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Page No.# 1/7
GAHC010178522025
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THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : Crl.Pet./1265/2025
LAKHESWAR SAIKIA
SON LATE TILESWAR SAIKIA, BY OCCUPATION CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
SERVICE, RESIDING AT FLAT- 3B, PROTECH PELICAN APARTMENT,
JAPORIGOG, DR. N.P. BORDOLOI PATH, GUWAHATI, ASSAM, PIN-781005,
CELL NO. 9163331630
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR
REP. BY THE LD. PP, ASSAM
2:SRI S ANDEEP KUMAR GOGOI
SON OF BIRANDA KUMAR GOGOI
DIVISIONAL MANAGER
FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA
DIVISIONAL OFFICE
TENGAPARA
KOKRAJHAR
ASSAM- 783370 AND RESIDING AT HOUSE NO. 58
PARAG DAS PATH
CHANDMARI
GUWAHATI
ASSAM
PIN-781003
CELL NO. 91633-3163
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. N ALAM, Y KHAUND,MR. K MOHAMMED,MR. D DAS SR.
ADV,S A BAKHTIAR,MR N J DAS
Advocate for the Respondent : PP, ASSAM, MR. P K ROY (R-2),MRS. A CHAKRABORTY (R2),MR. B DAS (R-2)
Page No.# 2/7
Linked Case : I.A.(Crl.)/514/2026
LAKHESWAR SAIKIA
SON LATE TILESWAR SAIKIA
BY OCCUPATION CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE
RESIDING AT FLAT- 3B
PROTECH PELICAN APARTMENT
JAPORIGOG
DR. N.P. BORDOLOI PATH
GUWAHATI
ASSAM
PIN-781005
CELL NO. 9163331630
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR
REP. BY THE LD. PP
ASSAM
2:SRI S ANDEEP KUMAR GOGOI
SON OF BIRANDA KUMAR GOGOI
DIVISIONAL MANAGER
FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA
DIVISIONAL OFFICE
TENGAPARA
KOKRAJHAR
ASSAM- 783370 AND RESIDING AT HOUSE NO. 58
PARAG DAS PATH
CHANDMARI
GUWAHATI
ASSAM
PIN-781003
CELL NO. 91633-31630
-----------Advocate for : MR. N ALAM
Advocate for : PP
ASSAM appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR
Page No.# 3/7
:: BEFORE ::
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PARTHIVJYOTI SAIKIA
O R D E R
18.05.2026
Heard Mr. D. Das, the learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. K. Mohammed, the
learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. M.P. Goswami, the learned
Addl. Public Prosecutor, Assam as well as Mr. S.K. Chakraborty, the learned counsel
appearing for the Respondent No.2.
2.
This is an application under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023 praying for quashing
the charge sheet being C.S. No.15/2022 dated 31.11.2022 in respect of the petitioner
Lakheswar Saikia arising out of BI(EO) P.S. Case No.11/2018 dated 02.07.2018 under
Section 120B/ 420/ 409 of the Indian Penal Code.
3.
The Regional Office of the Food Corporation of India had floated a Notice Inviting
Tender for appointment of regular contractors. After submission of tenders, the lowest
bid was accepted. The bidder submitted 2 Bank Guarantees issued by the UCO Bank.
Food Corporation of India wanted to confirm the genuineness of the Bank Guarantees
and to that effect, sent a letter to the said Bank at Guwahati. Subsequently, because
of some criminal acts by the contractor, his contract was terminated and the Food
Corporation of India had initiated a process for encashing Bank Guarantees given by
contractor. It was discovered that both the Bank Guarantees were not genuine.
Therefore, Food Corporation of India prayed that action should be taken against the
contractor M/s. 4A Enterprise.
4.
After completion of the Investigation, police filed the charge sheet against the
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present petitioner who was the General Manager of Food Corporation of Indian,
Regional Office and also against some other persons.
5.
On 28.07.2025, the trial court took cognizance of the offences against the
present petitioner Lakheswar Saikia under Section 120(B)/420/ and 409 of the Indian
Penal Code. The trial court took cognizance of the said offences against some other
accused also.
6.
