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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
The Hon’ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon’ble Justice Supratim Bhattacharya
W.P.L.R.T. No.212 of 2025
M/s. Skyline Vanijya Pvt. Limited. &Anr.
Vs.
The State of West Bengal & Ors.
For the petitioners
:
Mr. Arindam Banerjee, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Saptarshi Datta
Mr. Shounak Mukhopadhyay
Ms. Srinjita Ghosh
Mr. Pourush Kanti Pal
Ms. Debdut Hore
For the State
:
Mr. Sk. Md. Galib
Mr. Kapil Guha
For the respondent nos. 17,
23, 43, 44, 49, 53 and 59
:
Mr. Surya Prasad Chattopadhyay
Mr. Arjun Samanta
Ms. Trishtrya Mancherji
Heard on
:
19.01.2026
Judgment on
:
19.01.2026
Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-
1. At the outset, it is made clear that since no affidavits have been invited,
the allegations made in the writ petition are deemed to have been
denied by all the respondents.
2. Affidavit of service filed today in Court be kept on record.
3. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that only
16 respondents had contested in the Tribunal, out of whom one has
been served and the endorsements in respect of the others is “refused”.
4. Learned Senior Counsel hastens to add that the said refusals are
evident not from postal service but from private service effected by the
registered clerk of an advocate of this Court, which is also reflected in
the connected affidavit of service. In view of the affidavit being before us,
we construe such service to have been effected duly.
5. Be it mentioned here that some of the private respondents are
represented through counsel at the time of hearing, as are the State
respondents.
6.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners argues that the
learned Tribunal acted without jurisdiction and de hors the law in
refusing to condone the delay of about 561 days in preferring the
original application before the Tribunal.
7. The original application was preferred against an order passed under
the West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 2001.
8. By way of explanation, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that
although the initial writ petition was filed before this Court against the
impugned order about six and a half months subsequent to the
impugned order being passed under the said Act, since there is strictly
no limitation period provided by any statute for the Constitutional
remedy of Article 226 of the Constitution, the rigours of limitation were
not applicable and as such, there was no reason for the petitioners to
come within the statutory limitation period for preferring a challenge.
9. Such writ petition, it is submitted, could only be moved before a learned
Single Judge, since despite the best efforts of the petitioners, it was not
accepted by the Central Filing Department of this Court to be placed
before a Division Bench, having not been preferred against an order
passed by the Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal.
10. Ultimately, by an order dated September 25, 2020, the writ petition
bearing WP No. 20459 (W) of 2019 was dismissed by the concerned
learned Single Judge on the ground that it was not maintainable in view
of an equally efficacious alternative remedy being available by way of a
challenge before the appropriate Tribunal.
11. Within about three months from such dismissal, in the month of
December, 2020, the original application was filed before the Tribunal
against the original order of the Thika Controller, which was
accompanied by an application for condonation of delay. The said
condonation application having been dismissed, the present writ
petition has been preferred.
12. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submits further that
sufficient explanation for the delay has already been furnished in the
condonation application before the Tribunal and the learned Tribunal
took a hyper-technical view in rejecting the same.
13. Learned counsel for the appearing private respondents controverts such
submissions and places reliance on the judgment of the learned Single
Judge dated September 25, 2020, where it was recorded, while
dismissing the writ petition of the petitioners, that despite the
adjudication in the affirmative of the question as to the Thika Controller
having jurisdiction in the proceedings from which the challenge arose in
a bunch of previous writ petitions, the present writ petitioners repeated
the same exercise by taking out the writ petition in question, bearing
WP No. 20459 (W) of 2019, which also culminated in dismissal as not
maintainable.
14. It is vociferously contended that such attempt on the part of the writ
petitioners was a deliberate effort to protract the proceedings.
