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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
CRM(M) No. 392/2024 c/w
CRM(M) No. 219/2024
Reserved on: 13.08.2026
Pronounced on: 18.08.2026
Uploaded on: 18.08.2026
Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced? FULL
Manzoor Ahmad Khan
S/o Sheeraz Ahmad Khan
R/o HMT, Khushipora, Zainakote, Sgr.
Aged 48 years
Through:
…Petitioner(s)/Appellant(s)
Mr S. T. Hussain, Sr. Adv. with
Ms. Nida Nazir, Adv.
Vs.
Javaid Ahmad Malik
S/o Mohammad Sumander Malik,
R/o Maratgam, Handwara, Kupwara
Through:
...Respondent(s)
Mr. M. Y. Bhat, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Sajad Ahmad Bhat, Adv.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SHAHZAD AZEEM, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1.
These clubbed petitions arise from the same transaction between the
same parties and are, therefore, taken up together and proposed to be
disposed of by a common judgment.
2.
In both the petitions, the petitioner was the accused and the
respondent was the complainant before the learned Magistrate, (Trial
Magistrate). Accordingly, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as
“petitioner and respondent” respectively.
3.
The petitioner has invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court
under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) seeking quashing of
the complaints filed by the respondent under Section 138 of Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) and the consequent cognizance orders dated
8 October 2022 and 22 December 2022, whereby the Trial Magistrate, while
CRM(M) No. 392/2024 & CRM(M) No. 219/2024
Mohd Altaf Nima
I attest to the accuracy
and authenticity of this
document
18.08.2026
taking cognizance of the offence, issued process against the petitioner. The
petitioner has also questioned the order dated 24 March 2023 whereby a
warrant for production of the petitioner was issued.
Factual Matrix:
4.
Succinctly stated, the relevant facts are that there was a land
transaction between the parties. In furtherance thereof, the respondent is said
to have paid ₹ 45.50 lacs to the petitioner for purchase of land at Srinagar.
The petitioner was to execute a Sale Deed in favour of the respondent’s wife.
Though revenue extracts of the land-subject forming the matter of the
transaction are alleged to have been obtained, but the petitioner failed to
execute the sale deed. Consequently, a dispute arose, the petitioner issued
multiple cheques (ten in number) towards repayment of the amount received
by him from the respondent for the sale of the land.
5.
When these cheques were presented by the respondent for
encashment, the same were dishonored. Two demand notices were
accordingly issued, resulting in the filing of two complaints being Complaint
No. 327/B and 220/A on 08.10.2022 and 22.12.2022 respectively, for a total
amount of ₹ 45.50 lacs.
6.
The Trial Magistrate took cognizance and issued process vide the
impugned orders dated 8 October 2022 and 22 December 2022. Thereafter,
vide the impugned order dated 24 March 2023, a warrant was also issued for
production of the petitioner, who, at the relevant time, was lodged in
Kotbalwal Jail under the Public Safety Act. The petitioner was released on
27 July 2023 and thereafter the parties are stated to have entered into a
Compromise dated 22 August 2023, but same did not materialize.
7.
It is also equally noteworthy that the petitioner had, in an earlier round
of litigation, approached this Court challenging the order of the Trial
Magistrate whereby he was directed to deposit 20% of the cheque amount
[CRM(M) No. 481/2023]. The High Court has set-aside the trial court order
vide order dated 19 May 2025. The other attempt of the petitioner failed at
the threshold, whereby the petition No. CRM(M) No. 496/2023 was
dismissed as withdrawn.
CRM(M) No. 392/2024 & CRM(M) No. 219/2024
Mohd Altaf Nima
I attest to the accuracy
and authenticity of this
document
18.08.2026
8.
Certain developments during intervening period are also worth noting.
These petitions were at one point of time dismissed due to continuous
absence of the petitioner, but were later restored. During the interregnum,
the Trial Magistrate recalled the non-bailable warrants of arrest vide order
dated 20 September 2025 in view of the pendency of the present
proceedings.
9.
The present stage of the trial also assumes importance. Therefore, it
may be noted that the evidence of the respondent stands complete and the
petitioner-accused has already examined two defence witnesses. Thus, it is
apparent that the trial is at the verge of completion, but for the stay order
passed by this Court in the present proceedings.
Challenge and submissions:
10.
