Maharashtra Recognition of trade unions and prevention of unfair labour practices Act 1971: Departmental proceedings – Misconduct proved against respondent-driver of driving the vehicle rashly and negligently due to which the accident occurred in which four persons died – Disciplinary authority passed order of dismissal from service – Labour Court did not interfere with the order of dismissal by giving cogent reasons and after re-appreciating entire evidence on record including the order of acquittal passed by the criminal court – However, the Industrial Court though did not interfere with the findings recorded by disciplinary authority on misconduct proved, interfered with order of dismissal solely on the ground that punishment of dismissal was disproportionate to misconduct proved and the same was unfair labour practice as per item No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the Act of 1971 – The same was not interfered with by the High Court – On appeal, held: The findings of enquiry officer and order passed by Labour Court and Industrial Court showed that respondent-workman was driving the vehicle in such a great speed and rashly due to which the accident had occurred in which four persons died – Even while acquitting respondent-driver who was facing the trial under ss.279 and 304(a) of IPC, Criminal Court observed that prosecution had failed to prove that the incident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the respondent only and none else – Therefore, even if it is assumed that driver of the jeep was also negligent, it can be said to be a case of contributory negligence – That does not mean that the respondent-workman was not at all negligent – Hence, it did not absolve him of the misconduct – As per the cardinal principle of law an acquittal in a criminal trial has no bearing or relevance on the disciplinary proceedings as the standard of proof in both the cases are different and the proceedings operate in different fields and with different objectives – Therefore, the Industrial Court erred in giving much stress on the acquittal of the respondent by the criminal court – Applying clause No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the Act, 1971, to instant case, it cannot be said that the dismissal of the respondent was for misconduct of a minor or technical character, without having any regard to the nature of the misconduct – Even the past record of service of the respondent was not considered by the Industrial Court – As per case of the appellant, respondentworkman was in service for three years and during three years’ service tenure he was punished four times – Therefore, it cannot be said that the order of dismissal was without having any regard to the past record of the service of the respondent – Therefore, in facts and circumstances of the case, the Industrial Court wrongly invoked clause No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the Act, 1971, and wrongly interfered with the order of dismissal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The findings recorded by the enquiry officer in the departmental enquiry and the judgment and order passed by the labour court as well as the Industrial Court and even the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the criminal court show that when the respondent was driving the vehicle it met with an accident with the jeep coming from the opposite side and in the said accident four persons died. From the material on record it emerges that the impact of the accident with the jeep coming from the opposite side was such that the jeep was pushed back
25 feet. From the aforesaid facts it can be said that the respondent – workman was driving the vehicle in such a great speed and rashly due to which the accident had occurred in which four persons died. Even while acquitting the respondent-driver who was facing the trial under Sections 279 and 304(a) of IPC, Criminal Court observed that the prosecution failed to prove that the incident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the accused – respondent herein only and none else. Therefore, at the best even if it is assumed that even driver of the jeep was also negligent, it can be said to be a case of contributory negligence. That does not mean that the respondent-workman was not at all negligent. Hence, it does not absolve him of the misconduct. [Para 10.2][156-E-H; 157-A]
2.1 The Labour Court had in extenso considered the order of acquittal passed by the criminal court and did not agree with the submissions made on behalf of the respondent-workman that as he was acquitted by the criminal court he cannot be held guilty in the disciplinary proceedings. Even from the judgment and order passed by the criminal court, it appears that the criminal court acquitted the respondent based on the hostility of the witnesses; the evidence led by the interested witnesses; lacuna in examination of the investigating officer; panch for the spot panchnama of the incident, etc. Therefore, criminal court held that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary in the departmental proceedings the misconduct of driving the vehicle rashly and negligently which caused accident and due to which four persons died has been established and proved. As per the cardinal principle of law an acquittal in a criminal trial has no bearing or relevance on the disciplinary proceedings as the standard of proof in both the cases are different and the proceedings operate in different fields and with different objectives. Therefore, the Industrial Court has erred in giving much stress on the acquittal of the respondent by the criminal court. Even otherwise it is required to be noted that the Industrial Court has not interfered with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority holding charge and misconduct proved in the departmental enquiry, and has interfered with the punishment of dismissal solely on the ground that same is shockingly disproportionate and therefore can be said to be an unfair labour practice as per clause No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971. [Paras 10.3 10.4][157-B-G]
2.2 Applying clause No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971, to the present case it cannot be said that the dismissal of the respondent was for misconduct of a minor or technical character, without having any regard to the nature of the misconduct. The respondent – workman has been held to be guilty for a particular charge and particular misconduct. Even the past record of service of the respondent has not been considered by the Industrial Court. As per case of the appellant – MSRTC the respondent – workman was in service for three years and during three years’ service tenure he was punished four times. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order of dismissal was without having any regard to the past record of the service of the respondent. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Industrial Court wrongly invoked clause No.1(g) of ScheduleIV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971. [Para 10.5][158-E-H]
3. Even otherwise in the facts of the case when in the departmental enquiry, it has been specifically found that due to rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver – respondent, the accident took place in which four persons died, when the punishment of dismissal is imposed it cannot be said to be shockingly disproportionate punishment. In the departmental proceedings every aspect has been considered. Even the Industrial Court has not interfered with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer in the departmental proceedings. Therefore, in the facts and circumstance of the case, the Industrial Court committed a grave error and has exceeded in its jurisdiction while interfering with the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority, which was not interfered by the Labour Court. [Para 11][159-A-C]
4. It is also required to be noted that before the Industrial Court the respondent-workman-driver admitted that after the order of dismissal he has been gainfully employed. Therefore also the reinstatement in service with continuity of service was not warranted. Even the directions issued by the High Court directing the appellant to pay wages to the respondent-workman for the period from 01.11.2003 to 31.05.2018 also could not have been passed by the High Court in a writ petition filed by the appellant. It was not the petition filed by the workman-respondent. Therefore, even otherwise the directions issued in para 8 of the impugned judgment and order cannot be sustained as the same is beyond the scope and ambit of the controversy before the High Court. [Paras 12, 13][159-C-E]
Samar Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2011) 9 SCC 94 : [2011] 11 SCR 136; Union of India & Ors. v. Sitaram Mishra & Anr. (2019) 20 SCC 588 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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