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R.F.A. No. 02 of 2014
Mahesh Kumar Trivedi v. Smt. Nanda Rani Devi & Ors.
With
C.O. No.2 of 2015
Mahesh Kumar Trivedi v. Smt. Nanda Rani Devi & Ors.
THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM: GANGTOK
(Civil Appellate Jurisdiction)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------S.B.:
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BHASKAR RAJ PRADHAN, JUDGE
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R.F.A. No. 02 of 2014
Shri Mahesh Kumar Trivedi,
Son of late Pandit Ramagya Trivedi,
C/o Trivedi Stores,
Singtam,
East Sikkim.
.… Appellant
versus
Kamala Prasad (Since Deceased and substituted by the following
Legal Representatives)
1. Smt. Nanda Rani Devi,
Wife of late Kamala Prasad,
2. Shri Sonu Prasad,
Son of late Kamala Prasad,
3. Shri Deepak Prasad,
Son of late Kamala Prasad.
4. Master Niraj Prasad,
Son of late Kamala Prasad.
5. Ms. Radha Prasad,
D/o late Kamala Prasad.
6. Ms. Kusum Prasad,
D/o late Kamla Prasad.
7. Ms. Puja Prasad,
D/o late Kamala Prasad.
8. Ms. Rubi Prasad,
D/o late Kamala Prasad.
All Residents of Singtam Bazaar,
P.O. & P.S. Singtam, East Sikkim
…. Respondents
R.F.A. No. 02 of 2014
Mahesh Kumar Trivedi v. Smt. Nanda Rani Devi & Ors.
With
C.O. No.2 of 2015
Mahesh Kumar Trivedi v. Smt. Nanda Rani Devi & Ors.
With
C.O. No.02 of 2015
Shri Mahesh Kumar Trivedi,
Son of late Pandit Ramagya Trivedi,
R/o Singtam Bazaar, Singtam,
East Sikkim.
.… Appellant
versus
1. Smt. Nanda Rani Devi,
Wife of late Kamala Prasad,
2. Shri Sonu Prasad,
Son of late Kamala Prasad,
3. Shri Deepak Prasad,
Son of late Kamala Prasad.
4. Master Niraj Prasad,
Son of late Kamala Prasad.
5. Master Nakul Prasad,
Son of late Kamala Prasad.
6. Ms. Radha Prasad,
D/o late Kamala Prasad.
7. Ms. Kusum Prasad,
D/o late Kamala Prasad.
8. Ms. Puja Prasad,
D/o late Kamala Prasad.
9. Ms. Rubi Prasad,
D/o late Kamala Prasad.
All Residents of Singtam Bazaar,
P.O. & P.S. Singtam, East Sikkim
…. Respondents
-------------------------------------------------------------------------Appeal under Order XLI, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 & Cross Objection under Order XLI,
Rules 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
R.F.A. No. 02 of 2014
Mahesh Kumar Trivedi v. Smt. Nanda Rani Devi & Ors.
With
C.O. No.2 of 2015
Mahesh Kumar Trivedi v. Smt. Nanda Rani Devi & Ors.
Appearance:
Mr. A. K. Upadhayaya, Senior Advocate with Ms. Aruna
Chettri, Ms. Hemlata Sharma and Mr. Sonam Rinchen
Lepcha, Advocates for the Appellant.
Mr. B. Sharma, Senior Advocate with Mr. Sudhir
Prasad, Advocate.
------------------------------------------------------------------------JUDGMENT
(04.09.2018)
Bhaskar Raj Pradhan, J
1.
The judgment passed by the learned District Judge dated
13.09.2013 (the impugned judgment) in Title Suit No. 02 of 2010
(the suit) dismissing the suit filed by the Appellant-the Plaintiff
in the suit as well as the counter-claim preferred by late Kamala
Prasad-the sole Defendant in the suit has led to the Appellant as
well as the Respondents-the substituted Defendants preferring
R.F.A. No. 02 of 2014 and C.O. No. 02 of 2015 respectively. Both
the Regular First Appeal and the Cross Objection are taken up
together for disposal.
2.
The Appellant had filed the suit for specific performance
and consequential reliefs on 22.06.2004 against late Kamala
Prasad basing his claim of ownership on a document (Exhibit-1)
purportedly an agreement to sell praying for the following reliefs:
“(i)
For specific performance of the contract of sale of the Schedule
“A” property in favour of the plaintiff for which the defendant
may be directed to execute the sale deed in respect of the
Schedule “A” property in favour of the plaintiff, do the needful for
registration of the same and to accept the remaining sum of
consideration value as per agreement dated 02.11.1999.
(ii)
In the event the defendant fails or refuses to execute the sale
deed in respect of the Schedule “A” property then order
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Mahesh Kumar Trivedi v. Smt. Nanda Rani Devi & Ors.
compulsory registration of the sale deed after executing the sale
deed in respect of the Schedule “A” property by and through this
Hon’ble Court and upon direction to the defendant to accept the
remaining consideration value as per the agreement dated
02.11.1999;
3.
(iii)
Recovery of possession of the Schedule “C” property from the
defendant by evicting the defendant, his agents, servants etc.
from the Schedule “C” premises; in favour of the plaintiff;
(iv)
In the event it is found that the defendant is not the exclusive
owner of Schedule “A” property by virtue or partition then to
declare that the defendant shall execute the sale deed and cause
registration of the same as and when he becomes the owner of
the Schedule “A” property by partition or otherwise;
(v)
Declaring that the plaintiff is the owner of the Schedule “A”
property having right title and interest on it;
(vi)
Cost of all the proceedings;
(vii)
Any other decree, relief or reliefs as this Hon’ble Court may deem
fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.”
Exhibit-1 is in Hindi and titled “Kararnama” which means
agreement to sell. The said Exhibit-1 translated reads as under:
“Kararnama” (AGREEMENT)
Exhibit-1
“I Kamal Pd. S/o Lt Ram Das Ram, R/o Gram Num Nagar,
P.O. Jalalpur Bazar, Zilla Saran (Bihar).
Am executing this agreement on this 2/11/1999,
Tuesday, on the following terms and condition.
My Lt. Father Shri. Ram Das Ram and his younger brother
Lt. Shri Ram Fal Ram have their land and house situated
at Gangtok, Singtam and Rangpo Bazars, out of which the
land situated at Singtam Bazar measuring an area of
40x62 has been transferred to me by my brothers and
panchayat vide a document. Out of the said area of land I
and Mahesh Kumar Trivedi have orally agreed for the sale
of half of the land and house measuring 20x62 feet which
R.F.A. No. 02 of 2014
Mahesh Kumar Trivedi v. Smt. Nanda Rani Devi & Ors.
With
C.O. No.2 of 2015
Mahesh Kumar Trivedi v. Smt. Nanda Rani Devi & Ors.
is under occupation of Trivedi Stores being his shop and
residence since 1963. It has been agreed that the sale
price of the land, house, wood and entire property is
₹3,21,000/- (Three Lakhs Twenty One Thousand) out of
which payment of half amount would be made at the time
of registration of the land and the remaining half amount
within six months thereof on installment has been agreed
upon.
2. I have received the amount Rs.5,501/- (Five Thousand
Five Hundred One) as and by way of advance. The said
amount will be deducted from the total amount to be paid.
I have signed on this agreement after reading it and in full
consciousness, on the advice and in the presence of my
eldest son Rabi Prasad and other witnesses, so that there
may not be any dispute in future. If I be unable to register
sale deed within four years then Mahesh Kr. Trivedi can
take legal action against me and he shall have full right
over the said land and on the shop.
Witnesses.
1. Shiv Shanker Singh
Kamala Prasad
Thumb impression (Ext-1/B(colly))
Sd/- Ext- 1/E
Thumb impression (Ext-1/B (colly))
2. Shri Ram Prasad
Thumb impression (Ext-1/B (colly))
Sd/- Ext- 1/F
Ravi Kumar Prasad (Ext-1/C (colly)
4.
Exhibit-1 has not been signed by the Appellant. It purports
to contain the thumb impression of late Kamala Prasad and
signed by his son Ravi Kumar Prasad in the presence of two
witnesses Shiv Shankar Singh and Ram Prasad (P.W.2). It is a
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Mahesh Kumar Trivedi v. Smt. Nanda Rani Devi & Ors.
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Mahesh Kumar Trivedi v. Smt. Nanda Rani Devi & Ors.
hand written document. The recital reflects that there was an
agreement between the Appellant and late Kamala Prasad for
sale of “Land” and house measuring 20′x62′ for an amount of
₹3,21,000/-(Rupees three lakhs twenty one thousand) only. It
also reflects that it is a document evidencing payment of
₹5,501/- (five thousand five hundred one) only as advance.
5.
Late Kamala Prasad filed a written statement alleging
forgery of the purported agreement to sell dated 02.11.1999 and
alternatively of being taken advantage of being an alcoholic but
admitting nevertheless that he was the owner of the said suit
property. Issues would be framed. Since late Kamala Prasad had
raised no dispute regarding ownership of the suit property no
issue regarding ownership would been framed. There is therefore
no documentary proof of ownership of the scheduled property.
After the completion of the recording of the evidence of the
Appellant and his two witnesses the evidence in affidavit of late
Kamala Prasad would be filed and authenticated. However, he
would pass away before his cross-examination and therefore
substituted by the present Respondents as Defendants. Their
attempt to file an independent written statement contrary to the
written statement filed by late Kamala Prasad and be impleaded
as defendants under Order 1 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (CPC) would be declined by the learned District
Judge and thus the Respondent No.1 would file a written
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statement which was directed to be not in conflict with the
written statement filed by late Kamala Prasad. No evidence
would be produced at the time of filing the application under
Order 1 Rule 3 read with Section 94 and Section 151 CPC to
prima facie reflect that their claim of joint ownership was prima
facie true. The order passed declining the application would also
not be assailed. The written statements originally filed by late
Kamala Prasad as well as the one filed by Respondent. No.1 who
substituted him along with other Respondents makes a counter
claim for eviction of the Appellant from the scheduled property
as well as claim arrears of rent so does the written statement
filed by the Respondent No.1.
6.
Heard Mr. A.K. Upadhyaya, learned Senior Advocate for the
Appellant and Mr. B. Sharma, learned Senior Advocate for the
Respondents and the Cross Objector. The issues framed by the
learned District Judge during the trial are taken as points for
determination in the present Appeal and Cross Objection upon
consent. The said issues were:1)
Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form?
2)
Whether the suit is barred by law of Limitation?
3)
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree of specific
performance of the contract of sale of the schedule ‘A’
property in his favour?
4)
Whether the plaintiff is liable to be evicted as prayed for by
the defendant?
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7.
5)
To what relief or reliefs, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?
6)
Whether the plaintiff is a tenant in the suit property? If so,
whether the plaintiff is liable to pay the arrear house rent
as claimed by the defendant?
7)
Whether the document dated 2.11.1999 executed by the
defendant in favour or the plaintiff is a valid document
and enforceable in law?
8)
To what relief or reliefs the defendant is entitled?
It is seen that the burden of proof for issue nos.1), 2) and 3)
lay with the Appellant and for issue nos. 6), 7) and 8) with the
Respondents.
8.
It is the duty of the Appellate Court to appreciate the entire
evidence and arrive at its own independent conclusions, for
reasons assigned, either of affirmation or difference. The
jurisdiction of the First Appellate Court while hearing the First
Appeal is very wide like that of the trial Court. It is the final
Court of fact, ordinarily, and therefore, the parties are entitled to
an independent consideration of all points on both facts and law.
9.
Each of the issues are taken up, the correctness of the
opinion and the decision of the learned District Judge examined
and this Court’s decision on each of the said issues along with
the reasons are given hereunder.
10. The learned District Judge would examine issue nos.1, 3
and 7 together in this manner:
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“48. The whole case of the Plaintiff is based on the agreement
dated 02.11.1999 (Exhibit 1). He has categorically pleaded in his
pleadings and later deposed on oath before the Court that the
original Defendant having come to own the Schedule-A property
pursuant to a family partition executed the said agreement on
02.11.1999 (as an agreement for sale) whereby he sold the said
property to the Plaintiff at a consideration value of ₹3,21,000/-.
The said agreement was executed in front of the concerned
witnesses namely Ram Prasad (PW 2) and Shiv Shanker Singh.
