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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
Reserved on
12.12.2025
Pronounced on 06.02.2026
Uploaded on
09.02.2026
Whether the operative part or
full judgment is pronounced:
Full
RFA No. 29/2023
M/s Ram Kour Behari Lal and Co.
Through:
…Petitioner(s)/Appellant(s)
Mr. Jagpaul Singh, Adv.
v/s
M/s Hakam Chand and Co. and
others
Through:
…. Respondent(s)
Mr. Rohan Nanda, Adv. for No. 3
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJNESH OSWAL, JUDGE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAHUL BHARTI, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
PER OSWAL J
1.
This appeal under section 13(2) of the Commercial
Courts Act, 2015, by the appellants is directed against
an order dated 22.05.2023 passed by the Court of
learned Additional District Judge (Commercial Court),
Jammu (hereinafter to be referred as the 'Trial Court').
2.
By virtue of impugned order, the Trial Court has
dismissed the appellant‟s application for condonation
of delay attending an application seeking restoration of
a civil suit titled „M/s Ram Kour Behari Lal and
Company vs. M/s Hakam Chand and Company and
others‟, which stood dismissed for non-prosecution on
28.05.2011.
application
Consequently,
for
restoration of
the
accompanying
the
suit
was also
dismissed leaving the appellant non-suited without
adjudication of civil suit on merits which otherwise was
posted for final arguments and judgment.
3.
The appellant challenges the impugned order on the
grounds that the suit, which was diligently pursued for
sixteen years, was at the stage of final arguments when
it was dismissed for non-prosecution on 28.05.2011. It
is contended that the Trial Court acted in a casual and
mechanical manner, failing to appreciate that the
default arose from shuffling changes in the engaged
counsel's chamber, specifically following the departure
of Mr. Raman Sharma, Advocate, from the chambers of
Mr. A.V.
Gupta, Senior Advocate. The appellant
submits that since the trial of the suit was handled by
RFA No. 29/2023
Advocate Raman Sharma leading to stage of final
arguments being underway, the Trial Court ought to
have exercised its discretion under Explanation to
Order 17 Rule 2 of the J&K Code of Civil Procedure
1920 (in short „CPC‟) so as to dispose of the suit on
merits rather than dismissing it in default.
4.
Mr. Jagpaul Singh, learned counsel for the appellant
vehemently
argues
that
in
the
application
for
condonation of delay, it stood stated that the delay in
filing the restoration application was occasioned by
shifting of Mr. Raman Sharma, Advocate, who was all
along handling the matter as de facto counsel of the
appellant and who had transitioned from his Senior‟s
Chamber of senior Advocate Mr.A.V.Gupta, to establish
his independent practice coinciding when the suit was
listed for final arguments. Consequently, this shift
resulted in the appellant‟s suit suffering lack of due
attention and handling at the end of junior association
of senior Advocate Mr.A.V.Gupta & Association who
otherwise was the appellant‟s counsel. that led to suit‟s
dismissal for non-prosecution. He has further argued
that the learned Trial Court was not correct in holding
RFA No. 29/2023
that the applications have been filed by a counsel along
with his affidavit, who is not even remotely connected
with the appellant‟s suit because even though the
Power of Attorney(Vakalatnama) of said counsel filing
the applications on behalf of the appellant was not on
record,
but
after
he
filed
the
application
for
condonation of delay for restoration of the suit, said
counsel had filed an application for serving the
defendants/non-applicants through Publication mode
which application was duly signed by the appellant. It
is further submitted that the Trial Court, instead of
being hyper technical, ought to have adopted a liberal
and pragmatic approach in considering the application
for condonation of delay, as it is a settled principle of
law that a lis, that too original one, should ideally be
adjudicated on its merits rather than dismissed on
technical cause or default, particularly in the instant
case where the suit had reached the stage of final
arguments leaving nothing at the end of the appellant
as a suitor to be anything from its end. He has placed
reliance upon the judgments of the Apex Court in Mool
Chandra v Union of India and another, (2025) 1 SCC
RFA No. 29/2023
625 and Raghunath Devi v Administrator, Srinagar
Municipality, AIR 1962 J&K 83.
5.
On the contrary, Mr. Rohan Nanda, learned counsel for
respondent No. 3, has submitted that the application
for condonation of delay along with application for
restoration of the suit was filed by the counsel without
any formal authorization from the appellant‟s end for
which
learned Trial
Court
rightly
dismissed
the
application for condonation of delay for which there is
no perversity in the view point of the learned Trial
Court
that
the
appellant
has
not
demonstrated
sufficient cause for condoning the delay in seeking
restoration of its suit.
6.
Heard and perused the record including the record of
the Trial Court.
7.
