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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
A_G_A_R_T_A_L_A
WP(C) No. 268 of 2023
1.
M/S Dilkhusa Tea Co. Ltd. registered office: 3, Wood Street,
Kolkata 700016.
2.
M/S Fortuna Agro Plantation Ltd., a company registered under the
Companies Act, 1951 having its registered office at P.O.
Sadhanashram, Dist: Unakoti, Kailashahar, Tripura, Pin-799227.
…..Petitioners
-V E R S U S-
1.
The State of Tripura, represented by the Chief Secretary,
Government of Tripura, Secretariat, Capital Complex, P.O.
Kunjaban, Agartala, Pin-799010.
2.
Secretary to the Government of Tripura, Revenue Department, Civil
Secretariat, Capital Complex, P.O. Kunjaban, Agartala, Pin799010.
3.
The District Magistrate and Collector, Unakoti, P.O. Gournagar,
Kailashahar, Pin-799227.
4.
Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Kailashahar, District-Unakoti, Pin799277.
….. Respondents
B_E_F_O_R_E
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE T. AMARNATH GOUD
For Petitioner(s)
:
For Respondent(s)
:
Date of hearing
Date of delivery of
judgment and order
Whether fit for reporting
:
Mr. S. M. Chakraborty,Sr. Advocate.
Ms. Ankita Pal, Advocate.
Mrs. P. Chakraborty, Advocate.
Mr. S. S. Dey, Advocate General.
Ms. A. Chakraborty, Advocate.
08.08.2024
:
:
14.08.2024
YES.
JUDGMENT & ORDER
Heard Mr. S. M. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel
assisted by Ms. A. Pal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners also
heard Mr. S. S. Dey, learned Advocate General assisted by Ms. A.
Chakraborty, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
[2]
The present petition has been filed under Article-226 of the
Constitution of India for restraining the respondents from changing more
than 2100 acre of land in Record of Right (ROR, for short) created in the
name of the petitioners No.1 without affording reasonable opportunity of
being heard also restraining the respondents from recording the running
tea garden land in khas khatian by deleting the name of the petitioner
No.1 without following due process of law.
[3]
The case of the petitioner is that cultivation of more than
2100 acre of tea is generally taken up on vast tract of land which
normally cannot be held by a single person or a family, but to encourage
the industry special provisions have been made in the TLR & LR Act to
relax the ceiling limit by providing opportunities under Section-178 of
the said Act. Murticherra Tea Garden comprised in about 2066 Acre land
in North Tripura (now Unakoti) is owned by Dilkhusa Tea Co. Ltd.
(petitioner No.1) which was accorded the said permission under Section178(1) and 136(1)(f) of the Act. Subsequently in 1997 said Murticherra
Tea Estate was transferred to the 2nd petitioner company i.e. M/S
Fortuna Agro Plantation Limited by lease for 99 years. The permission
accorded under Section 178(1) in 1975 continued to be valid even after
the said transfer, but suddenly in 2010 the Government of Tripura
initiated a proceeding under Section 178(4) of the Act contemplating
withdrawal of permission granted.
[4]
In pursuance of the above, he Petitioner approached the
respondents and filed Written Statement and the Respondent
No.1/Secretary Revenue, passed order on 06-10-2012 withdrawing the
permission under section 178(1) accorded in 1975.The Ld. District
Collector declared the land in Murticherra Tea Estate to be treated a
Government Khash land barring only 7.20 standard hectares and directed
to correct the Record of Right.
[5]
Writ Petition No.509 of 2012 was filed challenging the
orders dated 06.10.2012 and consequential memo dated 03.11.2012 and
the same has been dismissed with observation on 18.03.2016 to the
respondents to give an opportunity to the petitioners under ChapterX111 of TLR & LR Act before converting the land to khas. The order
dated 18.03.2016 was not challenged by the respondents and same
attained finality.
[6]
In view of the observations made in the judgement dated
18.03.2016, writ appeal No.40 of 2016 was filed and by order dated
09.02.2021 the same has been allowed by setting aside the order dated
06-10-2012 passed by Secretary, Revenue Department, Government of
Tripura. The Review petition No.53 of 2022 was filed by State against
judgement in WA. No.40 of 2016 dated 09.02.2021 and the same is
allowed by order dated 09.02.2023. Thus, the respondent/State has
changed the entries in ROR.
[7]
Hence, the present writ petition against the action of the
respondents in changing the entries in the Record of Rights.
[8]
Mr. S. M. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel assisted by
Ms. A. Pal, learned counsel has submitted that the cause of action for
filing this petition arose on 11.04.2023 when the entries in khatians
reflected the name of government by deleting the names of the
petitioners.
[9]
The respondents have also changed the khatian of
Manuvalley from the name of the petitioner No.1 to the name of
government of Tripura with reference to orders dated 13.03.2023,
19.03.2023 and 27.03.2023 and created a khas kahtain No.1/2 for land
measuring 59.11 acres. The respondents have also changed the khatian
of Murticherra Mouza from the name of the petitioner No.1 to the name
of the government of Tripura with reference to orders dated 02.02.2023
and 25.01.2023 and created a khas khatian No.1/1 for land measuring
2000.78 acres of land.
