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29.01.2026
Item No.4 (DL)
Court No.551
AJ.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
W.P.A. 27928 of 2025
<
Manoj Beriwala
-VsUnion of India & Ors.
Mr. Sakabda Roy.
…for the petitioner.
Mr. Swatarup Banerjee,
Mrs. Priti Jain.
….for the Union of India.
Mr. Subhankar Nag,
Mr. Snehashis Sen,
Mr. Abhishek Banerjee.
….for the Port Trust Authority.
1. This writ petition seeks inter alia
restoration of possession of the petitioner as well
as annulment/setting aside of an order dated
April 10, 2025 passed by the Estate Officer,
Syama
Prasad
Mookerjee
Port,
Kolkata
(hereinafter „the said Port‟).
2.
It is the petitioner‟s case that the
petitioner has been in occupation of a space
measuring about 453.482 Sq. Mtr. situated at
103/20, Foreshore Road, Shibpur, Howrah,
West Bengal – 711102 belonging to the said Port
(hereafter “subject property”).
3. The petitioner claims to have been put
into possession of the subject property in the
year 1991 by one Mr. Ramaoudh Pandey who,
according to the petitioner, was the “erstwhile
tenant recognized by the Port Authorities”.
4.
It is also alleged that upon taking
possession, the petitioner made efforts to pay
rent which was not accepted and that the
Respondent Port Authorities are well aware of
the petitioner‟s possession. The petitioner has
annexed copies of petitions filed before the
learned Executive Magistrate in the year 2009 as
well as 2011 to demonstrate the fact that his
possession was known to the Port authorities.
5.
The petitioner claims to have been in
continuous occupation of the subject property
and alleges that on August 29, 2025 the
petitioner was dispossessed from the premises
and a padlock was put therein.
6.
The petitioner has also alleged that
during one of the recent visits to the property
the petitioner found that a portion of the wall of
the said unit was broken and materials have
been stolen therefrom and that the petitioner
has
lodged
a
complaint
with
the
police
authorities as regards the same.
7. The petitioner has also asserted that he
made a detailed representation on November 11,
2025 to the Port Authorities and requested them
to allow the petitioner to carry on with the
petitioner‟s business, however, since the said
representation was not considered, the petitioner
has approached this Court by way of the present
writ petition.
8.
Mr. Roy, learned Advocate appearing
for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has
been
dispossessed
from
the
said
property
without putting the petitioner on notice about
any proceeding that may have been initiated in
respect of the subject property.
9.
He submits that the petitioner could
not have been evicted on the basis of an order
dated April 10, 2025 passed by the Estate
Officer against one M/s. V. Madhukar & Co. It
is further submitted that even if it is assumed
that the petitioner has been in unauthorized
occupation of the subject property, then also the
respondent authorities could not have evicted
the petitioner without initiating appropriate
proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction
of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereafter
„the said Act of 1971‟), against the petitioner
upon issuance of appropriate notice to the
petitioner in terms of the said Act of 1971.
10. He invites the attention of the Court
to the petition filed before the learned Executive
Magistrate (2nd Court) at Howrah being Misc.
Petition No. 69 of 2011 and submits that on a
perusal
thereof
it
will
be
clear
that
the
respondent Port Authorities were aware of the
fact that the petitioner was and had been in
occupation
of
the
subject
property.
It
is
submitted that since the petitioner‟s occupation
was in the knowledge of the Port Authorities,
they could not have proceeded to evict the
petitioner
without
conducting
eviction
proceedings against the petitioner in terms of
the said Act of 1971.
11.
Mr. Roy has cited two orders, dated
August 18, 2011 and September 24, 2025
passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this
Court
in
F.A.
of
2004 in a bid to
demonstrate that the Port Authorities‟ attempt to
evict a third party on the basis of an order
passed against M/s. V. Madhukar & Co., had
been interdicted by this Court.
12.
Mr. Roy has further taken this Court
through
several
February,
letters
till
ranging
February
from
01,
19th
to
indicate that the petitioner has all along tried to
act bona fide and has all along made efforts to
make payments to the Port Authorities. It is
submitted
that
repeated
requests
by
the
petitioner for granting lease in respect of the
subject property which was in possession of the
petitioner, were also not acceded to.
13.
He has also drawn the attention of
this Court to a proceeding initiated by the
petitioner in the year 2009 against alleged
miscreants, who, according to the petitioner,
sought to forcibly dispossess the petitioner from
the subject property under occupation of the
petitioner.
