The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
28. 06.2022, subject to payment by the Plaintiff of the applicable escalated license fee and additional EMD/Security Deposit; d. Set aside E Auction issued under Catalogue No. EA-JAT-PKG-2607 (Lot No. PARKINGJAT-JAT-PCCV-24-26-1) scheduled for
17. 08.2026 and Permanent Prohibitory Injunction restraining the Defendants their officers, servants and agents, from finalising, confirming, acting upon or giving effect to the said E-Auction, or any other fresh auction/allotment in respect of the Commercial/Comprehensive Vehicle Parking Contract at Railway Station Jammu Tawi, or from handing over, allotting or creating any third-party right, title or interest e. Pass such other and further order(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem just, fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice. 8) The above-mentioned reliefs were sought on the ground that, after having emerged as the successful bidder, the appellant was allotted a commercial vehicle parking contract at Railway Station, Jammu, Tawi, with the contract start date as 1st September, 2023, and the end date as 31st August 2026. It was stated that as per Clause 3 of the e-auction, the period of five years contemplated under Clause 3(a) of the Standard SBD dated 28th June 2022 was reduced to three years extendable up to five years on additional payment, with enhancement of 10% of the licence fee in the fourth and fifth years over the previous year's fee. 9) It was pleaded by the appellant that, due to the civil suit titled “Taxi Operator Union & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.”, the parking site could be handed over to the appellant only on 1st Ap…
5. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that there is "a prima facie case" in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that noninterference by the Court would result in "irreparable injury" to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that "the balance of convenience" must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discret…
Full Judgment Text
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The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND
LADAKH AT JAMMU
(THROUGH VIRTUAL MODE)
Reserved on:
01.09.2026
Pronounced on: 08.09.2026
Uploaded on:
08.09.2026
Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced:
Full
RFA No.50/2026
M/S PRATHAM TRADERS
Through: -
... APPELLANT(S)
Mr. Pranav Kohli, Sr. Advocate, with
Mr. Farhan Mirza, Advocate.
Vs.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
…RESPONDENT(S)
Through: -
CORAM:
Mr. Vishal Sharma, DSGI, with
Mr. Eishan Dadichi, CGC.
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJNESH OSWAL, JUDGE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M. A. CHOWDHARY, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
Oswal ‘J’:
1)
This appeal is directed against the order dated
17.08.2026, passed by the Court of learned Additional
District Judge (Commercial Court), Jammu (for short, “the
Trial Court”), whereby the application for grant of interim
relief preferred by the appellant in the suit titled “M/S
Pratham Traders vs. Union of India and others” has been
dismissed.
2)
The appellant has assailed the order dated 17th August
2026 on the following grounds:
RFA No.50/2026
(I)
That, admittedly, the site was not handed over to the
appellant for 213 days solely on account of failure
attributable
to
the
respondents
and
the
respondents, in their written statement, have
admitted the said fact and have further admitted
that the contract period was of three years but
despite that, the learned Trial Court has dismissed
the application for grant of interim relief, to which
the appellant was entitled to in view of the categoric
admissions made by the respondents.
(II)
That the learned Trial Court has failed to give effect
to the admission made by the respondents, as
recorded in paragraph 4 of the impugned order, that
the appellant's claim for “force majeure relief” is
under consideration before the competent authority,
therefore, publication of a fresh e-auction notice for
the very same site during the pendency of the
appellant's claim before the competent authority is
prejudicial
to
the
appellant's
case
pending
consideration before the competent authority.
(III) That having expressly held in paragraphs 15, 17 and
18 of the impugned order that the contract is not
determinable and is specifically enforceable, the
learned Commercial Court has fallen in a palpable
RFA No.50/2026
error of law in denying interim protection to preserve
the very subject matter of the enforceable right.