[10]
The petitioners are limited companies and thereby the
quantum of land which can be held by them within the ceiling limit
ought to have been decided by the respondents in accordance with the
provision contained in Section-164A(6) of the TLR&LR Act before
converting land of petitioners as khas land. Having not done so the
respondents have acted in a high handed, illegal and un-constitutional
manner requiring interference of his Court.
[11]
Murticherra Tea Estate is a tea garden in North Tripura
(now Unakoti) comprised of about 2100 acres of land owned by the
petitioner No.1 has been leased out to the petitioner company No.2 for
99 years from the year in 1997. Since then, the petitioner No.2 has been
running the garden for cultivation of tea and rubber exempted under
Section-178(1) of TRL& LR Act, 1960. The land under cultivation and
ancillary purposes in the tea garden is the „jote‟ land of the company and
no part of it has ever been claimed as government khas land.
[12]
The petitioner No.1 has applied for permission to hold the
land in excess of the permissible ceiling limit for the purpose of
cultivation of tea in the year 1962 under Section-178(1) of TLR&LR Act
and the permission was accorded by the Revenue Commissioner to the
Govt. of Tripura, Revenue Department, Agartala vide order dated 23 rd
August, 1975.
[13]
It is contended that suddenly by a notice, the respondent
No.2 initiated a proceeding in 2010 under Section-178(4) of the TLR &
LR Act for the purpose of withdrawing the permission. The respondent
No.2 considered the written statement submitted by the petitioner and
passed order on 26.11.2011. The said order correctly recorded the
contention espoused in the written statement, that the petitioner company
is otherwise entitled to hold the land comprised in Murticherra Tea
Estate by virtue of the provisions under Section-164(6) of the TLR&LR
Act and considered from that point of view the concession required
under Section-178 is redundant. The respondent No.2 was called upon to
continue the validity of the permission in the interest of the garden when
the petitioner company is otherwise entitled to hold the entire area
applying Section-164(6) of the Act.
[14]
Ultimately, the respondent No.2 in a hasty manner instead
of following any consistency with the earlier order and without
maintaining the commitment made therein and without passing a
speaking order supported by reasons recorded the application of petition
made in 1962 under Section-178(1) of TLR & LR Act read with Rule211 of TLR&LR passed order on 06.10.2012 withdrawing the
permission granted.
[15]
Having received the copy of the order dated 06.10.2012, the
petitioner addressed letter dated 31.10.2012 pointing out the apparent
infirmities and illegalities in the order disclosing the intention of moving
the higher judicial forum against the illegal order and at the same time,
requested not to take the next step until a reasonable time for obtaining
appropriate order from the Court of law.
[16]
In the above background the respondents issued the
memorandum as under:
“Government of Tripura
Office of the District Magistrate & Collector
Unakoti District: Kailashahar
(Revenue Section)
No.IX-1(25)DUR/Vol-II/2012/3711-14
Dated, 03.11.2012
MEMO
As per decision of the Revenue Department, Govt. of Tripura, the
exemption of retention against Murticherra Tea Estate has been
withdrawn by the order dated 6-10-2012 passed by the Secretary,
Revenue Department in Case No.03/Rev/PS/2010 U/S 1/8 (4) of
TLR&LR Act, 1960. Hence, the entire Tea Garden land measuring
2066.00 acres (existing total area) should be reverted to Khas land.
According to the ceiling limit prescribed in Section-164(1) (d) of
TLR&LR Act, 1960 beyond 7.20 Standard Hectare will be treated as
surplus land and hence the SDM, Kailashahar is directed to declare the
said area of Murticherra Tea Estate as Khas land excluding 7.20 Standard
Hectare and correct the land records.
(Abhishek Chandra)
District Magistrate & Collector
Unakoti District, Kailashahar”
[17]
It is argued that after withdrawal of the exemption order, no
such notice to Dilkhosa Tea Estate was issued for submitted the return
within a specified period but, the Collector has passed the impugned
memorandum which is absolutely beyond his competence. It will not out
of place to mention that in or around 2012, the respondent authorities
changed the ROR of the petitioner company No.2 and declared the
company status as permissible possessor in some of the khatians and in
some of the khatians, the name of the petitioner was totally deleted
whereas till the time company status was as a raiyat.
[18]
Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel also contended that
in WP(C) No.509 of 2012 wherein, the present petitioner was also a
party it was observed that “19. It is further to be determined that if the
exemption order is withdrawn, whether the petitioners will have any
right including the intermediary right to retain the permissible area of
land or not. leaving all these issues unanswered, issuance of the
memorandum dated 03.11.2012 observing that beyond 7.20 standard
hectare the remaining land will be treated as surplus and on such
premises, direction to the SD, Kailashar for declaring the Murticherra
Tea Estate as khas land excluding 7.20 standard hectare or for
correcting the land records, is unsustainable in law inasmuch as, in
terms of Section-165 of the TLR &LR Act every person who retained
land in excess of the ceiling limit on 24th January, 1971 shall submit to
the competent authority in the prescribed form and within such period as
the State Government may by notification in the official gazette appoint,
a return giving the particulars of all land held by him indicating therein,
the persons of the land not exceeding the ceiling limit which he desires
to retain. The last date of submission was fixed for purpose of Section166 of the TLR&LR Act on 28.02.1974. But, the discretion had been left
to the competent authority to accept the return on assigning reasonable
cause since sub-section(3) of Section-166 of the TLR&LR Act provides
that if the persons fail to comply the notice of the Collector in declaring
the ceiling surplus land without offering him any further opportunity, the
Collector may take possession.”
