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2026:HHC:43211
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 24 of 2025
Reserved on: 24.09.2026
Date of Decision:06.10.2026
Kusha Devi
....Appellant
Versus
Rajeev Kumar
.... Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No.
For the appellant
:
Mr V.S. Rathore, Advocate.
For the Respondent
:
Nemo
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The
present
appeal
is
directed
against
the
judgment dated 13.08.2025, passed by learned Sessions Judge,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. (learned appellate Court), vide
which judgment of conviction dated 30.09.2023, and order of
sentence dated
04.10.2023, passed by
learned Judicial
Magistrate, First Class, Kangra, District Kangra, H.P. (learned
trial Court) were set aside. (The parties shall hereinafter be
referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the
learned trial Court for convenience).
. Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2026:HHC:43211
2.
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
revision are that the complainant filed a complaint before the
learned trial Court against the accused for the commission of
an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments (NI Act). It was asserted that the complainant
had deposited ₹1,12,630/-on 24.08.2016 and ₹1,12,630 on
25.08.2016 with the office of the accused. The complainant
deposited the relevant documents with the accused on the
date of maturity. The accused issued a cheque of ₹2,22,270/towards the part repayment of the amount. The complainant
presented the cheque before his bank, but it was dishonoured
with an endorsement ‘funds insufficient’. The complainant
sent a notice to the accused asking him to pay the money
within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. The notice was duly
served upon the accused, but he failed to pay the money.
Hence, a complaint was filed before the learned trial Court
against the accused, for taking action as per the law.
3.
The learned trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of
accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence
2026:HHC:43211
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he
pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4.
The complainant examined herself (CW1) to prove
her complaint.
5.
The accused denied the complainant's case in his
statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (CrPC). He stated that a false case was filed against
him. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.
5.
The learned trial Court held that the accused had
issued a cheque towards the repayment of the amount
deposited with him. There is a presumption that the cheque
was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability.
The accused had failed to rebut the presumption. The cheque
was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’.
The notice was duly served upon the accused, requiring him to
pay the money within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. The
accused failed to repay the money. Hence, all the ingredients
of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138
of the NI Act were duly satisfied. The learned trial Court
convicted the accused of the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and sentenced him
2026:HHC:43211
to undergo simple imprisonment for 2 months, and pay
compensation of ₹1,25,000/- to the complainant.
6.
Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed
by the learned trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which
was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at
Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. (learned appellate Court).
The learned appellate Court held that the cheque was issued
by B.M. Nidhi Ltd. The accused had put the signatures as an
authorised signatory. B. M. Nidhi Ltd. was not arrayed as an
accused, and the complaint was not maintainable in the
absence of the company. The learned trial Court failed to
consider this aspect. Hence, the learned appellate Court
allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and order passed
by the learned trial Court and acquitted the accused.
7.
Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the
learned appellate Court, the complainant has filed the present
appeal asserting that the learned appellate Court erred in
holding that the complaint was not maintainable in the
absence of the company. The accused was prosecuted as
Managing Director-cum-Proprietor of the Company. He had
put his signature on the cheque, and he was liable for its
2026:HHC:43211
dishonour. The accused did not dispute his liability to pay the
money. He had in fact paid ₹1,25,000/- during the pendency
of the proceedings, as per the judgment of the learned trial
Court, which showed that the accused owed a liability to the
complainant. The learned appellate Court erred in ignoring
this circumstance. Hence, it was prayed that the present
appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned
appellate Court be set aside.
8.
I have heard Mr V. S. Rathore, learned counsel for
the appellant/complainant, who submitted that the learned
appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. The cheque
was signed by the accused, and he never disputed his liability.
He had paid ₹1,25,000/- to the complainant during the
pendency
of
the
complaint,
clearly
showing
that
he
acknowledged his liability to pay the amount. The learned
appellate Court dismissed the complaint on a technical
ground without realising that the purpose of Section 138 of
the NI Act is to ensure that people repose confidence in the
transactions carried out by cheques. The learned trial Court
had taken an unreasonable view that could not have been
taken by any reasonable person. Therefore, he prayed that the
2026:HHC:43211
present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the
learned appellate Court be set aside.
9.
I
have
given
considerable
thought
to
the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the
records carefully.
10.
