M/s N. N. Global Mercantile Private Limited vs M/s Indo Unique Flame Ltd. & Ors.

11 and 16 – Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – ss. 3, 33 & 35 – Contract Act, 1872 – ss. 2(h), 10 – Appointment of Arbitrators by The Chief Justice of India Scheme, 1996 – Arbitration Agreement in an unregistered instrument, which is not duly stamped, if valid and enforceable – Whether the statutory bar contained in s.35 of the Stamp Act, 1899 applicable to instruments chargeable to stamp duty under s.3 read with the Schedule to the Act, would also render the arbitration agreement contained in such an instrument, which is not chargeable to payment of stamp duty, as being non-existent, unenforceable, or invalid, pending payment of stamp duty on the substantive contract/instrument – Held [per K. M. Joseph, J. (for himself and for Aniruddha Bose, J.)] : An instrument, which is exigible to stamp duty, may contain an Arbitration Clause and which is not stamped, cannot be said to be a contract, which is enforceable in law within the meaning of s.2(h) of the Contract Act and is not enforceable under s.2(g) of the Contract Act – An unstamped instrument, when it is required to be stamped, being not a contract and not enforceable in law, cannot, therefore, exist in law – The true intention behind the insertion of s.11(6A) in the Act was to confine the Court, acting under s.11, to examine and ascertain about the existence of an Arbitration Agreement – The Scheme permits the Court, under s.11 of the Act, acting on the basis of the original agreement or on a certified copy –The certified copy must, however, clearly indicate the stamp duty paid – If it does not do so, the Court should not act on such a certified copy – If the original of the instrument is produced and it is unstamped, the Court, acting under s.11, is dutybound to act under s.33 of the Stamp Act – When it does so, the other provisions, which, in the case of the payment of the duty and penalty would culminate in the certificate under s.42(2) of the Stamp Act, would also apply – When such a stage arises, the Court will be free to process the Application as per law – An Arbitration Agreement, within the meaning of s.7 of the Act, which attracts stamp duty and which is not stamped or insufficiently stamped, cannot be acted upon, in view of s.35 of the Stamp Act, unless following impounding and payment of the requisite duty, necessary certificate is provided under s.42 of the Stamp Act – The provisions of s.33 and the bar under s.35 of the Stamp Act, applicable to instruments chargeable to stamp duty under s.3 read with the Schedule to the Stamp Act, would render the Arbitration Agreement contained in such instrument as being non-existent in law unless the instrument is validated under the Stamp Act – Held (per C. T. Ravikumar, J.) (concurring): Being unstamped or insufficiently stamped, the agreement would not be available to be ‘admitted in evidence’ and ‘to be acted upon’, till it is validated following the procedures prescribed under the provisions of the Stamp Act and till then, it would not exist ‘in law’ – When the original document carrying the arbitration clause is produced and if it is found that it is unstamped or insufficiently stamped, the Court acting under s.11 is duty bound to act u/s.33 of the Indian Stamp Act – Held (per Ajay Rastogi, J.) (dissenting): The existence of a copy/certified copy of an arbitration agreement whether unstamped/insufficiently stamped at the prereferral stage is an enforceable document for purposes of appointment of an Arbitrator under s.11(6A) of the Act, 1996 where the judicial intervention shall be minimal confined only to the prima facie examination of “existence of an arbitration agreement” alone keeping in view the object of 2015 amendment and the courts must strictly adhere to the time schedule for appointment of Arbitrator prescribed under s.11(13) of the Act, 1996 – All the preliminary /debatable issues including insufficiently stamped/unduly stamped or validity of the arbitration agreement etc. are referrable to the Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal under s.16 of the Act, 1996 which, by virtue of the Doctrine of Kompetenz - Kompetenz has the power to do so – Held (per Hrishikesh Roy, J.) (dissenting): The examination of stamping and impounding need not be done at the threshold by a Court, at the pre-reference stage under s.11 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 – Non-stamping /insufficient stamping of the substantive contract/instrument would not render the arbitration agreement nonexistent in law and unenforceable /void, for the purpose of referring a matter for arbitration – An arbitration agreement should not be rendered void if it is suffering stamp deficiency which is a curable defect.

Answering the reference, the Court

HELD:

per K. M. JOSEPH, J. (for himself and ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.)