The principal ground of challenge urged by the petitioner is that the
cheques were purely security cheques which were forcibly obtained under
political pressure in the office of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM),
Srinagar (West), after a dispute over the land transaction.
11.
It is further contended that the actual amount received was only ₹ 32
lacs; that the cheques reflected an inflated amount of ₹. 45.50 lacs; that the
demand notice is undated and was never received by the petitioner; that
while the petitioner was under PSA detention, no proper service of summons
took place; and that after his release, the parties settled the matter on 22
August 2023 for ₹ 5 lacs, but the said compromise remained unsuccessful.
12.
It is further urged by the petitioner that the complaints are not
maintainable because the mandatory pre-conditions of Section 138 of the NI
Act have not been complied with and, therefore, the cognizance itself is
illegal and amounts to abuse of process of law. It is also contended that
multiple cheques form the subject matter of one complaint under Section
138 of the NI Act, hence the complaint themselves are not maintainable.
13.
Mr S. T. Hussain, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, also
vehemently argued that there is no proof of reflection of such a huge
transaction amounting to ₹ 45.50 lacs in the income tax return of the
complainant and, therefore, no presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act
CRM(M) No. 392/2024 & CRM(M) No. 219/2024
Mohd Altaf Nima
I attest to the accuracy
and authenticity of this
document
18.08.2026
can be raised. In this regard, learned senior counsel made reference to
Section 269-B of Income Tax Act, 1961. (Act of 1961).
14.
Ex-adverso, Mr. M. Y. Bhat, learned senior counsel for the respondent
argued that the respondent has filed two independent complaints under
Section 138 of the NI Act in respect of the dishonoured cheques issued by
the petitioner; that the statutory notices duly issued; and that the complaints
were filed after the requisite periods. It is further contended that the
petitioner has repeatedly delayed the trial by filing successive petitions
before this Court. Learned counsel submitted that this court in CRM(M) No.
481/2023 had directed the Trial Magistrate to dispose of the complaints
expeditiously without insisting upon deposit of 20% of the complaint
amount.
15.
Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the
admission on the part of the petitioner that the parties had entered into a
settlement is proof of the fact that they had entered into the transaction and
therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner to contend that the
cheques were not issued towards the discharge of a legally enforceable debt.
The respondent has also invoked the statutory presumption under Section
139 of the NI Act.
Analysis:
16.
The petitioner has challenged the cognizance orders. However, the
trial has now reached the stage of the petitioner-accused’s evidence and, in
this regard, two defence witnesses have already been examined by the
petitioner.
17.
It is trite that once a prima facie case under Section 138 of the NI Act
is disclosed, the High Court cannot embark upon a mini trial or decide
disputed questions of fact, such as whether the cheques were security
cheques, whether there exists a legally enforceable debt, whether actual
service of notice was effected, or what is the effect of any settlement. All
these questions are required to be decided by the trial Court in the light of
the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act.
CRM(M) No. 392/2024 & CRM(M) No. 219/2024
Mohd Altaf Nima
I attest to the accuracy
and authenticity of this
document
18.08.2026
18.
When defence evidence has commenced and is almost complete,
interference under Section 482 CrPC is ordinarily uncalled for. The trial
court is the proper forum to appreciate the evidence. This is a case which
also necessitates examination of the conduct of the petitioner, who has
repeatedly stalled the proceedings and, even after the earlier order of this
Court directing speedy disposal, has again at the fag end of the trial invoked
the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 CrPC. Such practice is
required to be deprecated in no uncertain terms.
19.
The facts as discernible from the reading of the complaints are that the
petitioner-accused had issued as many as ten cheques and, when same were
bounced,
the
respondent-complainant
issued
two
demand
notices.
Consequently, one complaint pertains to nine cheques and the other pertains
to the one cheque, emanating from the two demand notices.
20.
As regards the maintainability of the two complaints in respect of the
ten cheques is concerned, once two demand notices had been issued, it was
well within the jurisdiction of the Trial Magistrate to entertain two separate
complaints, especially when all the cheques formed part of one and the same
transaction. This issue stands clinched by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court
in Fayaz Ahmad Rather vs. Tariq Ahmad Wani. (CRM(M) No.
405/2023). It is well settled, nay, trite that a single complaint in respect of
dishonour of more than three cheques is maintainable if a consolidated
notice of demand is served upon the accused.
21.
