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2026:HHC:47941
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 443 of 2025 and
Cr. Appeal (C-SB) No. 13 of 2026
Reserved on: 14.10.2026
Date of Decision: 02.11.2026.
1.
Cr. Appeal No. 443 of 2025
Rajesh Kumar
...Appellant
Versus
State of H.P.
2.
...Respondent
Cr. Appeal (C-SB) No. 13 of 2026
Pradeep Kumar
...Appellant
Versus
State of H.P.
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the appellant(s)
:
Mr
Yashveer
Singh
Rathore,
Advocate, in Cr. Appeal No. 443 of
2025 and Mr K.S. Gill, Advocate, in
Cr. Appeal (C-SB) No. 13 of 2026.
For the Respondent
:
Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional
Advocate General (in both the
appeals).
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:47941
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeals are directed against the judgment
of conviction and order of sentence dated 01.07.2025, passed by
the learned Special Judge, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P.
(learned Trial Court), vide which the respondents (accused before
the learned Trial Court) were convicted of the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 20 and 29 of the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act) and were
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 5 years, pay a
fine of ₹70,000/- each, and in default of payment of fine, to
undergo further simple imprisonment for three months for the
commission of the aforesaid offences.
(The parties shall
hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed
before the learned Trial Court for convenience).
2.
Both the appeals have been preferred against the
same judgment; therefore, they are being taken up together for
disposal.
3.
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
appeals are that the police presented a challan against the
accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 20 and 29 of the NDPS Act. It
2026:HHC:47941
was asserted that ASI Raj Kumar (PW-12), HHC Rakesh Kumar
(PW-13), and HHC Rakesh Kumar (PW-15) were present at
Longni near the Forest Hut on 09.02.2019 in the official vehicle
bearing registration No. HP-33B-3667, being driven by HHG
Yaseen Mohd. (PW-11). A motorcycle bearing registration No.
HP-22B-0889 came from Joginder Nagar at about 10:40 PM. The
driver identified himself as Rajesh Kumar, and the pillion rider
identified himself as Pradeep Kumar. Rajesh Kumar and Pradeep
Kumar had backpacks with them. The motorcyclists became
perplexed after seeing the police. The police associated Dila Ram
(PW-9) and Desh Raj (PW-10) and searched the backpacks. A
white pant, blue jeans, and a carry bag were found inside the
backpack being carried by Rajesh Kumar. The carry bag contained
cannabis in the form of black sticks. The police also checked the
backpack being carried by Pradeep Kumar and found a polythene
packet containing cannabis. The police weighed the cannabis.
The cannabis recovered from the backpack of Rajesh Kumar was
found to be 288 grams, and the cannabis found in the backpack of
Pradeep Kumar was found to be 102 grams.
4.
The charas was put in the carry bag in the same
manner in which it was recovered. The carry bag was put in a
2026:HHC:47941
cloth parcel, and the parcel was sealed with the seal impression
of the seal 'DPRA'. Sample seal (Ex. P-3/PW-12) was taken on a
separate piece of cloth. NCB-1 form (Ex. P-2/PW-12) was filled in
triplicate, and the seal impression was also obtained on the NCB1 form. The seal was handed over to Desh Raj after use. The
charas found from the backpack of Pradeep Kumar was put in the
polythene packet, and the packet was put in a cloth parcel. The
parcel was sealed with three impressions of seal 'DPRN'. Sample
seal 'DPRN' (Ex. PW-6/H) was taken on a separate piece of cloth,
NCB-1 form was filled, and the seal impression was put on the
form. The parcel, motorcycle, and the backpacks were seized vide
memo (Ex. PW-6/A).
5.
The accused were apprised of their right to be
searched before the Magistrate. The accused consented to be
searched before the Magistrate. Memos (Ex. PW-6/D and
Ex. PW-6/E) were prepared. Executive Magistrate, Manphool
Singh (PW-14), was requested to visit the spot. The personal
search of the accused was conducted in the presence of the
Executive Magistrate, but no incriminating article was found.
Memos (Ex. PW-6/F and Ex. PW-6/G) were prepared. ASI Raj
Kumar took photographs (Ex. P-4/PW-12 to Ex. P-8/PW-12). He
2026:HHC:47941
prepared the rukka (Ex. P-9/PW-12) and handed it over to HHC
Rakesh Kumar No. 111 with a direction to take it to Police Station
Dharampur for the registration of the FIR.
6.
HHC Rakesh Kumar handed over the rukka to
Inspector Suram Singh (PW-16), who registered the FIR
(Ex. P-14/PW-16). Investigation was handed over to ASI Tibati
Ram (PW-17), who visited the spot, where ASI Raj Kumar handed
over the accused persons, case property, and case file to ASI
Tibati Ram. ASI Tibati Ram conducted further investigation. He
prepared
the
site
plan
(Ex.
P-23/PW-17),
recorded
the
statements of the witnesses as per their versions and arrested the
accused vide memo (Ex. P-24/PW-17). ASI Tibati Ram produced
the accused, cloth parcel, and case file before Inspector Suram
Singh (PW-16), who checked the seals and put his seal
impression 'DPRK' on the parcels. He also put the seal
impression on the NCB-1 form (Ex. P-2/PW-12). He issued a
resealing certificate (Ex. P-18/PW-16) and handed over the case
property to HC Pradeep Kumar (PW-5), who made an entry in the
register of Malkhana and deposited it in the Malkhana. He
handed over the case property to SHO on 11.02.2019 for
compliance with Section 52A of the NDPS Act.
2026:HHC:47941
7.
Suram Singh prepared an application (Ex. P-19/PW-
16) for certifying the inventory (Ex. P-20/PW-16). He handed
over the documents and the case property to ASI Tibati Ram
(PW-17), who carried them to the Court. The Court resealed the
parcels with three seals bearing the impression 'JMIC-II Mandi'
and passed an order (Ex. P-27/PW-17). ASI Tibati Ram took
photographs of the inventory proceedings (Ex. P-29/PW-17 to
Ex. P-34/PW-17). The case property was again deposited with
MHC Pradeep Kumar (PW-5), who handed over the case property
and the other documents to HHC Kashmir Singh (PW-3) with a
direction to carry them to FSL, Junga vide RC No. 27/2019
(Ex.PW-5/A). ASI Tibati Ram prepared the special report (Ex. P28/PW-17) and handed it over to Constable Roop Chand (PW-2)
with a direction to carry it to the supervisory officer. HHC Roop
Singh handed over the special report to SDPO, Sarkaghat, who
made an endorsement on the special report and handed it over to
HC Sandeep (PW-6), who made an entry in the special report
entry register (Ex. PW-6/A) and retained the special report on
the record.