The complaint mentions that the complainant had
deposited the amount in the agency/office of the accused. She
stated in her cross-examination that she had deposited the
money in the company of the accused on different dates. She
did not remember the name of the company. The notice was
also issued to the accused and not to the company.
11.
Therefore, the complainant's admitted case was
that the money was deposited in the company. The cheque
(Ext.C1) also mentions the name of the drawer as B.M. Nidhi
Ltd. The use of the word ‘Limited’ shows that B. M. Nidhi is a
Company. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had rightly
held that the cheque was issued by the company. The
complaint also mentioned the accused, Rajeev Kumar
Sharma, as Managing Director-cum-Proprietor of B. M. Nidhi
Ltd. Thus, the accused was arrayed in the capacity of the
Managing Director of the Company. It was laid down by the
2026:HHC:43211
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels &
Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661, that it is not permissible to
prosecute the Directors in the absence of the Company. It was
observed:
“58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we
are of the considered opinion that the commission of
the offence by the company is an express condition
precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others.
Thus, the words “as well as the company” appearing in
the section make it unmistakably clear that when the
company can be prosecuted, then only the persons
mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously
liable for the offence, subject to the averments in the
petition and proof thereof. One cannot be oblivious to
the fact that the company is a juristic person and it has
its respectability. If a finding is recorded against it, it
would create a concavity in its reputation. There can be
situations when the corporate reputation is affected
when a Director is indicted.
59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the
irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the
prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of
a company as an accused is imperative.”
12.
This judgment was followed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Charanjit Pal Jindal v. L.N. Metalics, (2015) 15
SCC 768: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1033, and it was held:
“11. From the aforesaid finding, we find that after
analysing all the provisions and having noticed the
different decisions rendered by this Court, the threejudge Bench arrived at the irresistible conclusion that
for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of
the Act, arraigning a company as an accused is
2026:HHC:43211
imperative. Hence, in this case, we find no reason to
refer the matter to the larger Bench.
12. In the present case, only the appellant was
impleaded as an accused. In that view of the matter, we
are of the view that the complaint with respect to the
offence under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the
Act was not maintainable following the decision in
Aneeta Hada [Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours
(P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661: (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 350: (2012)
3 SCC (Cri) 241]. We set aside the judgment dated 17-42010 passed by the trial court, the order dated 27-52011 passed by the appellate court and the impugned
judgment dated 9-11-2012 passed by the High Court of
Orissa, Cuttack in Charanjit Pal Jindal v. L.N. Metalics
[Charanjit Pal Jindal v. L.N. Metalics, Criminal Revision
No. 467 of 2011, decided on 9-11-2012 (Ori)]. The
appellant stands acquitted.”
13.
This position was reiterated in Himanshu v. B.
Shivamurthy, (2019) 3 SCC 797: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 83, and it
was held:
“13. In the absence of the company being arraigned as
an accused, a complaint against the appellant was
therefore not maintainable. The appellant had signed
the cheque as a Director of the company and for and on
its behalf. Moreover, in the absence of a notice of
demand being served on the company and without
compliance with the proviso to Section 138, the High
Court was in error in holding that the company could
now be arraigned as an accused.”
14.
A similar view was taken in Pawan Kumar Goel v. State of
U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1598, wherein it was held:
“31. This Court has been firm with the stand that if the
complainant fails to make specific averments against
the company in the complaint for the commission of
2026:HHC:43211
an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, the same
cannot be rectified by taking recourse to general
principles of criminal jurisprudence. Needless to say,
the provisions of Section 141 impose vicarious liability
by deeming a fiction which presupposes and requires
the commission of the offence by the company or firm.
Therefore, unless the company or firm has committed
the offence as a principal accused, the persons
mentioned in sub-sections (1) and (2) would not be
liable to be convicted based on the principles of
vicarious liability.”
15.
Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, the prosecution of the company was
essential before prosecuting its Managing Director/official.
The learned appellate Court had rightly held that the
complaint was not maintainable in the absence of the
company. This was a reasonable view that could have been
taken based on the material placed before the learned
appellate Court, and no interference is required with the
reasonable view of the learned appellate Court while deciding
an appeal against acquittal.
16.
No other point was urged.
17.
In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it
is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any,
also stand disposed of.
2026:HHC:43211
18.
In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed
to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety
in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial
Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six
months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave
Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the
leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof,
shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
19.
Records be sent back to the learned Court below
forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
06th October, 2026.
(Ravinder)
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