opinion, which
opinion would constitute the conclusive evidence as to
whether the drug conforms to the prescribed standards or
otherwise.
9.
Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that, in
utter disregard of the aforesaid statutory provisions invoked
by the petitioners, the respondent-Drug Inspector chose to
file the criminal complaint against the petitioners but failed
to approach the competent Court with an application for
getting the drug re-analysed in conformity with Section
25(4) of the aforesaid Act.
10.
The wrong, according to the petitioners, has not only been
committed by the complainant, but the Court has also
fallen into error while acting contrary to the law and
procedure envisaged under the Act. The Court below,
without going into the contents of the complaint and the
documents annexed thereto and without due application of
mind, took cognizance of the offence and issued process
against the petitioners. The Court, while issuing the
process, failed to appreciate the intention of the petitionercompany to have the sample of the drug re-analysed in
terms of Section 25 and, therefore, caused grave prejudice
to the statutory rights of the petitioners. By the time the
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summons were received by the petitioners, it has been
submitted by learned counsel that the shelf life of the drug
had expired.
11.
Therefore, aggrieved and dissatisfied with the initiation and
continuation of the impugned proceedings pending before
the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu, and
the subsequent orders passed therein, the petitioners were
left with no other option but to file the instant petition
invoking the inherent powers of this Court in terms of
Section 561-A Cr.P.C.
12.
The Court, after feeling prima facie satisfied, by virtue of an
interim order dated 10.01.2017, has already stayed the
proceedings before the Court of learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Jammu, in the case titled “State through Drug
Inspector, Jammu v. Hussain Brothers and Ors.”, which,
according to Learned counsel, is continuing as on date. The
Learned counsel, in the aforesaid backdrop, submits that
the impugned complaint, the order of issuance of summons
and all subsequent orders are without due application of
mind and are illegal and cannot withstand the test of law
and, therefore, are required to be quashed/set aside.
Learned counsel further submits that the complaint
preferred under the Act is liable to be dismissed in the
eventuality that the statutory rights guaranteed under
Section 25 of the aforesaid Act are denied to a person who
has
shown
his
intention
to
adduce
evidence
in
controversion of the report in terms of Section 25(3) of the
Act.
13.
According to the learned counsel, the Court has also fallen
into error, as the Court below, without due application of
mind, took cognizance prematurely and issued summons
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against the petitioners in the light of the admitted fact of
intimation of the right of re-analysis and, instead of getting
the drug in question re-tested/re-analysed from the Central
Drugs Laboratory, as envisaged under Sections 25(3) and
25(4) of the Act, allowed the proceedings to continue and
issued process. Such process, according to learned counsel,
cannot withstand the test of law, as the same is violative of
the statutory rights of the petitioners and the provisions of
the Act itself.
14.
Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the issue
is no more res integra and that the statutory right to
challenge the report of the Analyst is effectively invoked once
the person concerned, within the prescribed period, notifies
in writing his intention to adduce evidence in controversion of
the report. Such intimation does not require a separate or
specific request for sending the sample to the Central
Laboratory. Once, such intention is duly notified, the
conclusiveness attached to the report of the Analyst stands
displaced and the statutory mechanism for re-analysis of
the sample under the corresponding provision is required to
be followed. The right so conferred is a substantive
statutory safeguard and cannot be defeated by treating the
requirement of re-analysis as a mere procedural formality.
15.
Thus, learned counsel further submits that the action on
the part of the respondent in filing the impugned complaint
and the cognizance taken thereafter by the competent
Court cannot withstand the test of law and are liable to be
set aside. The record reveals that this Court, after feeling
prima facie satisfied, has granted an interim order staying
the aforesaid proceedings.
16.
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When a specific query was put to learned counsel for the
petitioners as to whether, in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, where the petitioner-company
had already expressed its intention for re-testing of the
drug within the statutory period and the respondent had
failed to comply with the statutory mechanism, the earlier
report, which had lost its significance, could subsequently
be relied upon. Learned counsel submits that the said
report had already lost its significance, particularly when
the petitioner had opted for re-testing/re-analysis from the
Central Drugs Laboratory, as envisaged under the Act.
Another query was raised with regard to the shelf life of the
drug, to which learned counsel replied that, once the shelf
life of the drug had expired, no subsequent order could be
passed either by this Court or by the Court below for retesting of a drug which had already lost its validity.
According to learned counsel, the only course left for this
Court was to quash the proceedings arising out of the
complaint.
He,
therefore,
submits
that
the
entire
proceedings, commencing from the filing of the complaint
and all proceedings emanating therefrom, are liable to be
set aside, as the procedure prescribed under the Act had
not been followed by the respondent.
17.
Learned counsel, in the aforesaid backdrop, lastly submits
that, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,
the petitioner-company has been deprived of its valuable
statutory right to have the drug in question re-analysed/retested by the Central Drugs Laboratory, notwithstanding
the admitted fact that the petitioner had, within the
stipulated period, intimated the respondent of its intention
to adduce evidence in controversion of the report of the
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Government Analyst. It is further submitted that the
Controller, Drugs and Food Control Organization, had
granted permission not only to file the complaint but also to
send the sample for re-testing. Learned counsel further
emphasizes that, under Section 25(4) of the Act, the report
of the Central Drugs Laboratory alone could constitute
conclusive evidence in the circumstances of the present
case, particularly when the petitioner had already exercised
its option for such re-testing. However, admittedly, the
sample was not sent to the Central Drugs Laboratory and,
consequently, no report was received from the said
Laboratory which could be relied upon by the respondent
against the petitioners or treated as conclusive evidence
against them.
18.
The aforesaid principle also assumes significance in the
present case in view of the submission of learned counsel
that the plea of the respondent, as pleaded in paragraph 16
of the complaint, that the petitioners have lost their
statutory
right
merely
because
their
communication
referred to an NABL-accredited laboratory, is not tenable in
law. He submitted that the only requirement under the
statute on the part of the petitioners was to controvert the
said report and, once such controversion had already been
made and the intention had been conveyed to the
respondent within the statutory period, the respondent was
under a legal obligation, qua the petitioners, to refer the
sample to the Central Drugs Laboratory, even if the
petitioners had asked for testing by a particular laboratory.