8.
The result of chemical analysis (Ex. P-21/PW-6) was
issued, in which it was shown that the exhibit stated as cannabis
2026:HHC:47941
in cloth parcels was extract of cannabis and samples of charas.
Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and
after the completion of the investigation, the challan was
prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.
9.
Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused. When the accused appeared, they were
charged with the commission of offences punishable under
Section 20 of the NDPS Act, to which they pleaded not guilty and
claimed to be tried.
10.
The prosecution examined 18 witnesses to prove its
case. HC Pramod Kumar (PW1) witnessed the recovery. HHC Roop
Singh (PW2) was working as MHC, with whom the case property
was deposited. HHC Kashmir Singh (PW3) carried the case
property to FSL Junga. HHC Karam Singh (PW4) brought the case
property from FSL Junga. Pradeep Kumar (PW5) was posted as
MHC and dealt with the case property. HC Sandeep (PW6) was
posted as reader to the SDPO, to whom the special report was
handed over. Constable Baldev Singh (PW7) recorded the
statements of witnesses as per the instructions of the
Investigating Officer. HHC Suresh Kumar (PW8) proved the entry
in the daily diary. Dila Ram (PW9) and Desh Raj (PW10) have not
2026:HHC:47941
supported the prosecution version. HHC Yaseen Mohd. (PW11), SI
Raj Kumar (PW12), HHC Rakesh Kumar (PW13) and HHC Rakesh
Kumar (PW15) witnessed the recoveries. Manphool Singh
(PW14), Executive Magistrate, witnessed the personal search of
the accused. Inspector Suram Singh (PW16) was posted as SHO,
who had re-sealed the parcel. Tibati Ram (PW17) investigated the
matter. Prithi Raj (PW18) developed the photographs.
11.
The accused, in their statements recorded under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied the
prosecution case in its entirety. They claimed that the witnesses
had deposed falsely against them and they were innocent. They
did not produce any evidence in their defence.
12.
Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. There was
nothing in their cross-examination to show that they were
making false statements. Minor contradictions in the statements
of the witnesses were not sufficient to discard their testimonies.
The mere fact that the independent witnesses had not supported
the prosecution case was not sufficient to doubt the prosecution
version. The integrity of the case property was established.
2026:HHC:47941
Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the
accused as mentioned above.
13.
Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by
the learned Trial Court, the accused have preferred separate
appeals asserting that the learned Courts below erred in
appreciating the evidence on record. The search and seizure were
not proved as per the law. The provisions of Section 50 of the
NDPS Act were not complied with. The independent witnesses
had not supported the prosecution version. The backpack from
which the recovery was effected was not produced before the
Court. The integrity of the case property was not established. The
sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court was excessive and
disproportionate to the quantity of charas stated to have been
recovered from the possession of the accused. Therefore, they
prayed that the present appeals be allowed and the judgment and
order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
14.
I have heard M/s Yashveer Singh Rathore and K S Gill,
learned counsel for the accused, and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned
Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.
15.
M/s Yashveer Singh Rathore and K.S. Gill, learned
counsel for the accused, submitted that the prosecution’s
2026:HHC:47941
witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. The
independent witnesses had not supported the prosecution’s case.
The backpack was not produced before the Court. All these
circumstances made the prosecution’s version doubtful. The
learned Trial Court had imposed a harsh sentence. Hence, they
prayed that the present appeals be allowed and the judgment and
order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
16.
Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent-State, submitted that the official
witnesses had proved the prosecution version. The mere fact that
independent witnesses had not supported the prosecution case
was not sufficient to doubt it. The link evidence was complete,
and there is no infirmity in the judgment and order passed by the
learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeals be
dismissed.
17.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
18.
Dila Ram (PW9) stated that he and his friends were
coming from Dharampur side. They reached at Longni at about
9:00-9:30 p.m. The police signalled them to stop. Nothing had
happened on the spot. He was permitted to be cross-examined.
2026:HHC:47941
He denied that the police had signalled the driver of the
motorcycle bearing Registration No. HP-22B-0889 to stop, the
motorcyclist disclosed their names, the motorcycle rider had the
backpacks, the police searched the backpacks in his presence, or
that charas was recovered during the search. He admitted his
signatures on various memos. He denied the previous statement
recorded by the police.
19.
Desh Raj (PW10) stated that he and his friend were
coming from Dharampur side on a scooter. They reached Longni
at about 09:00-9:30 p.m., and the police asked them to stop.
Nothing had happened on the spot. He was permitted to be crossexamined. He denied that police had intercepted a motorcycle
bearing registration No. HP-22B-0889 or that the motorcyclist
revealed their names as Rajesh Kumar and Pradeep Kumar. He
denied that the motorcyclist had backpacks which were searched
by the police and charas was recovered. He denied the previous
statement recorded by the police. However, he admitted his
signatures on the various documents.
20.
It was submitted that the testimonies of these
witnesses made the prosecution case doubtful. This submission
cannot be accepted. These witnesses were contradicted with their
2026:HHC:47941
previous statements, and they denied that they had made any
such statement to the police. Tibati Ram (PW17) specifically
stated that he had recorded the statements of Desh Raj and Dila
Ram (Ex. P25/PW17 and Ex. P26/PW17) as per their version. This
was not challenged in the cross-examination, and it was only
suggested to him that the statements were recorded at the Police
Station. Therefore, the testimony of Tibati Ram that he had
recorded the statements of Desh Raj and Dila Ram as per their
versions has gone unrebutted and has to be accepted as correct.
Hence, Desh Raj and Dila Ram are shown to have made two
inconsistent statements: one before the police that the recovery
was made in their presence from the backpacks being carried by
the accused and the other before the Court that no recovery was
effected in their presence. Both the statements cannot stand
together, and their credit has been impeached under Section
155(3) of the Indian Evidence Act. It was laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727 that
where a witness has been thoroughly discredited by confronting
him with the previous statement, his statement cannot be relied
upon. However, when he is confronted with some portions of the
2026:HHC:47941
previous statement, his credibility is shaken to that extent, and
the rest of the statement can be relied upon. It was observed:
“52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that
even in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is crossexamined and contradicted with the leave of the court by
the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of
law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for
the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether, as a
result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the
witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be
believed regarding a part of his testimony. If the Judge
finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not
been completely shaken, he may, after reading and
considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with
due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other
evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he
finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case,
the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and
in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally
discredited, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence,
discard his evidence in toto.”
