Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003 – s.3 – Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 – Validity of repealing Act – Power of the legislature to repeal an Act – Presidential assent for repeal statute, if required – KCCA Act designed to bring privately operated contract carriages under State control in order to serve the public interest and to implement the Directive Principles of State Policy – However, over the ensuing decades, urbanization intensified, public transport demand grew, and it became increasingly evident that the restrictive regime established by the KCCA Act was contributing to an artificial scarcity of public transport services, particularly in rural and semi-urban areas – In response, the Legislature exercised its plenary power by enacting the 2003 Act which repealed the KCCA Act – Constitutional validity of repealing Act:
Held: s.3 of the 2003 Act which repeals the KCCA Act, is constitutional, and State Legislature rightly exercised its power to repeal the Act – Power to repeal a law is coextensive with the power to enact it – Repeal was not an arbitrary act of legislative whim but was backed by a clear statement of objects and reasons that identified the deficiencies in the existing regulatory framework and the necessity to liberalize the transport sector – This Court’s decisions affirming the constitutional validity of an Act, do not bind the Legislature from modifying or repealing a statute when subsequent developments warrant a change in policy – It cannot be said that repeal should have required fresh presidential assent – Repeal statute does not recreate the legal framework anew but rather extinguishes the earlier Act’s operative provisions – Repeal statute is not subject to the same procedural requirements as an original enactment when it comes to the need for fresh assent, provided that the repeal falls within the legislative competence of the State – 2003 Repeal Act is rooted in the practical realities of modern transport policy – Repeal of the KCCA Act was thus a deliberate policy decision aimed at fostering a more dynamic and responsive transport framework – Legislature may, subject to constitutional limitations, repeal any law it has enacted – Repeal does not alter or contradict the judicial interpretation of the 1976 Act; rather, it reflects a conscious legislative choice to adapt to new economic and social conditions – Rationale underlying the 2003 Repeal Act is sound and consistent with the principles of legislative power. [Paras 10, 11, 13-18]
Motor Vehicles Act 1988 – ss.68(3)(b), 96 – Karnataka Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 – rr.55, 56 – Delegation of power to grant permit – Under s.68(5) of the MV Act, rw r.56 of the 1989 Rules, State Transport Authority-STA and Regional Transport Authorities-RTA, if can lawfully delegate the power to grant contract carriage permits to the Secretary or such power to remain with the multi-member authorities due to its quasijudicial character: Held: State Transport Authority possesses the power to delegate its functions u/s.68(5) of the MV Act read with r.56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules – Secretary of the STA is empowered to grant non-stage carriage permits (including contract carriage, special, tourist, and temporary permits) in accordance with s.68(5) and r. 56(1) (d), subject to the limitations and conditions prescribed therein – 1988 Act unambiguously confers upon the transport authorities, the power to delegate its functions provided that rules are framed u/s.96 – Even if it is accepted that the grant of permits has a quasijudicial element, it is an established principle of administrative law that quasi-judicial functions may be delegated if the enabling statute expressly provides for such delegation – s.68(5) read with r. 56(1)
(d) makes it clear that the Legislature intended for the transport authority to delegate certain routine permit functions – Exclusion of stage carriage permits from this delegation does not imply that all permit functions are inherently non-delegable – STA is entrusted with a wide range of responsibilities under the Motor Vehicles Act, and its workload necessitates delegation to ensure timely service delivery – Secretary, being a high-ranking officer with substantial expertise in transport administration, is well equipped to handle routine permit applications – Practical impact of not allowing delegation would be to overload the transport authority with routine functions, potentially causing undue delays and inefficiencies – Power of the State Transport Authority to delegate the issuance of contract carriage, special, tourist, and temporary permits to its Secretary is fully supported by the statutory provisions of s.68(5) and r.56(1)(d) – Delegation is a rational and necessary administrative measure that facilitates prompt and efficient processing of permit applications without undermining the oversight function of the STA – Power to delegate, as provided by law, remains intact, and any decision to the contrary is unsustainable in light of both legislative intent and practical necessity – High Court’s reasoning on the non-delegability of permit-granting power is flawed – Impugned orders of the High Court that denied the delegation power set aside. [Paras 20-30]
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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