(IV) The finding of the learned Commercial Court that the
appellant's
rights
stood
extinguished
by
acquiescence is perverse and contrary to the record,
as the appellant, on the third working day after
taking possession, addressed letter dated 3rd April
2024, thereby formally recording the pendency of the
earlier suit and the delay in handing over the site to
the appellant. According to the appellant, silence
during the continuance of a subsisting commercial
relationship cannot amount to waiver of a valuable
commercial right.
(V)
That, in the ordinary course of the proceedings, once
the impact of 213 days' deprivation began to be felt
upon annual returns and the subsequent events of
force majeure intervened, then only the cause for
extension arose.
(VI) That the finding of the learned Commercial Court
that no irreparable injury would be caused to the
appellant because the appellant is free to participate
in the fresh tender, is unsustainable both in law and
on facts.
RFA No.50/2026
(VII) That the observation made in paragraph 20 of the
impugned order that force majeure events would
entitle the appellant only to compensation and not
to extension proceeds on a misreading of the Special
Conditions of Contract. According to the appellant,
the Board's letter dated 24.02.2026 directs the caseto-case consideration, having regard to the actual
force majeure events and the period of loss of
earnings. The measure of relief is, therefore,
expressly correlated to the period of loss of earnings
and extension of the contract by the period of loss is
a natural and permissible consequence of such
consideration.
3)
Mr. Pranav Kohli, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the appellant, has submitted that once there is an admission
on the part of the respondents that the site was handed over
to the appellant after an inordinate delay of 213 days, the
appellant was entitled to extension of the contract period and
further the respondents could not have issued a fresh tender
for the very same site which was the subject matter of the
earlier contract, particularly when the claim of the appellant
on account of the losses suffered by him was pending
consideration before the competent authority.
4)
Per contra, Mr. Vishal Sharma, learned DSGI, has
submitted that the appellant was allotted the parking
RFA No.50/2026
contract at Railway Station, Jammu, Tawi, for a period of
three years commencing from 1st September, 2023, and
ending on 31st August 2026, and, as such, no vested right
exists in favour of the appellant to seek extension of the
contract, particularly when the date of expiry of the contract,
i.e. 31st August 2026, is admitted by the appellant. Learned
DSGI has vehemently argued that the claim of the appellant
with regard to the loss suffered by the appellant is under
consideration before the competent authority, but it doesn’t
mean that the appellant is entitled to extension of the
contract.
5)
Heard and perused the record.
6)
Before addressing the rival contentions of the parties,
it is pertinent to observe that the grant or refusal of interim
relief by a trial court is a matter of judicial discretion.
Appellate court’s interference with such an exercise of
discretion is warranted only where it is demonstrated that
the discretion was exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, or in
disregard of settled principles of law. The mere possibility of
a plausible alternative view does not constitute a valid
ground to set aside an interlocutory order, provided the view
taken by the court below is reasonably sustainable on the
record. In “Shruti Manav Sharma v. Sunaina Singh”, 2026
INSC 843, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:
RFA No.50/2026
“36. An order on an application for temporary
injunction is a discretionary one, and an
appellate court does not ordinarily substitute
its own discretion for that of the court of first
instance, save where the discretion has been
exercised
arbitrarily,
capriciously
or
perversely, or in ignorance of the settled
principles governing the grant or refusal of
such relief. The principle laid down in Wander
Ltd. & Anr. (supra) which has been approved by
subsequent decisions of this Court, has been
guiding the appellate courts in the country for
decades while exercising the appellate
jurisdiction considering the correctness of the
discretion and jurisdiction for grant or refusal
of interlocutory injunctions. The order of the
learned Single Judge, resting as it does on seven
specific findings addressing the nature of the
original plaintiff’s interest under the Will, the
doubt surrounding its finality, the plea of undue
influence, and the alter-ego character of the
defendant entities, cannot be said to be arbitrary,
capricious or perverse, nor to have been passed
in ignorance of settled principle. It is, on the
contrary, an order squarely anchored in the three
conditions that govern the grant of interim
injunction. The Division Bench’s substitution of
its own appreciation of the Will, of the parties’
conduct, and of the applicability of statutory
provisions bearing on the final merits, for the
exercise of discretion by the learned Single Judge,
was not warranted on the standard it had itself
correctly recited, and constitutes precisely the
kind of interference that Wander Ltd. & Anr.