This aspect of the matter, according to learned counsel for
the petitioners, has already been dealt with by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the judgments relied upon by him.
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Submissions on behalf of respondent:
19.
Mr. Raman Sharma, learned AAG, per contra, has drawn
the attention of the Court to the scheme and mandate of
Section 25 of the Act, which deals with the report of the
Government Analyst. In advancing his argument, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has relied
upon Sections 25(3) and 25(4) of the aforesaid Act. A
perusal thereof reveals that any document purporting to be
a report signed by the Government Analyst shall be
evidence of the facts stated therein and such evidence shall
be conclusive unless the person from whom the sample was
taken has, within 28 days of the receipt of a copy of the
report, notified in writing the Inspector or the Court before
which any proceeding in respect of the sample is pending
that he intends to adduce evidence in controversion of the
report.
20.
The Learned counsel for the respondent has also placed
reliance upon Section 25(4) of the aforesaid Act, which
provides that where a person has, under sub-section (3),
notified his intention of adducing evidence in controversion
of a Government Analyst’s report, the Court may, of its own
motion or at its discretion at the request either of the
complainant or the accused, cause the sample of the drug
produced before the Magistrate under sub-section (4) of
Section 23 to be sent for test or analysis to the said
laboratory, which shall make the test or analysis and report
in writing signed by or under the authority of the Director
of the Central Drugs Laboratory, the result thereof, and
such report shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated
therein.
21.
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Thus, according to learned counsel for the respondent, a
conjoint reading of both the statutory provisions makes it
abundantly clear that the only laboratory recognized under
law is the Central Drugs Laboratory, where the sample can
be sent and the report of the said laboratory shall
constitute
conclusive
evidence
in
a
particular
case.
However, the petitioners, by virtue of the communication
placed on record, have shown their intention to have the
drug re-tested or re-analyzed from a reputed NABLaccredited testing laboratory to verify their claim, which,
according to the respondent, is not recognized by law.
22.
It was further argued that since the petitioners had shown
their intention to re-analyze the sample from a particular
laboratory, i.e. NABL, which has no legal recognition in
terms of the aforesaid provision, the sample was rightly not
sent to the said laboratory. Therefore, no fault can be
attributed to the action on the part of the respondents. Had
there been any intention on the part of the petitioners to
have the sample re-tested or re-analyzed from the Central
Drugs Laboratory, then perhaps the petitioners would have
been right in saying that the respondent had not exercised
the option which the statute permits them to follow. Since a
demand was made for testing by a particular laboratory
which has no legal recognition in terms of the statute, the
sample was not sent to the said laboratory. Therefore, no
fault can be found with respect to the action on the part of
the respondents.
23.
The petitioners admittedly, in the instant case, have not
chosen to exercise the option for re-testing/re-analysis from
the designated laboratory, i.e. Central Drugs Laboratory,
and instead have chosen re-analysis of the sample from
NABL
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(National
Accreditation
Board
for
Testing
and
Calibration of Laboratories),. The learned counsel for the
respondent
has
vehemently
argued
that
once
the
petitioners have chosen to exercise their option for reanalyzing/re-testing
from
a
laboratory
which
is
not
recognized by law, the respondent was not obliged to act in
furtherance of the same, as the petitioners had not
exercised their option strictly in tune with the mandate of
law prescribed under Section 25(3) of the Act. Since there
was no such demand from the petitioners for re-testing/reanalysis from the designated laboratory recognized under
law, the respondents did not send the said sample to the
said laboratory which was never asked for. Having not done
that, learned counsel for the respondent submits that since
the petitioners have failed to exercise their option as
envisaged under law, the only report which had already
been submitted by the State Drug Laboratory, whereby the
sample had been declared as not of standard quality, has to
be relied upon. Therefore, the interim direction passed by
this
Court,
which
is
harshly
operating
against
the
respondent, is liable to be vacated so that the proceedings,
which have been stalled on the strength of the aforesaid
order, are allowed to proceed and the Court below is
permitted to proceed against the petitioners in accordance
with law, as the initial report has to be relied upon in the
instant facts and circumstances of the case.
24.
Lastly, learned counsel for the respondent submits that
even if the prayer of the petitioners, as mentioned in
paragraph 5 of the said communication, were complied with
and the sample could have been sent to the laboratory as
asked for, i.e. NABL, then what would be the sanctity of the
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report of the said laboratory, which is not recognized under
law, and whether the said report could be treated as
conclusive
evidence
of
the
drug
being
standard
or
otherwise, when the statute recognizes only that if the
sample has been declared as standard or otherwise by the
Central Drugs Laboratory, then, and only then, the same
shall constitute conclusive evidence of the quality of the
said
drug.
Since
the
petitioners
had
requested
the
respondent to test the sample from a laboratory not
recognised under law, no fault can be attributed to the
respondent for not acting in accordance with the mandate
of the statute when the petitioners themselves are at fault
and have not acted in consonance with the statutory
scheme.
Legal Analysis:
25.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having
gone through the record, the controversy which falls for
consideration in the present petition is a narrow one. The
question is as to whether, in the facts and circumstances of
the present case, the petitioners, having within the
statutory period of twenty-eight days disputed the report of
the Government Analyst and expressed their intention to
adduce evidence in controversion thereof, stood deprived of
their statutory right under Section 25(3) and (4) of the Act
merely because, while seeking re-analysis, they referred to
an
NABL-accredited
laboratory
instead
of
specifically
mentioning the Central Drugs Laboratory.
26.
Before examining the rival submissions, it would be
apposite to notice the scheme of Section 25(3) and (4) of the
Drugs and Cosmetics Act,1940 which read as under:
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25. Reports of Government Analysts.
“(3) Any document purporting to be a report signed by a
Government Analyst under this Chapter shall be evidence to the
facts stated therein, and such evidence shall be conclusive unless the
person from whom the sample was taken 5 [or the person whose
name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under
section 18A] has, within twenty-eight days of the receipt of a copy of
the report, notified in writing the Inspector or the Court before
which any proceedings in respect of the sample are pending that he
intends to adduce evidence in controversion of the report.