14.
He has relied on a judgment of the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of
India & Ors. –Vs- Mahendra Singh reported at
2022 SCC OnLine SC 909 for the proposition
that if a statute requires a particular thing to be
done in a certain way that thing should be done
in that way only or not at all.
15. He has also relied on a judgment of a
co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of
the State of West Bengal –Vs- M/s. Bansilal
Leisure Parks Ltd. & Anr. reported at (2019) 4
CHN 582 for the proposition that even a rank
trespasser ought not to be evicted without
following due process of law. He has next relied
on a judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
the case of M/s. Jain Ink Manufacturing
Company –Vs- Life Insurance Corporation of
India & Anr. reported at (1980) 4 SCC 435 for
the proposition that once a person enters into
possession or occupies a property then such
occupation becomes a continuous process right
from the time of entry into possession or
occupation and it continues till the premises is
left.
16. It is submitted by Mr. Roy that since
the petitioner has been evicted unheard, this
Court should intervene and pass appropriate
orders restoring possession to the petitioner.
17. Mr. Nag, learned Advocate appearing
for the respondent Port Authorities submits that
this writ petition should not be entertained
inasmuch as the petitioner has an equally
efficacious alternative remedy in the form of an
appeal before the Appellate Authority under
Section 9 of the said Act of 1971. It is further
submitted that the petitioner should be deemed
to have been put on notice inasmuch as the
notice issued in terms of the said Act of 1971
was affixed on a conspicuous part of the subject
property and the said notice was not only
addressed to the M/s. V. Madhukar & Co. but
also to all interested parties in the premises in
question.
18. Inviting the attention of this Court to
several letters issued by the petitioner to the
respondent Port Authorities, he has sought to
demonstrate that the petitioner was well aware
that the property which the petitioner was
occupying was previously occupied by M/s. V.
Madhukar & Co. since the petitioner had
mentioned the name of M/s. V. Madhukar & Co.
in the said letters. It is further submitted that
the petitioner cannot be heard at all as the
petitioner has in any event enjoyed the property
without paying anything.
19. Mr. Nag further submits that when the
petitioner had clear knowledge of the fact that
the subject premises were under the occupation
of M/s. V. Madhukar & Co. and that the
petitioner had been occupying the same without
authority,
then
Madhukar
&
notice
Co.
given
would
to
also
M/s.
V.
govern
the
petitioner. It is submitted that in any case upon
the notice being pasted/affixed at a conspicuous
place of the subject property, the petitioner
should be deemed to have got knowledge of the
proceedings and it was open to the petitioner to
appear and state his case before the Estate
Officer.
20.
Mr.
Nag
further
submits
that
possession of the property was taken in August,
2025. It is submitted that the subject property is
only a part of a large area measuring about
3289.99 Sq. Mtr. and therefore it is not admitted
that possession of the property was taken from
the petitioner.
21. Mr. Nag has produced a copy of the
notice issued to M/s. V. Madhukar & Co. and
has submitted that the said notice was also
published in newspapers. It is demonstrated
that the notice was not only addressed to M/s.
V. Madhukar & Co. but also to “any person
interested in the property as mentioned” in the
notice. He seeks dismissal of the writ petition.
22.
Heard learned Advocates appearing
for the respective parties and considered the
material-on-record.
23.
It is now well settled that mere
existence of an alternative remedy would not
preclude
a
writ
court
from
exercising
its
discretion to entertain a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India if the
case presented before it complains of or pertains
to any one or more of the following:i) violation of principles of natural justice;
ii) infringement of fundamental rights;
iii) challenge to the vires of any Act or
statutory provision;
iv) an act wholly without jurisdiction.
It
is
also
approaching
equally
a
Writ
settled
Court
that
a
person
bypassing
an
alternative remedy must demonstrate reasonably
expeditious approach.
24.
In the case at hand, even if the
petitioner‟s case is taken as face value and is
accepted, the petitioner had knowledge of some
proceedings by dint whereof, the petitioner was
evicted at least on August 29, 2025 when
according to the petitioner itself, the petitioner
was dispossessed. It is the petitioner‟s case that
the petitioner has been in continuous possession
of the subject property since 1992 and has been
doing business therefrom yet, the petitioner
approached this Court after being dispossessed
only on December 04, 2025.