21.
This Court also took a similar view in Ian Stilman
versus State 2002(2) ShimLC 16 wherein it was observed:
“12. It is now well settled that when a witness who has
been called by the prosecution is permitted to be crossexamined on behalf of the prosecution, such a witness
loses credibility and cannot be relied upon by the defence.
We find support for the view we have taken from the
various authorities of the Apex Court. In Jagir Singh v. The
State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1400,
the Apex Court observed:
"It is now well settled that when a witness, who has
been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be
cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the
result of that course being adopted is to discredit this
2026:HHC:47941
witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part
of his testimony.
22.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Mahesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 13 SCC 271; (2009) 3 SCC
(Cri) 543; 2008 SCC OnLine SC 656 that where the witness had
made an inconsistent statement before the police, his testimony
before the Court cannot be relied upon. It was observed at page
289:
“49. It is the evidence of PW PSI Dhimole that portion
marked “A” appearing in the statement of PW 1 was
recorded by him correctly. The defence has not brought on
record any evidence to show why the investigating officer
had recorded the portion marked " A " of the statement of
PW 1 incorrectly. If PW 1, the maker of the complaint, has
chosen not to corroborate his earlier statement made in
the complaint and recorded during investigation, the
conduct of such a witness, for no plausible and tenable
reasons pointed out on record, will give rise to doubt as to
the testimony of the investigating officer, who had
sincerely and honestly conducted the entire investigation
of the case. In these circumstances, we are of the view that
PW 1 has tried to conceal the material truth from the Court
with the sole purpose of shielding and protecting the
appellant for reasons best known to the witness and
therefore, no benefit could be given to the appellant for
unfavourable conduct of this witness to the prosecution.”
23.
It was held in Paramjeet Singh v. State of Uttarakhand,
(2010) 10 SCC 439: 2010 SCC OnLine SC 1087that where a witness
makes different statements at different times, he does not have
2026:HHC:47941
any regard for truth, and his testimony should be seen with due
care and caution. It was observed at page 448:
“16. The fact that the witness was declared hostile at the
instance of the Public Prosecutor and he was allowed to
cross-examine the witness furnishes no justification for
rejecting en bloc the evidence of the witness. However, the
court has to be very careful, as prima facie, a witness who
makes different statements at different times has no
regard for the truth. His evidence has to be read and
considered as a whole with a view to finding out whether
any weight should be attached to it. The court should be
slow to act on the testimony of such a witness; normally, it
should look for corroboration to his testimony. (Vide State
of Rajasthan v.Bhawani[(2003) 7 SCC 291: 2003 SCC (Cri)
1628].)
24.
It was laid down by this Court in Budh Ram Versus
State of H.P. 2020 Cri. L.J. 4254, that the prosecution's version
cannot be discarded because the independent witnesses did not
support it. It was observed:
Though the independent witnesses, PW-1 Rajiv Kumar and
PW-2 Hira Lal, were declared hostile and were crossexamined, the law in respect of appreciating the
testimonies of such witnesses is well settled. Hon'ble Apex
Court in Sudru versus State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 8 SCC
333, relying upon Bhajju versus State of M.P., 2010 4 SCC
327, has again reiterated the well-settled principle that
evidence of a hostile witness can be relied upon by the
prosecution version. Merely because a witness has turned
hostile, the same does not render his evidence or
testimony inadmissible in a trial, and such a conviction
can be based upon such testimony if it is corroborated by
other reliable evidence.
2026:HHC:47941
In a case titled Raja and Others versus State of Karnataka
(2016) 10 SCC 506, the Apex Court observed that the
evidence of a hostile witness cannot be altogether
discarded, and as such, it is open for the Court to rely on
the dependable part of such evidence which stands duly
corroborated by other reliable evidence on record.
In a case titled Selvaraj @ Chinnapaiyan versus State
represented by Inspector of Police, (2015) 2 SCC 662, the Apex
Court has observed that in a situation/case wherein the
witness deposes falsely in his/her cross-examination, that
itself is not sufficient to outrightly discard his/her
testimony in examination-in-chief. The Court held that a
conviction can be recorded believing the testimony of such
a witness given in examination-in-chief; however, such
evidence is required to be examined with great caution.
In Ashok alias Dangra Jaiswal versus State of Madhya
Pradesh, (2011) 5 SCC 123, it has been held as under: "The seizure witness turning hostile may not be very
significant by itself, as it is not an uncommon
phenomenon in criminal trials, particularly in cases
relating to the NDPS Act.”
25.
Therefore, the testimonies of the witnesses could not
have been used to discard the prosecution case.
26.
SI Raj Kumar (PW12) had effected the recovery. He
supported the prosecution case in his examination-in-chief,
which is not being reproduced to avoid prolixity and repetition.
He stated in his cross-examination that the police had left the
Police Station at about 08:53 p.m. The barrier was laid only at
Longini. No other vehicle was checked because the motorcycle
2026:HHC:47941
had arrived immediately after setting up the barrier. He admitted
that no motorcycle, Naib Tehsildar and the independent
witnesses were visible in the photographs. HHC Rakesh Kumar
left for the Police Station at about 11:55 p.m. with the Rukka and
reached the spot at about 05:00 a.m. He denied that no recovery
was effected and that he was making a false statement.
27.
HHG Yasmin (PW11) also supported the prosecution
version in his examination-in-chief, which is not being
reproduced to avoid repetition and prolixity. He stated in his
cross-examination that he was not a regular driver, but used to
perform the duty of the driver in the absence of the regular
driver. He did not remember the exact time when the naka was
laid. They had stayed at Kenchi Mode for 5-10 minutes. They put
the Naka at Longini at around 10:30 p.m. They had checked a
Scooty at Longini. The spot was busy, being on the National
Highway. They had stayed on the spot for about an hour. He
admitted that no photograph was taken in his presence by the
Investigating Officer. He denied that no recovery was effected
and that he was making a false statement.
28.
HHC Rakesh Kumar (PW13) also supported the
prosecution version in his examination-in-chief, which is not
2026:HHC:47941
being reproduced to avoid prolixity and repetition. He stated in
his cross-examination that police had checked 2-3 vehicles
before the motorcycle of the accused. He admitted that the place
of the incident was located on National Highway, which was a
busy road. He admitted that he had not seen the backpacks in the
Court from which the contraband was recovered. They had stayed
at the spot for about 1½ hours. He left the spot at about 11:55 p.m.
and reached the spot at 04:00 - 05:00 a.m. He travelled to the
Police Station by taking a lift and also returned to the spot by
taking a lift. He denied that no recovery was effected from the
accused.