1.1. An agreement, which is unenforceable on account of a substantive law, which would include the Stamp Act, would not be a contract, applying Section 2(h) of the Contract Act. It is only if an agreement is enforceable, that it would become a contract. It is only a ‘contract’, which would be the ‘Arbitration Agreement’, which is contemplated in Section 11(6A) of the Act. It may not be apposite to merely describe an unstamped Arbitration Agreement as a ‘curable defect’. As long it remains an unstamped instrument, it cannot be taken notice of for any purpose, as contemplated in Section 35 of the Stamp Act. It remains unenforceable. Section

17 declares the time at which an instrument, executed in India, must be stamped. The said provision contemplates that stamping of such an instrument must take place before or at the time of the execution of document. No Public Officer, nor Court nor Arbitrator, can permit any person to ask them to act upon it or receive it as evidence. In law, it is bereft of life. It is ‘not enforceable in law’. In the said sense, it also cannot exist in law. It would be void. The voidness is conflated to unenforceability receives fortification from Section 2(j) of the Contract Act which renders a contract which ceases to be enforceable void. What Section 11(6A) contemplates is a contract and it is not an agreement which cannot be treated as a contract. This is despite the use of the words ‘arbitration agreement’ in Section 11(6A). In other words, contract must conform to Section 7 of the Act. It must also, needless to say, fulfil the requirements of the Contract Act. [Paras 70 & 71][351-B-F]

1.2. An agreement which is unstamped or insufficiently stamped is not enforceable, as long as it remains in the said condition. Such an instrument would be void as being not enforceable [See Section 2(g) of the Contract Act]. It would not in the said sense exist in law. It can be “validated” by only the process contemplated in Section 33 and other provisions of the Stamp Act. This necessarily means that the court would not view it as enforceable, and therefore, existing in law. In the sense explained, it would not be found as ‘not void’ and therefore ‘not invalid’. Thus, in the context of the Act, the Stamp Act and the Contract Act, the opinion of this Court in SMS Tea Estates, in this regard as reiterated in Garware and approved in Vidya Drolia is correct. [Para 74][353-E-G]

2. An instrument, which is exigible to stamp duty, may contain an Arbitration Clause and which is not stamped, cannot be said to be a contract, which is enforceable in law within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Contract Act and is not enforceable under Section 2(g) of the Contract Act. An unstamped instrument, when it is required to be stamped, being not a contract and not enforceable in law, cannot, therefore, exist in law. Therefore, paragraphs-22 and 29 of Garware are approved. To this extent, this Court also approves of Vidya Drolia, insofar as the reasoning in paragraphs-22 and 29 of Garware is approved. [Para 110][374E-F]

3. The Scheme permits the Court, under Section 11 of the Act, acting on the basis of the original agreement or on a certified copy. The certified copy must, however, clearly indicate the stamp duty paid as held in SMS Tea Estates. If it does not do so, the Court should not act on such a certified copy. [Para 112][375-A]

4. The provisions of Sections 33 and the bar under Section

35 of the Stamp Act, applicable to instruments chargeable to stamp duty under Section 3 read with the Schedule to the Stamp Act, would render the Arbitration Agreement contained in such instrument as being non-existent in law unless the instrument is validated under the Stamp Act. [Para 115][375-D-E]

N.N. Global Mercantile Private Limited v. Indo Unique Flame Limited and others (2021) 4 SCC 379 – overruled.

SMS Tea Estates Private Limited v. Chandmari Tea Company Private Limited (2011) 14 SCC 66 : [2011] 9 SCR 382; Garware Wall Ropes Limited v. Coastal Marine Constructions & Engineering Limited (2019) 9 SCC 209 : [2019] 5 SCR 579; Vidya Drolia and others v. Durga Trading Corporation (2021) 2 SCC 1;

Dharmaratnakara Rai Bahadur Arcot Narainswamy Mudaliar Chattram v. Bhaskar Raju & Bros. (2020) 4 SCC 612 : [2020] 3 SCR 798; - affirmed.

SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. and another (2005)

8 SCC 618 : [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 688 – followed. Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Dilip Construction Company (1969) 1 SCC 597 : [1969] 3 SCR 736; United India Insurance Company Limited v. Hyundai Engineering and Construction Company Limited (2018) 17 SCC 607 : [2018] 12 SCR 1085 and Govind Rubber Limited Louids Dreyfus Commodities Asia Private Limited (2015) 13 SCC 477 : [2014] 12 SCR 488 – relied on.

