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IN
THE
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PRANAY VERMA
ON THE 1st OF FEBRUARY, 2024
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 3653 of 2024
BETWEEN:LAXMI BAI W/O MANSINGH, AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: LABOUR VILLAGE CHANDODIYA, DIST.
UJJAIN (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....PETITIONER
(BY SHRI HIMANSHU THAKUR - ADVOCATE)
AND
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH STATION HOUSE
OFFICER THROUGH POLICE STATION JAORA CITY,
DIST. RATLAM (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENT
(BY SHRI ANENDRA SINGH PARIHAR - PANEL LAWYER)
This petition coming on for admission this day, th e court passed the
following:
ORDER
This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has
been preferred by petitioner/accused for quashing the FIR No.313/2022,
registered at Police Station Jaora City, District Ratlam and also the charges
framed against her under Sections 8/15 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, and all proceedings subsequent thereto.
2. As per the prosecution, on 08.09.2022, on receipt of a secret
information, the Police apprehended a truck and trolley bearing registration No.
M.P.-43-AC- 9294 and recovered total 80 kilograms of contraband poppy
Signed by: JYOTI
CHOURASIA
Signing time: 02-Feb-24
3:08:25 PM
straw from the possession of co-accused Govardhan and Vikas which was
being transported by them without a valid licence. Thereafter, their
memorandum under Section 27 of the Evidence Act were recorded in which
they stated that they were carrying out the said transportation on the basis of the
contraband having been supplied to them by co-accused Vinod and Laxman.
Thereafter, memorandum under Section 27 of the Evidence Act of Vinod was
recorded in which he stated that the contraband belongs to the field owned by
her mother/the petitioner. On the basis of aforesaid memorandum the petitioner
h a s been implicated for the present offence and upon conclusion of
the
investigation charge sheet has been filed against her before the Court concerned
and charges as aforesaid have been framed against her by the trial Court by
order dated 26.05.2023.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is
innocent and has falsely been implicated in the case. She was neither present on
the spot nor was any contraband recovered from her possession. The petitioner
is not the owner of the vehicle. Her implication is only on the basis of the
disclosure statement of co-accused persons recorded under Section 27 of the
Indian Evidence Act in which they stated that co-accused Goverdhan and Vikas
had procured the contraband from co-accused Vinod and Laxman and that the
contraband belongs to the field which is owned by the petitioner, who is the
mother of co-accused Vinod. However, no fact as such could be discovered
on the basis of the aforesaid statement therefore there is no legally admissible
evidence within the meaning of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act
amounting to discovery of fact. Apart from this, there is no other evidence
available on record to connect the petitioner with the present crime. It is hence
submitted that the FIR against the petitioner deserves to be quashed.
Signed by: JYOTI
CHOURASIA
Signing time: 02-Feb-24
3:08:25 PM
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/State has supported the
impugned FIR and has prayed for rejection of the petition submitting that there
is sufficient material available on record against the petitioner.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the
record.
6. From perusal of the material available on record, it appears that no
recovery has been made from the possession of the petitioner. Neither is she the
owner of the vehicle in which the contraband was being transported nor was
she present in the vehicle at the time of the alleged incident. She was not
apprehended from the spot. She has been implicated only on the basis of
disclosure statement of co-accused recorded under Section 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act in which they deposed that co-accused Goverdhan and Vikas had
procured the contraband from co-accused Vinod and Laxman and that the
contraband belongs to the field which is owned by the petitioner, who is the
mother of co-accused Vinod.
7. Recently, this Court in the case of Dilip Kumar Vs. State of M.P. ,
M.Cr.C. No.2748/2022 decided on 12.04.2022 has held in paragraph No.15 to
18 as under:“15. A close scrutiny of the charge sheet reveals that apart from
the aforesaid memo and the bank statement of Dangi brothers, there is
n o other material available on record to suggest that the present
petitioner Deelep had also facilitated the sale of fake fertilizer which was
prepared by Suresh Dangi and other accused persons. There is also no
evidence available on record to suggest that the present petitioner
Deelep obtained from Suresh Dangi any amount over and above the
Signed by: JYOTI
CHOURASIA
Signing time: 02-Feb-24
3:08:25 PM
requisite amount of the sale of gypsum granules to him, which can be
said to be connected with the sale of fake fertilizer.