29.
Rakesh Kumar (PW15) also supported the prosecution
version. He stated in his cross-examination that he had left the
Police Station at about 08:00 p.m. The police had checked 6-7
vehicles on the spot. The photographs were taken by ASI Raj
Kumar. However, the photograph of the bike was not taken. He
admitted that Des Raj was the Pradhan of Gram Panchayat,
Longni. The police remained on the spot for about 3-4 hours. He
admitted that the spot was a busy road. He did not remember the
time when the Investigating Officer had left the spot with the
Rukka. He denied that he was making a false statement.
2026:HHC:47941
30.
It
was
submitted
that
the
statements
of
the
prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material
particulars. The following contradictions were highlighted: (i)
HHC Yaseen Mohd. (PW11) stated that no photograph was
taken in his presence, whereas HHC Rakesh Kumar (PW15)
and SI Raj Kumar (PW12) stated that photographs were
taken on the spot.
(ii)
HHC Rakesh Kumar (PW13) stated that they had stayed on
the spot for about 1 and a half hours, whereas HHC Rakesh
Kumar (PW15) stated that they had stayed on the spot for
about 3-4 hours.
(iii)
SI Raj Kumar (PW12) stated that no vehicle was checked
because the motorcycle of the accused had reached the
spot immediately after setting up the barrier, whereas
HHC Rakesh Kumar (PW15) stated that they had checked
6-7 vehicles on the spot.
31.
It was submitted that these contradictions made the
prosecution case highly doubtful. This submission cannot be
accepted. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State of
Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the discrepancies in the
statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the
prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies. It
was observed: “32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task.
There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for the
2026:HHC:47941
appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved
principles for the appreciation of ocular evidence in a
criminal case can be enumerated as follows:
“I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the
approach must be whether the evidence of the witness,
read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once
that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary
for the Court to scrutinise the evidence more
particularly, keeping in view the deficiencies,
drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence
as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is
against the general tenor of the evidence given by the
witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the
evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief.
II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence
had the opportunity to form the opinion about the
general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the
appellate court, which had not this benefit, will have to
attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the
trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and
formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence
on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the
matter of trivial details.
III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is
quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But
courts should bear in mind that it is only when
discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so
incompatible with the credibility of his version that the
court is justified in jettisoning his evidence.
IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching
the core of the case, a hyper-technical approach by
taking sentences torn out of context here or there from
the evidence, attaching importance to some technical
error committed by the investigating officer, not going
to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit
rejection of the evidence as a whole.
V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations
falling in the narration of an incident (either as
2026:HHC:47941
between the evidence of two witnesses or as between
two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic
approach for judicial scrutiny.
VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess
a photographic memory and to recall the details of an
incident. It is not as if a videotape is replayed on the
mental screen.
VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken
by events. The witness could not have anticipated the
occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise.
The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to
be attuned to absorb the details.
VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to
person. What one may notice, another may not. An
object or movement might emboss its image on one
person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the
part of another.
IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a
conversation and reproduce the very words used by
them or heard by them. They can only recall the main
purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a
witness to be a human tape recorder.
X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time
duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their
estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at
the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people
to make very precise or reliable estimates in such
matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of
individuals, which varies from person to person.
XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall
accurately the sequence of events that take place in
rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is
liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated
later on.
XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be
overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing
cross-examination by counsel and, out of nervousness,
mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of
2026:HHC:47941
events, or fill in details from imagination on the spur of
the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness
sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking
foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is
giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence
witnessed by him.
XIII. A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent
with the evidence, need not necessarily be sufficient to
amount to a contradiction. Unless the former statement
has the potency to discredit the latter statement, even if
the latter statement is at variance with the former to
some extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that
witness.” [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State
of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217: 1983 Cri LJ 1096: (AIR 1983
SC 753) Leela Ram v. State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC
525: AIR 1999 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh v. State of
UP (AIR 1959 SC 1012)”
32.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Karan Singh v. State of U.P., (2022) 6 SCC 52: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 479:
2022 SCC OnLine SC 253 that the Court has to examine the
evidence of the witnesses to find out whether it has a ring of truth
or not. The Court should not give undue importance to
omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to
the heart of the matter. It was observed at page 60: “38. From the evidence of Mahender Singh, PW 4, it
appears that no specific question was put to him as to
whether the appellant was present at the place of
occurrence or not. This Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State of
Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC
434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238] held: (SCC p. 446, para 24)
“24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence
read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once
2026:HHC:47941
that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary
for the court to scrutinise the evidence more,
particularly keeping in view the deficiencies,
drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence
as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is
against the general tenor of the evidence given by the
witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the
evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief.
Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue
importance
to
omissions,
contradictions
and
discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter
and shake the basic version of the prosecution
witness.”
39. Referring to Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of
Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of
Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Mr
Tyagi argued that minor discrepancies caused by lapses in
memory were acceptable; contradictions were not. In this
case, there was no contradiction, only minor
discrepancies.
40. In Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan [Kuriya v. State of
Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 202], this
Court held: (SCC pp. 447-48, paras 30-32)
“30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the
discrepancies or improvements which do not materially
affect the case of the prosecution and are insignificant
cannot be made the basis for doubting the case of the
prosecution. The courts may not concentrate too much
on such discrepancies or improvements. The purpose is
to primarily and clearly sift the chaff from the grain
and find out the truth from the testimony of the
witnesses. Where it does not affect the core of the
prosecution case, such a discrepancy should not be
attached undue significance. The normal course of
human conduct would be that while narrating a
particular
incident,
there
may
occur
minor
discrepancies. Such discrepancies may even, in law,
render
the
depositions
inadmissible.
The
improvements or variations must essentially relate to
2026:HHC:47941
the material particulars of the prosecution case. The
alleged improvements and variations must be shown
with respect to the material particulars of the case and
the occurrence. Every such improvement, not directly
related to the occurrence, is not a ground to doubt the
testimony of a witness. The credibility of a definite
circumstance of the prosecution case cannot be
weakened with reference to such minor or insignificant
improvements. Reference in this regard can be made to
the judgments of this Court in Kathi Bharat Vajsur v.