Duro Felguera, S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Limited (2017)

9 SCC 729 : [2017] 10 SCR 285; Mayavati Trading Private Limited v. Pradyuat Deb Burman (2019) 8 SCC

714 : [2019] 1 SCR 123; Lachmi Narayan Agarwalla and Others v. Braja Mohan Singh (SINCE DECEASED)

51 Indian Appeals 332; Joyman Bewa v. Easin Sarkar AIR 1926 Calcutta 877; Great Offshore Ltd. v. Iranian Offshore Engg. & Construction Co. (2008) 14 SCC 240 : [2008] 12 SCR 515; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2003) 3 SCC 57 : [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 387; Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd. and another (2005) 7 SCC 234 : [2005]

2 Suppl. SCR 699; National Insurance Company Limited v. Boghara Polyfab Private Limited (2009) 1 SCC 267 : [2008] 13 SCR 638; Ganga Retreat & Towers Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (2003) 12 SCC 91 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1134; Oriental Insurance Company v. Narbheram Power and Steel Private Limited (2018) 6 SCC 534 : [2018] 4 SCR 826; Dr. Chiranji Lal (D) by Lrs. v. Hari Das (D) by Lrs. (2005) 10 SCC 746 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 359; Hariom Agrawal v. Prakash Chand Malviya (2007) 8 SCC 514 : [2007] 10 SCR 772; M.R. Engineers & Contractors Private Limited v. Som Datt Builders Limited (2009) 7 SCC 696 : [2009] 10 SCR

373 and Jupudi Kesava Rao v. Pulavarthi Venkata Subbarao and others (1971) 1 SCC 545 : [1971] 3 SCR

590 – referred to.

Dip Narain Singh v. Nageshar Prasad and another AIR 1930 ALL 1 (FB) / 1929 SCC OnLine ALL 1; Imambi v. Khaja Hussain alias Khajasab AIR 1988 Karnataka 51; Gulzari Lal Marwari v. Ram Gopal ILR 1937 1 Calcutta 257; Purna Chandra Chakrabarty and others v. Kalipada Roy and another AIR 1942 Calcutta 386; United Insurance Company of Pakistan Limited v. Hafiz Muhammad Siddique PLD 1978 SC 279 and Gautam Landscapes Pvt. Limited v. Shailesh S. Shah (2019) SCC OnLine Bom 563 – referred to.

Heyman v. Darwins Limited (1942) AC 356 HL – referred to.

per C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J. (concurring)

1. Receiving the very ‘instrument’ which is carrying the arbitration agreement or containing an arbitration clause from the party who asserts its existence is essentially an act of receiving the evidence, in that limited sense. Therefore, how can the Court, which is having authority and competence to receive evidence, for the purpose of invoking the power under Section 11 (6), abstain from proceeding further in terms of Section 33 if it appears to it that such instrument produced before it, though required to be stamped, is unstamped or is not duly stamped. In terms of the mandate under Sub-section (2) of Section 33, for that purpose, the Section 11 Judge who received evidence shall ‘examine’ the instrument so chargeable and so produced in order to ascertain whether it is stamped with a stamp of the value and description required by the law in force in India, when such instrument was executed or first executed. Proviso (b), would only permit a Judge of the High Court for delegation of the duty of examining and impounding any such instrument to such officer as the Court may appoint in that behalf. Thus, it only gives discretion to a Judge of the High Court to delegate the duty of examining and impounding any such instrument in the manner mentioned under the said proviso if he chooses not to proceed in the manner provided for impounding the instrument in accordance with the relevant provision, by himself. When that be the provision under Section

33 (1) and (2), a conjoint reading of which obviously makes it mandatory for the Court exercising the power under Section 11

(6) to proceed in terms of the mandate under Section 33 when the circumstances legally invites its invocation. A contra view, would render Sub-section (2) of Section 33 and proviso (b) redundant and would defeat the very soul of the provisions as relates their application in respect of application filed under Section 11(6) of the Act. [Para 5][379-C-H]

2. What is permissible to be produced as secondary evidence i.e., other than the original document in terms of Section 2(a) of the scheme framed under Section 11(10) of the Act, is nothing but certified copy. But such a certified copy, would not be available to be proceeded with under Section 33 of the Stamp Act if it is unstamped or insufficiently stamped. In such circumstances, such certified copy shall not be acted upon. [Para 18][384-C-D]

SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. and another (2005)

8 SCC 618 : [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 688 – followed. Mt. Bittan Bibi & Anr. v. Kuntu Lal & Anr. ILR [1952] 2 All 984 – referred to.

per AJAY RASTOGI, J. (dissenting)