(4) Unless the sample has already been tested or analysed in the
Central Drugs Laboratory, where a person has under sub-section (3)
notified his intention of adducing evidence in controversion of a
Government Analysts report, the Court may, of its own motion or in
its discretion at the request either of the complainant or the accused,
cause the sample of the drug 3 [or cosmetic] produced before the
Magistrate under subsection (4) of section 23 to be sent for test or
analysis to the said Laboratory, which shall make the test or analysis
and report in writing signed by, or under the authority of, the
Director of the Central Drugs Laboratory the result thereof, and
such report shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein.”
27.
A
bare
perusal
of
the
aforesaid
provision
attaches
conclusiveness to the report of the Government Analyst
subject to the statutory exception carved out therein. The
report does not attain such conclusiveness where the
person from whom the sample was taken, or the person
whose particulars have been disclosed under Section 18-A,
within twenty-eight days of receipt of a copy of the report,
notifies in writing the Inspector or the Court before which
the proceedings are pending that he intends to adduce
evidence in controversion of the report.
28.
Sub-section (4) of Section 25 provides the mechanism
which follows such intimation. Where a person has notified
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his intention under sub-section (3), the sample produced
before the Magistrate under Section 23(4) may be caused to
be sent to the Central Drugs Laboratory for test or analysis
and the report of the Director of the said Laboratory is
made conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein.
29.
In the present case, it is significant to note that the
respondent has not disputed that the petitioner-company,
upon receipt of the report of the Government Analyst,
expressed its disagreement with the said report and
conveyed its intention to have the sample re-analysed. The
respondent's case, as set out in the complaint itself, is that
the petitioner-company sought re-analysis from an National
Accreditation Board for Testing and Calibration Laborites
NABL- and, therefore, according to the respondent, forfeited
its right of re-analysis from the Central Drugs Laboratory.
The very stand taken by the respondent, therefore,
proceeds on the admitted premise that the petitioners had
disputed the report of the Government Analyst and had
sought re-analysis.
30.
The mere fact that the petitioners, in their communication,
referred to “any NABL accredited laboratory” cannot, by
itself, be construed as an abandonment or waiver of the
statutory right available to them under Section 25(3) of the
Act. The fact that the petitioners may have used an
expression different from the statutory terminology while
requesting re-analysis may render the request imperfect in
form, but the substantive requirement under Section 25(3)
is whether they had communicated, within the prescribed
period, their intention to controvert the Government
Analyst's report. On the admitted facts, such intention was
clearly communicated.
31.
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The distinction between the statutory requirement under
Section 25(3) and the procedure contemplated under
Section 25(4) assumes significance. The petitioners were
not required, as a condition precedent under Section 25(3),
to correctly identify or nominate the Central Drugs
Laboratory. Once their intention to controvert the report
was duly communicated within the prescribed period, the
statutory mechanism under Section 25(4) was available for
obtaining the conclusive opinion of the Director, Central
Drugs Laboratory. The respondent, therefore, could not
have treated the reference to an NABL-accredited laboratory
as, by itself, resulting in forfeiture of the statutory right.
32.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Northern Mineral Ltd. v.
Union of India & Anr., (2010) 7 SCC 726, held as under:
“From the language and the underlying
object behind Section 24(3) and (4) of the
Act as also from the ratio of the decisions
aforesaid of this Court, we are of the
opinion that mere notifying intention to
adduce evidence in controversion of the
report of the Insecticide Analyst confers on
the accused the right and clothes the court
jurisdiction to send the sample for analysis
by Central Insecticides Laboratory and an
accused is not required to demand in
specific terms that sample be sent for
analysis to Central Insecticides Laboratory.
In our opinion the mere intention to adduce
evidence in controversion of the report,
implies demand to send the sample to
Central Insecticides Laboratory for test and
analysis.”
33.
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Furthermore, the expression “may” occurring in Section
25(4) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 cannot be
construed as conferring an unfettered discretion upon the
learned Trial Court. Though the provision employs the word
“may”, its true import has to be determined having
regard to the scheme of Section 25, the legislative intent
and, most importantly, the statutory right conferred upon
the person from whom the sample was taken to controvert
the Government Analyst's report.
34.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rakesh RanjanShrivastava
v. State of Jharkhand, (2024) 4 SCC 419, has expressly
held that the use of the word “may” does not invariably
make a provision discretionary. The Court observed:
“There is no doubt that the word “may”
ordinarily
does
not
mean
“must”.
Ordinarily, “may” will not be construed
as “shall”. But this is not an inflexible
rule. The use of the word “may” in
certain legislations can be construed as
“shall”, and the word “shall” can be
construed as “may”. It all depends on
the nature of the power conferred by the
relevant provision of the statute and the
effect of the exercise of the power. The
legislative intent also plays a role in the
interpretation of such provisions. Even the
context in which the word “may” has
been used is also relevant.”
35.
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The same principle was recognized in Hari Vishnu Kamath
v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, (1955) 1 SCR 1104, wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:
“It is well established that an enactment
in form mandatory might in substance be
directory and that the use of the word
‘shall’ does not conclude the matter.”
36.
Likewise, in State of U.P. and Others v. Babu Ram
Upadhya, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 5, Hon’ble Supreme Court
observed as under:
“The word “shall” in its ordinary import
is
“obligatory”; but there are many
decisions
wherein
the
courts
under
different situations construed the word to
mean “may”.
37.
Applying the aforesaid principle to the statutory provision
as envisaged under Section 25(4), there are cogent reasons
to construe “may” as “shall” in the circumstances
contemplated by the statutory provision mentioned supra
which are enumerated as under:i)
From the bare reading of Section 25(3) it is apparently
clear
that
it
creates
a
specific
statutory
right.
Ordinarily, the report of the Government Analyst is
made conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein.