(supra) forbids.”
7)
Briefly stated, the facts necessary for disposal of the
present appeal are that the appellant filed the suit against
the respondents seeking the following reliefs:
a. Declare that the Plaintiff is entitled to an
extension of the contract period of Contract
Agreement No. LC-23-4859014080JAT-CV
dated 21.07.2023 by 213 days, on account
of the delay in handing over possession of
the parking site occasioned by third-party
litigation and consequent inaction, and the
contract shall be deemed to remain valid
and subsisting up to and including
RFA No.50/2026
31.03.2027 (or such other date as this
Hon'ble Court may determine);
b. Declare that the Plaintiff is entitled to relief
under the Force Majeure clause of the
Standard Conditions of Contract for the
period during which its business was
adversely affected on account of the floods
and Operation Sindoro/Sindoor-related
disruptions from on or about 26.08.2025
onward, and direct the Defendants to
compute and grant such relief/extension in
accordance with the Railway Board's letter
dated 24.02.2026;
c. Declare that the Plaintiff is entitled to seek,
and direct the Defendants to consider and
grant, extension of the contract period from
3 (three) years to 5 (five) years in terms of
Para 3(a) &3(b) of the Railway Board's letter
No. 2022/TG-IV/18/Misc/E-Auction dated
28.06.2022, subject to payment by the
Plaintiff of the applicable escalated license
fee and additional EMD/Security Deposit;
d. Set aside E Auction issued under Catalogue
No. EA-JAT-PKG-2607 (Lot No. PARKINGJAT-JAT-PCCV-24-26-1) scheduled for
17.08.2026 and Permanent Prohibitory
Injunction restraining the Defendants their
officers, servants and agents, from
finalising, confirming, acting upon or giving
effect to the said E-Auction, or any other
fresh auction/allotment in respect of the
Commercial/Comprehensive
Vehicle
Parking Contract at Railway Station Jammu
Tawi, or from handing over, allotting or
creating any third-party right, title or interest
e. Pass such other and further order(s) as this
Hon'ble Court may deem just, fit and proper
in the facts and circumstances of the case,
in the interest of justice.
8)
The above-mentioned reliefs were sought on the ground
that, after having emerged as the successful bidder, the
appellant was allotted a commercial vehicle parking contract
at Railway Station, Jammu, Tawi, with the contract start
date as 1st September, 2023, and the end date as 31st August
RFA No.50/2026
2026. It was stated that as per Clause 3 of the e-auction, the
period of five years contemplated under Clause 3(a) of the
Standard SBD dated 28th June 2022 was reduced to three
years extendable up to five years on additional payment,
with enhancement of 10% of the licence fee in the fourth and
fifth years over the previous year's fee.
9)
It was pleaded by the appellant that, due to the civil
suit titled “Taxi Operator Union & Ors. Vs. Union of India &
Ors.”, the parking site could be handed over to the appellant
only on 1st April, 2024, i.e. after a delay of 213 days, which
otherwise was required to be handed over to the appellant
on 1st September 2023. It was further urged by the appellant
that, after the commencement of operations in terms of the
contract, Jammu Division witnessed severe and successive
disruptions on account of natural calamities and operation
Sindoor and as a direct and immediate consequence thereof,
number of train services to and from Jammu Railway Station
were either cancelled or suspended, resulting in substantial
reduction of passenger footfall at the railway station and,
consequently, decrease in the number of commercial
vehicles. Respondent No. 5 brought the matter to the notice
of Northern Railway Headquarters vide its letter dated 5th
December 2025, in continuation of an earlier letter dated
12th September 2025, seeking guidelines for grant of relief in
licence fee to NFR, catering and other lease/ commercial
RFA No.50/2026
contractors, including parking contractors, whose business
were adversely affected due to the reduced traffic of trains.
