M/s Natesan Agencies (Plantations) vs State Rep. by the Secretary to Government Environment and Forests Department

25 years) was of no effect – Appellant had acquired no right under the said second lease and least any right against the State – Therefore, appellant had no right to claim damages – Further, appellant was not dispossessed and there was nothing on record to suggest that appellant was prevented by the State from going inside the forest and collecting usufructs – Thus, there was no basis for the appellant to maintain an action for damages.

Limitation Act, 1963 – s.14 – Applicability of – Appellantpartnership firm had taken land on lease for purpose of cultivation of commercial crops – A notification dated 06.03.1976 was issued vide which land in question was acquired for sanctuary – The appellant and the Mutt attempted to get the land in question excluded from the sanctuary but were unsuccessful – Thereafter, instead of awarding compensation, the collector on 19.11.1993 excluded the land in question from the sanctuary – Aggrieved, appellant filed writ petition before the High Court, which was allowed by the Single Judge – However, Division Bench of High Court dismissed the writ petition while leaving it open for the Mutt and the appellant to approach the appropriate forum to claim damages – Division Bench also held that it was open for appellant to seek exclusion of the period during which they were prosecuting the matter in the High Court – Appellant filed civil suit for recovery of damages, which was decided in its favour by the Single Judge of the High Court, however, Division Bench reversed the decree and dismissed the suit – On appeal, held: It is settled that for applicability of s.14 of the limitation Act and exclusion of time spent in earlier proceeding, the matter-in-issue in both the earlier and the later proceeding must be the same – In the present case, the appellant in the earlier proceeding sought exclusion of the land from sanctuary and that State ought to take the land and pay compensation – Whereas, the claim in the present suit was founded on the ground that the plaintiff had suffered loss due to the proceedings under Wild life (Protection) Act, 1972 and then, due to exclusion of the subject land from acquisition – The relief claimed in the present suit and matter-in-issue cannot be said to be same as was in issue in the earlier proceeding – Therefore, s.14 of the Limitation Act not applicable in the present case.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD : Claim for damages by the appellant-whether sustainable?

1. It is beyond the pale of doubt that in the scheme of the Wildlife Protection Act 1972, issuance of a notification under Section 18 thereof has the peculiar and striking effect, of arresting the accrual of any right in the land comprised within the limits of the area specified in such notification except by way of testamentary or intestate succession (vide Section 20 ibid.). Even if the appellant was given the land in question on lease for a period of 5 years from 01.07.1972, that period came to an end on 30.06.1977. On this date of completion of the term of the lease, indisputably, the notification under Section 18(1), which was issued on 06.03.1976, was in operation and it had been the specific assertion of the appellant that the subject land was included in the said notification. That being the position, there was absolutely no occasion for the appellant acquiring any further right in the land in question after expiry of the term of his lease on 30.06.1977. For this reason alone, this Court clearly of the view that the so called second lease deed, said to have been executed in favour of the appellant on 20.03.1978 was of no effect. In other words, the notification under Section 18(1) having been issued on 06.03.1976, no right in the land in question could have been acquired except by succession and hence, acquiring of any right by the appellant in the subject land, said to be covered by the said notification dated 06.03.1976, by way of a lease, was absolutely out of question. [Para 16] [543-B; 544-A-C]

2. The entire substratum of the case of the appellant is knocked to the ground once it is found that the appellant had acquired no right under the said second lease dated 20.03.1978 and least any right against the State. Noteworthy it is that in all the previous litigations, initially seeking exclusion of land in question from the sanctuary; then seeking compensation for its TO GOVT. ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS DEPT.

inclusion; and then questioning its exclusion, the Mutt had been an active participant. In fact, the last petition seeking to question the exclusion was filed jointly by the Mutt and the appellant. However, the Mutt has not joined the claim for damages in this suit. The appellant had no right whatsoever to claim damages with reference to the alleged cause of action based on the order of exclusion dated 19.11.1993 for the reason that the alleged second lease was of no effect and the appellant had acquired no right thereunder. In other words that if at all the exclusion order dated 19.11.1993 furnished any right to maintain an action against the State, only and only the Mutt could have maintained such an action but not the appellant. The suit filed by the appellant is liable to be dismissed on this count alone. [Para 16.1] [544-D-G]