Though the original Defendant (since deceased) denied the above
claims of the Plaintiff I find that so far as the execution of Exhibit
1 is concerned the Plaintiff has been able to substantiate the
same. PW 2 Ram Prasad and PW 3 Jeetendra Singh have
corroborated the Plaintiff’s evidence above so far as the execution
of Exhibit 1 (in two pages) is concerned. According to PW 2, the
above
agreement was entered into between
the original
Defendant as the seller and the Plaintiff as the purchaser. He
has categorically identified Exhibits 1/A (collectively) on the two
pages of Exhibit 1 as the initials/signatures of the original
Defendant Kamala Prasad. Apart from that he has also identified
Exhibits 1/B (collectively) as the thumb impressions of the
original Defendant on both pages of Exhibit 1; Exhibits 1/C
(collectively) as the signature/initials of the son of the original
Defendant (Ravi Kumar Prasad-also deceased); and Exhibit 1/D
on the front page of Exhibit 1 as the thumb impression of Ravi
Kumar Prasad. PW 2 has also identified his signature on Exhibit
1 as Exhibit 1/F. Further, as per him Exhibit 1/E is the signature
of the other witness Shiv Shanker Singh. He has empathetically
deposed that Exhibit 1 was executed/signed in his presence. On
the same day, he claims, the original Defendant also took
₹5,501/- as advance against the consideration value. Similarly,
PW 3 Jeetendra Singh has also deposed regarding the execution
of Exhibit 1 by the original Defendant. He too has identified the
signature/initials/thumb impressions of the original Defendant
and his son Ravi Kumar Prasad (deceased) on Exhibit 1. The
evidence of the Plaintiff, PWs 2 and 3 to the above extent have
not been demolished during their respective cross-examinations
by the concerned Defendant(s). A conjoint reading of their
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evidence makes it amply clear that Exhibit 1 was executed by
the original Defendant. So far as the validity and enforceability of
Exhibit 1 are concerned the same shall be considered hereinafter.
49.
It may also be mentioned here that though PW 3 is not a
signatory/attesting
witness
to
Exhibit 1
nevertheless
his
evidence clearly establishes that he was present while it was
being executed and signed. As regards PW 2, it may be
mentioned that though during his cross-examination he admitted
that he did not remember ‘exactly’ as to what is written in
Exhibit 1, his evidence (when read as a whole) is clear that he
knows what Exhibit 1 purports to.
50.
The original Defendant took contradictory pleas as regards
Exhibit 1. At one place he would say that he has not signed
Exhibit 1. Again in the same breath he would claim that if at all
he had executed it the same was under the influence of alcohol
and without understanding the contents thereof. It is quite
astounding to note that between 02.11.1999 (date when the
document was executed) and 22.06.2004 (date when the present
suit was instituted) the original Defendant made no attempts to
challenge and/or have the concerned document/agreement set
aside (by approaching appropriate forums). So far as the
substituted Defendants are concerned, as mentioned earlier
above they have claimed ignorance about the said document.
51.
The question of validity and enforceability of Exhibit 1 as
well as the question of the Plaintiff’s entitlement to specific
performance of Exhibit 1 shall be considered now.
52.
As mentioned above, it is admitted position that the
original Defendant came to possess the Schedule-A property
pursuant to a family partition (original Defendant has admitted
this). It has, however, not been mentioned specifically if the
partition was under Hindu Law and if the Defendant(s) are
governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law or the
Dayabagha School of Hindu Law. Since the original Defendant
and the substituted Defendants are Hindus it has to be
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necessarily presumed that the concerned partition was under the
Hindu Law. Again, it not clear as to when the partition took
place. Neither the Plaintiff nor the original Defendant has cared
to explain or highlight as to when the concerned partition
actually took place. Going by the facts and circumstances of the
case, it is at least not the case of the Plaintiff that the concerned
partition was between the original Defendant and his five sons
who would be coparceners along with him (if Mitakshara Hindu)
in relation to the Schedule-A property which obviously was
inherited by the original Defendant and became ancestral in his
hands as regards him and his sons (the concerned property is
still standing in the names of the father of the original Defendant
late Ram Das Ram and his late uncle late Ram Phal Ram). If the
Defendant(s) are governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu
Law in that case every adult coparcerner, whether male or
female, would be entitled to a share on partition. If the partition
had taken place after the birth of the sons (and daughters in
case of Dayabhaga Hindu) of the original Defendant then he
could have only taken the Schedule-A property per stirpes as
regards every other branch in the family and per capita as
regards himself and his sons (and daughters in case of
Dayabhaga Hindu). In that case, the original Defendant would
have been entitled only to 1/6th or 1/10th, as the case may be,
of the Schedule-A property (as he had five sons and four
daughters). As the exact date of partition is not clear even if it is
assumed that one or two sons or one or two daughters of the
original Defendant were not born when the partition took place
even then he would only be entitled to certain limited share i.e.,
much less as compared to the whole chunk of the Schedule-A
property. By no stretch of imagination can he be regarded as
being the owner of the whole of Schedule-A property so as to be
competent or having the requisite title over it to transfer
ownership over it in favour of the Plaintiff.
53.
The question which now arises here is whether it would be
equitable and just to hold/declare that the Plaintiff is entitled to
the specific performance of Exhibit 1. I am afraid, the answer
here would be in the negative. It is well-settled that specific
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performance of contract/agreement is an equitable relief and
where the grant of such relief is likely to be iniquitous the Court
would not be obliged to grant the relief. As the original Defendant
had no more right than his limited share over the schedule-A
property he could not have entered into the concerned agreement
to sell off the whole of it. The Plaintiff cannot also seek remedies
under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as
Exhibit1 has not been signed by all the other co-sharers/coparceners. At the most, the Plaintiff can institute a fresh suit for
general partition of the schedule-A property amongst the
Defendants and the alienation by the original Defendant would
be valid to the extent of his limited share alone.
54.
The above discussions and observations would also make
it clear that the suit as framed is not maintainable.
The issues no.7), 3) & 1) are, accordingly, decided in the
negative against the Plaintiff. It is, however, made clear that the
Plaintiff shall be at liberty to initiate appropriate proceedings for
the money advanced by him to the original Defendant in
pursuance of Exhibit 1 against the property left behind by the
latter. ”
1)
Whether the suit is maintainable in its present
form?
3)
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree of
specific performance of the contract of sale of
the schedule ‘A’ property in his favour?
11. Both the issue nos. 1) and 3) can be taken up and decided
together. The Appellant filed a suit for specific performance of a
contract and consequential reliefs. The learned District Judge
would hold that the suit was not maintainable and that the
Appellant was not entitled to specific performance.
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12. The learned District Judge would examine this issue and
hold that the suit was not maintainable. However, this Court is
not in agreement with the reasoning of the learned District
Judge on the said issue which reasoning shall be dealt with
appropriately later.
13. The Appellant has sought the reliefs prayed for in the plaint
based Exhibit-1 dated 02.11.1999 only. During the hearing a
question was raised by this Court as to whether the suit was
maintainable and whether the Appellant was entitled to specific
performance of Exhibit-1 in view of the specific pleadings made
by the Appellant in the plaint and specifically paragraph 4
thereof as it suggest that the readiness and willingness to
perform the essential terms of Exhibit-1 which are to be
performed by the Appellant was conditional even if one was to
consider it as an “agreement”.
Mr. A. K. Upadhyaya would
contend that this was a plea not taken by the Respondents and
therefore it was not permissible for this Court to examine it. This
submission of the learned Counsel is not tenable on the face of
the provision under which the Appellant has preferred the
present Appeal. The Appeal preferred by the Appellant is under
Order XLI, Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC. The said Order XLI, Rule 2
of the CPC provides:
2. Grounds which may be taken in appeal.- The appellant shall
not, except by leave of the court, urge or be heard in support of any
ground of objection not set forth in the memorandum of appeal; but the
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Appellate Court, in deciding the appeal, shall not be confined to the
grounds of objection set forth in the memorandum of appeal or taken
by leave of the court under this rule:
Provided that the court shall not rest its decision on any other ground
unless the party who may be affected thereby has had a sufficient
opportunity of contesting the case on that ground.”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. In the written statement filed by Late Kamala Prasad as
well as the Respondent No.1 herein, maintainability of the suit
would be one of the preliminary objections raised. The Appellant
was given an opportunity to examine and make submission on
the maintainability of the suit in view of Section 16 (c) of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963. Mr. A. K. Upadhyaya would contend
that the readiness and willingness of the Appellant to perform
the essential terms of Exhibit-1 could not be termed as
conditional. He would refer to paragraph 14 of the plaint in
which the Appellant had averred:
“14. That the Plaintiff is always ready and willing to pay the
remaining sum of consideration value to the defendant and to act
as per the agreement after he executed the sale deed in favour of
the plaintiff and also do the needful for completing the
registration. The plaintiff is ready and willing to complete the
sale deed as per the agreement dated 2.11.1999.”
15. It is trite that the averments in the plaint must be read as
whole and not isolated sentences to understand the nature of the
pleadings.
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16. Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides:
“16. Personal bars to relief.-Specific performance of a contract
cannot be enforced in favour of a person(c)
who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has
always been ready and willing to perform the essential
terms of the contract which are to be performed by him,
other than terms the performance of which has been
prevented or waived by the defendant.
Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (c),—
(i)
where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not
essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the
defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so
directed by the court;
(ii)
the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and
willingness to perform, the contract according to its true
construction.”
17. The Appellant had filed a suit for specific performance and
consequential reliefs in which it was also averred:
“4.
That the said agreement was prepared in presence of
witnesses. After receipt of ₹5501/- the defendant again
took ₹2000/- on 13.3.2000 towards consideration value.
Thereafter he again took ₹3203/- in cash against
consideration value; including this amount of ₹3203/- the
plaintiff spent ₹25,500/- Rupees twenty five thousand and
five hundred) on account of transportation fare, house
repairing etc. Apart from this the defendant did not pay
₹25,500/- towards license fee from March, 2001 and also
mesne profit till January, 2004 amounting to ₹25,500/-.
Thus altogether a sum of ₹58,501/- (Rupees fifty eight
thousand five hundred and one) was spent by the plaintiff
in the account of the defendant as consideration value,
transportation, cash amount paid etc. Adjusting ₹58,501/-
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from ₹3,21,000/- the plaintiff has now to pay a sum of
₹2,62,499/- to the defendant towards consideration value;
which he is ready and willing to pay at any time to the
defendant.”
[Emphasis supplied]
18. The Appellant thereafter authenticated his evidence in
affidavit in which he deposed :
“5.
That the said agreement was prepared in presence of witnesses.
After receipt of Rs.5501/- the defendant again took Rs.2000/- on
13.3.2000 towards consideration value. Ext.2 is the said Money
Receipt and Ext.2/A is the signature of the defendant and
Ext.2/B is the signature of witness, Jeetendra Singh. Thereafter
he again took Rs.3203/- in cash against consideration value;
including this amount of Rs.3203/- I spent Rs.25,500/- Rupees
twenty five
thousand
and five
hundred)
on
account
of
transportation fare, house repairing etc. Apart from this the
defendant did not pay Rs.25,500/- towards license fee from
March, 2001 and also mesne profit till January, 2004 amounting
to Rs.25,500/-. Thus altogether a sum of Rs.58,501/- (Rupees
fifty eight thousand five hundred and one) was spent by me in
the
account
of
the
defendant
as
consideration
transportation, cash amount paid etc. Adjusting
value,
Rs.58,501/-
from Rs.3,21,000/- I have now to pay a sum of Rs.2,62,499/- to
the defendant towards consideration value; which I am ready
and willing to pay at any time to the defendant.”
[Emphasis supplied]
19. Reading the paragraph 4 and 14 of the plaint in a
wholesome manner with the Appellant’s statement in paragraph
5 of the evidence in affidavit there is no room for doubt that the
Appellants readiness and willingness was to pay only the residue
of the amount of consideration payable i.e. ₹3,21,000/- (Rupees
three lakhs twenty one thousand) only after deduction of the
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amount of ₹58,501/- (Rupees fifty eight thousand five hundred
one) only as claimed.