The legislature, however, expressly carves out an
exception where the person from whom the sample was
taken, within twenty-eight days of receiving the report,
notifies
his
controversion
intention
of
to
that report.
adduce
The
evidence
in
legislature
has
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therefore consciously recognized a right to challenge the
Government Analyst's report.
ii)
Section 25(4) provides the mechanism through which
that right is to be made effective. Once the person has
exercised the right under sub-section (3), the sample is
capable of being tested or analyzed by the Central
Drugs Laboratory and the report of that Laboratory is
itself made conclusive evidence. Thus, the provision is
not merely procedural; it is the statutory mechanism for
resolving the conflict between the Government Analyst's
report and the defence of the person affected by that
report.
iii)
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly treated the
right under Section 25 as a valuable statutory right.
The importance of that right is particularly evident
because, if the sample is not sent to the Central Drugs
Laboratory while it remains capable of being tested, the
person may permanently lose the opportunity of
obtaining
an
independent
analysis.
The
Hon’ble
Supreme Court has recognized that where delay
attributable to the prosecution deprives the accused of
this statutory right, the consequences can be fatal to
the prosecution.
iv)
A construction which treats “may” as an entirely
discretionary power would defeat the very right which
Section 25(3) expressly preserves. The legislature
cannot reasonably be taken to have created a right to
controvert the
Government Analyst's report while
simultaneously conferring an unrestricted discretion to
refuse
the
statutory
mechanism
necessary
for
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exercising that right. Such an interpretation would
make the protection contained in sub-section (3) largely
illusory.
v)
The expression “may” must therefore be read in the
context of the consequence of its exercise. Where the
person has complied with Section 25(3) by notifying his
intention to controvert the Government Analyst's report,
and the statutory conditions for resorting to Section
25(4) are otherwise satisfied, refusal to facilitate
examination of the sample by the Central Drugs
Laboratory would deprive that person of the very
statutory safeguard which the legislature intended to
provide.
vi)
The principle is therefore not that the word “may”
must invariably be substituted with “shall”. Rather,
in the particular statutory context of Section 25(3) and
(4), the legislative intent, the nature of the right
conferred and the consequences of non-exercise of the
power justify construing “may” as “shall”. Such an
interpretation gives effect to the provision by way of
purposive interpretation rather than rendering the
statutory right to controvert the Government Analyst's
report ineffective.
38.
Accordingly, this Court is of the opinion that once the
statutory conditions under Section 25(3) are fulfilled and
the person entitled under the provision has duly exercised
his right to controvert the Government Analyst's report, the
Court's power under Section 25(4), though expressed as
“may”,
assumes
a
mandatory
character
where
its
exercise is necessary to preserve and give meaningful effect
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to that statutory right as the Court has to give weightage to
the purpose, object and legislative intention behind the
provision so that interpretation advances the object of law.
39.
The aforesaid view also finds support from the judgment of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ‘M/s. Medicamen Biotech
Ltd. and Another v. Rubina Bose, Drug Inspector’,
(2008) 7 SCC 196, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
while examining the very provisions of Section 25(3) and (4)
of the Act, recognized the right of the accused to have the
disputed sample tested by the Central Drugs Laboratory
once the statutory requirement of notifying the intention to
controvert the Government Analyst's report had been
fulfilled. The Court further held that deprivation of such
valuable right, in the facts of that case, necessitated
quashing of the proceedings. It was held as under:
“13. A reading of the aforesaid provisions would
reveal that they lay certain obligations as well as
provide safeguards for a person from whom a drug
has been seized for analysis or testing as Section
25(3) specifies
that
unless
such
a
person
controverts the correctness of the report submitted
by the Government Analyst within 28 days in
writing that he intends to adduce evidence to
controvert the report of the Analyst, it would be
deemed to be conclusive evidence of the quality of
the drug whereas sub-section (4) of Section
25 obliges the Magistrate on the request of the
complainant or the accused or on in his own
motion to send the fourth sample which has been
disputed for fresh testing to the Director of the
Central Drugs Laboratory….
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18. We find that this judgment helps the case of the
appellant rather than that of the respondent
because in spite of two communications from the
appellant that it intended to adduce evidence to
controvert the facts given in the report of the
Government Analyst, the fourth sample with the
Magistrate had not been sent for re-analysis. The
observations
in Amery
Pharmaceuticals’
case
(supra) are also to the same effect. We find that the
aforesaid interpretation supports the case of the
appellants inasmuch they had been deprived of the
right to have the fourth sample tested from the
Central Drugs Laboratory. It is also clear that the
complaint had been filed on the 2nd July 2002
which is about a month short of the expiry date of
the drug and as such had the accused appellant
appeared before the Magistrate even on 2nd July
2002 it would have been well nigh impossible to get
the sample tested before its expiry. In the affidavit
filed to the petition by Dr. D. Rao, Deputy Drugs
Controller, and in arguments before us, it has been
repeatedly stressed that the delay in sending of the
sample to the Central Drugs Laboratory had
occurred as the appellant had avoided service of
summons on it till 9th May 2005. This is begging
the question. We find that there is no explanation
as to why the complaint itself had been filed about
a month before the expiry of the shelf life of the
drug and concededly the filing of the complaint
had nothing to do with the appearance of the
accused in response to the notices which were to be
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issued by the Court after the complaint had been
filed. Likewise, we observe that the requests for
retesting of the drug had been made by the
appellant in August/September 2001 as would be
clear from the facts already given above and there
is absolutely no reason as to why the complaint
could not have been filed earlier and the fourth
sample sent for retesting well within time. We are,
therefore, of the opinion that the facts of the case
suggest that the appellants have been deprived of a
valuable right under Section 25(3) and 25(4) of the
Act which must necessitate the quashing of the
proceedings against them.”
40.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the
analogous statutory mechanism under the Insecticides Act,
1968, in ‘State of Haryana v. Unique Farmaid (P.) Ltd.