15. It is argued that the intentional invocation of the writ jurisdiction, on
the specific question of jurisdiction of the Thika Controller, even after
such question was held in favour of the Thika Controller having such
jurisdiction in view of the writ petitioners having themselves submitted
to the jurisdiction of the Thika Controller, is mala fide in nature and
does not come within the ambit of the term “bona fide” as used in
Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
16. Thus, the benefit of Section 14 the Limitation Act, it is submitted,
cannot be extended to the petitioners and the Tribunal was justified in
dismissing the condonation application.
17. Learned counsel for the private respondents cites, in support of his
arguments, a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of
H. Guruswami & Ors. Vs. Krishnaiah since deceased by LRs reported
at 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54, where it was categorically observed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court that while considering the application for
condonation of delay, the Court must not start with the merits of the
main matter but owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the
explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It was observed
that it is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the
opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the Court may
bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the
delay.
18. Learned
Senior
Government
Advocate,
appealing
for
the
State
respondent, apart from relying on the judgment cited by the private
respondents, also seeks to rely on another judgment of the same
Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. That apart, learned
Senior Government Advocate cites M.P.
Steel
Corporation
Vs.
Commissioner of Central Excise reported at (2015) 7 SCC 58 for
highlighting the proposition that the period prior to the institution or
the initiation of any abortive proceeding cannot be excluded in
calculating limitation for the simple reason that Section 14 does not
enable a litigant to get a benefit beyond what is contemplated by the
Section - that is to put the litigant in the same position as if the abortive
proceeding had never taken place.
19. Learned Senior Government Advocate also places reliance on the
illustration in that regard given in paragraph No. 49 of the said
judgment, where it was found that in a case where limitation period for
the original proceeding is six months and the plaintiff / applicant files
such a proceeding on the ninetieth day i.e. after three months are over,
and the said proceeding turns out to be abortive after it has gone
through a chequered career in the Appellate Court, so long as the fresh
proceeding is filed within the remaining three months’ period, Section
14 will apply to exclude the entire time taken starting from the ninetyfirst day till the final appeal is ultimately dismissed.
20. Learned Senior Government Advocate specifically places the relevant
portions of the impugned judgment of the Tribunal to reiterate that the
learned Tribunal took into consideration all the facets of the matter. It is
further argued that the delay of the initial period of six and a half
months prior to filing of the writ petition has not been explained at all.
Thus, it is contended that the present writ petition ought to be
dismissed.
21. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, this Court finds that the
learned Tribunal proceeded primarily on the premise, while dismissing
the condonation application of the writ petitioners, that the conduct of
the writ petitioners in filing the said application was not bona fide
within the contemplation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
22. While so observing, the learned Tribunal held that a half-hearted
attempt had been made on behalf of the petitioners to explain the delay
and the factual background as placed by the petitioners appeared to be
based on half-truth, which was taken to be a “whole lie”. Also, it was
observed that the delay caused was intentional, as jurisdiction of the
Hon’ble High Court “was approached by the petitioners by filing a writ
petition to seeka judicial review under the active guidance of an alleged
expert in the field of Thika Tenancy laws while it was evident that the
petitioners of the M.A. No. 02 of 2021 have sought to fix a period of
limitation according to their choice and convenience”.
23. However, there is a subtle distinction between a half-truth and a full
truth which does not satisfy the
perception/conscience of the
Court/Tribunal.In the present case, there is no instance of suppression
of any material fact by the writ petitioners in their condonation
application before the Tribunal. The writ petitioners, even if held guilty
of
omission,
such
omission
was
restrict
to
non-furnishing
of
explanation for the period of six and a half months prior to the first
filing of the first writ petition and not of any suppression.
24. From the arguments of the writ petitioners, it transpires that the writ
petitioners placed specific reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this
Court in the matter of Shahi Encleves Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The State of West
Bengal & Ors.reportedat2016 (4) CHN (Cal) 190, for the proposition
that an action questioning the wrongful assumption of jurisdiction by
the Thika Controller is not barred before the Writ Court.
25. One of the premises of the challenge to the Thika Controller’s order in
the writ petition was jurisdiction.