[19]
In this case, after the withdrawal of the exemption order no
such notice to Dilkhosa Tea Estate was issued for submitting the return
within a specified period but the Collector has passed the impugned
memorandum which is absolutely beyond his competence.
[20]
Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel in support of his
case has cited certain decisions of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in 2005 AIR
SCW 3727 titled as State of H.P. and Another v. Gujarat Ambuja
Cement Ltd. and Another, (2207) 10 SCC 88 titled as M.P. State Agro
Industries Development Corpn. Ltd. and Another v. Jahan Khan and
2009 AIR SCW 654 titled as Mariamma Roy v. Indian Bank & Others
and prayed to allow the writ petition and to restore the lands to the
petitioners.
[21]
At the threshold, Mr. S.S. Dey, learned Advocate General
assisted by Ms. A. Chakraborty, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents has submitted that there is no cause of action for filing of
the present petition and there is no violation of principle of natural
justice. He draws attention of this Court in proceeding under Section136(1) (f) and 178(1) of the TLR&LR Act, 1960 dated 23rd August, 1975
under in respect of Dilkhosh (Murticherra) T.E. under Kailashahar subdivision and in this regard a gazette notification dated March, 22, 1963
was also placed on record. For the purpose of reference, memo dated
23rd August, 1975 may be reproduced herein below:
“Case No.29(TE) 62-03
Government of Tripura
Revenue Department.
Agartala, the 23rd August, 1975
Sub: Proceedings u/s 136(1) (f) and 176(1) of the TLR & LR Act, 1960
in respect of Dilkhosh (Murticherra) T.E. under Kailasahar sub-division
ORDUR
The commissioner of Revenue, Land Reforms & Tzxes, Tripura is
pleased to order that the Dilkhosh (Murticherra) Tea Estate be allowed to
retain an area of land measuring 849.86 hectares (2100.00) acres
belonging to land at moujas Murticherra, Samrurpar and Manuvalley
under Kailasahar sub-division u/s 136(1)(f) of the TLR&LR Act, 1960.
An area of land measuring 221.12 hectares (546.39) acres is not included
in the area allowed to be retaining and would be resumed by the
Government.
The Commissioner of Revenue, Land Reforms & Taxes is further
p0leased to order that the tea estate be exempted u/s 178(1) of the
TLR&LR Act, 1960 the area of land measuring 849.87 hectares
(2100.00) acres at moujas Murticherra, Samrurpur and Manuvalley under
Kailasahar sub-division from the operation of ceiling provision of
section-164 of the said Act.
The estate authorities should show definite improvement in the
management of the garden in the development of the area and proper
utilization of lands etc. within a period of 3 years from the date of issue
of this order. In the event of any failure in this direction, the exemption
order issued would be withdrawn and land resumed.
The Estate authorities may exercise option to retain plots not exceeding
the area of 849.87 hectares (2100.00) acres within a period of two months
from the date of this order and to intimate the same to the Director of
Settlement & Land Records, Tripura, Agartala and the D.M. & Collector,
Kailasahar, North Tripura Dist. who would go into the issue separately.
By order of the Commissioner of
Revenue, Land Reforms & Taxes.
(S. Banerjee)
Under Secretary to the Govt. of Tripura.”
[22]
It has been submitted by the learned senior counsel
appearing for the petitioner that no notice was issued to the petitioner to
taking appropriate steps. But Mr. Dey, learned Advocate General has
pointed out that on 24.09.2011 notice was duly served by the Court of
the Secretary, Government of Tripura, Revenue Department wherein,
counsel for the respondent No.2 was asked, if the area of land held by
the respondents were within the ceiling limit there was no reasons for
them to reply to this question although he stated that if may be either due
to lack of knowledge of the respondents companies or due to
misinterpretation of statutory provisions.
[23]
The case has been initiated on the basis of report of
Collector, North Tripura that Dilkhusha (Murticherra) Tea Estate of
Kailashahar sub-division has diverted its tea garden land by establishing
saw mill and raising rubber and teak plantation, M/s Dilkhusha
(Murticherra) Tea Estate was allowed to retain an area of land measuring
849.87 hectores (2100 acres) spreading over mouja Murticherra,
Samrurpur and Manuvalley under Kailashahar sub-division under
Section-136(1)(f) of the TLR& LR Act. Exemption of the said areas
under Section-178(1) of the TLR& LR Act 1960 from the operation of
the ceiling provisions under Section-164 of the Act was given on
condition that the tea estate authority should show definite improvement
in the management of the garden. But, the proprietor Dilkhusha
(Murticherra) Tea Estate and its lessee violated the provision of Section178(1) and as such the exemptions granted vide No. 29(Tea)/62-63 dated
23.07.1975 is hereby withdrawn.