The civil suit, in reference, for recovery of an amount of
Rs. 5.58 lac came to be originally instituted by the
appellant before this Court, which was later assigned
to the court of learned Additional District Judge,
Jammu for disposal vide an order dated 26.02.1996.
8.
After the closure of evidence of the appellant, the
evidence of the respondents was led and closed on
RFA No. 29/2023
30.03.2010. The suit file was then posted for final
arguments on 05.05.2010. Thereafter, on 19.04.2011
the matter was posted for 03.05.2011, when none
appeared on behalf of the appellant to be adjourned for
03.05.2011 when none had appeared on behalf of both
parties. On 27.05.2011, none appeared on behalf of the
appellant,
while
the
counsel
on
behalf
of
the
respondent No 2 was present. Thereafter, the suit was
posted for 28.05.2011 when taking note of the absence
of the appellant as well as his counsel, the suit was
dismissed for non-prosecution.
9.
Thereafter,
a
time
barred
restoration
application
accompanied by an application for condonation of
delay came to be presented for restoration of the suit
on behalf of the appellant through and by Mr. Aditya
Gupta, Advocate on 19.12.2012 which was dismissed
for non-prosecution on 28.05.2011. The application
was supported by an affidavit sworn by advocate Mr.
Aditya Gupta.
10.
The
appellant
sought
condonation
of
delay
by
explaining that Advocate Sh. Raman Sharma, an
associate of M/s A.V Gupta & Associates had become
RFA No. 29/2023
independent and moved from the Chambers of Mr.
A.V.Gupta,
Senior
Advocate,
to
pursue
his
own
practice while the suit was fixed for final hearing. This
transition caused an oversight in file management in
the
chambers
of
M/s
A.V.Gupta
&
Associates.
Meanwhile, the proprietor of the appellant‟s own ill
health hindered ability to follow up on the proceedings.
11.
Contrarily, the respondents submitted before the Trial
Court that an engaged counsel's internal chamber
arrangements and brief handling do not excuse the
appellant‟s negligence. The respondents maintained
that the appellant failed to show due diligence by
causing appearance on several dates of hearing,
leaving the Trial Court with no alternative but to
dismiss the suit in default. It is further contended that
it is the primary duty of the litigant, not just the
lawyer, to monitor the progress of the litigation.
12.
The endorsement on the application for restoration of
suit indicates a procedural lapse in the Trial Court's
Registry. Although the Trial Court directed a report
from the office regarding the filing, no such report was
ever prepared and provided. Consequently, notices
RFA No. 29/2023
were issued on 19.12.2012 without the Court or the
Court
Clerk
noticing
the
absence
of
the
Vakalatnama/Power of Attorney. The primary purpose
of an office report solicited is to catch such clerical
deficiencies. Had the Trial Court‟s office performed its
duty with diligence, the counsel would have been
prompted to cure the defect immediately. The issuance
of notice by the Trial Court, despite the incomplete
filing, constitutes a shared error.
13.
Under the principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit,
a litigant must not suffer due to an oversight by the
Court‟s
administration.
Therefore,
the
procedural
irregularity should not be a ground for dismissing the
appellant's plea. In the case of Jang Singh vs. Brij Lal
& Ors., 1966 AIR(SC) 1631, the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court of India has encapsulated the essence of maxim
“actus curiae neminem gravabit” in para-6 which is
reproduced as under:The facts of the case almost speak for
themselves. A search was made for the
application on which the order of the
Court directing a deposit of Rs. 4,950
was said to be passed. That application
RFA No. 29/2023
remained untracedthough the District
Judge adjourned the case more than
once. It is, however, quite clear that the
challan was prepared under the Court‟s
direction
and
the duplicate challan
prepared by the Court as well as the
one presented to the Bank have been
produced in this case and they show
the lesser amount. This challan is
admittedly prepared by the Execution
Clerk and it is also an admitted fact
that Jang Singh is an illiterate person.
The Execution Clerk has deposed to the
procedure which is usually followed
and he has pointed out that first there is
a report by the Ahlmed about the
amount in deposit and then an order is
made by the Court on the application
before the challan is prepared. It is,
therefore, quite clear that if there was
an error the Court and its officers
largely contributed to it. It is no doubt
true that a litigant must be vigilant and
take care but where a litigant goes to
Court and asks for the assistance of the
Court so that his obligations under a
decree might be fulfilled by him strictly,
it is incumbent on the Court, if it does
not leave the litigant to his own devices,
RFA No. 29/2023
to ensure that the correct information is
furnished. If the Court in supplying the
information
makes
a
mistake
the
responsibility of the litigant, though it
does not altogether cease, is at least
shared by the Court. If the litigant acts
on the faith of that information the
Courts cannot hold him responsible for
a mistake which it itself caused. There
is no higher principle for the guidance of
the Court than the one that no act of
Courts should harm a litigant and it is
the bounden duty of Courts to see that if
a person is harmed by a mistake of the
Court he should be restored to the
position he would have occupied but for
that mistake. This is aptly summed up
in the maxim: “Actus curiae neminem
gravabit”.