20. In re: Inderchand Jain (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. v. Motilal (DEAD)
THROUGH LRS.1 the Supreme Court would hold:
“15. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 mandates that
the discretionary relief of specific performance of the contract can be
granted only in the event the plaintiff not only makes necessary
pleadings but also establishes that he had all along been ready and
willing to perform his part of the contract. Such readiness and
willingness on the part of the plaintiff is not confined only to the stage
of filing of the plaint but also at the subsequent stage viz. at the
hearing. It has been so held in Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan
[(2005) 6 SCC 243] in the following terms: (SCC p. 256, paras 30-31)
“30. It is now well settled that the conduct of the parties,
with a view to arrive at a finding as to whether the plaintiffrespondents were all along and still are ready and willing to
perform their part of contract as is mandatorily required under
Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act must be determined having
regard to the entire attending circumstances. A bare averment in
the plaint or a statement made in the examination-in-chief would
not suffice. The conduct of the plaintiff-respondents must be
judged having regard to the entirety of the pleadings as also the
evidences brought on records.
31. In terms of Forms 47 and 48 appended to Appendix A of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff must plead that ‘he has been and
still is ready and willing specifically to perform the agreement on his
part of which the defendant has had notice’ or ‘the plaintiff is still
ready and willing to pay the purchase money of the said property to
the defendant’. The offer of the plaintiff in the instant case is a
conditional one and, thus, does not fulfil the requirements of law.”
(2009) 14 SCC 663
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21. A perusal of Exhibit-1 quantifies the consideration amount
for the sale of the suit property at ₹3,21,000/- (Rupees three
lakhs twenty one thousand) only.
An amount of ₹5,501/-
(Rupees five thousand five hundred one) only as advance was
acknowledged by late Kamala Prasad being paid to him. No
further amount was quantified or acknowledged in Exhibit-1. It
is Exhibit-1 which the Appellant seeks specific performance of.
However, in the plaint as well as in the evidence of the Appellant
he seeks adjustment of various amounts which did not form part
of Exhibit-1 and it is the specific case of the Appellant that:
“adjusting ₹58,501/- from ₹3,21,000/- the plaintiff has now to
pay a sum of
₹2,62,499/- to the defendant towards consideration
value; which he is ready and willing to pay at any time to the
defendant.”
22. The Appellant has also failed to plead in the Appeal that he
was ready and willing to pay the entire consideration amount as
agreed vide Exhibit-1. In fact even in the written submission filed
by the Appellant on 05.07.2018 before this Court the aforesaid
pleading regarding readiness and
willingness to
pay the
remaining amount after adjustment of ₹58,501/- (Rupees fifty
eight thousand five hundred one) only is reiterated. The conduct
of the Appellant judged having regard to the entirety of the
pleadings as also the evidences brought on record this Court has
no hesitation to hold that the readiness and willingness of the
Appellant if at all was conditional and therefore in terms of
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Section
16(c)
of
the
Specific
Relief
Act,
1963,
specific
performance of Exhibit-1 even if it was to be considered to be an
“agreement” could not be granted in favour of the Appellant.
23. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides:
“20.
Discretion
performance.—(1) The
as
to
jurisdiction
decreeing
specific
to
specific
decree
performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant
such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion
of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by
judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal.
(2) The following are cases in which the court may properly
exercise discretion not to decree specific performance:—
(a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the
parties at the time of entering into the contract or the
other circumstances under which the contract was
entered into are such that the contract, though not
voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage
over the defendant; or
(b) where the performance of the contract would involve
some hardship on the defendant which he did not
foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve
no such hardship on the plaintiff; or
(c) where the defendant entered into the contract under
circumstances which though not rendering the
contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce
specific performance.
Explanation 1.—Mere inadequacy of consideration, or the
mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or
improvident in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute an
unfair advantage within the meaning of clause (a) or hardship
within the meaning of clause (b).
Explanation 2.— The question whether the performance of
a contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the
meaning of clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship
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has resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the
contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances
existing at the time of the contract.
(3) The court may properly exercise discretion to decree
specific performance in any case where the plaintiff
has done substantial acts or suffered losses in
consequence of a contract capable of specific
performance.
(4) The court shall not refuse to any party specific
performance of a contract merely on the ground that
the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the
party.”
24. The circumstances referred to in sub-section 2 to 4 are not
exhaustive in regard to exercise of discretion for granting a
decree for specific performance. Section 20 of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963 provides that the relief for specific performance is
discretionary and is not given merely because it is lawful to do
so. The discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and
reasonable, guided
by
judicial principles
and
capable
of
correction by a court of appeal.
25. In re: Ganesh Shet v. C.S.G.K. Setty (Dr)2 the Supreme Court
would hold:
“13. It is again well settled that in a suit for specific
performance, the evidence and proof of the agreement must be
absolutely clear and certain.”
(1998) 5 SCC 381
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26. The case of the Appellant in the plaint was that late Kamala
Prasad was the owner of the suit property. Specific performance
of Exhibit-1 was sought for by the Appellant on the ground that
late Kamala Prasad was the owner of the suit property. Exhibit-1
also records that late Kamala Prasad is the owner of the suit
property. However, in the written statement filed by the
Appellant to the counter claim for eviction and arrears of rent
preferred by late Kamala Prasad as well as the Respondents in
the same proceedings he would deny that late Kamala Prasad
was the owner of the suit property. Similarly in the counter claim
to the written statement filed by the Respondent No.1 the
Appellant would deny that the Respondents are the joint owners
of the suit property. When the Appellant who seeks specific
performance waivers on the most crucial aspect i.e. the
ownership of the suit property which he desires to own by
seeking specific performance of Exhibit-1, the discretionary relief
as contemplated by the Specific Relief Act, 1963 cannot be
granted to the Appellant.
27. Consequently, it is held that the Appellant was not entitled
to specific performance of Exhibit-1 and further that the suit as
framed was not maintainable.
(2)
Whether the suit is barred by law of Limitation?
28. The learned District Judge would hold that the suit was not
barred by limitation as it was filed on 22.06.2004 within one
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year of the expiry of the time stipulated in Exhibit-1. Article 54 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 provides the period of limitation for
specific performance of a contract to be three years from the date
fixed for the performance, or if no such date is fixed, when the
plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. Exhibit-1
provided that if late Kamala Prasad is unable to register sale
deed within 04 years then the Appellant can institute legal action
against him and have full right over the said land and the shop.
It is seen that the Exhibit-1 is dated 02.11.1999. Four years
from 02.11.1999 would be 02.11.2003. Admittedly no sale deed
relating to Exhibit-1 was registered on or before 02.11.2003. The
cause of action for filing the suit for a specific performance would
thus arise only on the expiry of the four years period on
02.11.2003.
As per Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the
limitation for filing a suit for specific performance of Exhibit-1
dated 02.11.1999 would be three years from 02.11.2003. The
suit was admittedly filed on 22.06.2004 within the three years
limitation period as such no interference is required to be made
with the judgment of the learned District Judge with regard to
the said issue.
4) Whether the plaintiff is liable to be evicted as prayed
for by the defendant?
6) Whether the plaintiff is a tenant in the suit property?
If so, whether the plaintiff is liable to pay the arrear
house rent as claimed by the defendant?
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29. These two issues relate to the counter-claim made by the
Respondents and therefore, the burden of proof lay on the
Respondents.
30. Order VIII Rule 6A CPC provides:
“6A. Counter- claim by Defendant- 1) A Defendant in a suit
may, in addition to his right of pleading a set-off under rule 6, set up,
by way of counter-claim against the claim of the plaintiff, any right or
claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against
the plaintiff either before or after the filing of the suit, but before the
defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for
delivering his defence has expired, whether such counter- claim is in
the nature of a claim for damages or not:
Provided that such counter-claim shall not exceed the pecuniary
limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
(2)
Such counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross-
suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in the
same suit, both on the original claim and on the counter-claim.
(3)
The plaintiff shall be at liberty to file a written statement in
answer to the counter-claim of the defendant within such period as
may be fixed by the Court.
(4)
The counter-claim shall be treated as a plaint and
governed by the rules applicable to plaints.”
31. Late Kamala Prasad would, in the written statement, seek a
counter-claim for a decree declaring the Appellant as a defaulter
with respect to the suit property and a decree of eviction on the
ground of default. In the written statement filed on 20.10.2004
late Kamala Prasad would categorically admit the assertion made
by the Appellant that he was the owner of the suit property and
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that he had acquired it through family partition. In the counter
claim filed by late Kamala Prasad he would assert that he is the
owner of the suit property; the Appellant is a tenant thereof at a
monthly rate of ₹ 700/- (Rupees seven hundred) only and that
the Appellant has defaulted to pay rent of the suit property and
thus liable to be evicted.
32. The Appellant filed a written statement on 22.04.2005 to
the said counter-claim. He denied the ownership of late Kamala
Prasad of the suit property although in the plaint he had
asserted that late Kamala Prasad was the owner thereof. The
Appellant also denied that he is a tenant under late Kamala
Prasad. The Appellant denied that he had defaulted in paying
rent for the suit property as he had become the owner of the suit
property on and from 02.11.1999 on the execution of Exhibit-1.
The Appellant would also deny that he was a tenant under late
Kamala Prasad at a monthly rent of ₹700/- (Rupees seven
hundred) only and that he had defaulted in paying the said rent
from the year 1999.
33. On 19.02.2011 late Kamala Prasad filed his evidence in
affidavit. In his evidence late Kamala Prasad however, took a
turn on his claim of ownership of the suit property and stated
instead the he could not transact the suit property on the
ground that other legal heirs and successors of late Ram Phal
Ram and his own sons and daughters have claim in the said suit
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property. The evidence of late Kamala Prasad to the extent that it
is in conflict with the written statement filed by late Kamala
Prasad cannot be considered as no amount of evidence contrary
to the pleading can be relied on or accepted.
34. Late Kamala Prasad also asserted that it was the brother of
the Appellant one Ramesh Trivedi who was a tenant in the suit
property and that the Appellant had been posing himself to be
the tenant thereof. Late Kamala Prasad authenticated his
evidence in affidavit on 22.02.2011. Late Kamala Prasad,
however, died on 22.05.2011 and thereafter the learned District
Judge permitted the substitution of late Kamala Prasad by his
legal heirs, the Respondents herein.
35. In the written statement filed by Respondent No.1 on
19.09.2012 she would simply deny the assertion made by the
Appellant of late Kamala Prasad’s ownership of the suit property
due to lack of knowledge. It was asserted that the Appellant was
a tenant in the suit property. It was also asserted that the
Appellant has made himself liable for eviction due to default. It
was asserted that late Kamala Prasad was co-owner of the suit
property and that the Respondents are also co-owners of the suit
property. The Respondent No.1 also asserted that the Appellant
was a tenant in the suit property at a monthly rent of ₹700/(Rupees seven hundred) only and that he defaulted in payment
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of rent. The Respondent No.1 therefore sought a counter claim
for a decree for eviction of the Appellant on the ground of default
in payment of rent and a decree for realization of arrears of rent
from 02.11.1999 till date together with interest @ 9%.
36. On 03.12.2012 a written statement would be filed by the
Appellant
against
the
counter-claim. In the
said
written
statement it would be denied that late Kamala Prasad along with
others is the joint owner of the suit property and that the
Appellant was tenant thereof. It was once again claimed that the
Appellant became the owner by virtue of the sale transaction of
the suit property. The Appellant admitted that before execution
of Exhibit-1 he was a tenant. It was denied that he was a tenant
with respect to the suit property at a monthly rent of ₹700/(Rupees seven hundred) only and that he had defaulted.
37. The learned District Judge would examine these two issues
at paragraph 55, 56 and 60 of the judgment dated 13.09.2013.
Paragraphs 55 and 56 of the judgment dated 13.09.2013 which
deals with issue nos. 6 are extracted below:
“55. The issue no.6) shall be taken up now.
“6) whether the Plaintiff is a tenant in the suit premises. If so,
whether the Plaintiff is liable to pay the arrear house rent as
claimed by the Defendant?”
56.
