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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
MA No.20/2024
Reserved on: 18.05.2026
Pronounced on:04.06.2026
Uploaded on: 05.06.2026
1.
Manohar Lal S/o Late Sh. Ram Lal
R/o Krishan Nagar,, Miran Sahib Tehsil
R.S.Pura, District Jammu, age 70 years
2.
Jugal Kishore S/o Late Sh. Ram Lal
R/o Krishan Nagar, Miran Sahib Tehsil
R.S.Pura, District Jammu, age 65 years
…..Appellant(s)
Through: Mr. R.K.Jain, Sr. Advocate with
Ms. Kritika Jain, Advocate
Vs
1. Narinder Singh adopted son of Sh. Amar Nath
R/o Village Maralia Tehsil R.S.Pura, Jammu
2. Niharika D/o Narinder Singh R/o Village
Maralia Tehsil R.S.Pura, Jammu
3. Vidhushi Mandhar W/o Lt. Raghbir Singh R/o
Village Maralia Tehsil R.S.Pura, Jammu
…..Respondent(s)
Through: Mr. Amit Bhardwaj, Advocate for R-1 & 2
Coram: HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE MOKSHA KHAJURIA KAZMI, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1.
Impugned in this appeal is an order dated 15th May, 2024 passed by the
Court of learned 1st Additional District Judge, Jammu in an interim
application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, arising out of suit titled Manohar Lal and another v.
Narinder Singh and others. The appellants pray for setting aside the
impugned order with a further direction to the parties not to create third
party interest qua the suit property or change the nature of the subject
matter.
MA No.20/2024
2.
Being owner in possession of 7 kanals of land comprising in Khasra
No.43 min situated at village Maralia Tehshil R.S.Pura, District
Jammu, respondent No.1 entered into an agreement to sell dated
09.06.1998 with the appellants with respect to aforesaid land for a total
consideration of Rs.1.00 lac. The appellants had paid Rs.70,000/- to
respondent No.1 towards sale consideration and balance amount of
Rs.30,000/- was agreed to be paid at the time of registration of sale
deed. The possession of the subject land was handed over to the
appellants. Later on, a General Power of Attorney was also executed by
respondent No.1 in favour of appellant No.1, which was duly registered
before Sub-Registrar, Jammu on 15th November, 1999. Since the land,
subject matter of agreement to sell, was mortgaged with State Bank of
India, respondent No.1 assured execution of sale deed immediately
after release of the land by the bank. According to the appellants, they
remained in possession of the subject land till June, 2016 without any
hindrance or obstruction. In November, 2013, appellants came to know
that respondent No.1 has liquidated the loan and the subject land has
been released from mortgage, as such, respondent No.1 was requested
to execute the sale deed. Balance sale consideration of Rs.30,000/- was
paid in two installments.
3.
On 20th May, 2016 at about 11 am respondent No.3 with the help of
some musclemen, in the absence of the appellants, trespassed into the
subject land and forcibly occupied the land stating that, respondent
No.2 on the basis of Power of Attorney dated 5 th October, 2014,
executed sale deed dated 8th January, 2014 in respect of the subject land
MA No.20/2024
in favour of respondent No.3, who is her sister-in-law. Feeling
aggrieved, the appellants preferred a civil suit seeking declaration of
sale deed dated 8th January, 2014 as well as General Power of Attorney
executed in the month of October, 2013 as null and void, besides
specific performance of agreement to sell dated 9th June, 1998 executed
by respondent No.1 in favour of the appellants.
4.
After filing of the suit, initially the trial Court has passed an interim
order dated 20th August, 2016, thereby temporarily restraining
respondents from creating 3rd party interest vis-à-vis the subject land or
changing its nature subject to filing of objections from the other side.
The respondents have been granted liberty to seek alteration,
modification or cancellation of the interim order.
5.
On being put to notice, respondents appeared before the trial Court and
filed their written statements, thereby opposing the suit as well as
application for interim injunction, both on legal as well as factual
grounds. The trial Court after considering the submissions made on
behalf of both the parties, vacated the interim injunction, vide order
impugned dated 15th May, 2024, which has been impugned in this
appeal. The conclusion part of the order impugned reads thus:
“Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and
analyzing the legal and factual position obtaining in the case,
I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiffs-applicants
can enforce the agreement against defendant No.1 by seeking
alternative land or compensation with interest, has, as such,
no right to seek temporary injunction against the defendants
and no issue on the facts that the defendant No.1 through
defendant No.2 has executed a sale deed in favour of
defendant No.3 illegally, rather the agreement to sell in
MA No.20/2024
question has to be enforced as per terms thereof and validity
of the said agreement to sell is also to be yet determined. The
application is found devoid of merit and is dismissed and
interim injunction granted vide order dated 20.08.2016 is
hereby vacated. Anything said herein above, shall not be
construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the
main case and are limited for the disposal of this application
only. Application be attached with the main file after its due
compilation.”