25. There is no explanation in the writ
petition as to why has the petitioner approached
this Court after expiry of four months. There is
no contemporaneous objection to the petitioner‟s
alleged eviction on August 29, 2025.
26. The objection that the petitioner raised
coupled with a request for regularization of
tenancy was made as late as on November 11,
2025.
27.
Section 9 of the said Act of 1971
provides that the Appellate Authority should be
approached within a period of twelve days from
the date of communication of the order to the
appellant from the date of publication of the
order under Section 5(1) of the said Act of 1971.
It is trite law that even if a writ petition is
delayed, the Writ Court can still entertain the
same provided there is sufficient explanation for
the delay occasioned in approaching the writ
court. In a case where there is no explanation at
all, even a slight delay may be fatal.
28. In the case at hand the petitioner has
been evicted on the strength of the order dated
April 10, 2025 passed by the Estate Officer in a
proceeding under the said Act of 1971. The
petitioner is therefore a person aggrieved by
such order and the appellate remedy was
available to him. Not having approached the
appellate forum in time, the petitioner cannot
now seek redress from the Writ Court upon
approaching
prescribed
it,
for
after
expiry
preferring
of
the
statutory
time
appeal,
without explaining the delay.
29. It is settled law that if a person has
disabled himself from availing of the alternative
remedy by his own fault by not approaching the
statutory authority within the time he, cannot be
permitted to urge that as a ground for the Writ
Court to exercise its discretion in his favour
(See-
A.V.
Venkateswaran,
Collector
of
Customs, Bombay -Vs- Ramchand Sobhraj
Wadhwani & Anr., AIR 1961 SC 1506).
30.
Furthermore,
even
if
the
delay
occasioned by the petitioner is ignored, then
also, there is yet another factor which dissuades
this Court from entertaining the writ petition.
31. The petitioner‟s case of “no notice-no
hearing” falls in the domain of disputed question
of facts for various reasons.
32. While the petitioner has alleged that
the petitioner has been in continuous possession
of the subject property since 1991, there is
nothing on record to evince that the petitioner
has been in continuous possession of the
subject property at least after 2011 when
proceedings
under
Section
had
been
initiated before the Executive Magistrate on
behalf of the Port Authorities against certain
persons including the petitioner. Unless the
petitioner‟s occupation at the time of initiation of
the proceedings under the said Act of 1971 is
established he may have no right to notice.
33. The eviction order dated April 10, 2025
that has been annexed to the writ petition shows
that certified copy thereof has been obtained on
the same day on which the order was passed.
In answer to a query of the Court in this regard,
Mr. Roy submitted that the orders were supplied
to the petitioner subsequently. However, there is
nothing on record to demonstrate that certified
copies the orders passed in the proceedings
under the said Act of 1971 were supplied to the
petitioner later.
There is no averment in such
regard in the writ petition.
34. The issue as to whether the petitioner
actually had notice of the proceedings or not and
the issue as regards affixation thereof is again in
the zone of dispute. If the notice was indeed
affixed at the conspicuous part of the premises,
then the petitioner may not be entitled to allege
non-service of notice.
35. All these questions lie in the realm of
disputed questions of fact which a writ court
should not venture into. It would not be possible
for the Writ Court to thrash out the truth on the
basis of affidavit evidence in a proceeding under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
36.
For all the reasons aforesaid, this
Court is not inclined to entertain the writ
petition.
37. The judgments cited by Mr. Roy state
salutary principles that must be followed but
since this Court is not entertaining the writ
petition and not deciding the same on merits,
the said judgments do not aid the petitioner in
the present proceeding.
38. WPA 27928 of 2025 is dismissed,
without any order as to costs.
39. This order shall however not preclude
the petitioner from approaching the Appellate
Authority in accordance with law.
40. It is recorded that in course of
arguments, Mr. Roy has handed up to Court a
copy of an order dated December 11, 2025
passed by the Estate Officer wherefrom it
appears
that
the
petitioner‟s
representation
dated November 12, 2025 has been forwarded by
the Estate Officer to the Port Estate Division for
“needful action”. The same is taken on record. It
is also clarified that nothing in this order shall
prevent the Port Authorities from considering the
petitioner‟s representation dated November 11,
2025 made to them in accordance with law.
41. Urgent photostat certified copy of this
order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties
subject
to
compliance
with
all
requisite
formalities.
(Om Narayan Rai, J.)
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