Going by the plea set up by the Plaintiff it is noted that as per
him after 02.11.1999 (i.e., when the concerned agreement was
executed by the original Defendant) he has become the owner of the
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Schedule-A property. I am afraid, the same is not the case. It is wellsettled that an agreement to sell does not convey any right, title or
interest in the property. It creates only an enforceable right between he
parties. So far as the validity/enforceability of Exhibit 1 and the right
of the Plaintiff to have the concerned agreement enforced are concerned
this Court has already given its findings in that regard above. By no
stretch of imagination can the Plaintiff be regarded as the owner of the
suit property on and after 02.11.1999. He can only be regarded as the
tenant of the suit premises. Now, it has been pleaded by the
Defendant(s) that the Plaintiff has failed to pay the rent from the year
1999 onwards. The same has not been refuted by the Plaintiff who, on
his part, had his own justification for not paying the rent. Be that as it
may, it can only be concluded that the Plaintiff is still a tenant of the
suit premises/Schedule-A property and as such liable to pay the
arrears of rent as claimed by the Defendant(s).”
(Emphasis supplied)
38. The learned District Judge would thus hold this issue in
favour of the Respondents. The learned District Judge would
hold that the Appellant was a tenant in the suit premises and
that he was liable to pay the arrears of house rent as claimed by
the Respondents. The learned District Judge would hold so on
mere consideration of the Appellant plea regarding his claim of
ownership on execution of Exhibit-1 without examining the
evidence adduced.
39. The learned District Judge would also examine issue no.4
i.e. “Whether the plaintiff is liable to be evicted as prayed for by
the defendant?” and hold thus:
“60.
The original Defendant/substituted Defendants in their Counter-
claim have pleaded that since the Plaintiff has failed to pay the rent (of
₹700/- per month) for the Schedule-A premises after executing Exhibit 1
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and since he has also disputed the ownership of his landlord(s) he is
liable to be evicted from the Schedule-A premises on those grounds. So
far as the non-payment of rent is concerned neither the original
Defendant nor any of the substituted Defendants has cared to explain
if the aforesaid amount of rent is as per the rents prevailing in the
locality/standard rent. Further, there is nothing to indicate that the rent
(arrears) was ever demanded by the Defendant(s) at any point of time.
Even otherwise, in view of the Rent Law applicable to the concerned
property i.e., the Notification No.6326-600-H&W-B dated 14.04.1949 of
the Health & Works Department, Government of Sikkim (Old Law of
Sikkim) which provides that the landlord may be permitted to evict the
tenant on ‘due application’ to the appropriate Court (District Court) and
also considering that the matter needs to be gone into detail in the
appropriate eviction proceedings, it would be appropriate if the
Defendant(s) approach the Court concerned under the concerned Rent
Law on duly presenting an application as required. So far as the other
ground is concerned, Ld. Senior Advocate Shri B. Sharma had
contended that in view of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
the Plaintiff being the tenant is estopped from denying the ownershiptitle of his landlord(s). I am afraid the submissions of Shri Sharma are
not legally sound as Section 116 would only be applicable if the
Plaintiff had been put into possession by the Defendant(s). In the
present case the Plaintiff was in possession of the concerned tenanted
premises/Schedule-A properties even before the Defendant(s) came to
possess/own it. It is trite that the Rule of Estoppel above only applies
to cases in which the tenants are put into possession of the concerned
property by the persons to whom they have attorned and not to cases
in which the tenants have previously been in possession.
The substituted Defendants shall however be free to initiate
eviction proceedings, if so advised.”
40. Even while holding issue no.6 in the affirmative i.e. the
Appellant is a tenant in the suit property and that the Appellant
was liable to pay arrears of rent as claimed by the Respondents
the learned District Judge in the decree passed on 13.09.2013
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dismissed the counter-claim of the Respondents. The Appeal
filed by the Appellant makes no specific grievance against the
finding recorded by the learned District Judge in the judgment
dated 13.09.2013 with regard to issue no. 6. In the synopsis of
argument submitted by the Appellant it is submitted that this
issue is to be decided under the Rent Control Act of the State
and not in a suit for specific performance of contract and that
under the Rent Control Act of Sikkim specific eviction suit is to
be filed by depositing specific amount of court fee for eviction of
a tenant before the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction
and as such eviction suit cannot be in the form of counter-claim
in a specific performance of a contract.
41. While framing issues it must be kept in mind that issues
are framed when one party asserts a fact which is denied by the
other. While framing issues the Court must necessary fix the
burden of proof of the specific issue on the party who asserts it.
The findings rendered thereon must always be based on the
evidence adduced.
42. The learned District Judge would refer to Notification
No.6326-600-H&W-B dated 14.04.1949 which deals with the
rent law applicable to the rest of Sikkim beside Gangtok which is
governed by the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956.
The said Notification No.6326-600-H&W-B dated 14.04.1949 is
extracted below:
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“GOVERNMENT OF SIKKIM
Health and works department.
Notification No.6326-600-H&W-B
Under powers conferred in para 2 of Notification No.1366-G,
dated the 28th July 1947, the following Rules have been framed to
regulate letting and sub-letting of premises controlling rents thereof and
unreasonable eviction of tenants as the scarcity of housing
accommodation still exists in Sikkim.
1.
The landlords can charge rent for premises either for
residential or business purposes on the basis of the rents prevailing in
locality in year 1939, plus an increase upto 50 percent so long as the
scarcity of housing accommodation lasts.
2.
The landlords cannot eject the tenants so long as the
scarcity of housing accommodation lasts, but when the whole or part of
the premises are required for their personal occupation or for thorough
overhauling the premises or on failure by the tenants to pay rent for
four months the landlords may be permitted to evict the tenant on due
application to the Chief Court.
3.
Any tenant may apply to this Department for fixing his
rent. On receipt of such application the Department will enquire about
the rent prevailing in the locality in 1939, and fix rent as per Rule (I)
above.
4.
Any person acting in contravention of this Notification will
be liable to prosecution under para 4 of notification No. 1366-066-G,
dated the 28th July, 1947.
5.
The tenant means those person in actual occupation.
Landlord, means owner of the premises.
These rules will come into force with immediate effect.
By order of His Highness the Maharaja of Sikkim.
R.B. Singh,
Gangtok
The 14th, April, 1949.
Secretary,
Health and Works Department,
Government of Sikkim.”
43. A perusal of the afore-quoted notification makes it evident
that the said notification was meant to control rents and
unreasonable eviction of tenants as the scarcity of housing
accommodation still existed in Sikkim. Clause 2 of the said
notification provides for the grounds on which a landlord could
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eject a tenant. So long as the scarcity of housing accommodation
lasts the landlord cannot eject the tenant save on the grounds
provided. When whole or part of the premises are required for
their personal occupation or for thorough over-hauling the
premises or on failure by the tenants to pay rent for four months
the landlords “may be permitted” to evict the tenant on due
application to the Chief Court. As per clause 5 “tenant” means
those persons in actual possession and “landlord” means owner
of the premises. The Respondents sought eviction of the
Appellant for non-payment of rent. Therefore, the Respondents
were required to prove that they were the owners of the said
property; the Appellant was a tenant thereof; that there was a
failure on the part of the Appellant to pay rent for at least four
months. On proving the aforesaid facts the discretion was with
the Court to evict the Appellant.
44. The plea of the Appellant that eviction suit cannot be in the
form of a counter-claim in a suit for specific performance of
contract has no legal basis in view of the provision of Order VIII
6A CPC quoted above with provides that a Defendant in a suit
may, in addition to his right of pleading a set of under Rule 6, set
up, by way of counter-claim against the claim of a Plaintiff, “any
right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the
defendant against the plaintiff ……… .”
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45. The language of Order VIII 6A CPC quoted above is wide
enough to include a counter claim for eviction and arrears of
rent.
46. In view of the written statement filed by late Kamala Prasad
admitting the assertion of the Appellant regarding his ownership
to the suit property no issues would be framed and consequently
no evidence adduced. Resultantly no authoritative finding as to
who is the owner of the suit property would be pronounced by
the learned District Judge. As held above no amount of oral
evidence led by the Respondent No.1 could be relied upon which
was in conflict with the pleadings in the written statement filed
by late Kamala Prasad. The counter claim was filed by the
Respondents and therefore the burden of proof lay upon them.
47.
Late Kamala Prasad unfortunately, passed away before he
could be cross examined on his evidence in affidavit. Late
Kamala Prasad’s evidence in affidavit filed on 19.02.2011
curiously did not take the stand taken by him in his written
statement that he was the owner of the said property. He
deposed that:
“I cannot transact the suit property firstly on the ground that
other legal heirs and successors of late Ramdas Ramphal Ram and my
sons and daughter have claim in the suit property.”
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48. Respondent No.1 does not claim ownership of the said
property in her evidence in affidavit. In cross-examination she
admits that she has filed no documents to prove that the suit
property or that the landed properties in the State of Sikkim are
recorded in the name of late Ram Das Ram Phal Ram. In fact in
cross-examination she volunteered to state that there was no
partition of the ancestral property. Regarding the issue of rent
claimed by her in her counter claim she in fact categorically
admitted in cross-examination that:
“It is true that I am entitled to no rent from the plaintiff.”
49. The Respondents examined Kamlesh Kumar as their
witness. He also did not elucidate further on the ownership of
the suit property of the Respondents. Therefore it is evident that
the Respondents failed to assert even ownership of the suit
property leave alone establish it.
50. Respondent No.1 would claim in her evidence in affidavit
that it was the brother of the plaintiff Shri Ramesh Trivedi who
was a tenant in the suit property.
51. Respondent No.1 would claim in her evidence in affidavit
that:
“the plaintiff has not paid the rent for the suit premises either to
me or to other members of Ram Das Ram Ram Phal Ram since
November, 1999, as such the plaintiff is liable to be evicted from the
suit premises and the shop premises occupied by him on the ground of
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default. That I categorically state that plaintiff as a defaulter in
payment of rent and as such, I may be granted relief as made in the
counter-claim.”
52. Respondent
No.1
would
however,
admit
in
cross-
examination that:
“I know Ramesh Trivedi who is now dead. It is true that Ramesh
Trivedi was not a tenant in the suit premises …… I cannot say whether
the plaintiff is a defaulter or not. I also do not understand the meaning
of the word ‘Default’.”
53. It is clear that the Respondents have failed to establish
neither their ownership to the suit property nor the fact that the
Appellant was a tenant thereof. In fact the evidence of
Respondent No.1 oscillates between asserting that it was in fact
the Appellant’s brother late Ramesh Trivedi who was a tenant of
the suit property in her evidence in affidavit and thereafter
accepting the suggestion of the Appellant’s Counsel that late
Ramesh Trivedi was in fact not a tenant of the suit property.
54. However, Mr. B. Sharma would submit that the counterclaim was liable to be granted in favour of the Respondents on
the basis of the averment made by the Appellant in the plaint
itself clearly admitting the factum of the Appellant being a tenant
prior to 02.11.1999 and paying rent thereof and thereafter not
paying the rent in view of his claim of ownership on execution of
Exhibit-1.
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55. In the present case no judgment was sought on admission
by either of the parties. A perusal of the pleadings before the
learned District Judge as well as the judgment dated 13.09.2013
it is evident that the learned Counsel for the Respondents has
sought to raise the issue of the Appellant’s admission for the first
time at the hearing of this Appeal and cross objection. In fact
even the amended cross objection filed by the Respondent No.2
on 09.03.2018 does not contain a single ground regarding the
admission purportedly made by the Appellant.
56. Besides the pleadings of the respective parties to the suit
the evidence adduced by them is also available in the records.
Both the parties have taken conflicting position in the suit as
well as the counter-claim.
57. The Appellant would aver in paragraph 12 of the plaint:
“12. That as stated above before the sale agreement dated
2.11.1999 was executed; the plaintiff was occupying the
Schedule “A” premises as a tenant under the defendant. Initially
as per instructions of the defendant and the members of his
family the plaintiff used to pay monthly rent to Shri. Kailash
Prasad who is the son of elder brother of Kamala Prasad.
However, through a letter Shri. Rajiv Prasad, son of Shri Kailash
Prasad informed the plaintiff that the Schedule “A” property had
fallen in the share of the defendant who has become its owner
and therefore, the plaintiff should pay monthly rent to the
defendant himself. After receipt of the said letter, the plaintiff
started paying rent to the defendant and accordingly rent was
paid in the hand of the defendant upto October 1999. However,
from 2.11.1999 as the defendant had sold out the Schedule “A”
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property to the plaintiff therefore, there was no question of
payment of rent to the defendant as the plaintiff became the
owner by virtue of the agreement dated 2.11.1999.”