The Railway Board, vide its communication dated 24th
February 2026, addressed to the Principal Chief Commercial
Manager,
Northern
Railway,
in
response
representation, categorically confirmed
to
the
that the force
majeure clause existing in the Standard Conditions of
Contract provides for relief in such eventualities and directed
that an administrative decision regarding grant of relief may
be taken on a case-to-case basis, keeping in view the actual
cause being force majeure, the conditions of the contract for
seeking such relief and the actual period of loss of earnings.
10)
The appellant urged that his case was covered within
the four corners of the aforesaid force majeure clause and
the
Railway's
own
contemporaneous
acknowledgment
thereof regarding the delay of 213 days in handing over
possession of the site to the appellant and the subsequent
floods/operation Sindoor resulting into reduced footfall. The
appellant claims to have made numerous representations to
the respondents but, instead of deciding the same,
respondent No. 5 published a fresh e-auction notice dated
1st August 2026, inviting fresh bids for allotment of
comprehensive vehicle parking contract at Railway Station
Jammu Tawi for a period of three years in respect of the
RFA No.50/2026
same site, subject matter of the earlier contract awarded to
the appellant.
11)
The appellant, along with the suit, had also filed an
application
for
grant
of
interim
for
restraining
the
respondents from proceeding with the impugned e-auction
and from creating any third-party interest in respect of the
subject site during the pendency of the suit.
12)
The respondents filed their written statement, wherein,
besides raising preliminary objections, they stated that the
contract was allotted to the appellant for three years only but
the site could not be handed over to the appellant due to
pendency of the suit filed by Taxi Operators and the site was
ultimately handed over to the appellant after a period of 213
days, however, the licence fee for the said period has not
been recovered from the appellant. It is further asserted by
the respondents that the licence fee has been recovered from
the appellant for the period of actual period of contract, i.e.
from 1st April 2024 to 31st August 2026 and the advance
licence fee of Rs.25,25,000/- has already been adjusted
against the subsequent outstanding licence fee payments.
Further the earnest money deposited by the appellant would
be refunded after completion of the contract, subject to
fulfilment of the contractual obligations and completion of
the requisite formalities. It is further pleaded by the
RFA No.50/2026
respondents that grant of relief on account of disruption of
business is to be considered by the competent authority and
the representation of the appellant for grant of compensation
on account of disruption of works due to floods and
Operation Sindoor is under consideration before the
competent
authority.
It
is
further
communications/representations
stated
that
the
submitted
by
the
appellant had been duly replied to by the respondents. It is
also averred that the e-auction of commercial parking at
Jammu Tawi Railway Station is scheduled to be conducted
on 17.08.2026 through the IREPS module and the said eauction is open and the appellant is free to participate
therein.
13)
The learned Trial Court, after hearing the parties, in
terms of order dated 17th August 2026, dismissed the
application for grant of interim relief filed by the appellant.
14)
The first contention raised by the appellant is that, on
account of failure of the respondents to hand over
possession of the parking site for a period of 213 days, the
appellant was entitled to extension of the contract for a
corresponding period of 213 days.
15)
It is the positive stand of the respondents that they
have not charged any licence fee in terms of the contract for
the above mentioned period. The appellant has not been able
RFA No.50/2026
to dispute the said averment made by the respondents in
their written statement. Further, as per the own admission
of
the
appellant,
the
appellant
submitted
its
first
representation only on 4th June 2025, i.e. for more than a
year, the appellant did not raise any plea regarding delayed
handing
over
of
the
site.
Even
after
filing
of
the
representation till the issuance of fresh e-NIT, the appellant
remained silent and, in fact, by its conduct, acquiesced in
the delay caused in handing over the site to it. Appellant in
terms of e-auction was allotted the abovementioned contract
only for three years, and while reducing the period of
contract the communication dated 28th June 2022 of the
Railway Board has been taken note of, and as such the
learned trial court is right in returning finding that contract
agreement nowhere provides for extension of the contract
beyond the period of three years.