&Ors.’, (1999) 8 SCC 190, has also held that as under:
“12. It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the
respondents in these appeals have been deprived of
their valuable right to have the sample tested from the
Central Insecticides Laboratory under sub- section (4)
of Section 24 of the Act. Under sub-section (3)
of Section 24 report signed by the Insecticide analyst
shall be evidence of the facts stated therein and shall be
conclusive evidence against the accused only if the
accused do not, within 28 days of the receipt of the
report, notify in writing to the Insecticides Inspector or
the Court before which proceedings are pending that
they intend to adduce evidence to controvert the report.
In the present cases Insecticide Inspector was notified
that the accused intended to adduce evidence to
controvert the report. By the time the matter reached
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the court, shelf life of the sample had already expired
and no purpose would have been served informing the
court of such an intention. The report of the Insecticide
Analyst was, therefore, not conclusive. A valuable right
had been conferred on the accused to have the sample
tested from the Central Insecticides Laboratory and in
the circumstances of the case accused have been
deprived of that right, thus, prejudicing them in their
defence.”
41.
Similarly the Hon’ble Apex Court in “Northern Mineral
Ltd. v Union of India and Anr., 2010 (7) SCC 726, while
considering the statutory mechanism governing the testing
of the sample and the consequence of failure to follow the
prescribed procedure, held as under:
“23. Section 24(3) of the Act gives right to the accused
to rebut the conclusive nature of the evidence of
Insecticide Analyst by notifying its intention to adduce
evidence in controversion of the report before the
Insecticide Inspector or before Court where proceeding
in respect of the samples is pending. Further the Court
has been given power to send the sample for analysis
and test by the Central Insecticides Laboratory of its
own motion or at the request of the complainant or the
accused.
24. No proceeding was pending before any Court, when
the accused was served with Insecticide Analyst report,
the intention was necessarily required to be conveyed to
the Insecticide Inspector, which was so done by the
appellant and in this background Insecticide Inspector
was obliged to institute complaint forthwith and
produce sample and request the court to send the
sample for analysis and test to the Central Insecticides
Laboratory. Appellant did whatever was possible for it.
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Its right has been defeated by not sending the sample
for analysis and report to Central Insecticides
Laboratory.”
42.
The principle that emerges from the aforesaid judgments is
not merely that a fresh report from the Central Drugs
Laboratory is desirable, but that the statutory right
afforded to the accused to have the disputed sample
subjected to the conclusive test contemplated under
Section 25(4) constitutes a valuable safeguard in the
prosecution under the Act. The importance of the right
becomes even more pertinent where the shelf life of the
drug expires and the sample can thereafter no longer be
subjected to a meaningful statutory re-analysis.
43.
In the present case, the petitioners have specifically pleaded
that the summons in the impugned complaint were
received by them in November, 2016, whereas the shelf life
of the drug in question had expired in November, 2015.
Thus, by the time the petitioners were called upon to
appear before the learned Magistrate, the sample had
already crossed its prescribed shelf life. Consequently, the
petitioners could not, upon their appearance before the
learned Magistrate, effectively seek an order for sending the
sample for re-analysis to the Central Drugs Laboratory in
terms of Section 25(4) of the Act. The opportunity
contemplated under Section 25(4), therefore, had already
become practically unavailable by the time the petitioners
came before the learned Magistrate.
44.
The fact that the shelf life of the drug had expired assumes
significance in the present case. The purpose of re-analysis
or
re-testing
is
to
ascertain,
through
the
statutory
mechanism, the quality and conformity of the drug which is
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the subject matter of the prosecution. Once the prescribed
shelf life of the drug has expired, the purpose of subjecting
the sample to a fresh analysis is substantially defeated. The
opportunity for such re-analysis, therefore, cannot be
regarded
as
effectively
available
merely
because
the
physical sample may have continued to exist.
45.
The importance of the shelf life of the drug has also been
considered by this Court in “Albert David Limited v.
Union Territory of J&K &Ors.”, CRM(M) No. 618/2024,
decided on 18.08.2026, wherein, while examining the
statutory mechanism for re-analysis under the Drugs and
Cosmetics Act, this Court observed as under:
“66. The statutory scheme of the Drugs and Cosmetics
Act assumes particular significance in this regard, as
the procedure contemplated thereunder is inherently
time-bound and the efficacy of the statutory right of reanalysis is closely connected with the shelf life of the
drug. Timely action by the authorities is therefore
essential to preserve the sample for meaningful
examination and to ensure that the statutory right of
the accused is not rendered illusory by the passage of
time….”
46.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in “M/s. Gupta Chemicals Pvt.
Ltd. and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Another”,
(2010) 7 SCC 735, while examining the valuable statutory
right of the accused to have the sample examined by the
Central Insecticides Laboratory upon timely communication
of his intention, and the consequence of failure to facilitate
such examination before expiry of the shelf life of the sample,
has held as under:
“12….. As noted earlier in the present case
the
appellants
had
intimated
the
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insecticide inspector their intention to
have the sample tested in the central
insecticides
laboratory
within
the
prescribed period of 28 days of receipt of
the copy of the state analyst report, yet no
step was taken by the inspector either to
send the sample to the central insecticides
laboratory or to file the complaint in the
court with promptitude in which case the
appellants
would
have
moved
the
magistrate for appropriate order for the
purpose. The resultant position is that due
to sheer inaction on the part of the
inspector, it has not been possible for the
appellants to have the sample examined
by the central insecticides laboratory and
in the meantime, the shelf-life of the
sample of insecticide seized had expired
and for that reason no further step could
be
taken
for its
examination.
In
the
circumstances, we are of the view that
continuing
this
criminal
prosecution
against the appellant will be a futile
exercise and abuse of the process of court.
The
High
Court
was
not
right
in
dismissing the petition filed under Section
482 of Cr.P.C.”
47.
The same principle finds support from the judgment of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court in “Shiv Narain Bansal
and Anr. v. State of Haryana and Anr.”, 1996 Cri LJ
338, wherein, while considering the consequence of failure
to send the sample to the Central Drugs Laboratory within
its shelf life, the Court held as under:
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“12. In view of my discussion above, I find
force in the argument of the learned
counsel
for
petitioners
the
had
petitioners
informed
that
the
the
Drugs
Inspector in time for sending their sample
to get it tested from the Central Drugs
Laboratory but it was the fault of the
Inspector that the sample could not be
sent to the Central Drugs Laboratory in
time and it was sent only after its expiry
date. The petitioners obviously have been
deprived of their right given to them
under Section 25(3) of the Act.”