58.
The Appellant in his evidence in affidavit would state:
“13. That as stated above before the sale agreement dated
2.11.1999 was executed; I was occupying the Schedule “A”
premises as a tenant under the defendant. Initially as per
instructions of the defendant and the members of his family I
used to pay monthly rent to Shri Kailash Prasad who is the son
of elder brother of Kamala Prasad. However, through a letter
Shri. Rajiv Prasad, son of Shri Kailash Prasad informed me that
the Schedule “A” property had fallen in the share of the
defendant who has become its owner and therefore, I should pay
monthly rent to the defendant myself. After receipt of the said
letter, I started paying rent to the defendant and accordingly rent
was paid in the hand of the defendant upto October 1999. Ext.5
is the said letter and Ext.5/A is the signature of Rajiv Prasad.
However, from 2.11.1999 as the defendant has sold out the
Schedule “A” property to me therefore, there was no question of
payment of rent to the defendant as I became the owner by
virtue of the agreement dated 2.11.1999.”
59. The admission by the Appellant was that he was a tenant in
the suit property under late Kamala Prasad till 02.11.1999 from
which date he became the owner thereof. The Appellant further
admits that he paid rent till October 1999 to late Kamala Prasad.
With regard to the question of payment of rent after 02.11.1999
the Appellant states that from 02.11.1999 as late Kamala Prasad
had sold out the schedule “A” property to him there was no
question of payment of rent to him.
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60. The admission by the Appellant in the plaint as well as in
his evidence in affidavit regarding the tenancy is that till
02.11.1999 he was a tenant under late Kamala Prasad. The
Appellant has admitted in the plaint as well as in evidence in
affidavit that he has paid rent to late Kamala Prasad till October,
1999. Mr. B. Sharma, seeks to press the admission of the
Appellant as waiver of proof required to establish the ingredients
of
Clause
of
Notification
No.6326-600-H&W-P
dated
14.04.1949. As held above the Respondents were required to
prove that they were the owners of the said suit property; the
Appellant was a tenant thereof and that there was failure on the
part of the Appellant to pay rent for at least four months.
Regarding ownership the Appellant’s admission in the plaint as
well as in the evidence of affidavit is only to the extent that late
Kamala Prasad was the owner of the suit property. The Appellant
has in his evidence in affidavit admitted that he was a tenant till
02.11.1999 under late Kamala Prasad. The Appellant has stated
that on and from 02.11.1999 after the execution of Exhibit-1
there was no question of paying rent to late Kamala Prasad as he
has become the owner thereof. The statement of the Appellant
may be considered as implied admission of the fact that on and
from 02.11.1999 he did not pay rent to late Kamala Prasad for
the tenancy. However, as stated above both late Kamala Prasad
as well as Respondent No.1 adduced evidence in Court. In the
said evidences in affidavit late Kamala Prasad as well as the
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Respondent No.1 categorically stated that it was the brother of
the Appellant i.e. Ramesh Trivedi who was the tenant in the suit
premises.
61. Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides:
“101. Burden of proof.—Whoever desires any Court to give
judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of
facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist.
When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is
said that the burden of proof lies on that person.”
62. Section 102 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides:
“102. On whom burden of proof lies.—The burden of proof in
a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at
all were given on either side.”
63. The burden of proof that the Respondents were the owner
of the suit property, the Appellant was the tenant thereof and
that the Appellant had failed and neglected to pay rent for a
period of at least four months for the purpose of the counterclaim lay on the Respondents.
64. Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 defines
admission in this manner:
“17. Admission defined.-An admission is a statement, oral of
documentary or contained in electronic form, which suggests any
inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by
any of the persons, and under the circumstances, hereinafter
mentioned.”
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65. The word “statement” appearing in Section 17 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 not being defined the ordinary dictionary
meaning is required to be applied. Thus “statement” would mean
something that is stated. An admission must be clear and
unambiguous to permit waiver of the requirement of proof.
66. Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides:
“58. Facts admitted need not be proved.-No fact need to be
proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents
agree to admit at the hearing, or which, before the hearing, they agree
to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule of
pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their
pleadings:
Provided that the Courts may, in its discretion, require the facts
admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions.”
67. Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with
admissions during trial i.e. “at or before the hearing.” Proof of
such facts is not required for the reason that facts admitted
require no proof. Section 58 deals with judicial admission. The
section governs admission by pleadings. Admission in the
manner contemplated under this section is a substitute for
evidence and a waiver or dispensation with the production of
evidence by conceding for the purposes of litigation that the
proposition of fact alleged by the opponent is true.
68. The proviso to Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
however, provides for discretion upon the Court to require even
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the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such
admissions.
69.
The Respondent No.1 has failed to even assert the factum
of ownership of the suit property or that the Appellant was a
tenant thereof in the evidence in affidavit of Respondent No.1 to
support the averments in her written statement leave alone
tender evidence to the said effect. Even if the averment of the
Appellant is considered as an admission it could only help the
Respondents as evidence to prove what they assert. The
admission was to the effect that late Kamala Prasad was the
owner of the suit property. However, the failure of the
Respondent No.1 to assert the said facts in her evidence in
affidavit would disentitle the Respondents to take advantage of
the averments made by the Appellant in the plaint or the
statement made by the Appellant in his affidavit in evidence at
this stage.
70. Although there was a clear admission of the Appellant in
the plaint as well as in the evidence in affidavit that he was a
tenant in the suit property the Respondent No.1’s statement in
her evidence in affidavit that in fact it was the brother of the
Appellant i.e. Ramesh Trevedi who was the tenant would
disentitle the Respondents to take advantage of the judicial
admission made by the Appellant at this stage. The Respondents
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have thus failed to prove that the Appellant was the tenant in
their suit property.
71. Notification No.6326-600-H&W-B dated 14.04.1949 grants
a discretion to the Court to permit the eviction of the tenant on
failure by the tenant to pay rent four months. The counter
claims however, are vague. In the counter claim by late Kamala
Prasad it is pleaded:
“V. That the plaintiff is a tenant under the defendant with
respect to the suit premises at a monthly rate of Rs.700/-. The plaintiff
has defaulted to pay the rent of the suit premises admittedly from the
year 1999 and as such is liable to be evicted from the said premises.”
72. The counter claim filed by the Respondent No.1 pleads:
“V. That the plaintiff is the tenant in the premises at a monthly
rent of Rs.700/-. The plaintiff has defaulted to pay the rent of the suit
is liable to be evicted from the said premises.”
73. From the counter claim filed by the Respondent No.1 it is
simply impossible to tell the period of non-payment of rent. It is
also pleaded that the cause of action for the counter claim arose
for the first time on 02.11.1999 when purported deed of
agreement was alleged to be executed. The Respondents valued
the counter claim at ₹8,400 (Rupees eight thousand four
hundred) only both for the purpose of Court fees and jurisdiction
and the Court fees of ₹504/- (Rupees five hundred four) only was
paid.
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74. Order VII Rule 2 CPC mandates that every pleading shall
contain, and contain only, a statement in a concise form of the
material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or
defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they
are to be proved. From the pleadings in the counter claim of the
Respondent No.1 it is impossible to fathom the period of the
failure by the Appellant to pay rent totaling to four months or
more. The Respondent No.1 is the only Respondent who came as
a witness. The Respondent No.1 stated in her evidence in
affidavit that the Appellant had not paid rent for the suit
premises since November, 1999. However, she also admitted that
she could not say whether the Appellant was a defaulter or not
and admitted that she was not entitled to any rent from the
plaintiff. Even if this Court were to accept the statement of
Respondent No.1 that the Appellant had not paid rent for the
suit premises since November, 1999 much of the claim for
arrears of rent would be barred by limitation. The counter claim
was first made by late Kamala Prasad on 28.10.2004. Therefore,
the claim of the arrears of rent from November, 1999 till
November, 2002 would be barred by limitation under Article 52
of the Limitation Act, 1963 which provides a period of limitation
of three years for instituting a suit for arrears of rent from the
time when the arrears become due. A claim for arrears of rent
from November 1999 till 28.10.2004 at the rate of ₹700/(Rupees seven hundred) only per month would require the
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Respondents to pay Court fees much higher than ₹504/- (Rupees
five hundred four) only paid. In any event it is impossible to
decree the counter claim for arrears of rent without specific
pleadings and specific evidence which would persuade the Court
to believe the same. The failure of the Respondent to prove
ownership of the suit premises and that the Appellant was the
tenant thereof disentitles them on their claim for arrears of rent.
In the circumstances it must also be held that the Respondents
have failed to prove that the Appellant was liable to pay arrears
of house rent to them. Issue nos. 4) and 6) are therefore held
against the Respondents.
7)
Whether the document dated 2.11.1999 executed
by the defendant in favour or the plaintiff is a
valid document and enforceable in law?
75. Exhibit-1 has admittedly not been signed by the Appellant
as the purchaser. Thus it has become vital to examine whether
Exhibit-1 is an agreement at all.
76. Section 2(e) and (h) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
provides:
“(e)
Every promise and every set of promises, forming the
consideration for each other, is an agreement;”
“(h)
An agreement enforceable by law is a contract;”
77. Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 provides:
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“10. What agreements are contracts.-All agreements are
contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties
competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a
lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be void.
Nothing herein contained shall affect any law in force in
India, and not hereby expressly repealed, by which any contract
is required to be made in writing or in the presence of witnesses,
or any law relating to the registration of documents.”
78. An agreement to sell is necessarily a bilateral contract as
there must be a meeting of mind between the seller and the
purchaser. The seller must agree to sell and the purchaser must
agree and be willing to purchase for a lawful consideration.
There must be free consent of the parties. Only those agreements
which are enforceable by law are contracts.
79. In re: Aloka Bose v. Parmatma Devi & Ors.3 the Supreme
Court would hold:
“14. Certain amount of confusion is created on account of two
divergent views expressed by two High Courts. In S.M. Gopal Chetty v.
Raman [AIR 1998 Mad 169] a learned Single Judge held that where the
agreement of sale was not signed by the purchaser, but only by the
vendor, it cannot be said that there was a contract between the vendor
and the purchaser; and as there was no contract, the question of
specific performance of an agreement signed only by the vendor did not
arise. On the other hand, in Mohd. Mohar Ali v. Mohd. Mamud Ali [AIR
1998 Gau 92] a learned Single Judge held that an agreement of sale
was a unilateral contract (under which the vendor agreed to sell the
immovable property to the purchaser in accordance with the terms
contained in the said agreement), that such an agreement for sale did
not require the signatures of both parties, and that therefore an
(2009) 2 SCC 582
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agreement for sale signed only by the vendor was enforceable by the
purchaser.
15. We find that neither of the two decisions have addressed the
real issue and cannot be said to be laying down the correct law. The
observation in Mohd. Mohar Ali [AIR 1998 Gau 92] stating that an
agreement of sale is an unilateral contract is not correct. An unilateral
contract refers to a gratuitous promise where only one party makes a
promise without a return promise. Unilateral contract is explained thus
by John D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo in The Law of Contracts [4th
Edn., Para 2-10(a) at pp. 64-65]:
“If A says to B, ‘If you walk across the Brooklyn Bridge I
will pay you $100,’ A has made a promise but has not asked B
for a return promise. A has asked B to perform, not a
commitment to perform. A has thus made an offer looking to a
unilateral contract. B cannot accept this offer by promising to
walk the bridge. B must accept, if at all, by performing the act.
Because no return promise is requested, at no point is B bound to
perform. If B does perform, a contract involving two parties is
created, but the contract is classified as unilateral because only
one party is ever under an obligation.”
All agreements of sale are bilateral contracts as promises are made by
both — the vendor agreeing to sell and the purchaser agreeing to
purchase.
16. On the other hand, the observation in S.M. Gopal Chetty [AIR
1998 Mad 169] that unless agreement is signed both by the vendor
and purchaser, it is not a valid contract is also not sound. An
agreement of sale comes into existence when the vendor agrees to sell
and the purchaser agrees to purchase, for an agreed consideration on
agreed terms. It can be oral. It can be by exchange of communications
which may or may not be signed. It may be by a single document
signed by both parties. It can also be by a document in two parts, each
party signing one copy and then exchanging the signed copy as a
consequence of which the purchaser has the copy signed by the vendor
and a vendor has a copy signed by the purchaser. Or it can be by the
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vendor executing the document and delivering it to the purchaser who
accepts it.