[24]
In writ petition No. WP(C) No.509 of 2012 and others it has
been observed that “As consequence thereof, the said memorandum
dated 03.11.2012 is set aside. On the basis of the order dated
06.10.2012, Dilkhosa tea estate would be provided opportunity of filing
their return for retaining their preferred land and for declaring the
ceiling surplus land to be vested with the government by passing the
appropriate order. Only thereafter, the consequential order on the basis
of the return or for non filing of the return may be passed by the
competent authority i.e. the District Collector.”
[25]
Mr. Dey, learned Advocate General has submitted that as
per the gazette notification dated 22.03.1963 in the Tripura Gazette, the
estate in question, situated with the then Kailashahar sub-division now
Unakoti district was already vested in the government of Tripura free
from all encumbrances. Consequently, the entire land claimed by the
petitioners falling within Unakoti district as of date, in any view of the
matter is a Govt. khas land.
[26]
There is no averment in the writ petition with regard to that
gazette notification and the same is unchallenged. It is further contended
that the petitioners have concealed the real facts and made untrue
statements. Initially, the petitioner company applied for the exemption
from the operation of Section-164 of the TLR & LR Act, 1960 and also
prayed for retention of the ceiling surplus land. However, the same was
rejected and no retention order was issued in their favour and further the
Revenue Department, government of Tripura directed the Collector to
take over the land after observing all formalities.
[27]
Learned Advocate General has placed his reliance on a
similarly situated case i.e. in WP(C) No.31 of 2023 wherein, the Court
by judgment dated 12.07.2024 held thus:
“15. The petitioner, Silkota Tea Co. Ltd. claim as the owner of Tea
Garden named “Hiracherra Tea Estate” and according to them, it is 105
years old company registered in the year 1917. The petitioner-company
has contended that they are in possession of tea estate and are cultivating
tea since its inceptions. The Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms
Act, 1960 (in short TLR&LR Act) came into force and on perusal of
record, it is seen that on 22.03.1963, a gazette notification vide No.
F.39(93)-REV/62 was published in the Tripura Gazette, which is
extracted hereunder for appreciation of fact:
“...In exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 134 of
the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 (43 of 1960) the
Administrator is pleased to declare that with effect from the 15th April,
1963 all estates situated in Kailashahar sub-division and under
Puranrajbar police station of Belonia sub-Division and all right, title and
interest of every intermediary in such estates shall vest in the
Government free from all encumbrance.....”
[28]
He has placed reliance on some decisions of the Hon‟ble
Apex Court to establish his case beyond reasonable doubt. AIR 1969
Calcutta 424 titled as Shyamlal Purohit and Another v. Jagannath Ray
and Another and (2015) 12 SCC 501 titled as Uttar Pradesh State
Industrial
Development
Corporation
Limited
v.
Monsanto
Manufacturers Private Limited and Another.
[29]
Heard both sides.
[30]
The claim of the petitioners as owners of the subject
land and their names reflected in the Khatian which is only the
entries in the revenue records and the same cannot be treated as a
title deed. The petitioners have not explained as to how their names
came to be entered in the revenue records and on the strength of
what documents i.e. either sale deed or by succession or in
heritance. In the absence of any such title deed, it cannot be said
that the petitioners are the owners. More so, when the petitioner is a
company, it cannot be construed that company would own the
property without there being any legally entitled documents. Mere
giving an impression on the strength of the entry in revenue record
do not entitle the petitioners to claim themselves as owners.
[31]
In Shyamlal Purohit and Another v. Jagannath Ray and
Another reported in AIR 1969 Calcutta 424 the Hon‟ble Apex Court has
observed thus:
“7. The case most relied upon by the respondents is a Bench decision of
this Court, Basanta Kumar Roy v. Charu Chandra Pal, . The facts hi that
case were as follows: The respondent Charu Chandra Pal obtained a
money decree against the principal debtor Burdwan Fisheries and
Industries Ltd. and the guarantor, the Managing Director of the principal
debtor company. The decree was put into execution in Money Execution
Case No. 18 of 1955 and on 21st May, 1956 it was sold by auction to the
highest bidder, namely the decree-holder who had been permitted to bid
at the sale. On 21st June, 1956 the appellant Basanta Kumar Roy,
describing himself as the principal judgment-debtor of the company, filed
an application under Order 21, Rule 90 for setting aside the sale. The
ground was that the decree-holder had purchased the properties "secretly
and fraudulently and in an illegal and irregular way by causing a show of
auction sale." The decree-holder auction-purchaser contested the
application. The learned judges referred and relied upon the English
cases, Macaura v. Northern Assurance Co., (1925) AC 619 and
Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Forest, (1924) 8 Tax Cas 704 (710)
as well as two Supreme Court decisions--Sholapur Mills case, and Bacha
F. Gazedar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay, . Reference was
also made to a Madras case, Vaidyanatha v. Bank of India Ltd., . The
Court held as follows:"We are of opinion that there Is no substance in the contention. However,
wide may be the meaning of the expression any person whose interests
are affected by the sale" such person must have an existing or present
interest, which is affected by the sale of the property. The existing or the
present interest must be in the property which is sold. A corporator is not
the corporation, which is a distinct legal person. In the assets of a
corporation. Its share-holders have no legal or equitable interest.