State of Gujarat [Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat,
(2012) 5 SCC 724 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 740], Narayan
Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan
Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8
SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Gura Singh v. State of
Rajasthan [Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC
205: 2001 SCC (Cri) 323] and Sukhchain Singh v. State of
Haryana [Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 5
SCC 100: 2002 SCC (Cri) 961].
31. What is to be seen next is whether the version
presented in the Court was substantially similar to
what was said during the investigation. It is only when
exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the
case that the Court has to consider whether the witness
was stating the truth or not. [Ref. Sunil Kumar v. State
(NCT of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2003) 11 SCC 367: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055]].
32. These are variations which would not amount to any
serious consequences. The Court has to accept the
normal conduct of a person. The witness who is
watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten
by 15 people can hardly be expected to state a minuteby-minute description of the event. Everybody, and
more particularly a person who is known to or is related
to the deceased, would give all his attention to take
steps to prevent the assault on the victim and then to
make every effort to provide him with medical aid and
inform the police. The statements which are recorded
immediately upon the incident would have to be given a
2026:HHC:47941
little leeway with regard to the statements being made
and recorded with utmost exactitude. It is a settled
principle of law that every improvement or variation
cannot be treated as an attempt to falsely implicate the
accused by the witness. The approach of the court has
to be reasonable and practicable. Reference in this
regard can be made to Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana
[Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350:
(2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 266] and Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh
[Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 9 SCC 561: (2011) 3
SCC (Cri) 777].
41. In Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B. [Shyamal Ghosh v.
State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 685], this
Court held: (SCC pp. 666-67, paras 46 & 49)
“46. Then, it was argued that there are certain
discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of
the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as these witnesses
have given different timings as to when they had seen
the scuffling and strangulation of the deceased by the
accused. … Undoubtedly, some minor discrepancies or
variations are traceable in the statements of these
witnesses. But what the Court has to see is whether
these variations are material and affect the case of the
prosecution substantially. Every variation may not be
enough to adversely affect the case of the prosecution.
***
49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should
examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and
read the said statement along with the statements of
other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational
conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in
part and/or in isolation. We are unable to see any
material or serious contradiction in the statement of
these witnesses which may give any advantage to the
accused.”
42. In Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v.
State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238],
this Court held: (SCC p. 446, para 24)
2026:HHC:47941
“24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence
read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once
that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary
for the court to scrutinise the evidence more,
particularly keeping in view the deficiencies,
drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence
as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is
against the general tenor of the evidence given by the
witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the
evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief.
Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue
importance
to
omissions,
contradictions
and
discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter
and shake the basic version of the prosecution
witness.”
33.
Similar is the judgment in Anuj Singh v. State of Bihar,
2022 SCC OnLine SC 497: AIR 2022 SC 2817, wherein it was
observed:
“17. It is not disputed that there are minor contradictions
with respect to the time of the occurrence or injuries
attributed to the hand or foot, but the constant narrative
of the witnesses is that the appellants were present at the
place of occurrence, armed with guns, and they caused the
injury to informant PW-6. However, the testimony of a
witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely
because of minor contradictions or omissions, as observed
by this Court in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary &Anr. Vs.
State of Maharashtra, 2000 8 SCC 457. This Court, while
considering the issue of contradictions in the testimony
while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial, held
that only contradictions in material particulars and not
minor contradictions can be grounds to discredit the
testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para
42 of the judgment reads as under:
"42. Only such omissions which amount to a
contradiction in material particulars can be used to
2026:HHC:47941
discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission
in the police statement by itself would not
necessarily render the testimony of the witness
unreliable. When the version given by the witness in
the court is different in material particulars from
that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of
the prosecution becomes doubtful and not
otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear
in the statements of truthful witnesses as memory
sometimes plays false, and the sense of observation
differs from person to person. The omissions in the
earlier statement, if found to be of trivial details, as
in the present case, would not cause any dent in the
testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a contradiction of
a statement of a witness on any material point, that
is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of
such witness."
34.
Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, the statements of the witnesses cannot
be discarded due to omissions, contradictions, or discrepancies.
The Court must consider whether the discrepancies negatively
affect the prosecution's case and whether they pertain to the core
of the case rather than the details.
35.
The
contradiction
regarding
the
time
is
not
significant because no person remembers the time by looking at
the watch, and when anyone is asked about the time, he gives a
different time, which may or may not be correct. It was laid down
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai
v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217 that people make their
2026:HHC:47941
estimates by guesswork regarding the time on the spur of the
moment, and one cannot expect people to make very precise or
reliable estimates in such matters. It was observed:“(5) In regard to the exact time of an incident or the time
duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their
estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the
time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to
make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters.
Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which
varies from person to person.”
36.
Therefore, the contradiction regarding the time
cannot be used to discard the prosecution’s version.
37.
In the present case, the incident had taken place in
the year 2019. Statement of HHG Yaseen Mohammad was
recorded on 08.09.2022, more than three years after the incident,
and the statement of HHC Rakesh Kumar was recorded on
27.09.2023, four years after the incident. Human memory fails
with time, and contradictions are bound to come. Therefore, the
contradiction regarding the number of vehicles checked by the
police is not significant. Further, the failure to notice the taking
of a photograph by HHC Yaseen Mohammad can be because of an
error of observation or failure of memory, which cannot be used
to discard the prosecution version. Therefore, the submission
2026:HHC:47941
that the prosecution case has become doubtful because of the
discrepancies cannot be accepted.
38.
HHH Yaseen Mohammad (PW11) and HHC Rakesh
Kumar (PW13) admitted in their cross-examination that they had
not seen the backpacks from which the recovery was effected. It
was submitted that the prosecution had not produced the
backpack before the Court, which made the prosecution case
suspect. This submission cannot be accepted. The backpack
(Ex.MO-7) held by Rajesh Kumar and the backpack (Ex.MO-8)
held by Pradeep Kumar were shown to SI Raj Kumar and Rakesh
Kumar (PW15). The pant (Ex.MO-9) was also found in the
backpack (Ex.MO-8). Therefore, it is not correct to say that the
backpacks were not produced before the Court. They were duly
produced and identified by SI Raj Kumar and Rakesh Kumar
(PW15). Therefore, the prosecution case is not doubtful because
the backpacks were not shown to some of the witnesses.
39.