17. Section 10 of the Act provides that all agreements are
contracts if they are made by the free consent by the parties competent
to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are
not expressly declared to be void under the provisions of the Contract
Act. The proviso to Section 10 of the Act makes it clear that the section
will not apply to contracts which are required to be made in writing or
in the presence of witnesses or any law relating to registration of
documents. Our attention has not been drawn to any law applicable in
Bihar at the relevant time, which requires an agreement of sale to be
made in writing or in the presence of witnesses or to be registered.
Therefore, even an oral agreement to sell is valid. If so, a written
agreement signed by one of the parties, if it evidences such an oral
agreement will also be valid.”
[Emphasis supplied]
80. As the Appellant has sought to rely upon Exhibit-1
admittedly signed only by late Kamala Prasad it was incumbent
upon the Appellant to establish that there was either an oral
agreement between them or that Exhibit-1 was executed by late
Kamala Prasad and delivered to the Appellant who accepted it. It
was further incumbent upon the Appellant not only to establish
the execution of Exhibit-1 by late Kamala Prasad but that he
himself had also agreed to purchase the scheduled property for
an agreed consideration on agreed terms.
81. Exhibit-1 has been exhibited in the original by the
Appellant in the suit. Obviously Exhibit-1 was in the possession
of the Appellant. The factum of delivery of Exhibit-1 by late
Kamala Prasad to the Appellant has neither been pleaded nor
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proved save the fact that the Appellant produced the original
before the Trial Court.
82. Exhibit-1 records the purported agreement. In the evidence
in affidavit of the Appellant, Exhibit-1 is referred to as the
agreement between the Appellant and late Kamala Prasad. The
Appellant also asserts that the Exhibit-1 bears the thumb
impression of late Kamala Prasad and it was prepared in the
presence of witnesses and signed by them. It also asserts that
Ravi Kumar Prasad, the eldest son of late Kamala Prasad, had
also signed it. Exhibit 1 also categorically recites that the
executant was willing to sell half of the land devolved upon him
from the partition by a document executed by the brothers and
Panchayat being 20′x62′ which had been in occupation of Trivedi
Stores as house and shop since 1963 and for which the
Appellant and the executants had orally agreed.
83. Exhibit-1 is hand written. The Appellant has identified the
signatures on the first page of Exhibit-1 marked exhibit-1/A
collectively as the signature of late Kamala Prasad and the
thumb impressions marked exhibit-1/B collectively as late
Kamala Prasad’s thumb impression (“L.T.I.”). The Appellant has
also identified the signature of witness Shri Shiv Shankar Singh
as exhibit i.e. and witness Ram Prasad as exhibit-1/F. The
Appellant has identified the signatures of late Kamala Prasad’s
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son Ravi Kumar Prasad as exhibit-I/C collectively. The Appellant
has not identified the handwriting in Exhibit-1. The Appellant in
cross-examination has denied that late Kamala Prasad had not
written Exhibit-1. There are two witnesses who had purportedly
signed in Exhibit-1. In cross-examination the Appellant admitted
that one of the said witness Shiv Shankar Singh had been a
teacher in Singtam School along with him till he resigned in the
year 1984 and that the other witness Ram Prasad was his
employee. The Appellant denied that he managed to manufacture
Exhibit-1 with the help of his co-teacher and his employee.
84. Ram Prasad in his evidence in affidavit stated that he knew
the Appellant and late Kamala Prasad. He stated that through an
agreement dated 02.11.1999 entered between them the suit
property was sold for a consideration value of ₹3,21,000/(Rupees three lakhs twenty one thousand) only and provided the
details of the said agreement. He identified Exhibit-1 as the
agreement and the signature and the thumb impression of late
Kamala Prasad, the signatures of Ravi Kumar Prasad, the
signature of witness Shiv Shankar Singh and his own signature.
He also stated that at the time of execution of Exhibit-1 late
Kamala Prasad was in his full senses and that he had not
consumed alcohol. Ram Prasad asserted that Exhibit-1 was
executed in his presence on late Kamala Prasad’s free will and
that there was no coercion or any undue influence from the
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Appellant. In cross-examination Ram Prasad admitted that he
had been working under the Appellant for last 34 years. He
admitted that he did not remember what exactly was written in
Exhibit-1 or the date of its execution. He admitted that he did
not know what was written in his evidence in affidavit as he did
not know English.
85. The other witness Shiv Shankar Singh was not examined.
Jitendra Singh in his evidence in affidavit gave an identical
evidence as that of Ram Prasad with regard to the execution of
Exhibit-1
and
also
identified
the
signatures
and
thumb
impressions thereon. He also stated that at the time of execution
Exhibit-1 as well as the money receipt dated 13.03.2000 (exhibit2) late Kamala Prasad was in his full senses and he had not
consumed alcohol. He also stated that the said two documents
were executed in his presence by late Kamala Prasad on his free
will and there was no coercion or undue influence from the
Appellant. In cross-examination he admitted that he was not a
witness to Exhibit-1.
86. Late Kamala Prasad however, denied executing Exhibit-1
and alleged forgery. It is trite that one who alleges forgery must
prove it. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the Respondents to
prove forgery. Late Kamala Prasad also took an alternative plea
inconsistent to the plea of forgery that he being an alcoholic the
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Appellant took undue advantage in his drunken stupor and had
Exhibit-1 executed by him. It was also incumbent upon the
Respondents to prove the alternative plea that the Appellant took
advantage of late Kamala Prasad’s drunken stupor and taking
undue advantage of it had Exhibit-1 executed by him. The
Appellant
would
contend
that
this
was
a
mutually
exclusive/contradictory stand which was not permissible in law.
87.
In re: Baldev Singh v. Manohar Singh4 the Supreme Court
would hold:
“16. This being the position, we are therefore of the view
that inconsistent pleas can be raised by the defendants in the
written statement although the same may not be permissible in
the case of plaint. In Modi Spg. and Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha
Ram & Co. [(1976) 4 SCC 320] this principle has been enunciated
by this Court in which it has been clearly laid down that
inconsistent or alternative pleas can be made in the written
statement. Accordingly, the High Court and the trial court had
gone wrong in holding that the defendant-appellants are not
allowed to take inconsistent pleas in their defence.”
88. In view of the clear exposition of the law by the Supreme
Court that inconsistent or alternative plea can be made in the
written statement the Appellant’s submission that it is not
permissible is not tenable.
(2006) 6 SCC 498
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89. The defence in the present case was first pleaded by late
Kamala Prasad in his written statement in which he admitted
that he was the owner of the suit property and that he had
become the owner through a family partition. Late Kamala
Prasad took a slightly different plea in his evidence on affidavit
regarding ownership. He stated that the suit premise is recorded
in the name of his father and uncle Ram Das Ram Ramphal
Ram. He took the plea that he could not transact the suit
property because there were other legal heirs and successors of
late Ram Das Ram Ramphal Ram and his sons and daughters
who have claim in the suit property.
90. In re: Pt. Shamboo Nath Tikoo v. S. Gian Singh,5 the Supreme
Court would hold:
“20. No doubt, the finding recorded by the learned third
Judge (Farooqi, J.) that two rooms of Dharamshalla had been
granted by Maharaja Partap Singh in favour of the Sikh
community-defendants, accords with the finding of another
learned Judge (Jalal-ud-Din, J.). But, that finding, in our view,
becomes wholly unsustainable being altogether a new case
made out for the defendants by him, in that, such case is not in
any way traceable to the pleas of defence of the defendants set
out in their written statements against their ejectment from the
said two rooms.”
91. In re: Rajendra Pratap Singh v. Rameshwar Prasad6 the
Supreme Court would hold:
1995 Supp (3) SCC 266
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“13. When the defendant in this case did not dispute in
the written statement the fact that the lease was validly made, it
is not open to him to raise a contention later, viz., the instrument
was
not
executed
by
both
the
lessor
and
lessee
and
consequently the lease is void. The High Court, has therefore,
rightly confirmed the finding of the courts below that the decree
for eviction on the ground under Section 11(1)(e) of the Bihar Act
is not liable to be interfered with.”
92. In re: Ramesh Kumar & Anr. v. Furu Ram & Anr.7 the Supreme
Court would hold:
“33. It is well settled that no amount of evidence contrary to the
pleading can be relied on or accepted. In this case, there is
variance and divergence between the pleading and documentary
evidence, pleading and oral evidence and between the oral and
documentary evidence. It is thus clear that the entire case of the
respondents is liable to be rejected. The different versions clearly
demonstrate fraud and misrepresentation on the part of the
respondents.”
93. In view of the settle position of law that an altogether new
case cannot be set up which is inconsistent with the defence
taken in the written statement and that no amount of evidence
contrary to the pleading can be relied on or accepted it was not
permissible for late Kamala Prasad to have taken the plea of joint
ownership of the suit property in spite of the clear plea taken by
him in his written statement that he was in fact the owner of the
said suit property having become the owner through a family
partition.
(1998) 7 SCC 602
(2011) 8 SCC 613
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94. However, late Kamala Prasad died on 22.05.2011 after
authenticating his evidence on affidavit on 22.02.2011.
95. In re: Krishan Dayal v. Chandu Ram8 H.R. Khanna, J. of the
Delhi High Court would hold:
“ I have given the matter my consideration and am of the view
that the statement of a witness in examination-in-chief, which was
admissible at the time it was recorded, cannot become inadmissible by
reason of the subsequent death of the witness before crossexamination. The absence of cross-examination would undoubtedly
affect the value and weight to be attached to the statement of the
witness, but it would not render the statement inadmissible or result in
its effacement. So far as the question is concerned as to what weight
should be attached to such statement made in examination-in-chief the
Court has to keep in view the facts and circumstances of each
individual case. Some of the factors which may be borne in mind are
the nature of the testimony, its probative value, the status of the
witness, his relationship or connection with the parties to the case, a
likely anumus which may colour his statement and any other factor
touching the credibility of the witness which may emerge on the record.
Regard must also be had to the fact that the witness has not been
subjected to cross-examination. The Court should see whether there
are indications on the record that as a result of cross-examination his
testimony was likely to be seriously shaken or his good faith or credit
to be successfully impeached. The Court may also adopt a rule not to
act upon such testimony unless it is materially corroborated or is
supported by the surrounding circumstances. If after applying that rule
of caution, the Court decides to rely upon the statement of a witness
who was examined in chief, but who died before cross-examination,
the decision of the Court in this respect would not suffer from any
infirmity.”
1969 SCC OnLine Del 134
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96. In view of the settled position of law as clearly expounded
by H.R. Khanna, J. in his instructive judgment in re: Krishan
Dayal (supra) this Court deems it proper to examine the other
facts before coming to a conclusion whether to rely upon the
statement of late Kamala Prasad.
97. Ravi Prasad also deposed before the Court as late Kamala
Prasad’s witness. In his evidence in affidavit he stated that
during November 1999, the Appellant called his father and
obtained certain signatures and some thumb impressions in
blank papers. He also stated that he was also asked to sign in
such papers stating that these were the acknowledgement of
payment of rent and his father was also paid some amount
which he had paid to a liquor vender. Ravi Prasad also stated
that his signature was obtained in the blank paper when he was
a minor. Ravi Prasad also took the stand that Exhibit-1 and 2
are manufactured documents. He stated that he knew that his
father had not sold the schedule ‘A’ property nor had he taken
any advance as a consideration. On 22.02.2011 Ravi Prasad
authenticated and confirmed his evidence in affidavit. Ravi
Prasad however could not be cross examined as he passed way
in the year 2011.
98. After the death of late Kamala Prasad the present
Respondents
substituted
him.