There is nothing in the Indian law to warrant the assumption that a
shareholder who buys shares buys any interest In the property of the
company which is a juristic person entirely distinct from the
shareholders. The true position of a shareholder Is that on buying shares
an Investor becomes entitled to participate in the profits of the company
in which he holds the shares. If and when the company declares, subject
to the Articles of Association, that the profits or any portion thereof
should be distributed by way of dividends among the shareholders. He
has undoubtedly a further right to participate in the assets of the company
which would be left over after winding up but not in the assets as a whole
as Lord Anderson puts it.
The legal position of a shareholder being hereinbefore Indicated the
appellant had no interest in the auction-sold property, which was
adversely affected by the sale."
8. It was held accordingly that the application for setting aside the sale
was not maintainable and the appeal was dismissed.
9. Since great reliance has been placed before us on this Division Bench
judgment. I shall briefly notice the authorities mentioned therein. In the
House of Lords' decision 1925 AC 619 (Supra) the facts were as follows- The owner of a timber estate sold the whole of the timber thereon to a
timber company in consideration of fully paid-up shares in the company.
He was the sole shareholder in the company and also a creditor of the
company to a large extent. Subsequently, by policies effected in his own
name with several insurance companies, he insured this timber against
the risk of fire. The greater part of the timber having been destroyed by
fire, he sued the insurance company to recover the loss. The point was as
to whether he had any "insurable interest" in the goods Insured. Lord
Buckmaster said as follows:"Turning now to his position as shareholder, this must be independent of
the extent of his share interest. If he were entitled to insure holding all the
shares in the company, the shareholders would be equally entitled, if the
shares were in separate hands. Now, no shareholder has any right to any
item of property owned by the company, for he has no legal or equitable
interest therein. He is entitled to share in the profits while it continues to
carry on business and a share in the distribution of the surplus assets
when the company is wound up."
[32]
In
Uttar
Pradesh
State
Industrial
Development
Corporation Limited v. Monsanto Manufacturers Private Limited and
Another reported in (2015) 12 SCC 501, the Hon‟ble Apex Court
observed ad infra:
“22. For deciding the issue involved in the present case it is necessary to
refer certain clauses of licence agreement, lease deed and guidelines
issued by the appellant-Corporation which are common in all the cases.
23. Clause 4(h) of the licence agreement prohibits licensee's acts to
directly or indirectly transfer, assignment, sale, encumber or part with its
interest under the benefit of the said Agreement without previous consent
in writing of the Grantor, relevant portion of which reads as follows:
"4(h). That the Licence will not directly or indirectly transfer, assign, sell,
encumber or part with its interest under or the benefit of this Agreement
or any part thereof in any manner whatsoever without the previous
consent in writing of the Grantor and it shall be open to the Grantor to
refuse such consent or grant the same subject to such conditions as may
be laid down by the Grantor in the behalf."
24. Sub-Clause (p) of Clause 3 of lease deed also prohibits any alteration
in the Memorandum and Articles of Association or in its capital structure
without the written consent of the Lessor, relevant portion of which reads
as follows:
"3(p) That the Lessee being a registered partnership firm declares, affirms
and undertakes that during the subsistence of the terms of this agreement,
the said partnership shall not be dissolved, reconstituted or wound up,
and/or dealt with in any way which may jeopardize the rights and
interests of the Lessor in the matter of this lease, nor shall its constitution
be altered in any manner otherwise written consent of the Lessor, first
and obtained, and it shall not stand dissolved on the death or insolvency
of any of its partners;
OR The Lessee being an individual or sole proprietor of a firm, shall not
allow any person(s) as partner(s) with him without the prior written
consent of the Lessor;
OR The Lessee being a Company shall not make or attempt to make any
alterations, whatsoever in the provisions of its Memorandum and Articles
of Association or in its capital structure without the written consent of the
Lessor, first had and obtained, and the Lessee hereby undertakes to get
registered the prescribed particulars of the charge hereunder created with
Registrar of Joint Stock Companies under Section 126 of Companies Act,
1956, within stipulated period.
While granting its consent as aforesaid the Lessor may require the
successor in interest of the Lessee to enter into a binding contract with
the Lessor to abide by and faithfully carry out the terms, conditions,
stipulations, provisos and agreements herein contained or such other
terms and conditions as the Lessor may, in its discretion, impose
including the payment by the successor-in-interest such additional
premium and/or enhanced rent as the Lessor may in its discretion think
proper. In the even of breach of this condition the agreement shall be
determined at the discretion of the Lessor.
Provided that the right to determine this agreement under this clause will
not be exercised if the industry at the premises has been financed by the
State Government or the Industrial Finance Corporation of India or the
Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India, or the U.P.
Financial Corporation or Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment
Corporation of Uttar Pradesh or any scheduled bank(including the State
Bank of India) and the said financing body or bodies mentioned above
decide to take over possession or sell, or lease or assign the mortgaged
assets in exercise vesting in it or them by virtue of the deeds or deed
executed in its or their favour by the Lessee as provided herein above, or
under any law for the time being in force."