6.
Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants would
submit that the initial order of temporary injunction restraining the
respondents from creating third-party interests was passed after due
consideration of the pleadings and material available on record. There
was no subsequent change in circumstances warranting vacation of the
said protection; in a suit for specific performance, preservation of the
property in dispute is of paramount importance. He would further argue
that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that compensation in
terms of money cannot be an adequate substitute in a suit for specific
performance. The trial Court failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it
in accordance with law and the impugned order therefore deserves
interference by this Hon’ble Court.
7.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents while
supporting the impugned order, would submit that in terms of Section
41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, interim injunction, which is a
discretionary equitable relief cannot be granted when an equally
efficacious relief is available. He would further argue that the settled
principle of law is that if the injury suffered by the plaintiff on account
of refusal of temporary injunction was not irreparable, the court will
refuse temporary injunction even where prima facie case is in favour of
MA No.20/2024
the plaintiff. To substantiate his arguments, reliance has been placed on
M/s Best Seller Retail (I) P. Ltd. v. M/s Aditya Birla Nuvo Ltd. and
others, (2012) 6 SCC 792 and a judgment of High Court of Karnataka
in Sri Devera Bhandram v. Srinivasa Rao.
8.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available
on record.
9.
It is a settled principle of law that while considering an application for
temporary injunction in a suit for specific performance of contract, the
Court is required to examine whether the plaintiff has made out a prima
facie case, whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of grant of
injunction, and whether refusal of interim protection would cause
irreparable loss and injury to the plaintiff. In cases relating to
immovable property, preservation of the subject matter of the suit
assumes paramount importance so that the final decree, if passed in
favour of the plaintiff, does not become illusory or incapable of
enforcement.
10.
In the instant case, respondent No.1 is stated to have entered into an
agreement to sell with the appellants on 9th June, 1998 with respect to
the land in question of which possession was also handed over to the
plaintiff. According to the appellants, since the property was mortgaged
with the bank, as such, it was agreed that after getting the property
released from the bank, respondent No.1 will execute a proper sale
deed in favour of the petitioners. However, in breach of the agreement
to sell, respondent No.1 transferred the property in question in favour
of respondent No.3 through respondent No.2, who none other than her
MA No.20/2024
sister-in-law. According to the appellants, exercise to transfer the
property in question in favour of respondent No.3 through respondent
No.2 has been carried out just to defeat their rights over the property,
for which they have already paid full and final sale consideration as per
the agreement to sell entered into between the parties. The sale deed is
also under challenge.
11.
Initially, the trial Court finding a prima facie case besides balance of
convenience in favour of the appellants and irreparable loss to be
caused to the appellants, in the event of refusal to grant interim
injunction, restrained the respondents from creating 3rd party interest
vis-à-vis the suit land or changing its nature.
Creation of third party interests or transfer of the suit property during
trial would not only complicate execution of the decree but may also
lead to multiplicity of proceedings and equities in favour of subsequent
purchasers. Therefore, even where alternate relief such as refund of
earnest money or damages is claimed, the same does not disentitle the
plaintiff from seeking temporary injunction, as the primary relief in
such suits remains enforcement of the contract qua the immovable
property itself.
13.
The main point which weighed with the trial Court in vacating the
interim injunction granted in favour of the appellants is availability of
alternative relief of seeking alternate land or compensation along with
interest is not a bar to granting a temporary injunction against the
creation of third-party interest.
MA No.20/2024
14.
The Supreme Court in the case of Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.)
v. Baldev Dass, (2004) 8 SCC 488 has observed in the following
manner:“Be That as it may, Mr. Sachhar is right in contending that unless
and until a case of irreparable loss or damage is made out by a party
to the suit, the court should not permit the nature of the property
being changed which also includes alienation or transfer of the
property which may lead to loss or damage being caused to the party
who may ultimately succeed and may further lead to multiplicity of
proceedings.”
15.
The Supreme Court in the case of Dev Prakash and another v. Indra
and others, (2018) 14 SCC 292 has observed that the very essence of
the contempt of temporary injunction during the pendency of a civil
litigation involving any property is to prevent its threatened wastage,
damage and alienation by any party thereto to the immeasurable
prejudice to the other side or to tender the situation irreversible.