16. Regarding admissibility of the confessional statement given by
a co-accused and of the petitioner, a reference may be had to the
decision rendered by the Supreme Court, authored by Vivian Bose, J. in
the case of Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra), the
relevant paras 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the same read, as under:
“8. Gurubachan‟s confession has played an important part
in implicating the appellant, and the question at once arises, how
far and in what way the confession of an accused person can be
used against a co-accused? It is evident that it is not evidence in
the ordinary sense of the term because, as the Privy Council say in
Bhuboni Sahu v. King. “It does not indeed come within the
definition of „evidence‟ contained in Section 3 of the Evidence
Act., It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of
the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination.” Their
Lordships also point out that it is
“obviously evidence of a very weak type … It is a much
weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approve, which is
not subject to any of those infirmities.” They stated in addition that
such a confession cannot be made the foundation of a conviction
and can only be used in “support of other evidence”. In view of
these remarks it would be pointless to cover the same ground, but
we feel it is necessary to expound this further as misapprehension
still exists. The question is, in what way can it be used in support of
other evidence? Can it be used to fill in missing gaps? Can it be
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CHOURASIA
Signing time: 02-Feb-24
3:08:25 PM
used to corroborate an accomplice or, as in the present case, a
witness who, though not an accomplice, is placed in the same
category regarding credibility because the Judge refuses to believe
him except insofar as he is corroborated?
9. In our opinion, the matter was put succinctly by Sir Lawrence
Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chucker-butty where he said that
such a confession can only be used to “lend assurance to other evidence
against a co-accused” or, to put it in another way, as Reilly J. did in In
re Periyaswami Moopan “the provision goes no further than this where
there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support
his conviction, then the kind of confession described in Section 30 may
be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that
evidence”.
10. Translating these observations into concrete terms they come
to this. The proper way to approach a case of this kind is, first, to
marshal the evidence against the accused excluding the confession
altogether from consideration and see whether, if it is believed, a
conviction
could safely be based on it. If it is capable of belief
independently of the confession, then ofcourse it is not necessary to call
the confession in aid. But cases may arise where the Judge is not
prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if
believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an event
the Judge may call in aid the confession and use it to lend assurance to
the other evidence and thus fortify himself in believing what without the
aid of the confession he would not be prepared to accept.
11. Then, as regards its use in the corroboration of accomplices
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CHOURASIA
Signing time: 02-Feb-24
3:08:25 PM
and approvers. A co-accused who confesses is naturally an accomplice
and the danger of using the testimony of one accomplice to corroborate
another has repeatedly been pointed out. The danger is in no way
lessened when the “evidence” is not on oath and cannot be tested by
cross-examination. Prudence will dictate the same rule of caution in the
case of a witness who though not an accomplice is regarded by the
Judge as having no greater probative value. But all these are only rules
of prudence. So far as the law is concerned, a conviction can be based
on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice provided the Judge
has the rule of caution, which experience dictates, in mind and gives
reasons why he thinks it would be safe in a given case to disregard it.
Two of us had occasion to examine this recently in Rameshwar v. State
of Rajasthan. It follows that the testimony of an accomplice can in law
be used to corroborate another though it ought not to be so used save in
exceptional circumstances and for reasons disclosed. As the Privy
Council observe in Bhuboni Sahu v. King:
“The tendency to include the innocent with the guilty is peculiarly
prevalent in India, as judges have noted on innumerable occasions, and
it is very difficult for the court to guard against the danger … The only
real safeguard against the risk of condemning the innocent with the
guilty lies in insisting on independent evidence which in some measure
implicates such accused.”
(emphasis supplied)
1 7 . Testing the facts of the case at hand on the anvil of the
aforesaid dictum of the Supreme Court, this Court finds that the only
Signed by: JYOTI
CHOURASIA
Signing time: 02-Feb-24
3:08:25 PM
material evidence against the present petitioner is the memo prepared
under Section 27 of the Evidence Act by the co-accused and certain
bank transactions of the co-accused in which he has sent certain amount
to the present petitioner through NEFT. In such facts and circumstances
o f the case, if the petitioner who is in the business of manufacturing
Gypsum Granules and Allied products, and if in the legitimate business
transaction the aforesaid granules were purchased by the other accused
persons and in turn they use it in the manufacture of fake fertilizer, such
act, in the considered opinion of this Court, would not amount to an
offence for the present petitioner and he cannot be held guilty for the
aforesaid act of the co-accused persons in the absence of any other
material available on record to connect the petitioner with the offence,
as has already been observed above.
18. Resultantly, the petition stands allowed and the charge sheet,
so far as it relates to the present petitioner is concerned, as also the
further proceedings initiated in the trial Court against him stands
quashed.”
8. On a perusal of the case diary as well as the charge-sheet filed in the
matter, this Court is of the opinion that against the present petitioner, there is no
tangible evidence collected by the prosecution except the memos prepared
under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act at the instance of other co-accused
person.
9. In view of the aforesaid, the petition deserves to be and is accordingly
allowed. FIR registered at Crime No.313/2022 at Police Station Jaora City,
District Ratlam as well as the consequent proceedings pursuant thereto
including the order dated 26.05.2023 passed by the trial Court framing charges
Signed by: JYOTI
CHOURASIA
Signing time: 02-Feb-24
3:08:25 PM
against the petitioner under Section 8/15 and 29 of the NDPS are hereby
quashed and the petitioner is discharged for the aforesaid offences.
(PRANAY VERMA)
JUDGE
jyoti
Signed by: JYOTI
CHOURASIA
Signing time: 02-Feb-24
3:08:25 PM
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