NCB-I Form (Ex. P2/PW12) mentions the date and
place of seizure as 09.02.2019 at 10:40 p.m. at Longni. It was
submitted that the motorcycle was intercepted at Longni at 10:40
p.m. and the seizure could not have been made at that time. This
submission will not help the accused. Column No. 2 of NCB-1
2026:HHC:47941
Form mentions the name and address of the offender as ASI Raj
Kumar, IO, PS, Dharampur at Mandi, which shows the level of
training of the Investigating Officer. Therefore, not much can be
made out from mentioning the date and time of seizure.
40.
It was submitted that only the photographs of the
accused were taken and no photographs of the motorcycle,
Executive
Magistrate,
etc.
were
taken,
which
made
the
prosecution case doubtful. This submission is not acceptable. The
photographs have been taken during the night, and the
background is black. In one photograph, a police official is
slightly visible. Thus, the fact that the Executive Magistrate,
motorcycle or the police official are not visible in the
photographs will not make much difference.
41.
Nothing was suggested to the police officials as to
why they would be deposing falsely against the accused. The
accused had also not stated in their statements recorded under
Section 313 of the CrPC that they had any enmity with the official
witnesses, which would prompt the police officials to make false
statements against them. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Kripal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 5 SCC
646: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 680: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 207, that the
2026:HHC:47941
testimonies of the police officials cannot be ignored because they
are police officials. It was observed at page 656:
“21. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant that recovery has not been proved by any
independent witness is of no substance for the reason that,
in the absence of an independent witness to support the
recovery, it cannot be ignored unless proved to the
contrary. There is no such legal proposition that the
evidence of police officials, unless supported by an
independent witness, is unworthy of acceptance or that the
evidence of police officials can be outrightly disregarded.”
42.
It was laid down by this Court in Budh Ram Versus
State of H.P. 2020 Cri.L.J.4254 that the testimonies of the police
officials cannot be discarded on the ground that they belong to
the police force. It was observed:
“11. It is a settled proposition of law that the sole
testimony of the police official, which, if otherwise, is
reliable, trustworthy, cogent and duly corroborated by
other admissible evidence, cannot be discarded only on the
ground that he is a police official and may be interested in
the success of the case. There is also no rule of law which
lays down that no conviction can be recorded on the
testimony of a police officer even if such evidence is
otherwise trustworthy. The rule of prudence may require
more scrutiny of their evidence. Wherever the evidence of
a police officer, after scrutiny, inspires confidence and is
found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form the basis
of a conviction, and the absence of some independent
witness of the locality does not in any way affect the
creditworthiness of the prosecution case. No infirmity
attaches to the testimony of the police officers merely
because they belong to the police force.”
2026:HHC:47941
43.
Similar is the judgment in Karamjit Singh versus State,
AIR 2003 S.C. 3011, wherein it was held:
“The testimony of police personnel should be treated in
the same manner as the testimony of any other witness,
and there is no principle of law that without corroboration
by independent witnesses, their testimony cannot be
relied upon. The presumption that a person acts honestly
applies, as much in favour of police personnel as of other
persons, and it is not a proper judicial approach to distrust
and suspect them without good grounds. It will all depend
upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and no
principle of general application can be laid down.”
(Emphasis supplied)
44.
This position was reiterated in Sathyan v. State of
Kerala, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 986, wherein it was observed:
22. Conviction being based solely on the evidence of police
officials is no longer an issue on which the jury is out. In
other words, the law is well settled that if the evidence of
such a police officer is found to be reliable and
trustworthy, then basing the conviction thereupon cannot
be questioned, and the same shall stand on firm ground.
This Court in Pramod Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)
2013 (6) SCC 588, after referring to State of U.P. v. Anil Singh
[1988 Supp SCC 686: 1989 SCC (Cri) 48], State (Govt. of NCT
of Delhi) v. Sunil [(2001) 1 SCC 652: 2001 SCC (Cri) 248] and
Ramjee Rai v. State of Bihar [(2006) 13 SCC 229 : (2007) 2
SCC (Cri) 626] has laid down recently in Kashmiri Lal v.
State of Haryana [(2013) 6 SCC 595: AIR 2013 SCW 3102] that
there is no absolute command of law that the police
officers cannot be cited as witnesses and their testimony
should always be treated with suspicion. Ordinarily, the
public at large shows their disinclination to come forward
to become witnesses. If the testimony of the police officer
is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the court can
definitely act upon the same. If, in the course of
2026:HHC:47941
scrutinising the evidence, the court finds the evidence of
the police officer to be unreliable and untrustworthy, the
court may disbelieve him, but it should not do so solely on
the presumption that a witness from the Department of
Police should be viewed with distrust. This is also based on
the principle that the quality of the evidence weighs over
the quantity of evidence.
23. Referring to State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil, 2001
(1) SCC 652, in Kulwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 6
SCC 674, this court held that: —
“23. … That apart, the case of the prosecution cannot be
rejected solely on the ground that independent
witnesses have not been examined when, on the
perusal of the evidence on record, the Court finds that
the case put forth by the prosecution is trustworthy.
When the evidence of the official witnesses is
trustworthy and credible, there is no reason not to rest
the conviction on the basis of their evidence.”
24. We must note that in the former it was observed: —
“21… At any rate, the court cannot start with the
presumption that the police records are untrustworthy.
As a proposition of law, the presumption should be the
other way around. That official acts of the police have
been regularly performed is a wise principle of
presumption and recognised even by the legislature… If
the court has any good reason to suspect the
truthfulness of such records of the police, the court
could certainly take into account the fact that no other
independent person was present at the time of
recovery. But it is not a legally approvable procedure to
presume the police action as unreliable to start with,
nor to jettison such action merely for the reason that
police did not collect signatures of independent
persons in the documents made contemporaneous with
such actions.”
25. Recently, this Court in Mohd. Naushad v. State (NCT of
Delhi) 2023 SCC OnLine 784 had observed that the
testimonies of police witnesses, as well as pointing out
2026:HHC:47941
memos, do not stand vitiated due to the absence of
independent witnesses.
26. It is clear from the above propositions of law, as
reproduced and referred to, that the testimonies of official
witnesses
cannot
be
discarded
simply
because
independent witnesses were not examined. The
correctness or authenticity is only to be doubted on “any
good reason” which, quite apparently, is missing from the
present case. No reason is forthcoming on behalf of the
Appellant to challenge the veracity of the testimonies of
PW - 1 and PW - 2, which the courts below have found
absolutely to be inspiring confidence. Therefore, basing
the conviction on the testimony of the police witnesses as
undertaken by the trial court and confirmed by the High
Court vide the impugned judgment, cannot be faulted
with.”