Respondent
No.1
examined
herself as a witness. She filed her evidence in affidavit in which
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she took a plea that the suit premises was recorded in the name
of her father-in-law’s late Ram Das Ram and late Ram Ram Phal
Ram. She took a specific plea in her evidence in affidavit to the
following effect:
“9. That in the month November, 1999 the plaintiff had come to
meet my husband and he told my husband to put some thumb
impression on blank papers and handed my husband some
amount. The plaintiff told my husband that he has come to pay
the rent and he asked by husband to give the thumb impression
as a token of rent receipt. My husband during the drunken state
gave some thumb impression on the Blank sheets. My husband
used to sign on the documents whenever he used to do any
transaction and he never used to sign in Devnagri. As such I
state that Exhibit-1 and Exhibit-2 which are false and fabricated
documents which the plaintiff took during the drunken state. I
have seen the documents i.e. Exhibit-1 (a) collectively and
exhibit-1 (b) collectively, after seeing the same I am confident
enough to state that the signature and thumb impression
appearing are not of my husband. However, assuming but not
admitting if the thumb impression and signatures are of my
husband then the same were obtained on blank papers by
means of fraudulent act of the plaintiff, when my husband was
in drunken state. When plaintiff obtained the signatures and
thumb impression, the plaintiff said that he was taking the same
in lieu of rent receipt. My husband accepted some amount in lieu
of the rent from the plaintiff and instead of using the said money
for house hold goods he used the same to clear his dues in the
liquor shop and buy liquor. I am confident enough to state that
my husband and other members of my family have not got a
single paise for the suit property. My husband had no right title
to sell/transfer the suit property as other members and legal
heirs and successors of late Ram Das Ram Ram Phal Ram,
myself and my children have claim over the suit property. The
suit property which the plaintiff wants to grab through a
fraudulent document was/is not his sole property, as admitted
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above the suit property is still recorded in the name of late Ram
Das Ram and Late Ram Phal Ram.”
xxxxxxxxxxxx
13.
That my husband was an illiterate person nor could he
read and write in English and Devnagri but he could put his
signature. I have seen a copy of Exhibit 1 and 2 and was read
over the contents and I am sure and confident that the
documents are false. I am also confident that the signature
appearing on Exhibit 1 and 2 are not of my husband nor the
signature is that of my son Late Ravi Prasad. The document are
manufactured document for the purpose of this case.
14.
That the statement that Ravi Prasad also signed on Exhibit
1 is also false as during 1999 my eldest son said Ravi Prasad
was a minor. The document given by Shri Rajeev Prasad is false
and fabricated document and same has not been written and
signed by Shri Rajeev Prasad.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
16.
That my husband and my elder son used to consume
heavy amount alcohol which was the cause of their death. I also
state that plaintiff has taken advantage of my husband being
drunk and accordingly he has taken the thumb impression on
the blank sheet for which the plaintiff is liable to prosecuted.
17.
That the fact that the suit property is still recorded in the
name of Ram Das Ram Ram Phal Ram and even assuming but
not admitting my husband has stated that the suit property is a
partitioned property this is not correct as no documents has been
furnished by the plaintiffs and my husband showing that the
suit property is the partitioned property. Assuming but not
admitting that the suit property is a partitioned property in that
event also the plaintiff cannot file the present suit by virtue of
Exhibit 1 and 2 as the property in question has not been
recorded in his name and he could not have signed Exhibit 1 and
2, if it is proved that the signatures therein are genuine signature
of my husband.”
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99. The evidence of Respondent No.1 which seeks to take a
stand contrary to the written statement filed by late Kamala
Prasad in which he had categorically admitted his ownership of
the suit property through a family partition cannot be relied
upon or accepted. However, like late Kamala Prasad, Respondent
No.1 also took the two alternative pleas of forgery and undue
advantage taken by the Appellant of late Kamala Prasad’s
drunken stupor and having Exhibit-1 executed by him. As held
earlier both these pleas were required to be proved by the
Respondents. The Appellant cross-examined the Respondent
No.1 regarding her evidence in affidavit. In cross-examination
she admitted that she had not filed any document either from
the hospital or from the police station in the Court to prove that
her husband was an excessive drunkard. She also admitted that
she had not filed any complaint either before the Court, in the
police station or before the Panchayat alleging that the Appellant
had taken thumb impression of her husband in blank papers. To
a suggestion put in cross-examination the Respondent No.1
stated that she could not say whether her husband had at any
time reported to the police, to the Court or to the Panchayat that
the Appellant had taken his thumb impressions on blank papers
by practicing fraud. She also admitted that she had not filed any
document in the Court to prove that her husband used to sign in
‘Devnagiri’. Respondent No.1 admitted that she had never seen
Exhibit-1 or 2 before. She could not say or identify the thumb
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impressions and the signatures appearing on Exhibit-1 or 2. She
could not also say or identify as to whether the said documents
bear the signature of her son and the thumb impression and
signature of her husband. She admitted that:
“It is true that because I had never seen Exhibit 1 and 2 as such
I cannot say as to whether the same are false or fabricated documents.
I therefore, cannot say whether my husband had put his thumb
impressions on the said documents. Neither me nor my husband ever
filed any complaint before the police, to the Panchayat or in the Court
stating that Exhibit 1 and 2 are false and fabricated and that the same
do not bear the thumb impressions of my husband.”
100. The Respondents also examined one Kamlesh Kumar and
filed his evidence in affidavit. He stated that he had been staying
in Singtam since 1986 and knew the family of the Defendant. He
stated that late Kamala Prasad and his son used to consume
heavy amount of alcohol. He also stated that late Kamala Prasad
used to borrow money from him and other people from Singtam
to buy alcohol. Kamlesh Kumar stated that before late Kamala
Prasad expired he used to always see him drunk and people
used to take advantage of him Kamlesh Kumar also stated that
because of his alcoholism late Kamala Prasad never participated
in the family affairs and he used to sign any document if he was
offered alcohol and the same was his son late Ravi Prasad’s
nature. In cross-examination Kamlesh Kumar admitted that he
had no evidence to prove that late Kamala Prasad used to
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consume heavy alcohol. No other evidence was produced by the
Respondents.
101. Although oral evidence was led by the Respondents to show
that Late Kamala Prasad used to consume alcohol from the
above it is evident that the Respondents have failed to prove
forgery of Exhibit-1 or the alternative plea that the Appellant had
taken undue advantage of late Kamala Prasad’s drunken stupor
and got Exhibit-1 executed by him without his free consent. The
evidence of the Appellant, Ram Prasad and Jitendra Singh with
Exhibit-1 does probabalise that Exhibit-1 was executed by late
Kamala Prasad. The learned District Judge would also come to
the conclusion that Exhibit-1 was executed by late Kamala
Prasad. None of the Appellants witness asserts that the contents
of Exhibit-1 is in the handwriting of late Kamala Prasad. There is
no evidence on record that the handwriting on Exhibit-1 is of late
Kamala Prasad. To complicate the issue further in the written
statement filed by the Appellant to the counter claim of late
Kamala Prasad as well as the Respondent No.1 he denies that
late Kamala Prasad was the owner of the suit property. On an
application filed before this Court being C.M. Appl. No.250 of
2015 by the Respondents in the present proceedings this Court
vide order dated 27.06.2016 would direct the Registry to send
the original Exhibit-1 to a handwriting expert and submit a
report. Exhibit-1 in the original (two pages) were sent for
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Forensic
Examination
to
the
Regional
Forensic
Science
Laboratory (RFSL), Sikkim Saramsa, Ranipool. An opinion dated
20.07.2016 has been placed on record where the Scientific
Officer-cum-Assistant
Chemical
Examiner,
Government
of
Sikkim, question document division, RFSL, Sikkim has opined
that interse examination of the writings therein which were
marked as Q1, Q2 and Q3 reveals consistency in handwriting
characteristics indicating that they were written by one and the
same person. It was also opined that the last three lines of
Exhibit-1 giving the options to the Appellant to take legal
proceedings on the failure of late Kamala Prasad in registering a
sale deed and further the right to the suit property was
incorporated subsequently. However, the date and time could
not be determined. It was also stated in the opinion that when
observed under stereo binocular microscope it was found that
the colour and lustre of the said writing was found to be
different, their alignments of the writings compressed (squeezed)
and smaller in size due to limited space available and that the
writings therein shows slower speed of writing then his usual
writing habit. The terminal letter of that portion of Exhibit-1
overlapped the finger impression. The Respondents would not
seek expert opinion as to whether Exhibit-1 was in the
handwriting of late Kamala Prasad or whether the signature or
the thumb impression thereon was his.
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102. This Court shall now proceed to examine the issue as to
whether Exhibit-1 is a valid document and enforceable in law.
103. As held above the evidence on record does probabalise that
Exhibit-1 was executed by late Kamala Prasad. The Appellant
asserts that Exhibit-1 is an agreement to sell by which he
became the owner of the suit property. Exhibit-1 is not a sale
deed or a title deed. The mere execution of Exhibit-1 would not
make the Appellant the owner of the suit property as he claims.
Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 states that
“sale” is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or
promised or part paid and part-promised. It also provides that
such transfer, in the case of tangible immovable property of the
value of one hundred rupees and upwards, can be made only by
a registered instrument. Admittedly Exhibit-1 is also not a
registered deed. If it is to be considered as an agreement certain
requirements are required to be fulfilled. An agreement is always
bilateral. Therefore, merely probabilising
the execution of
Exhibit-1 by late Kamala Prasad would not suffice. It was
incumbent upon the Appellant to prove that he had also agreed
to pay the consideration and abide by the terms and conditions
of
Exhibit-1.
This
Court,
while
examining
the
issue
of
maintainability of the said suit and specific performance of
Exhibit-1 has come to the conclusion that the readiness and
willingness of the Appellant was conditional and therefore
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specific performance of Exhibit-1 could not be granted in favour
of the Appellant. Exhibit-1 reflects that the consideration
amount for the sale of the suit property was ₹3,21,000/- (Rupees
three lakhs twenty one thousand) only out of which an amount
of ₹5,501/- (Rupees five thousand five hundred one) only was
acknowledged as advance received by late Kamala Prasad. Thus
an amount of ₹3,15,499/- (Rupees three lakhs fifteen thousand
four hundred ninety nine) only was required to be paid by the
Appellant as per Exhibit-1. To make Exhibit-1 bilateral the
Appellant ought to have been ready and willing to pay the
balance amount of ₹3,15,499/- (Rupees three lakhs fifteen
thousand four hundred ninety nine) only to late Kamala Prasad.
However, as held before, this was never the intention of the
Appellant and the Appellant would seek adjustment of various
amounts totaling to ₹58,501/- (Rupees fifty eight thousand five
hundred one) only not forming part of Exhibit-1 and be ready
and willing to pay only ₹2,62,499/- (Rupees two lakhs sixty two
thousand four hundred ninety nine) only to late Kamala Prasad
towards consideration value. There was not even a pleading that
the said amounts sought to be adjusted had been agreed upon
by late Kamala Prasad.
104. That apart in the first contemporaneous document relied
upon by the Appellant i.e. notice dated 23.03.2003 (Exhibit-3)
the following adjustments were sought. ₹5,501/- (Rupees five
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thousand five hundred one) only as advance. Further amount of
₹2000/- (Rupees two thousand) only alleged to have been
received by late Kamala Prasad. An amount of ₹13,000/- (Rupees
thirteen thousand) only on account consumable goods taken by
him from the Appellants shop which was to be considered as
advance amount too as per the Appellant. Besides the aforesaid
it was also asserted in the said notice that the Appellant had
incurred an amount of ₹1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh) only for
improvement
of
the
condition
of
the
wooden
house
in
furtherance of the contract. However, in the plaint some of those
amounts changed. In the plaint it was pleaded that besides the
₹5,501/- (Rupees five thousand five hundred one) only paid as
advance a further amount of ₹2000/- (Rupees two thousand)
only was taken by late Kamala Prasad however, without any
further details. It was asserted that a further amount of ₹3,203/(Rupees three thousand two hundred three) only in cash against
consideration value was also taken by late Kamala Prasad. The
Appellant now asserted that including the amount of ₹3,203/(Rupees three thousand two hundred three) only he spent
₹25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand) only on account of
transportation fare, house repairing etc. The Appellant would
also plead that late Kamala Prasad did not pay ₹25,000/(Rupees twenty five thousand) only towards license fee from
March, 2001 and also mesne profit till January, 2004 which
altogether amounted to ₹58,501/- (Rupees fifty eight thousand
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five hundred one) only which was required to be adjusted and
that the Appellant was ready and willing pay only an amount of
₹2,62,499/- (Rupees two lakhs sixty two thousand four hundred
ninety nine) only from the total consideration value payable. The
evidence of Jitendra Prasad merely states that late Kamala
Prasad again took ₹2000/- (Rupees two thousand) only on
13.03.2000 towards consideration value without specifying that
the consideration was towards advance for the agreement
entered between the Appellant and late Kamala Prasad due to
which Exhibit-1 was executed.