1. The limited scope of the Court under Section 11(6A) at the pre-referral stage is to examine whether the arbitration agreement, prima facie, exists as referred to under Section 7 of the Act, 1996, which includes only the determination of the following factors : (i) Whether the arbitration agreement is in writing? (ii) Whether the core contractual ingredients qua the arbitration agreement are fulfilled? (iii) On rare occasions, on a serious note of objection, if any, it may examine whether the subject matter of dispute is arbitrable? [Para 92][420-E-F]

2. (i) The existence of a copy/certified copy of an arbitration agreement whether unstamped/ 60 insufficiently stamped at the pre-referral stage is an enforceable document for the purposes of appointment of an Arbitrator under Section 11(6A) of the Act, 1996 where the judicial intervention shall be minimal confined only to the prima facie examination of “existence of an arbitration agreement” alone keeping in view the object of 2015 amendment and the courts must strictly adhere to the time schedule for the appointment of Arbitrator prescribed under Section 11(13) of the Act, 1996. (ii) All the preliminary/debatable issues including insufficiently stamped/unduly stamped or validity of the arbitration agreement etc. are referrable to the Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 of the Act, 1996 which, by virtue of the Doctrine of Kompetenz - Kompetenz has the power to do so. (iii) The decision in SMS Tea Estates Private Limited stands overruled. Paras 22 and 29 of Garware Wall Ropes Limited which are approved in paras 146 and 147 in Vidya Drolia and Others are overruled to that extent. [Para 97][422-H; 423-A-D]

N.N. Global Mercantile Private Limited v. Indo Unique Flame Limited and others (2021) 4 SCC 379 – affirmed.

Vidya Drolia and others v. Durga Trading Corporation (2021) 2 SCC 1; SMS Tea Estates Private Limited v. Chandmari Tea Company Private Limited (2011) 14 SCC 66 : [2011] 9 SCR 382 and Garware Wall Ropes Limited v. Coastal Marine Constructions & Engineering Limited (2019) 9 SCC 209 : [2019] 5 SCR 579 – overruled.

Jupudi Kesava Rao v. Pulavarthi Venkata Subbarao and others (1971) 1 SCC 545 : [1971] 3 SCR 590 and Hariom Agrawal v. Prakash Chand Malviya (2007) 8 SCC 514 : [2007] 10 SCR 772 - relied on.

Naina Thakkar v. Annapurna Builders (2013) 14 SCC 354; Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others v P. Laxmi Devi(Smt.) (2008) 4 SCC 720 : [2008] 3 SCR 330; Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v OOO Insurance Company Chubb (2020) UK SC 38; Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd. and another (2005) 7 SCC 234 : [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 699; Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Dilip Construction Company (1969) 1 SCC 597 : [1969] 3 SCR 736; Vytla Sitanna v. Marivada Viranna AIR 1934 PC 105; Guru Nanak Foundation v. Rattan Singh and Sons (1981) 4 SCC 634 : [1982] 1 SCR 842; Food Corporation of India v. Joginderpal Mohinderpal and Another (1989) 2 SCC 347 : [1989]

1 SCR 880; SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. and another (2005) 8 SCC 618 : [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 688; Duro Felguera, S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Limited (2017)

9 SCC 729 : [2017] 10 SCR 285; Mayavati Trading Private Limited v. Pradyuat Deb Burman (2019) 8 SCC

714 : [2019] 1 SCR 123; Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Limited v. Northern Coal Field Limited (2020) 2 SCC 455; World Sport Group (Mauritius) Limited v. MSM Satellite (Singapore) Pte. Limited (2014)

11 SCC 639 : [2014] 1 SCR 796; Pravin Electricals Private Limited v. Galaxy Infra and Engineering Private Limited (2021) 5 SCC 671; United India Insurance Company Limited v. Hyundai Engineering and Construction Company Limited (2018) 17 SCC 607 : [2018] 12 SCR 1085 – referred to.

per HRISHIKESH ROY, J. (dissenting)

1. On a harmonious reading of the inconsistencies in the provisions of the three different Acts, it is found that the general law must yield to the special law in the sense, that an arbitration agreement cannot be rendered void on insufficient stamping by a general law, especially when none of the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996 which is a special Act provide for stamping. The requirement for the “formal” validity of an arbitration agreement under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would take precedence, considering the special nature of the Act and the principle of minimal judicial intervention. Applying the rule of construction that in cases of conflict between a specific law and a general law, the specific law prevails and the general law like the Contract Act, 1872 applies only to such cases which are not covered by the special law; therefore, Section2(e), 2(g) , 2(h) of the Contract Act, 1872 cannot override Section 7 contained in the special law i.e. the Arbitration Act, 1996 when it comes to formal validity. Moreover, when the words of the statute in Section