26. In the present case the entire shareholding of Goyal family headed by
Mr. Amar Nath Goyal in the said company was transferred to the MehtaLamba Family. The entire list of shareholders, Managing Director and
Board of Directors was provided by Monsanto to the appellantCorporation vide letter dated 7.5.1994. The record shows that the original
subscribers of shares were members of Goyal family and the entire
shareholding was transferred to Mehta-Lamba family. Therefore, the
original subscribers of shares of respondent No. 1 Company were totally
changed.
27. The "Memorandum of Association" of a company limited by shares
mandatorily prescribes in "Table-B" (Table-B of 1956 Act and Table-A
of 2013 Act deals with Company Limited by shares) of the Companies
Act mandatorily prescribed that the names, addresses, description,
occupation of subscribers shall be given in Memorandum of Association.
In this case as the original subscribers of shares were changed in 1994,
there was material alteration in the "Memorandum of Association" of
respondent no. 1 Company.
[33]
Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners has
placed his reliance in a decision of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in 2005
AIR SCW 3727 titled as State of H.P. and Another v. Gujarat Ambuja
Cement Ltd. and Another, wherein, it has been held thus:
“22. In Harbans Lal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., [2003] 2 SCC
107, this Court held that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by
availability of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of
compulsion and the Court must consider the pros and cons of the case
and then may interfere if it comes to the conclusion that the petitioner
seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; where there is failure
of principles of natural justice or where the orders or proceedings are
wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.”
[34]
In another case in M.P. State Agro Industries Development
Corpn. Ltd. and Another v. Jahan Khan reported in (2007) 10 SCC 88
the Hon‟ble Apex Court has held as under:
“11. Be that as it may, we are of the opinion that in the light of our
interpretation of the aforenoted Regulations, the imposition of penalty
vide composite order dated 19th December, 1989, directing recovery of
loss of Rs.16903.41 and stoppage of three increments with cumulative
effect, is a major penalty, clearly envisaging a regular enquiry before
punishing the respondent. Since admittedly this procedure was not
followed, the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that
imposition of the impugned penalty without holding enquiry was illegal
and without jurisdiction.
12. Before parting with the case, we may also deal with the submission of
learned counsel for the appellants that a remedy by way of an appeal
being available to the respondent, the High Court ought not to have
entertained his petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.
There is no gainsaying that in a given case, the High Court may not
entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on the
ground of availability of an alternative remedy, but the said rule cannot
be said to be of universal application. The rule of exclusion of writ
jurisdiction due to availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of
discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of
the availability of an alternative remedy, a writ court may still exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction of judicial review, in at least three
contingencies, namely, (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of
any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of
natural justice or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without
jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. In these circumstances,
an alternative remedy does not operate as a bar. (See: Whirpool
Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks , Harbanslal Sahnia & Anr. Vs.
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Ors. , State of H.P. Vs. Gujarat Ambuja
Cement Ltd. and Sanjana M. Wig Vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation
Ltd.).
[35]
In Mariamma Roy v. Indian Bank & Others, reported in
AIR SCW 654, the Hon‟ble Apex Court has observed as under:
“3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and examined the
impugned order as well as the other materials on record. After examining
the impugned order as well as the materials on record, we are of the view
that the order of the High Court cannot be sustained. Before the High
Court, the appellant sought to contend that before passing the impugned
order, the appellant was not at all issued with any notice. The High Court,
however, without going into the question whether the notice was at all
served on the appellant or not, dismissed the writ petition only on the
ground that the appellant has got a right of appeal against the impugned
order under the provisions of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and
Financial Institutions Act, 1993. In our view, the High Court was not
justified in passing the impugned order on the aforesaid ground. It is well
settled that even if an alternative remedy was available to an aggrieved
party against a particular order, but if it was open to such party to move a
writ application and the court has the power to entertain the same if it
finds that while passing the order there has been a violation of the
principle of natural justice. That being the position, in the present case the
appellant was not served with any notice before passing the impugned
order. That being the position and without going into the merits, the
impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the High
Court for decision on merits in accordance with law. The High Court is
requested to dispose of the writ petition at an early date preferably within
six months from the date of supply of a copy of this order to it. We make
it clear that we have not gone into the merits of the dispute raised by the
parties before us, all questions are left open to be decided by the High
Court in accordance with law. The impugned order is, therefore, set aside
and the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no
order as to costs”
[36]
For the purpose of reference, some relevant provisions such
as Sections-99, 133, 134, 136, 164 & 178(4) of the Tripura Land
Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 are extracted hereunder:
“"99. Rights of raiyats.-(1) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby
declared that subject to the other provisions of this Act,(a) The rights of a raiyat in his land shall be permanent, heritable and
transferable;
(b) The raiyat shall be entitled by himself, his servants, under-raiyats,
agents or other representatives to ereet farm buildings, construct wells or
tanks or make other the better cultivation of the land or its convenient or
profitable use;
(c) the raiyat is entitled to plant trees on his land, to enjoy the products
thereof and to fell, utilise or dispose of the timber of any trees on his land
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall entitle a raiyat to use his land to the
detriment of any adjoining land which is not his or in contravention of the
provisions of any other law for the time being in force applicable to such
lands.***
133. Definitions-In this Part,(a) "estate" means lands included under one entry in any of the general
registers of revenue-paying and revenue-free lands and includes(i) revenue-free lands not entered in any register, and
(ii) a part of or a share in an estate;
(b) "homestead" means a dwelling house together with any courtyard,
compound, garden, or out-house and includes any out-buildings used for
purposes connected with agriculture and any family graveyard, library,
office, guest-house, grain store, latrines, boundary walls, tanks, wells or
places of worship appertaining to such dwelling house;
(c) "Intermediary" means a person who holds in an estate the right, title
or interest of a talukdar and includes(i) A person who holds land either revenue-free or at a concessional rate,
and
(ii) A tenure holder,
(d) "tenant" means a person who cultivates or holds the land of an
intermediary under an agreement, express or implied, on condition of
paying therefore rent in cash or in kind or delivering a share of the
produce and includes a person who cultivates or holds land of and
intermediary under the system generally known as "bhag", "adhi" or
"barga"; and the term "sub-tenant" shall be construed accordingly;
(e) "tenure holder" means a person who has acquired from an
intermediary the right to hold lands for the purpose of collecting rents or
bringing them under cultivation by establishing tenants thereon***.