Insofar as the alleged violation of Section 269-B of the Act of 1961 is
concerned, same is absolutely misconceived and, if accepted, would lead to
absurdity. Mere non-reflection of the transaction in the complainant’s
Income Tax returns does not, by itself, destroy the presumption under
Section 139 of the NI Act. This issue stands settled in Sanjabij Tari vs.
Kishore S. Borcar and Anr. AIR Online 2025 SC 980, wherein the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that any breach of Section 269SS of the Income
Tax Act, 1961, is subject only to a penalty under Section 271D of the said
Act. It has further been held that any violation of Section 269SS would not
render the transaction unenforceable under Section 138 of the NI Act, nor
would it rebut the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act,
CRM(M) No. 392/2024 & CRM(M) No. 219/2024
Mohd Altaf Nima
I attest to the accuracy
and authenticity of this
document
18.08.2026
because the payee/holder in due course is liable only to the penalty
prescribed under the Income Tax Act. The argument that any transaction
above ₹ 20,000/- is illegal and void and, therefore, does not fall within the
definition of “legally enforceable debt” cannot be countenanced. In fact, the
reference by learned senior counsel to Section 269-B of the Act of 1961
itself is self defeating and misconceived; the relevant provision rather it is
Section 269SS of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which deals with the mode of
taking or accepting certain loans, deposits and specified sum.
22.
Insofar as Section 269-B of the Act of 1961 is concerned, it has no
relevance whatsoever to cheque bounce cases. The said provision deals only
with the appointment of a “competent authority” for acquisition of
immovable property which has been transferred for understated/undervalued
consideration, to counteract tax evasion and has nothing to do with loans,
deposits, or cash transactions. The argument on this count is, therefore,
rejected.
23.
On a plain reading of both complains, the basic ingredients of Section
138 of the NI Act are prima facie disclosed. The respondent-complainant has
also led his evidence, including the evidence of the witness from the Postal
Department. Once that threshold is crossed, the complaints cannot be
quashed mid-trial by examining the defence version.
24.
In Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
AIR Online 2022 SC 632, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with
the scope of Section 482 in a case arising under the provisions of Negotiable
Instruments Act, held thus:
“19. In our assessment, the impugned judgment is rendered by
applying the correct legal principles and the High Court
rightly declined relief to the accused, in the quashing
proceeding. Having said this, to rebut the legal presumption
against him, the appellant must also get a fair opportunity to
adduce his evidence in an open trial by an impartial judge
who can dispassionately weigh the material to reach the truth
of the matter. At this point, one might benefit by recalling the
words of Harry Brown, the American author and investment
advisor who so aptly said - “A fair trial is one in which the
CRM(M) No. 392/2024 & CRM(M) No. 219/2024
Mohd Altaf Nima
I attest to the accuracy
and authenticity of this
document
18.08.2026
rules of evidence are honored, the accused has competent
counsel, and the judge enforce the proper court room
procedure – a trial in which every assumption can be
challenged.” We expect no less and no more for the
appellant.”
25.
The High Court cannot conduct a mini trial or a roving enquiry into
disputed questions of fact such as, existence of a legally enforceable debt,
actual service of notice, etc. These are matters for the trial court, particularly
in view of the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act.
26.
The power under Section 482 CrPC is exceptional and is not intended
to short-circuit a trial that is already at an advanced stage. When defence
evidence has commenced, the proper course is to allow the trial court to
conclude the matter on merits.
27.
For the foregoing reasons and keeping in view the advanced stage of
the trials, any observations on the factual narrative contended by the
petitioner would prejudice the parties at the stage of appreciation of evidence
by the Trial Magistrate.
28.
Accordingly, both the petitions CRM(M) No. 392/2024 and CRM(M)
No. 219/2024 deserve to be dismissed and are hereby dismissed.
29.
The trial court shall conclude the examination of the remaining
witnesses by holding day-to-day trial and shall dispose of both the
complaints expeditiously preferably within a period of one month, regard
being had to the direction already passed by this Court in CRM(M) No.
481/2023 without fail.
30.
Disposed of with connected CrlMs.
(SHAHZAD AZEEM)
JUDGE
SRINAGAR:
18.08.2026
Altaf
Whether approved for reporting? Yes
CRM(M) No. 392/2024 & CRM(M) No. 219/2024
Mohd Altaf Nima
I attest to the accuracy
and authenticity of this
document
18.08.2026
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