11 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 do not mention “validity” or even “inoperable and incapable of being performed” as mentioned in Section 45 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 or “prima facie no valid arbitration agreement” in Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, it must be understood that the general words in a different statute such as the Contract Act, 1872 cannot override the specific words used in the special law. That is to say, that an arbitration agreement cannot be rendered “void” on insufficient stamping by a Section

11 judge when the scope of examination is only limited to the “existence” of the arbitration agreement and not “validity”. [Paras

79.1 & 79.2][473-B-F]

2. It is essential to interpret the special law in a way that gives effect to its specific provisions, while also ensuring that it is consistent with the general law to the extent possible. Impounding at the stage of Section 11 would stall arbitral proceedings right at the outset because of the statutory bar under Section 35 of the Stamp Act, 1899. One way to harmonise Section 35 of Stamp Act, 1899 and Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 is for the Section 11 judge to defer necessary stamping and impounding to the arbitrator/collector, as applicable. A plain reading of Section 35 of the Stamp Act, 1899 makes it clear that it does not preclude an Arbitrator or Collector to impound the unstamped/insufficiently stamped document. [Para 79.4][474-E-F]

3. The Arbitrator under Section 16 has the jurisdiction to decide on “existence” and “validity”. A plain reading of Section 11(6A) would show that the examination by Court is confined only to “existence” and not even “validity”. Moreover, the present reference only concerns with the formal requirement of stamping and not arbitrability. Applying contextual interpretation to render an arbitration agreement void on the formal requirement of stamping would defeat the very purpose of the Arbitration Act, 1996. A document cannot be rendered invalid or unenforceable especially if the defect is curable under the Stamp Act, 1899. Moreover, none of the provisions in the Stamp Act, 1899 have the effect of rendering a document invalid. Thus, the position in Vidya Drolia to the extent that it relies on Garware is incorrect. [Para 86.2][489-B-D]

N.N. Global Mercantile Private Limited v. Indo Unique Flame Limited and others (2021) 4 SCC 379 – affirmed. Vidya Drolia and others v. Durga Trading Corporation (2021) 2 SCC 1; Garware Wall Ropes Limited v. Coastal Marine Constructions & Engineering Limited (2019) 9 SCC 209 : [2019] 5 SCR 579; SMS Tea Estates Private Limited v. Chandmari Tea Company Private Limited (2011) 14 SCC 66 : [2011] 9 SCR 382; United India Insurance Company Limited v. Hyundai Engineering and Construction Company Limited (2018) 17 SCC 607 : [2018] 12 SCR 1085; - overruled.

SBP & Co v Patel Engg. Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 618 : [2005]

4 Suppl. SCR 688 – followed.

Jupudi Kesava Rao v. Pulavarthi Venkata Subbarao and others (1971) 1 SCC 545 : [1971] 3 SCR 590; Hariom Agrawal v. Prakash Chand Malviya (2007) 8 SCC 514 : [2007] 10 SCR 772 – relied on.

National Insurance Company Limited v. Boghara Polyfab Private Limited (2009) 1 SCC 267 : [2008] 13 SCR 638; Govt. of AP. v P. Laxmi Devi (2008) 4 SCC

720 : [2008] 3 SCR 330; Bengal Immunity Co v. State of Bihar (1955) 2 SCR 603; Govt. of India v. Vedanta (2020) 10 SCC 1; Amazon v. Future Retail (2022) 1 SCC 209; Chloro Controls v Severn Trent Water Purification Inc (2013) 1 SCC 641 : [2012] 13 SCR 402; Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd. and another (2005) 7 SCC 234 : [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 699; Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd. (2011) 8 SCC 333 : [2011] 11 SCR 1; Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Dilip Construction Company (1969) 1 SCC 597 : [1969] 3 SCR 736; Chiranji Lal (Dr.) v. Hari Das (2005) 10 SCC 746 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 359; Jagdish Narain v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, AIR 1994 All 371; RIO Glass Solar SA v. Shriram EPC Limited and Ors. (2018) 18 SCC 313; Commissioner of IT v. Chandanben Maganlal (2000) 245 ITR 182; Hameed Joharan v. Abdul Salam (2001) 7 SCC 573 : [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 469; Chiranji Lal (Dr.) v. Hari Das (2005)