134. Notification vesting estates in the State.-(1) As soon as may be after
the commencement of this Act, the [State Government] may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, declare that, with effect from the date
specified in the notification (herein-after referred to as the vesting date),
all estates situated in any area or areas and all rights, title and interest of
every intermediary in such estates shall vest in the Government free from
all encumbrances.
(2) Every notification under sub-section (1) shall also be published in
such other manner as may be prescribed.
(3) The publication of notification in the manner provided in sub-section
(1) and
(2) Shall be conclusive evidence of the notice of declaration to the
intermediaries whose interests are affected by such notification***
136. Rights of intermediary to certain lands. (1) Notwithstanding
anything contained in Sections 134 and 135, an intermediary shall,
subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) be entitled to retain with effect
from the vesting date;
(a) Homesteads, buildings and structures together with the appurtenant
thereto in the possession of the intermediary other than buildings vested
in the Government under section 135;
(b) Lands under the personal cultivation of the intermediary:
(c) lands in I rights have not already accrued to a tenant under any
custom, agreement or law and which have been leased by an intermediary
who, both at the commencement of the lease and on the vesting date, was
a person under disability.
(d) Lands held by the intermediary as mortgagor which are subject to
usufructuary mortgage and are under the personal cultivation of the
mortgage;
(e) lands comprised in orchards or used for the purpose of live-stock
breeding, poultry, farming or dairy farming, which are in the occupation
of the intermediary,
(f) so much of the lands comprised in a tea garden, mill, factory or
workshop as in the opinion of the State Government is required for such
tea garden, mill, factory or workshop.
(2) An intermediary who is entitled to retain possession of any land under
sub-section(1) shall hold such land directly under the Government from
the vesting date as a raiyat thereof [or as a non-agricultural tenant thereof,
as the case may be] and be liable to pay therefore land revenue at full rate
applicable to similar lands in the locality"
137. Collector to take charge of estates, etc., vested in the Government(1) The Collector shall take charge of estates and interests of
intermediaries which vest in the Government under section 135.
(2) For the purpose aforesaid, the Collector may, by written order served
in the prescribe manner, require any intermediary or other person in
possession of any such estate or interest to give up such possession by a
date to be specified in the order (which shall not be earlier than sixty days
from the date of service of the order) to deliver by that date any
documents, registers, or records, connected with the management of such
estate or interest which are in his custody to furnish a statement in the
prescribed form in respect of such estate or interest.
(3) The Collector or any other officer authorized by him in this behalf
may take such steps or use such force as may be necessary to enforce
compliance with the order and may also enter any building or place for
the purpose of taking possession of the documents, registers or records
referred to in sub-section(2),
(4) An intermediary shall be entitled to make inspection of any
documents, registers or records which have been delivered to or taken
possession of by the collector, to make notes there from or to have
certified copies thereof granted to him. No fees shall be charged for
making inspection or for making notes, but fees may be charged,
according to the prescribed scale, for the grant of certified copies.
(5) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise the Collector to
take possession of(a) Any land or of any right of an intermediary therein, which may be
retained by the intermediary under section 136, or
(b) Any religious institution or any building connected therewith***.
164. Ceiling on holdings. On and form the 24th January, 1971 no person
shall, whether as a raiyat or as an underraiyat or as a mortgage in
possession or otherwise or partly in one capacity and partly in another,
hold in the aggregate any land in excess of the ceiling limit applicable to
him under section 164A.
164A. Celling limit. (1) The ceiling limit shall be(a) In the case of an adult unmarried person, two standard hectares;
(b) In the case of a person who is the sole surviving member of a family,
two standard hectares,
(c) In the case of a person having a family consisting of two or more but
not more than five members, four standard hectares;
(d) in the case of a person having a family consisting of more than five
members, four standard hectares plus 0.60 standard hectare for each
member in excess of five so, however, that the total ceiling limit for such
a person shall not in any case exceed 7.20 a surpass:
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where in the
family of person there are more members than one, owing land, the
ceiling limit for that person together with the ceiling limit of all the
members of the family, shall not in any case exceed(a) Where the member of members of such family does not exceed five,
four standard hectares;
(b) Where such member exceeds five, four standard hectares plus 0.60
standard hectares for each member in excess of five so, however, that the
aggregate of the ceiling limit shall not in any case exceed 7.20 standard
hectares.