45.
The Learned Trial Court had the advantage of looking
at witnesses and hearing the testimonies. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh
(2025) SCC Online SC 69 that the Appellate Court should not
interfere with the findings regarding the credibility of the
witnesses recorded by the learned Trial Court unless there is
some illegality in it. It was observed: “83. The trial court, after recording the testimony of the
PW-10 and on consideration of the same, found her
evidence trustworthy and credible. We see no reason to
question the assessment about the credibility of the
witness by the Trial Court, which had the advantage of
seeing and hearing the witness and all other witnesses.
Nothing has been brought to our notice of any serious
illegality or breach of fundamental law so as to warrant
taking a different view of the evidence of PW-10.
2026:HHC:47941
In this regard, we may keep in mind the valuable
observations
made
by
this
Court
in Jagdish
Singh v. Madhuri Devi, (2008) 10 SCC 497 in the following
words:
“28. At the same time, however, the appellate court
is expected, nay bound, to bear in mind a finding
recorded by the trial court on oral evidence. It
should not forget that the trial court had an
advantage and opportunity of seeing the demeanour
of witnesses and, hence, the trial court's
conclusions should not normally be disturbed. No
doubt, the appellate court possesses the same
powers as that of the original court, but they have to
be exercised with proper care, caution and
circumspection. When a finding of fact has been
recorded by the trial court mainly on appreciation of
oral evidence, it should not be lightly disturbed
unless the approach of the trial court in the
appraisal of evidence is erroneous, contrary to wellestablished principles of law or unreasonable.
29. …………………………………..
30. In Sara Veeraswami v. Talluri Narayya [(1947-48)
75 IA 252: AIR 1949 PC 32] the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council, after referring to relevant
decisions on the point, stated [Quoting from
Watt v. Thomas, [1947] 1 All ER 582, pp. 583 H-584 A.]
: (IA p. 255)
“… but if the evidence as a whole can
reasonably be regarded as justifying the
conclusion arrived at at the trial, and
especially if that conclusion has been arrived
at on conflicting testimony by a tribunal
which saw and heard the witnesses, the
appellate court will bear in mind that it has
not enjoyed this opportunity and that the view
of the trial Judge as to where credibility lies is
entitled to great weight. This is not to say that
the Judge of the first instance can be treated as
2026:HHC:47941
infallible in determining which side is telling
the truth or is refraining from exaggeration.
Like other tribunals, he may go wrong on a
question of fact, but it is a cogent
circumstance that a Judge of first instance,
when estimating the value of verbal
testimony, has the advantage (which is denied
to courts of appeal) of having the witnesses
before him and observing the manner in
which their evidence is given.”
46.
It was further held in Goverdhan (supra) that the
assessment of evidence cannot be made in a criminal trial
technically and the Court has to see the realities of life while
appreciating the evidence. It was observed: “66. We must also keep in mind that in a trial, the
assessment of evidence cannot be made in a technical
manner and the realities of life must be kept in mind for
arriving at the truth as observed by this Court in State of
H.P. v. Lekh Raj (2000) 1 SCC 247 as follows;
“10. The High Court appears to have adopted a
technical approach in disposing of the appeal filed
by the respondents. This Court in State of
Punjab v. Jagir Singh [(1974) 3 SCC 277: 1973 SCC (Cri)
886] held: (SCC pp. 285-86, para 23)
‘23. A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale
wherein one is free to give flight to one's
imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself
with the question as to whether the accused
arraigned at the trial is guilty of the crime
with which he is charged. Crime is an event in
real life and is the product of the interplay of
different human emotions. In arriving at the
conclusion about the guilt of the accused
charged with the commission of a crime, the
court has to judge the evidence by the
2026:HHC:47941
yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth
and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the
final analysis would have to depend upon its
own facts. Although the benefit of every
reasonable doubt should be given to the
accused, the courts should not at the same
time reject evidence which is ex facie
trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or
in the nature of conjectures.’
The criminal trial cannot be equated with a
mock scene from a stunt film. The legal trial is
conducted to ascertain the guilt or innocence
of the accused arraigned. In arriving at a
conclusion about the truth, the courts are
required to adopt a rational approach and
judge the evidence by its intrinsic worth and
the
animus
of
the
witnesses.
The
hypertechnicalities
or
figments
of
imagination should not be allowed to divest
the court of its responsibility of sifting and
weighing the evidence to arrive at the
conclusion regarding the existence or
otherwise of a particular circumstance,
keeping in view the peculiar facts of each case,
the social position of the victim and the
accused, the larger interests of the society,
particularly the law and order problem and
degrading values of life inherent in the
prevalent system. The realities of life have to
be kept in mind while appreciating the
evidence for arriving at the truth. The courts
are not obliged to make efforts either to give
latitude to the prosecution or loosely construe
the law in favour of the accused. The
traditional dogmatic hypertechnical approach
has to be replaced by a rational, realistic and
genuine approach for administering justice in
a criminal trial. Criminal jurisprudence cannot
be considered to be a utopian thought but have
to be considered as part and parcel of the
2026:HHC:47941
human civilisation and the realities of life. The
courts cannot ignore the erosion in values of
life which are a common feature of the present
system. Such erosions cannot be given a bonus
in favour of those who are guilty of polluting
society and mankind.”
47.
It was further held that the Court has to put together
the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle to determine the criminal liability of
the accused and the prosecution has to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt. It was observed: “18. In case of a crime committed, upon completion of the
investigation by the investigating agency, the accused are
brought before the court to face trial. Under our criminal
jurisprudence, the court ordinarily is not privy to the
evidence collected during the investigation by the
investigating
agency.
After
completion
of
the
investigation, what is brought before the trial court is an
array of evidence, both documentary and oral, collected by
the investigating agency against the accused, which is
required to be marshalled and analysed by the court to
arrive at appropriate conclusions. The prosecution seeks
to recreate the incident of the crime before the court in
sequence, based on the evidence so collected, linking the
accused with the commission of the crime. Such recreation
of the crime by the prosecution before the court is akin to
putting the evidence together as in a jigsaw puzzle
whereby all the relevant pieces of evidence are put
together to complete the picture of the crime. The prime
responsibility of the court is to see whether this jigsaw
puzzle has been properly placed by the prosecution, from
which a clear picture emerges as to the happening of the
incident with the assigned role of the accused as part of
the aforesaid jigsaw puzzle. Only thereafter, the role of the
accused in perpetrating the offence can be properly
ascribed and proved and accordingly, criminal liability
fastened on the accused.