3. The Division Bench has rightly observed in the impugned judgment that there is nothing on record to establish that the original owner and the plaintiff were prevented from going inside the forest and collecting the usufructs. In a comprehension of the facts on record and the law applicable, it cannot be said that the plaintiff-appellant was prevented from exercising its lawful rights in any unlawful manner by the State. Hence, there appears no basis for the appellant to maintain an action for damages. [Para 17.2] [545-F-G]

Limitation

4. Section 14 is one such provision in the Limitation Act that provides for exclusion of the time spent in prosecuting one civil proceeding bona fide in a Court not having jurisdiction, while computing limitation in any suit where the matter in issue is same as that of the earlier proceeding. [Para 21.4] [548-C]

5. In the present case, except the fact that the earlier writ petition in challenge to the exclusion order dated 19.11.1993 was civil proceeding and the plaintiff might have been prosecuting with due diligence, none of the other requirements of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are satisfied. The basic requirement, that the matter in issue in the earlier and the later proceeding ought to be the same; and both the proceedings, earlier and later, ought to relate to the same cause of action and for the same relief, is totally missing. Rather, the matter in issue in the earlier proceeding could well be contradistinguished from the matter in issue in the present suit. In the said earlier proceeding, the plaintiff-appellant joined the Mutt to assert that the respondentState was not entitled to exclude the land in question from sanctuary; and that the State ought to take the land and ought to pay compensation as proposed by some of its officers. On the other hand, the claim in the present suit is founded on the ground that the plaintiff has suffered loss due to the proceedings under the Act of 1972 and then, due to exclusion of the subject land from acquisition. The relief claimed in the present suit and matter in issue herein cannot be said to be the same as had been in issue in the earlier proceeding i.e., the said writ petition against the exclusion order dated 19.11.1993. Apart from the fact that the earlier proceeding i.e., the said writ petition was for a different relief for quashing the exclusion order dated 19.11.1993, it is also pertinent that the said writ petition was dismissed on merit and not for want of jurisdiction. Applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is totally ruled out in this case. [Para 21.5] [551-D-H; 552-A]

Thiru John v. Returning Officer & Ors. (1977) 3 SCC

540 : [1977] 3 SCR 538 ; Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar (2003) 8 SCC 673 : [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 802 ; Standard Chartered Bank v. Andhra Bank Financial Services Ltd. & Ors. (2006) 6 SCC 94 : [2006] 2 Suppl. SCR 1 ; Union of India v. Hari Krishan Khosla (Dead) by LRs. (1993) Supp (2) SCC 149 : [1992] 1 Suppl. SCR 620 ; Kasturi Lal v. State of U.P. AIR 1965 SC 1039 : [1965] SCR 375 ; N. Nagendra Rao & Co. v. State of A.P. (1994) 6 SCC 205 : [1994] 3 Suppl. SCR

144 ; Union of India v. Sancheti Food Products Ltd. (2015) 15 SCC 447 ; Rameshwar Lal v. Municipal

Council, Tonk & Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 100 : [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 227 ; Union of India v. Shring Construction Co. (P) Ltd. (2006) 8 SCC 18 : [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR

273 ; State of A.P. v. Challa Ramkrishna Reddy & Ors. (2000) 5 SCC 712 : [2000] 3 SCR 644 – referred to. TO GOVT. ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS DEPT.

Yeshwant Deorao v. Walchand Ramchand AIR 1951

SC 16 : [1950] SCR 852 ; Madhavrao Narayanarao

Patwardhan v. Ramkrishna Govind Bhanu and Ors. AIR 1958 SC 767 : [1959] SCR 564 ; Zafar Khan and Ors. v. Board of Revenue, U.P. and Ors. 1984 (Supp) SCC

505 : [1985] SCR 287 – relied on.

Kashinath Shankarappa v. The New Akot Cotton

Ginning and Pressing Co. Ltd. AIR 1951 Nagpur 255 – approved.