48.
The aforesaid principle has to be considered in conjunction
with the conduct of the petitioners in the instant case, who
immediately upon receipt of the report of the Government
Analyst, have, within the prescribed period, disputed the
report
and
evidence
in
communicated
controversion
their
intention
thereof.
The
to
adduce
petitioners,
therefore, did not accept the report as final and had
expressly sought an opportunity to have the correctness of
the report subjected to further examination. Once such
intention had been communicated within the statutory
period, the report of the Government Analyst could not,
merely by passage of time, be treated as conclusive against
the petitioners while simultaneously denying them an
effective opportunity of having the sample subjected to the
further statutory examination.
49.
The position becomes more significant because the expiry of
the shelf life occurred before the petitioners could approach
the learned Magistrate for the exercise of the power
contemplated under Section 25(4). The petitioners cannot
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be faulted for not seeking an order which, by the time they
received the summons, could no longer have resulted in a
meaningful re-analysis of the drug. The statutory right to
controvert the report and the statutory mechanism for
giving effect to that right have to be viewed together. A right
which has been exercised within the prescribed period
cannot be rendered ineffective merely because the sample
was allowed to reach the end of its shelf life before the
person exercising that right could obtain the benefit of the
further procedure contemplated by the statute.
50.
The contention of the respondent that the petitioners had
referred in their communication to re-testing of the drug
from “any NABL accredited laboratory” also does not, in the
facts of the present case, absolve the respondent of its
obligation under the statutory scheme. The reference to an
NABL accredited laboratory may indicate the manner in
which the petitioners, at that stage, expressed their desire
for an independent re-testing of the drug. However, such
reference cannot be construed to mean that the petitioners
had abandoned or waived the statutory right available to
them under Section 25(3) read with Section 25(4) of the Act.
51.
Once the statutory right had been invoked, the question of
sending the sample for re-analysis was to be considered in
accordance with the mechanism prescribed under Section
25(4) of the Act. The reference to an NABL-accredited
laboratory, therefore, could not have the effect of relieving
the respondent of the obligation to take the necessary steps
for placing the sample before the competent Court for
consideration
of
re-analysis
by
the
Laboratory in accordance with the Act.
Central
Drugs
52.
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It is also relevant that the record, as noticed hereinbefore,
shows that the Controller, vide communication dated
19.05.2014, had permitted prosecution and had directed
that the sample be sent for re-analysis/re-testing under
Section 25(4). Thus, the question of re-analysis was not
wholly alien to the proceedings or raised for the first time
before this Court. The statutory mechanism for further
examination of the sample had itself been noticed at the
departmental level. Yet, the sample was not ultimately
subjected to examination by the Central Drugs Laboratory
before the expiry of its shelf life.
53.
In these circumstances, the respondent cannot take
advantage of the petitioners' reference to an “NABL
accredited laboratory” and contend that such reference
brought the statutory mechanism to an end. The substance
of the petitioners' communication was that they disputed
the Government Analyst's report and intended to controvert
the same by adducing evidence and by seeking re-testing of
the drug. The respondent, having knowledge of such
intention, could not treat the form in which the petitioners
expressed their request as sufficient to deprive them of the
statutory safeguard available under the Act.
54.
In Northern Mineral Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court considered, in particular, the very contention that
the accused had merely notified its intention to adduce
evidence in controversion of the Analyst’s report but had
not specifically requested that the sample be sent to the
Central Insecticides Laboratory. While examining the scope
of the corresponding provisions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held as under:
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“11. …. Further intention of adducing
evidence
in
controversion
Insecticide
Analyst
report
of
the
clothes
the
Magistrate the power to send the sample
for analysis to the Central Insecticides
Laboratory either on its own motion or at
the request of the complainant or the
accused. In face of the language employed
in Section 24(4) of the Act, the act of the
accused notifying in writing its intention
to adduce evidence in controversion of the
report in our opinion shall give right to
the accused and would be sufficient to
clothe the Magistrate the jurisdiction to
send the sample to Central Insecticide
Laboratory for analysis and it is not
required to state that it intends to get
sample
analysed
from
the
Central
Insecticides Laboratory. True it is that
report of the Insecticides Analyst can be
challenged
on
various
grounds
but
accused can not be compelled to disclose
those grounds and expose his defence and
he is required only to notify in writing his
intention
to
adduce
evidence
controversion. The moment
it
is
in
done
conclusive evidentiary value of the report
gets denuded and the statutory right to
get the sample tested and analysed by the
Central
Insecticides
Laboratory
gets
fructified.
12. The decisions of this Court in the
cases
of National
Organic
Chemical
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Industries Ltd. (Supra), Unique Farmaid (P)
Ltd.
&Ors. (Supra)
and
M/s.
Gupta
Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. (Supra), in our opinion
do support Mr. Nehra's contention. True it
is that in first two cases, the accused,
besides
sending
intimation
that
they
intend to adduce evidence in controversion
of
the
report
specifically
sample
accused
persons
have
demanded
for
sending the
anlaysis
by
the
for
Central
Insecticides Laboratory. However, the ratio
of the decision does not rest on this fact.
While laying down the law, this Court only
took into consideration that accused had
intimated its intention to adduce evidence
in controversion of the report and that
conferred him the right to get sample
tested
by Central
Insecticides
Laboratory. The decision of this Court in
the case of M/s Gupta Chemicals (supra) is
very close to the facts of the present case.
In
the
said
case
"on
receipt
of
the
information about the State Analyst report
the appellants
sent
intimation to the
Inspector expressing their intention to
lead evidence against the report" and this
intimation
was
read
to
mean
"their
intention to have the sample tested in the
Central Insecticides Laboratory". From the
language
and
the
underlying
object
behind Section 24(3) and (4) of the Act as
also
from
the
ratio
of
the
decisions
aforesaid of this Court, we are of the
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opinion that mere notifying intention to
adduce evidence in controversion of the
report of the Insecticide Analyst confers
on the accused the right and clothes the
court jurisdiction to send the sample for
analysis
by
the
Central
Insecticides
Laboratory and an accused is not required
to demand in specific terms that sample
be sent for analysis to Central Insecticides
Laboratory.