10 SCC 746 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 359; Burjore and Bhawani Prasad v Bhagana ILR 10 Cal 557; Sainik Motors v State of Rajasthan 1962 (1) SCR 517; State of UP v Babu Ram AIR 1961 SC 751 : [1961] SCR 679; ICICI Ltd. v. East Coast Boat Builders & Engineers Ltd (1998) 9 SCC 728; KR Raveendranathan v. State of Kerala (1996) 10 SCC 35; Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd (1999) 2 SCC 479 : [1999] 1 SCR 89; Ador Samia Pvt Ltd. v. Peekay Holdings Ltd (1999)

8 SCC 572 : [1999] 1 Suppl. SCR 658; Konkan Railways Corpn v. Mehul Construction Co (2000) 7 SCC

201 : [2000] 2 Suppl. SCR 563; Konkan Railways Corpn v. Mehul Construction Co (2002) 2 SCC 388 : [2002] 1 SCR 728; A. Ayyasamy vs A. Paramasivam & Ors (2016) 10 SCC 386 : [2016] 11 SCR 521; Black Pearl Hotels v Planet M. Retail Ltd. (2017) 4 SCC 498 : [2017] 2 SCR 50; Duro Felguera, S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Limited (2017) 9 SCC 729 : [2017] 10 SCR 285; Mayavati Trading Private Limited v. Pradyuat Deb Burman (2019) 8 SCC 714 : [2019] 1 SCR 123; Pravin Electricals Private Limited v. Galaxy Infra and Engineering Private Limited (2021) 5 SCC 671; Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 233 (2d Cir 1960); Travancore Devaswom Board v. Panchamy Pack, 2004

13 SCC 510; Union of India v Popular Construction Co 2001 (8) SCC 470 : [2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 619; St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi (1992) 1 SCC

558 : [1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 121; Great Offshore Ltd. v. Iranian Offshore Engg. & Construction Co. (2008) 14 SCC 240 : [2008] 12 SCR 515; Trimex International FZE vs Vedanta Aluminum Limited, India 2010 (1) SCALE 574; Union of India v Kishorilal Gupta & Bros (1959) 1 SCR 493; National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing federation India Ltd. v Gains Trading Limited (2007) 5 SCC 692; Naihati Jute Mills Ltd. v Khayaliram Jagannath AIR 1968 SC 522 : [1968] SCR 821; P Manohar Reddy & Bros. v. Maharashtra Krishna Valley Development Corporation & Ors (2009) 2 SCC 494 : [2008] 17 SCR 1217; Oriental Insurance Company v. Narbheram Power and Steel Private Limited (2018) 6 SCC 534 : [2018] 4 SCR 826; Guru Nanak Foundation v. Rattan Singh and Sons (1981) 4 SCC 634 : [1982] 1 SCR 842; M/s Shree Vishnu Constructions v. The Engineer in Chief Military Engineering Service and others SLP(C) No. 5306/2022 dated 1.4.2022; Intercontinental Hotels Group (India) Private Ltd. v. Waterline Hotels Pvt. Ltd 2022 SCC OnLine SC 83 – referred to.

J.M.A. Raju v Krishnamurthy Bhatt, AIR 1976 Guj 72; Gulzari Lal Malwari v Ram Gopal AIR 1937 Cal 765; Mattegunta Dhanalakshmi v Kantam Raju Saradamba, AIR 1977 AP 348; Puranchandra v Kallipada Roy, AIR 1942 Cal 386; Boottam Pitchiah v Boyapati Koteswara Rao AIR 1964 AP 519; Board of Revenue v N. Narasimhan AIR 1961 Mad 504; A. Bapiraju v District Registrar AIR 1968 AP 142; Gulzari Lal Malwari v Ram Gopal AIR 1937 Cal 765; Chennai Container Terminal Pvt Ltd v. Union of India, 2007 3 Arb LR 218 (Mad); United India Insurance Co. Ltd. V Kumar Texturisers AIR 1999 Bom 118 - referred to.

Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v OOO Insurance Company Chubb (2020) UKSC 38; United Insurance Company of Pakistan Limited v. Hafiz Muhammad Siddique 1978 PLD SC 279; House of Lords in Fiona Trust and Holding Corporation v. Privalov (2007) 1 All ER(Comm) 891; Buckeye Check Cashing Inc. v. Cardegna, 2006 SCC OnLine US SC 14; Henry Schein, Inc. v Archer and White Sales, Inc 2019 SCC Online US SC 1; Weatherford Oiltool Middle East Limited vs Baker Hughes Singapore PTE 2022 SCC OnLine 1464; Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. 2022 – referred to.