26. As such, it was arguable, in the least, as to whether the writ petition
was maintainable in view of the challenge on the ground of jurisdiction
at the point of time when the writ petition bearing WP 20459 (W) of
2019 was filed. Thus, in scientific terms, the possibility of the writ
petition being maintainable was fifty per cent from a quantum
perspective, which was crystallized into cent per cent reality upon the
observer, i.e. the learned Single Judge, deciding the writ petition,
coming to the definite conclusion that the writ petition was not
maintainable and that a challenge lay before the Tribunal.
27. Hence, there was no fault on the part of the petitioners in so far as the
maintainability of the writ petition was concerned, so as to attribute
malafides to the very filing of the writ petition itself. The cause of action
for filing the original application was ripened only upon the writ petition
attaining finality upon the learned Single Judge observing in the final
analysis that it was not maintainable, on the ground of the previous
adjudication of a bunch of prior writ petitions.
28. The question which now remains to be considered is whether the nonfurnishing of any specific explanation for the six and half month period
prior to the filing of the writ petition is germane.
29. It is well-settled that there is no statutory time limit for filing a writ
petition. Different Courts, including the Apex Court of the country, have
held that awrit petition has to be filed within a “reasonable period”,
which is subject again to the perception of the specific Court
adjudicating the same. In the present case, no such point was raised,
came up for adjudication or was decided by the learned Single Judge
while taking up the writ petition itself and as such, it cannot be said
that the said delay in filing the writ petition can be made a ground in a
subsequent condonation application.
30. Since the chosen remedy of the writ petitioners was Article 226 of the
Constitution of India at the juncture of filing of the writ petition (the
maintainability
of
which
was
decided
only
subsequently
while
dismissing the same), the statutory limitation period prescribed for
preferring a challenge before the Tribunal cannot be superimposed on
the said period. The Court has to proceed from the perspective of a writ
petition in analyzing the six and half month delay in preferring the writ
petition. In view of the above discussion, thus, it cannot be said that on
the date of filing of the writ petition, any specific statutory limitation
period was flouted, since the writ jurisdiction was specifically invoked
by the writ petitioners.
31. Only upon the writ petition having been finally dismissed as not
maintainable did the cause of action of the writ petitioners ripen and
crystallize for the purpose of filing an original application before the
Tribunal. The period thereafter has been well-explained and is further
justified due to the Pandemic restrictions prevalent during the same.
32. Thus, we find that sufficient explanation was given for the delay in
making the original application on the part of the writ petitioners and
the learned Tribunal acted in an illegal manner in rejecting the said
condonation application.
33. Insofar as the ratio laid down in M.P. Steel Corporation (supra) is
concerned, we, with utmost respect, agree with the same and do not
extend the benefit of Section 14 beyond the period during which the
writ petition was subsisting, having discussed the rest of the period in
our above observations within the contemplation of Section 5, and not
Section 14, of the Limitation Act.
34. Regarding applicability of the principle laid down in Guruswami
(supra), in view of our specific finding that there was no dearth of bona
fides as such or attribution of malafides which can be pinpointed on the
writ petitioners, the principle laid down therein is not attracted as well.
35. In such view of the matter, WPLRT 212 of 2025 is allowed on contest,
thereby setting aside the impugned judgment dated November 3, 2025,
passed by the Fourth Bench, West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy
Tribunal in M.A. No. 02 of 2021 [in connection with O.A. No.2083 of
2020 (LRTT)] and allowing the condonation application filed by the writ
petitioners before the Tribunal, bearing M.A. No. 02 of 2021.
36. The learned Tribunal shall now take up O.A. No.2083 of 2020 (LRTT)
and the other connected pending applications in connection therewith
for adjudication on merits in accordance with law. It is further clarified
that the merits of the said O.A. as well as the connected applications
have not been entered into by this Court.
37. There will be no order as to costs.
38. All parties shall act on the basis of the server copy of this order, duly
downloaded from the official website of this Court.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
I agree.
(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)
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