In
our
intention
to
adduce
controversion
of
opinion
the
the
evidence
report,
mere
in
implies
demand to send the sample to Central
Insecticides
Laboratory
for
test
and
it
clear
that
analysis.”
55.
The
aforesaid
principle
makes
mere
communication of the intention of the accused to adduce
evidence in controversion of the report of the Government
Analyst is sufficient to clothe the Magistrate with the
jurisdiction to cause the sample to be sent for test or
analysis to the Central Drugs Laboratory in terms of
Section 25(4) of the Act. No specific or particular form of
request for sending the sample to the Central Drugs
Laboratory is contemplated once the intention to controvert
the report has been duly communicated within the
prescribed period.
56.
The role of the learned Magistrate, therefore, assumes
significance in the present case. Section 25(4) contemplates
a further statutory mechanism once the report of the
Government Analyst is sought to be controverted. The
Court is not required to treat the report of the Government
Analyst as conclusively determinative in a case where the
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statutory condition contemplated under Section 25(3) has
been duly fulfilled. The Court, upon being seized of the
complaint and being apprised of the petitioners' earlier
communication disputing the Government Analyst's report,
was required to examine the effect of such communication
and the availability of the sample for the purpose of the
further examination contemplated under Section 25(4).
57.
The learned Magistrate was, therefore, required to examine
whether the petitioners had exercised their statutory right
within the prescribed period and, if so, whether the
procedure contemplated under Section 25(4) could still be
effectively given effect to. This was particularly necessary
because the petitioners' right to controvert the Government
Analyst's report had already been communicated before the
complaint was instituted. The Court could not proceed on
the assumption that the Government Analyst's report had
retained its conclusive character without first considering
the effect of the petitioners' timely communication.
58.
The subsequent expiry of the shelf life of the drug is also a
circumstance which could not be ignored while considering
the continuation of the proceedings. Once the sample had
ceased to be valid for meaningful re-analysis, the statutory
safeguard available to the petitioners could no longer be
effectively implemented. The Court, therefore, had to
examine the matter in the context of the actual availability
of the statutory remedy and not merely its theoretical
availability on the date when the complaint was instituted.
59.
Thus, the issue is not merely whether the petitioners had
used the expression “NABL accredited laboratory” instead of
expressly referring to the Central Drugs Laboratory. The
more fundamental question is whether, after the petitioners
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had timely disputed the Government Analyst's report and
expressed their intention to controvert it, the statutory
mechanism for giving effect to that right was duly pursued
before the sample lost its validity. In the backdrop of
aforesaid facts and circumstances, the answer to the said
question, in the considered view of this Court, is clearly in
the negative.
60.
The petitioners had done what was required of them at the
stage contemplated under Section 25(3), as they had
communicated within the prescribed period their intention
to controvert the report of the Government Analyst.
Thereafter, the failure to have the sample subjected to the
statutory re-analysis cannot be placed entirely upon the
petitioners, particularly when the summons itself reached
them only after the shelf life of the drug had expired. By
that stage, the opportunity which the petitioners were
entitled to avail before the learned Magistrate under Section
25(4) had ceased to be of any practical value.
61.
In such circumstances, this Court has no hesitation in
holding that the earlier report of the Government Analyst
cannot be permitted to operate as a conclusive basis
against the petitioners as the petitioners had not accepted
that report and they had timely expressed their intention to
controvert
it.
The
further
statutory
opportunity
contemplated for resolving such dispute was not effectively
availed before the sample expired. To nevertheless treat the
earlier report as conclusive would, in effect, deprive the
petitioners of the very statutory safeguard which they had
sought to invoke.
62.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Northern Mineral Ltd.
(supra), while considering the effect of such intimation,
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observed that the report of the Insecticide Analyst loses its
conclusive character once the accused notifies his intention
to controvert the same, and held as under:
“11. From a plain reading of Section 24(3) of
the Act, it is evident that an accused within
28 days of the receipt of the copy of the report
of
the
Insecticide
Analyst
to
avoid
its
evidentiary value is required to notify in
writing to the Insecticide Inspector or the
Court before which the proceeding is pending
that
it
intends
to
adduce
evidence
in
controversion of the report. Section 24(4) of
the Act provides that when an accused had
notified its intention of adducing evidence in
controversion of the Insecticide Analyst report
under Section 24(3) of the Act, the court may
of its own motion or in its discretion at the
request either of the complainant or the
accused cause the sample to be sent for
analysis
to
the
Central
Insecticides
Laboratory. Under the scheme of the Act when
the accused had notified its intention to
adduce evidence in controversion of the report
of the Insecticide Analyst, the legal fiction
that the report of the Insecticide Analyst shall
be conclusive evidence of the facts stated in
its report looses its conclusive character. The
Legislature has used similar expression i.e.
the
"intention
to
adduce
evidence
in controversion of the report" in both subsection (3) and sub- section (4) of Section 24 of
the Act, hence both the expression has to be
given one and the same meaning. Notification
of
an
intention
to
adduce
evidence
in
controversion of the report takes out the
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report of the Insecticide Analyst from the
class of "conclusive evidence" contemplated
under sub-section (3) of Section 24 of the Act.”
63.
Similarly,
in “Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ghisa
Ram”, AIR 1967 SC 970, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
while considering an analogous statutory mechanism under
the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, recognized the
importance of the right of the accused to have the sample
analyzed by the superior laboratory and held as under:
“It appears to us that when a valuable right is
conferred by s. 13 (2) of the Act on the vendor to
have the sample given to him analysed by the
Director of the Central Food Laboratory, it is to
be expected that the prosecution will proceed in
such a manner that that right will not be
denied to him. The right is a valuable one,
because
the
certificate
of
the
Director
supersedes the report of the Public Analyst and
is treated as conclusive evidence of its contents.