(3) For the purpose of sub-section (2), all the land owned individually by
the members of the family or jointly by some or all of the members of the
family shall be deemed to be owned by the members in the family.
(4) In determining the extent of land owned by a person having a family
or the sole surviving member of a family or an adult unmarried person,
the share of such person or sole surviving member or such adult
unmarried person, as the case may be, in the lands owned by a
cooperative society, company, co-operative farming society, a Hindu
undivided family or a firm shall be taken into account.
Explanation. For the purposes of this sub-section, the share of a person
having a family or the sole surviving member of a family or an adult
unmarried person in the lands owned by a co-operative society, company,
co-operative farming society, a Hindu undivided family or a farm shall be
deemed to be the extent of land which could be allotted to him, had such
lands divided or partitioned, as the case may be.
(5) The lands owned by a trust or endowment, other than a public nature,
shall be deemed to be lands owned by the beneficiaries under the trust or
endowment and each such beneficiary shall be deemed to be a person
holding land under this Act to the extent of the share of his beneficial
interest in the said trust or endowment.
(6) The ceiling limit for a co-operative society, company, co-operative
farming society, a Hindu undivided family or a firm, as the case may be,
shall not exceed the sum total of the ceiling limits of each member of
such co-operative society, company, co- operative farming society, a
Hindu undivided family or each partner of such firm.
Explanation. For the purpose of determining the ceiling limit of each
member referred to in this sub-section, any land held separately by a
person who is a member of a cooperative society, company, co-operative
farming society or a Hindu individed family or a partner of a firm shall be
deducted from the ceiling limit referred to in sub-sections. ***
(5) So that the sum total of the area of land held by such person whether
as such member or partner or individually or as a member of a family
may not in any case exceed the ceiling limit applicable to him under these
sub-sections.*********
178. Power to exempt, etc..******(4) Where any land, in respect of
which exemption has been granted under subsection (1) or sub-section (2)
or sub-section (3), ceases to be used, or is not within the prescribed time
used, for the purpose for which exemption had been granted, the [State
Government] may, after giving the persons affected an opportunity of
being heard, withdraw such exemption........”
[37]
This case is not as simple as it is filed and argued on the point of
challenging the names in khatian without giving notice. But the basic issue
and root of the matter is something else. The petitioners have not explained
how the petitioners were in possession of the property. Their claim is
petitioner No.1 is owner and respondent No.2 is lessee of the land. It is also
seen from the revenue records i.e. the khatian placed by the senior counsel for
the petitioner that there are some illegal occupants in possession of the land
which is reflected in column No. 9 and in column No.6, the petitioners are
shown as the owner and there is no basic documents or any title deed filed in
support of their contention to say that the petitioners are owners.
[38]
The petitioners have not filed any relevant document nor made a
specific pleading as to how they became owners and who is their vendor and
under what document, they are claiming ownership and from which period the
petitioners being registered companies obviously if they are owners under the
deed they would submit in the registration of companies before Tea Board,
and also retain originals with them. But no such averment or document is
placed on record before this Court. In view of the same, this Court draws an
adverse inference against the petitioners.
[39]
It is reasonably construed that all land in a State is the property
of a State unless it is claimed under lawful alienable title. The series of
proceedings which relate to exemption, withdrawal of exemptions, are noticed
by this Court that they have not dealt with the issue of ownership and there is
no reference as to how the petitioners claimed ownership on the said
properties. Unless the petitioners establish that he is the owner of the said
land, it is not open for him to claim equities. Insofar as the contention that
petitioner No.1 has granted long lease in favour of petitioner No.2 is
concerned, petitioner No.1 cannot transfer a better title upon petitioner No.2,
when petitioner No.1 itself is not having a proven lawful alienable title. The
said proposition is settled law.
[40]
Insofar as the change of entries in the khatian by replacing the
name of the petitioners with the government as owner is concerned, this Court
is of the view that no notice is required and there is no violation of principle of
natural justice since the petitioners were already represented before this Court
in earlier round of litigation and in pursuance of the same, consequential steps
have been initiated by the respondents in changing the entries in the Record of
Right i.e. the Khatian.
[41]
Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is liable to be dismissed.
[42]
However, in the event, if the petitioners feel that they are the
lawful owners of the said property, they shall approach before the Revenue
Secretary on or before 31.08.2024 and submit relevant documents i.e. title
deed enabling the Revenue Secretary for taking appropriate steps in
accordance with law as expeditiously as possible.
[43]
In the light of the above, the present petition stands
dismissed. As sequel, miscellaneous application, pending if any, shall
stand closed.
T. AMARNATH GOUD, J
A.Ghosh
ANJAN
GHOSH
ANJAN GHOSH
Date: 2024.08.28
13:10:36 +05'30'
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