14.
The record contains an application signed personally
by the appellant, accompanied by an affidavit dated
08.11.2014, wherein the appellant affirms that his
counsel was acting on his express instructions. This is
clear manifestation of the appellant‟s intent which
suffered to cure any procedural defect regarding
Vakalatnama. In the peculiar facts and circumstances
of the case, the non-filing of a Vakalatnama/ Power of
RFA No. 29/2023
Attorney can be held to be a technical irregularity and
not a fatal flaw to the competency of an application. We
disagree with the respondents' contention that the
restoration plea was 'incompetent'. The appellant's
personal
involvement
and
subsequent
filings
sufficiently validate the authority of his counsel.
15.
It now falls upon this Court to examine the legality of
the order dated 22.05.2023, whereby the learned Trial
Court rejected the appellant‟s plea for condonation of
delay.
16.
The primary ground for condoning the 560-days delay
is the confusion resulting from Mr. Raman Sharma,
Advocate, transitioning to an independent practice
away from the chambers of Mr. A.V. Gupta, Senior
Advocate. While the application does not explicitly state
the date when the appellant gained knowledge of the
dismissal, this omission should not overshadow the
procedural history of the case.
17.
The suit had been pending for final arguments for over
a
year,
with
the
recording
of
evidence
already
concluded. Under Explanation to Order 17 Rule 2 of
the CPC, when entire or substantial portion of evidence
RFA No. 29/2023
in suit has been recorded, the Trial Court possesses
the discretion to proceed for final adjudication as if the
parties to suit were present.
18.
Given that the appellant had fulfilled his obligation by
concluding
his
evidence,
the
responsibility
for
addressing final arguments rested with his counsel.
The
counsel‟s
absence,
caused
by
the
reasons
aforementioned, led to a dismissal that contradicts the
spirit of the CPC. Ordinarily, a suit poised and
positioned at the stage of final arguments should be
adjudicated on its merits rather than being dismissed
for non-prosecution.
19.
When a suit in particular pending for final arguments
is dismissed for non-prosecution, an adjudication
friendly approach is required while considering an
application be it for condonation the delay in filing the
application for restoration or for restoration of such
suit unless and until the purported cause put up for
seeking
condonation
of
delay
and
consequent
restoration is nothing but to honeyfuggle the court.
20.
We are of the considered view that every endeavour
should be made by the courts to decide on merits the
RFA No. 29/2023
lis which has matured for adjudication. So far as
controversy at hand is concerned, the appellant had
been diligently contesting the suit for 16 years before
the learned Trial Court. The cause projected by the
appellant for condoning the delay can neither be
termed imaginary nor fanciful warranting its rejection.
21.
Denying the appellant of his right to get the suit
adjudicated on merits, particularly when he was
vigorously pursuing the same for 16 long years, just
because of delay, would be unjust and iniquitous.
22.
In Mool Chandra’s case (supra), the Hon‟ble Apex
Court has observed that “If negligence can be attributed
to the appellant, then necessarily the delay which has
not been condoned by the Tribunal and affirmed by the
High Court deserves to be accepted. However, if no fault
can be laid at the doors of the appellant and cause
shown is sufficient then we are of the considered view
that both the Tribunal and the High Court were in error
in not adopting a liberal approach or justice-oriented
approach to condone the delay”.
23.
For all what has been said, analyzed and discussed
hereinabove, we are of the considered view that the
RFA No. 29/2023
learned trial court was not correct in its approach in
rejecting the application filed for condoning the delay.
24.
Accordingly, the instant appeal is allowed. Order dated
22.05.2023 passed by the learned Trial Court is set
aside. Application for condonation of delay is allowed.
Delay in filing the application for restoration of the suit
is condoned. Resultantly, the restoration application
filed on identical grounds is also allowed. The suit is
restored
to
remanded
its
to
original
the
number.
learned
Trial
The
matter
Court
for
is
its
adjudication on merits in accordance with law. Parties
through their respective counsel shall appear before
the learned Trial Court on 02.03.2026.
25.
Original record be sent back forthwith.
(RAHUL BHARTI)
JUDGE
(RAJNESH OSWAL)
JUDGE
JAMMU:
06.02.2026
Rakesh PS
Whether the judgment is speaking: Yes
Whether the judgment is reportable: Yes
KARAM CHAND
2026.02.09 13:58
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
RFA No. 29/2023
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