Obviously, the right has been given to the
vendor in order that, for his, satisfaction and
proper defence, he should be able to have the
sample kept in his charge analyzed by a
greater
expert
whose
certificate
is
to
be
accepted by Court as conclusive evidence. In a
case where there is denial of this right on
account
of
the
deliberate
conduct
of
the
prosecution, we think that the vendor, in his
trial, is so seriously prejudiced that it would
not be proper to uphold his conviction on the
basis of the report of the Public Analyst, even
though that report continues to be evidence in
the case of the facts contained therein.”
64.
CRMC 17/2017
CrlM(1746/2020) IA(1/2017)
The cumulative effect of the aforesaid circumstances is that
the petitioners had timely disputed the report of the
Government Analyst; as they had expressed their intention
to adduce evidence in controversion thereof and the sample
was not sent for examination to the Central Drugs
Laboratory before expiry of its shelf life; and the petitioners
received the summons only in November, 2016, much after
the drug had expired in November, 2015. Consequently,
when the petitioners came before the learned Magistrate,
the statutory remedy of meaningful re-analysis had already
become unavailable.
65.
In view of the above, the reference made by the petitioners
to re-testing from “any NABL accredited laboratory” cannot
be treated as a waiver of their statutory right, nor can it
absolve the respondent of its obligation to proceed in
accordance with Section 25(4) of the Act. Equally, the
learned Magistrate, while dealing with the complaint, was
required to take into consideration the fact that the
petitioners
had
already
expressed
their
intention
to
controvert the Government Analyst's report and that such
right could be meaningfully protected only if the statutory
mechanism for re-analysis was pursued before the expiry of
the shelf life of the drug.
66.
Once the sample had expired and could no longer be
meaningfully re-tested, the petitioners could not be placed in
the position of having to face prosecution solely on the basis
of a Government Analyst's report which they had timely
elected to controvert. The subsequent expiry of the sample
could not operate to the prejudice of the petitioners so as to
restore conclusiveness to a report which had already been
disputed in accordance with the statutory scheme. The
CRMC 17/2017
CrlM(1746/2020) IA(1/2017)
failure to preserve an effective opportunity for re-analysis
has, in the facts of the present case, resulted in substantive
prejudice to the petitioners.
67.
Therefore, the Government Analyst's report, in the peculiar
facts of the present case, cannot be treated as conclusive
against
the
petitioners
for
sustaining
the
impugned
prosecution, particularly when the petitioners had timely
communicated their intention to controvert the same and
the opportunity for statutory re-analysis was lost before
they
even
received
the
summons
from
the
learned
Magistrate. The failure to subject the sample to re-analysis
before expiry of its shelf life, coupled with the subsequent
reliance upon the very report which the petitioners had
sought to controvert, has rendered the statutory safeguard
contemplated under Sections 25(3) and 25(4) ineffective.
Conclusion:
68.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered view that the petitioners had, within the
prescribed period of twenty-eight days, duly disputed the
report of the Government Analyst and communicated their
intention to adduce evidence in controversion thereof. Once
such intention was communicated in terms of Section 25(3)
of the Act, the conclusiveness attached to the report of the
Government Analyst stood displaced and the statutory
mechanism contemplated under Section 25(4) became
available. The petitioners could not be deprived of such
statutory
safeguard
merely
because,
in
their
communication, they had referred to re-testing by an
NABL-accredited
laboratory
instead
mentioning the Central Drugs Laboratory.
of
specifically
69.
The
CRMC 17/2017
CrlM(1746/2020) IA(1/2017)
substance
petitioners
of
was
the
that
communication
they
disputed
made
the
by
the
Government
Analyst's report and sought an independent re-analysis of
the
sample.
The
reference
to
an
NABL-accredited
laboratory, therefore, could not be construed as a waiver or
abandonment of the statutory right available to them under
the Act, in the light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble
Apex Court wherein it has been held that reference to a
particular laboratory will have no effect on the statutory
right as provided under the Act, when the accused has
shown
his
inclination
for
retesting.
The
subsequent
procedure for obtaining the conclusive report was to be
governed by Section 25(4), and not by the particular
terminology
employed
by
the
petitioners
in
their
communication.
70.
It is also significant that the respondent was admittedly
aware of the petitioners' intention to controvert the report
and
that
the
communication
competent
dated
authority
19.05.2014,
itself,
vide
permitted
re-
analysis/re-testing under Section 25(4) of the Act. However,
the sample was not sent to the Central Drugs Laboratory
before the expiry of its shelf life. By the time the petitioners
received the summons in November, 2016, the drug had
already expired in November, 2015, thereby rendering the
statutory right available to the petitioner nugatory.
71.
In these circumstances, the petitioners cannot be made to
suffer the consequences of the loss of an opportunity which
they had sought to exercise within the statutory period. The
Government
Analyst's
report,
controverted,
cannot
be
having
permitted
been
to
timely
regain
its
conclusiveness merely because the sample subsequently
CRMC 17/2017
CrlM(1746/2020) IA(1/2017)
lost its shelf life. To allow the prosecution to continue solely
on the basis of such report would result in substantive
prejudice to the petitioners and defeat the statutory
safeguard contemplated under Sections 25(3) and 25(4) of
the Act.
72.
Accordingly, this Court finds that continuation of the
impugned proceedings against the petitioners would cause
manifest prejudice and would amount to permitting the
prosecution to proceed without affording the petitioners the
statutory safeguard available to them under the Act. The
petition is, therefore, allowed. The impugned complaint
titled State through Drug Inspector, Jammu v. Hussain
Brothers and Ors., pending before the learned Chief
Judicial
Magistrate,
Jammu,
insofar
as
the
present
petitioners are concerned, the same is dismissed and all
consequential proceedings arising therefrom, are hereby
quashed.
73.
The writ petition is allowed in the manner indicated above.
(Wasim Sadiq Nargal)
Judge
Srinagar:
22.09.2026
Mubashir/ JS
Whether order is speaking :
Whether order is reportable:
Yes
Yes
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