105. Thus it is unequivocally certain that there was in fact no
“agreement” between the Appellant and late Kamala Prasad in
terms of Exhibit-1.
Exhibit-1 even if executed by late Kamala
Prasad was not enforceable in law in the facts of the present case
because the Appellant failed to agree and abide by its terms.
Exhibit-1 may have been executed by late Kamala Prasad but the
said document was neither a sale deed nor a contract of sale.
The Appellant’s failure to assert or prove that the Appellant was
in agreement with the terms and conditions of Exhibit-1 which
admittedly was signed only by late Kamala Prasad make it
evident that the said Exhibit-1 was not an agreement to sell or
that there was any oral agreement to sell between the Appellant
and late Kamala Prasad. Mere willingness and desire to acquire
an immovable property is not enough. There must be willingness
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on the part of the Appellant to purchase the same for the
consideration on which the late Kamala Prasad is said to be
willing to sell the same for.
106. The learned District Judge would hold that a conjoint
reading of the evidence produced by the Appellant makes it
amply clear that Exhibit-1 was executed by late Kamala Prasad.
However, the learned District Judge would come to the
conclusion that Exhibit-1 was neither valid nor enforceable.
The learned District Judge would come to the conclusion that
late Kamala Prasad did not have absolute right in the said
property being a Hindu governed either by the Mitakshara or the
Dayabagha School of Hindu Law on conjectures and surmises.
107. Whether the Defendant was a Hindu governed by any
particular school of Hindu law is a question of fact to be
determined by evidence and evidence alone. On examination of
the plaint as well as the written statements it is seen that neither
the Appellant nor late Kamala Prasad as the sole Defendant had
pleaded that the sole Defendant was a Hindu governed by either
the Mitakshara School or the Dayabagha School. The affidavit in
support of the evidence of late Kamala Prasad as well as
Respondent No.1 merely states that they were Hindu by faith.
The Respondents who substituted late Kamala Prasad after his
death
as
Defendants
stepped
into
his
shoes.
Even
the
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Respondents did not so plead. In fact by specific orders of the
learned District Judge the Respondents were precluded from
taking a stand in conflict with the stand taken by late Kamala
Prasad and therefore, when late Kamala Prasad had in the
written statement categorically admitted the fact that he was the
owner of the suit property after a family partition the question of
examining the partition as well as whether the Mitakshara or the
Dayabagha Schools of Hindu Law would govern such partition
and the effect thereof on mere conjectures and surmises by the
learned District Judge was uncalled for. More so when late
Kamala Prasad, the Respondent No.1 or Kamlesh Kumar had not
even stated that late Kamala Prasad or the Respondent No.1
were Hindus.
108. The learned District Judge held that the suit filed by the
Appellant was not maintainable on presuming a defect in the
title of late Kamala Prasad, the original sole Defendant over the
suit property. While holding that late Kamala Prasad had a
defect in title to the suit property the learned District Judge
would ignore two earlier orders passed by the same Court. Order
dated 23.04.2012 would decide the objection raised by the
Appellant as well as the petition filed by the Respondent No.2
under Order 1 Rule 3 read with Section 94 and 151 Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (CPC) and hold that a legal representative of a
deceased defendant cannot take the plea in a pending suit,
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inconsistent with the plea taken by the deceased defendant in
his written statement. Holding so the learned District Judge
would direct that the Respondents shall not file any written
statement that raises a contrary view but shall continue the suit
on the same cause of action without setting up a new or
inconsistent plea. A written statement was however, filed by the
Respondents on 28.05.2012.
On 20.06.2012 the Appellant
would file his reply. On 07.08.2017 the learned District Judge
would hear the Appellant as well as the Respondents on the
admissibility of the written statement filed by the Respondents.
The learned District Judge would rely upon the order passed
earlier on 23.04.2012 and disallow certain portions of the written
statement being a new and inconsistent plea contrary to the one
taken by late Kamala Prasad and permit the filing of the written
statement after deletion of the said portions quoted below:
Paragraph 7 - “7. It is submitted that as far as the knowledge of the
answering defendant goes the suit property originally belongs to M/s
Ram Das Ram Ram Phal Ram. The defendants have no personal
knowledge of the partition and hence same is denied. The answering
defendant was married to the original defendant during 1976 and so
far the knowledge of the defendant goes the suit property is a joint
property.”,
Paragraph 14 - “14.
It is submitted that the defendants are still the
co-owner of the suit property and as such they are not required to quit
and vacate the suit property in any manner whatsoever and can ever
be treated as a trespasser. On the contrary the tenant can never
challenge the title of the land lord however defective it may be. The
statement of granting permission, license and forcible possession are
nothing but false statements and denied by the defendant.”
And entire paragraph 23 “23. That the defendant apart from the above
averment made in the Written Statement and counter claim beg to
further file her additional written statement and state that original
defendant (since deceased) and the late Ravi Kumar Prasad did not
have right title and interest over the suit property nor they had any
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salable rights and thus the suit property is throughout recorded in the
name of M/s. Ram Das Ram Ram Phal Ram.” …………………………..”
109. In effect
the
two
orders
dated
on 23.04.2012
and
07.08.2017 passed by the learned District Judge would preclude
the Respondents from taking a stand in conflict to the admission
that late Kamala Prasad had taken in his written statement that
he was in fact the owner of the suit property acquired through
family partition.
110. The order dated 23.04.2012 passed by the learned District
Judge would be passed after examining the law and the
judgments of the Supreme Court. In re: Vidyawati v. Man Mohan &
Ors.9 the Supreme Court would hold:
“3. It is seen that the petitioner's claim of right, title and interest
entirely rests on the will said to have been executed by Champawati in
favour of the first defendant and herself. It is now admitted across the
Bar that the first defendant had life interest created under the will
executed by Champawati. Therefore, the said interest is coterminous
with his demise. Whether the petitioner has independent right, title and
interest dehors the claim of the first defendant is a matter to be gone
into at a later proceeding. It is true that when the petitioner was
impleaded as a party-defendant, all rights under Order 22, Rule 4(2),
and defences available to the deceased defendant became available to
her. In addition, if the petitioner had any independent right, title or
interest in the property then she had to get herself impleaded in the
suit as a party defendant in which event she could set up her own
independent right, title and interest, to resist the claim made by the
plaintiff or challenge the decree that may be passed in the suit. This is
the view the court below has taken rightly.
(1995) 5 SCC 431
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2. It is contended for the petitioner that both the plaintiff-first
defendant and the petitioner's claims are founded on the will executed
by Champawati, where the first defendant had right and interest for
life and the petitioner had right thereafter and as such she could raise
the plea which Brijmohan Kapoor could have raised in his written
statement. The courts below were not right in refusing to permit the
petitioner to file additional written statement. In support thereof, the
petitioner placed strong reliance on the judgment of this Court in Bal
Kishan v. Om Parkash [(1986) 4 SCC 155 : AIR 1986 SC 1952] .
4. This Court in Bal Kishan v. Om Parkash [(1972) 2 SCC 461 :
(1973) 1 SCR 850] has said thus:
“The sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of Order 22 authorises the legal
representative of a deceased defendant to file an additional
written statement or statement of objections raising all pleas
which the deceased-defendant had or could have raised except
those which were personal to the deceased-defendant or
respondent.”
5. The same view was expressed in Jagdish Chander Chatterjee
v. Sri Kishan [(1972) 2 SCC 461 : (1973) 1 SCR 850] wherein this Court
said: (SCC pp. 464-65, para 10)
“… legal representative of the deceased respondent was
entitled to make any defence appropriate to his character as
legal representative of the deceased respondent. In other words,
the heirs and the legal representatives could urge all contentions
which the deceased could have urged except only those which
were personal to the deceased. Indeed this does not prevent the
legal representatives from setting up also their own independent
title, in which case there could be no objection to the court
impleading them not merely as the legal representatives of the
deceased but also in their personal capacity avoiding thereby a
separate suit for a decision on the independent title.”
6. This being the position in law, the view of the court below is
perfectly legal. It is open to the petitioner to implead herself in her
independent capacity under Order 1, Rule 10 or retain the right to file
independent suit asserting her own right. We do not find any error of
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jurisdiction or material irregularity committed in the exercise of
jurisdiction by the court below warranting our interference. The SLP is,
accordingly, dismissed.”
111. The order dated 23.04.2012 rejecting the Respondents
application under Order 1 Rule 3 read with Section 94 and 151
CPC would not be assailed by the Appellant. Even in the cross
objection filed in spite of opportunity granted to amend the
original counter claim and taken no ground challenging the said
order
dated
23.04.2012
has
been
taken
although
the
Respondents could have done so under the provisions of Section
105 CPC. The said application in any event had not even prima
facie showed that the suit property was not exclusively owned by
late Kamala Prasad.
112. Thus the learned District Judge had erred in travelling
beyond the pleadings and rendering findings based on surmises
and conjectures.
5) To what relief or reliefs, if any, is the plaintiff
entitled?
8)
To what relief or reliefs the defendant is entitled?
113. The learned District Judge would opine that neither the
Appellant nor the Respondents are entitled to any relief or the
relief prayed for although the learned District Judge had given
the option to the Appellant to take appropriate proceedings for
the money advanced by him to late Kamala Prasad and to the
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Respondents to seek eviction of the Appellant before the
appropriate Court which option in effect would amount to
granting reliefs not prayed for to the Appellant as well as the
Respondents. In re: Banarsi and Ors. v. Ram Phal10 the Supreme
Court would hold:
“ In a suit seeking specific performance of an agreement to
sell governed by the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
the court has a discretion to decree specific performance of the
agreement. The plaintiff may also claim compensation under
Section 21 or any other relief to which he may be entitled
including the refund of money or deposit paid or made by him in
case
his
claim
for
specific
performance
is
refused.
No
compensation or any other relief including the relief of refund
shall be granted by the court unless it has been specifically
claimed in the plaint by the plaintiff.”
114. Thus the impugned order to the extent it grants liberty to
initiate appropriate proceedings for the money advanced by him
to late Kamala Prasad in pursuance of Exhibit-1 against the
property left behind him is also not permissible as no specific
relief for realization of money advanced has been sought for in
the plaint.
115. In spite of the specific prayer for eviction and arrears of rent
prayed for by the Respondents the learned District Judge
declining to examine the issue on the ground that the applicable
rent law i.e. Notification No.6326-600-H&W-B dated 14.04.1949
provided for the landlord being permitted to evict the tenant on
(2003) 9 SCC 606
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due application to the appropriate Court (District Court) and also
considering the matter is required to be gone into in detail in
appropriate eviction proceedings was also not correct. As held
above the provisions of Order VIII Rule 6A CPC was wide enough
to examine the counter claim praying for eviction in terms of the
said notification as well as for arrears of rent. It was open for the
Respondents to file the counter claim which they did. The
specific issues relating to the counter claim having been framed
and evidence led it was incumbent upon the learned District
Judge to pronounce on the said issues. A suit is tried on the
issues raised by the parties. In the circumstances the learned
District Judge granting liberty to the substituted defendants to
initiate eviction proceedings if so advised was also not correct. In
re: Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Santosh Kumari11 the Supreme Court would
hold that “A Civil Court does not grant leave to file another suit. If
the law permits, the Plaintiff may file another suit but not on the
basis of observations made by a superior Court”. In view of the
aforesaid it is held that the Appellant as well as the Respondents
as substituted legal heirs of late Kamala Prasad were also not
entitled to any other reliefs too.
116. The conflicting positions taken by the Appellant as well as
the Respondents on crucial facts vital to obtain the relief prayed
for in such a nonchalant manner with scant respect for truth
(2007) 8 SCC 600
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non suits them. All points of determination stand considered and
determined. The Appeal as well as the cross-objection is decided
and dismissed.
( Bhaskar Raj Pradhan )
Judge
04.09.2018
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