Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Or. XXIII r.3A – Challenge to Compromise Decree by instituting a separate suit – Maintainability of – Held: Or.XXIII r.3A states that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful – A party challenging a consent decree based on compromise has to approach the same court, which recorded the compromise and institution of a separate suit challenging the consent decree is not maintainable – Submission of plaintiff that in the suit he has not specifically prayed for setting aside the Compromise decree rather prayed to declare that the Compromise Decree is not binding on him is not acceptable – A mere clever drafting would not permit the plaintiff to make the suit maintainable which otherwise is barred by law – Decree – Compromise decree. Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. A plain reading of Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC would show that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. [Para 8][1090-C]
2. The Trial Court was absolutely justified in rejecting the plaint on the ground that the suit for the reliefs sought challenging the Compromise Decree would not be maintainable. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the plaintiff that in the suit the plaintiff has not specifically prayed for setting aside the Compromise Decree and what is prayed is to declare that the Compromise Decree is not binding on him and that for the other reliefs sought, the suit would not be barred and still the suit would be maintainable is concerned, the aforesaid cannot be accepted. As held by this Court in a catena of decisions right from 1977 that a mere clever drafting would not permit the plaintiff to make the suit maintainable which otherwise would not be maintainable and/or barred by law. It has been consistently held by this Court that if clever drafting of the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage. [Paras 9, 10 , 10.1][1095-F-H; 1096-A-B]
3. Considering the reliefs of declaration of title, recovery of possession, cancellation of revocation of Gift Deed, the said reliefs can be granted only if the Compromise Decree dated 13.01.2016 passed in O.S. No.1750 of 2015 is set aside. Therefore, by asking such multiple reliefs, the plaintiff by clever drafting wants to get his suit maintainable, which otherwise would not be maintainable questioning the Compromise Decree. All the said reliefs were subject matter of earlier suits and thereafter also subject matter of O.S. No.1750 of 2015 in which the Compromise Decree has been passed. Therefore, it is rightly held by the Trial Court that the suit in the present form and for the reliefs sought would be barred under Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC and therefore the Trial Court rightly rejected the plaint in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC. The High Court has erred in setting aside the said order by entering into the merits of the validity of the Compromise Decree on the ground that the same was hit by Order XXXII Rule 7 CPC, which was not permissible at this stage of deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and the only issue which was required to be considered by the High Court was whether the suit challenging the Compromise Decree would be maintainable or not. [Para 11][1096-G-H; 1097-A-C]
R. Janakiammal v. S.K. Kumarasamy, (2021) 9 SCC 114; T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and Anr., (1977)
4 SCC 467 : [1978] 1 SCR 742; Ram Singh v. Gram Panchayat Mehal Kalan, (1986) 4 SCC 364 : [1986] 3 SCR 831 – relied on.
Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi, (1993) 1 SCC 581 : [1992]
3 Suppl. SCR 524; Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh & Ors., (2006) 5 SCC 566 : [2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 370; Horil v. Keshav, (2012) 5 SCC 525 : [2012] 3 SCR 1; R. Rajanna v. S.R. Venkataswamy & Ors., (2014) 15 SCC 471 : [2014] 14 SCR 535; Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174 : [2017] 5 SCR 294; Canara Bank v. P. Selathal and Ors., (2020) 13 SCC 143; Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasanna Singh, (2020) 16 SCC 601 : [2019] 4 SCR 1069; Ram Singh v. Gram Panchayat Mehal Kalan, (1986) 4 SCC 364 : [1986] 3 SCR 831 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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