Relevant extract of the judgment reads thus:
“As it is, the very essence of the concept of temporary
injunction and receivership during the pendency of a civil
litigation involving any property is to prevent its threatened
wastage, damage and alienation by any party thereto, to the
immeasurable prejudice to the other side or to render the
situation irreversible not only to impact upon the ultimate
decision but also to render the relief granted, illusory. We do
not wish to burden this order by the decisions of this Court
on the issue except referring to the one in Maharwal Khewaji
Trust (Regd.) Faridkot v. Baldev Dass AIR 2005 SC 104,
wherein it has been underlined that unless and until a case of
irreparable loss or damage is made out by a party to the suit,
the court should not permit the nature of the property to be
changed, which may include alienation or transfer thereof
leading to loss or damage been cause to the party who may
MA No.20/2024
ultimately succeed and which would as well lead to
multiplicity of proceedings. Judicial discretion has to be
disciplined by jurisprudential ethics and can by no means
conduct itself as an unruly horse.”
16.
The observations of the Supreme Court made in paragraph No.45 of the
judgment in the case of Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish
Ambalal Choksi and others, 2024 INSC 913 are noteworthy and are
reproduced hereunder:
“45. Quite often, in these types of litigations, it is sought to
be argued that an injunction restraining the defendant from
transferring the suit property was absolutely unnecessary as
no post-suit transfer by the defendant can adversely affect
the
result
of
the
suit
because
of
the
provisions
of Section 52 of the T. P. Act whereunder all such transfers
cannot but abide by the result of the suit. It is true that the
doctrine of lis pendens as enunciated in Section 52 of the T.
P. Act takes care of all pendente lite transfers; but it may not
always be good enough to take fullest care of the plaintiffs
interest vis-a-vis such a transfer. We may give one
appropriate illustration of a suit for specific performance of
contract based on an agreement of sale. In a suit wherein the
plaintiff prays for specific performance and if the defendant
is not restrained from selling the property to a third party and
accordingly a third party purchases the same bona fide for
value without any notice of the pending litigation and spends
a huge sum for the improvement thereof or for construction
thereon, the equity in his favour may intervene to persuade
the Court to decline, in the exercise of its discretion, the
equitable relief of specific performance to the plaintiff at the
trial and to award damages only in favour of the plaintiff. It
must be noted that Rule 1 of Order 39 of the Code clearly
provides for interim injunction restraining the alienation or
sale of the suit property and if the doctrine of lis pendens as
enacted in Section 52 of the T. P. Act was regarded to have
provided all the panacea against pendente lite transfers, the
Legislature would not have provided in Rule 1 for interim
MA No.20/2024
injunction restraining the transfer of suit property. Rule 1 of
Order 39, in
our view, clearly demonstrates that,
notwithstanding the Rule of lis pendens in Section 52 of the
T. P. Act, there can be occasion for the grant of injunction
restraining pendente lite transfers in a fit and proper case.
(See: Smt. Muktakesi Dawn and Ors. v. Haripada Mazumdar
and Anr. reported in AIR 1988 Cal 25)
17.
The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents
are with respect to the availability of alternate relief and irreparable
injury. In the present case, allegation of the appellants is that in order to
defeat their claim over the suit property, the respondent No.1 had
executed a power of attorney in favour of his daughter and thereafter
executed a sale deed in favour of respondent No.3, who is none other
than his daughter-in-law. According to the appellants, the respondents
are trying to create third party interests over the suit land just to defeat
the rights of the appellants. If such alienation is permitted, the same
would not only complicate the adjudication of the dispute but would
also result in multiplicity of litigation and irreparable injury to the
plaintiff. The balance of convenience lies overwhelmingly in favour of
preserving the suit property till final disposal of the suit, as any transfer
pendente lite may seriously prejudice the rights of the appellants and
render the decree, if ultimately passed in their favour, ineffective and
incapable of proper enforcement.
18.
Mere availability of an alternate relief or eventual compensation cannot
be treated as a bar to grant of temporary injunction where the subject
matter of the suit itself is immovable property and preservation of its
status is necessary in the interest of justice.
MA No.20/2024
19.
Having regard to the nature of dispute between the parties and the
materials on record, I am of the opinion that the property should not
change hands any further. Once third party rights are created, the
plaintiff would suffer continuing hardship and unnecessary litigation
against subsequent purchasers, which cannot be adequately remedied
by damages alone.
20.
For all what has been said above, this appeal is allowed and the order
impugned dated 15th May, 2024 is set aside. The respondents are
directed not to create any third party interest over the property in
question till disposal of the suit, which is pending before the trial Court.
Record be sent back.
(Moksha Khajuria Kazmi)
Judge
Jammu
04.06.2026
Vinod, Secy
Whether the order is reportable: No
Vinod Kumar
2026.06.05 10:08
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