Mr. Das has submitted that the petitioner Lakheswar Saikia had acted in his
official capacity. Therefore, sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is necessary and without prosecution sanction, the trial court has taken
cognizance of the offences against the present petitioner. Mr. Das has submitted that
the genuineness or correctness of the acts done by the present petitioner Lakheswar
Saikia is immaterial in the absence of prior sanction for prosecution. In order to
buttress his point, Mr. Das has relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
that was delivered in Suneeti Toteja v. State of U.P. and Another, reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 433. Paragraphs 29, 31 and 32 are quoted as under:
“29. As per the aforementioned proposition, it is only to be seen if the accused public
servant was acting in the performance of his/her official duties, and if the answer is in the
affirmative, then prior sanction for their prosecution is a condition precedent to the cognizance
of the cases against them by the courts. It is therefore largely a disputed question of fact here
and not a question of law. However, this fact of appellant herein acting in her official capacity
is not seriously contested by the respondents herein. In the instant case, the appellant had
filed the counter affidavit and interacted with the complainant in her capacity of a Presiding
Officer, ICC. The correctness of the allegations with regard to the conduct of the appellant
need not be ascertained herein by this Court but the fact that she was acting in her official
duty is sufficient to hold that a prior sanction from the department was in fact necessary
before the Magistrate taking cognizance against her. The Magistrate therefore erred in
proceeding to take cognizance against the appellant without the sanction for prosecution being
received from BIS, and since BIS has eventually refused to grant sanction for the prosecution
of the appellant, the prosecution against the appellant could not have been sustained.
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31. Similarly, learned counsel for the complainant had placed reliance on the judgment of
this Court in Subramanian Swamy to lend credence to the argument of deemed sanction for
prosecution. However, even the said judgment does not in any manner lay down the notion of
deemed sanction. First, the said judgment dealt primarily with the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 and the sanction for prosecution under that Act. Secondly, G.S. Singhvi, J. while
penning his separate but concurring opinion in the said judgment, had given some guidelines
for the consideration of the Parliament, one of which is to the effect that at the end of the
extended period of time limit, if no decision is taken, sanction will be deemed to have been
granted to the proposal for prosecution, and the prosecuting agency or the private
complainant will proceed to file the chargesheet/complaint in the court to commence
prosecution within fifteen days of the expiry of the aforementioned time limit. However, such a
proposition has not yet been statutorily incorporated by the Parliament and in such a scenario,
this Court cannot read such a mandate into the statute when it does not exist.
32. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the learned Magistrate was not right in taking
cognizance of the offence against the appellant herein without there being a sanction for
prosecution granted by the competent authority. Further, the High Court erred in not
considering the fact that the sanction for prosecution was not granted by the competent
authority under Section 197 of the CrPC and eventually the sanction was expressly denied by
the competent authority with respect to the allegations against the appellant. The necessary
sanction not having been granted has vitiated the very initiation of the criminal proceeding
against the appellant herein. Consequently, the chargesheet, the summoning order and the
consequent steps, if any, taken by the trial court pursuant to the same are liable to be
quashed qua the appellant herein and are thus quashed.”
7.
Mr. Das further relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court that was
delivered in G.C. Manjunath v. Seetaram, reported in (2025) 5 SCC 390. Paragraphs 34
and 35 are quoted as under:
“34. A careful reading of Section 197CrPC unequivocally delineates a statutory bar on
the Court's jurisdiction to take cognizance of offences alleged against public servants,
save without the prior sanction of the appropriate Government. The essential
precondition for the applicability of this provision is that the alleged offence must have
been committed by the public servant while acting in the discharge of, or purported
discharge of, their official duties. The protective mantle of Section 197CrPC, however,
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is not absolute; it does not extend to acts that are manifestly beyond the scope of
official duty or wholly unconnected thereto. Acts bereft of any reasonable nexus to
official functions fall outside the ambit of this safeguard and do not attract the bar
imposed under Section 197CrPC.
35. Both the aforesaid provisions serve a similar protective function. While Section 170
of the Police Act mandates prior sanction for prosecuting a public official for “acts done
under colour of, or in excess of, such duty or authority”, Section 197CrPC requires prior
sanction where a public official is accused of having committed “any offence alleged to
have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his
official duty”. The underlying rationale of both these statutory provisions is to
safeguard public functionaries from frivolous or vexatious prosecution for actions
undertaken in good faith in the discharge of, or purported discharge of, their official
duties, thereby ensuring that the fear of litigation does not impede the efficient
functioning of public administration.”
8.
I have given my anxious considerations to the submissions made by the learned
counsels for both sides.
9.
The genuineness of the allegations against the petitioner need not be
ascertained in this case. The fact that he was acting in his official capacity is sufficient
to hold that prior sanction from the authority concerned was necessary before the
Magistrate took cognizance against him. In this case, it is an admitted fact that prior
sanction could not be procured before filing of the charge sheet by the Investigating
Officer. In the charge sheet itself it has been mentioned about that fact.
10.
This Court is of the opinion that under the circumstance, taking cognizance of
the offences against the present petitioner without there being a sanction for
prosecution granted by the competent authority is not correct. The absence of
sanction for prosecution has vitiated the very initiation of the criminal proceedings
against the present petitioner. Hence, the impugned order dated 28.07.2025 passed by
the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kamrup (M) at Guwahati in PRC Case
No.94/2023 is bad in law. In the result, the criminal proceedings of PRC Case
No.94/2023 against the present petitioner Lakheswar Saikia is quashed and set aside.
With the aforesaid direction, the criminal petition and the connected
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Interlocutory Application are disposed of accordingly.
JUDGE
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