16)
The conduct of a litigant is also required to be
considered while considering an application for grant of
emergent relief. In the present case, after handing over the
site to the appellant, the suit came to be preferred by the
appellant after two years and four months when the contract
was going to expire on 31st August 2026. Therefore, in our
view, the appellant was not entitled to the relief for extension
of the contract by 213 days, by way of interim relief.
RFA No.50/2026
17)
Next it was contended by the appellant that the
representation of the appellant for indemnification of the loss
suffered on account of force majeure events, i.e. floods and
Operation Sindoor, was pending before the competent
authority and, while the same was pending, the respondents
could not have floated a fresh tender.
18)
It is admitted by the appellant that the contract end
date was 31st August 2026. The respondents, in paragraph
11 of their written statement, have stated that the
representation for grant of compensation on account of
disruption of works due to floods and Operation Sindoor is
under consideration. The respondents have nowhere stated
that the extension of contract was also under active
consideration of the competent authority.
19)
Be that as it may, the loss suffered by the appellant on
account of force majeure events, by itself, cannot entitle the
appellant to the relief of extension of contract. Otherwise
also, the appellant has not been able to demonstrate any
specific clause in the contract which provides for extension
of the contract on account of force majeure events. The loss,
if any, suffered by the appellant on account of force majeure
events or on account of delayed handing over of the parking
site, can be quantified in monetary terms and it cannot be
said that the appellant would suffer irreparable loss in the
RFA No.50/2026
event the interim relief sought by the appellant is denied.
Where
a
harm
is
capable
of
complete
monetary
compensation, the essential element of 'irreparable injury' is
not satisfied. In “Dalpat Kumar and another Vs. Prahlad
Singh and others, AIR 1993 SUPREME COURT 276, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held as under:
5. Therefore, the burden is on the
plaintiff by evidence aliunde by affidavit
or otherwise that there is "a prima facie
case" in his favour which needs
adjudication at the trial. The existence of
the prima facie right and infraction of the
enjoyment of his property or the right is a
condition for the grant of temporary
injunction. Prima facie case is not to be
confused with prima facie title which has
to be established, on evidence at the
trial. Only prima facie case is a
substantial question raised, bona fide,
which needs investigation and a
decision on merits. Satisfaction that
there is a prima facie case by itself is
not sufficient to grant injunction. The
Court further has to satisfy that noninterference by the Court would result
in "irreparable injury" to the party
seeking relief and that there is no
other remedy available to the party
except one to grant injunction and he
needs
protection
from
the
consequences of apprehended injury
or dispossession. Irreparable injury,
however, does not mean that there
must be no physical possibility of
repairing the injury, but means only
that the injury must be a material one,
namely one that cannot be adequately
compensated by way of damages. The
third condition also is that "the balance
of convenience" must be in favour of
granting injunction. The Court while
granting or refusing to grant injunction
should
exercise
sound
judicial
discretion to find the amount of
RFA No.50/2026
substantial mischief or injury which is
likely to be caused to the parties, if the
injunction is refused and compare it with
that it is likely to be caused to the other
side if the injunction is granted. If on
weighing competing possibilities or
probabilities of likelihood of injury and if
the Court considers that pending the
suit, the subject-matter should be
maintained in status quo, an injunction
would be issued. Thus the Court has to
exercise its sound judicial discretion in
granting or refusing the relief of ad
interim injunction pending the suit.”
20)
We have examined the order passed by the learned Trial
Court and find that the discretion exercised by the learned
Trial Court cannot be termed as perverse or contrary to the
settled principles of law so as to necessitate interference by
this Court.
21)
In view of the above, we do not find any reason to show
indulgence so to interfere with the order dated 17th August
2026 passed by the learned Trial Court. The appeal lacks
merit and is dismissed accordingly along with connected
CM(s).
(M. A. Chowdhary)
Judge
(Rajnesh Oswal)
Judge
Srinagar,
08.09.2026
“Bhat Altaf-Secretary”
Whether the JUDGMENT is reportable:
RFA No.50/2026
NO
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