2026:HHC:47941
19. As per Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a fact
can be said to have been proved when, after considering
the matters before it, the court either believes it to exist or
considers its existence so probable that a prudent man
ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to
act upon the supposition that it exists. The court
undertakes this exercise of examining whether the facts
alleged, including the particular criminal acts attributed to
the accused, are proved or not.
20. It is also to be noted that the law does not contemplate
stitching the pieces of evidence in a watertight manner,
for the standard of proof in a criminal case is not proof
beyond all doubt but only beyond reasonable doubt. In
other words, if a clear picture emerges on piecing together
all evidence which indicates beyond reasonable doubt the
role played by the accused in the perpetration of the crime,
the court holds the accused criminally liable and punishes
them under the provisions of the penal code, in
contradistinction to the requirement of proof based on the
preponderance of probabilities as in the case of civil
proceedings.
21. It will be relevant to discuss, at this juncture, what is
meant by “reasonable doubt”. It means that such doubt
must be free from suppositional speculation. It must not
be the result of minute emotional detailing, and the doubt
must be actual and substantial and not merely vague
apprehension. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary,
trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based
upon reason and common sense as observed in Ramakant
Rai v. Madan Rai, (2003) 12 SCC 395 wherein it was
observed as under:
“24. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free
from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford
any favourite other than the truth. To constitute
reasonable doubt, it must be free from an overly
emotional response. Doubts must be actual and
substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons
arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as
opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable
2026:HHC:47941
doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible
doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and common
sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case.”
22. While applying this principle of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court has to undertake a candid
consideration of all the evidence in a fair and reasonable
manner as observed by this Court in State of
Haryana v. Bhagirath (1999) 5 SCC 96 as follows:
“8. It is nearly impossible in any criminal trial to
prove all the elements with scientific precision. A
criminal court could be convinced of the guilt only
beyond the range of a reasonable doubt. Of course,
the expression ‘reasonable doubt’ is incapable of
definition. Modern thinking is in favour of the view
that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the same as
proof which affords moral certainty to the Judge.
9. Francis Wharton, a celebrated writer on criminal
law in the United States, has quoted from judicial
pronouncements in his book Wharton's Criminal
Evidence (at p. 31, Vol. 1 of the 12th Edn.) as follows:
‘It is difficult to define the phrase “reasonable
doubt”. However, in all criminal cases, a
careful explanation of the term ought to be
given. A definition often quoted or followed is
that given by Chief Justice Shaw in the Webster
case [Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush 295: 59
Mass 295 (1850)]. He says: “It is not mere
possible doubt, because everything relating to
human affairs and depending upon moral
evidence is open to some possible or
imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case
which, after the entire comparison and
consideration of all the evidence, leaves the
minds of the jurors in that consideration that
they cannot say they feel an abiding
conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of
the charge.”’
2026:HHC:47941
10. In the treatise The Law of Criminal Evidence authored by
H.C. Underhill it is stated (at p. 34, Vol. 1 of the 5th Edn.) thus:
‘The doubt to be reasonable must be such a one as an
honest, sensible and fair-minded man might, with
reason, entertain consistently with a conscientious
desire to ascertain the truth. An honestly
entertained doubt of guilt is a reasonable doubt. A
vague conjecture or an inference of the possibility of
the innocence of the accused is not a reasonable
doubt. A reasonable doubt is one which arises from a
consideration of all the evidence in a fair and
reasonable way. There must be a candid
consideration of all the evidence, and if, after this
candid consideration is had by the jurors, there
remains in the minds a conviction of the guilt of the
accused, then there is no room for a reasonable
doubt.’
23. The concept of reasonable doubt has to be also
understood in the Indian context, keeping in mind the
social reality, and this principle cannot be stretched
beyond a reasonable limit to avoid generating a cynical
view of law as observed by this Court in Shivaji Sahebrao
Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 as follows:
“6. Even at this stage, we may remind ourselves of a
necessary social perspective in criminal cases which
suffer from insufficient forensic appreciation. The
dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of
benefit of the doubt at the expense of social defence
and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are
always good regardless of justice to the victim and
the community demand special emphasis in the
contemporary context of escalating crime and
escape. The judicial instrument has public
accountability. The cherished principles or golden
thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs
through the web of our law should not be stretched
morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and
degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in
2026:HHC:47941
the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but
one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false
dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the
accused. Otherwise, any practical system of justice
will then break down and lose credibility with the
community. The evil of acquitting a guilty person
lightly, as a learned Author [Glanville Williams in
‘Proof of Guilt’] has sapiently observed, goes much
beyond the simple fact that just one guilty person
has gone unpunished. If unmerited acquittals
become general, they tend to lead to a cynical
disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to a
public demand for harsher legal presumptions
against indicted “persons” and more severe
punishment of those who are found guilty. Thus, too
frequent acquittals of the guilty may lead to a
ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial
protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons it is
true to say, with Viscount Simon, that “a
miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal
of the guilty no less than from the conviction of the
innocent.…”
In
short,
our
jurisprudential
enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be
moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal
justice potent and realistic. A balance has to be
struck between chasing chance possibilities as good
enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the
logic of preponderant probability to punish
marginal innocents. We have adopted these cautions
in analysing the evidence and appraising the
soundness of the contrary conclusions reached by
the courts below. Certainly, in the last analysis,
reasonable doubts must operate to the advantage of
the appellant. In India, the law has been laid down
on these lines long ago.”
24. Further, what would be the standard degree of “proof”
which would be required in any particular case was also
discussed in the aforesaid case of Ramakant Rai (supra) in
the following words:
2026:HHC:47941
“23. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to
be convicted of an offence which is not established
by the evidential standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Though this standard is a higher
standard, there is, however, no absolute standard.
What degree of probability amounts to “proof” is an
exercise particular to each case. Referring to (sic) of
probability amounts to “proof” is an exercise, the
interdependence of evidence and the confirmation
of one piece of evidence by another, as the learned
author says: [see The Mathematics of Proof II:
Glanville Williams, Criminal Law Review, 1979, by
Sweet and Maxwell, p. 340 (342)]
“The simple multiplication rule does not
apply if the separate pieces of evidence are
dependent. Two events are dependent when
they tend to occur together, and the evidence
of such events may also be said to be
dependent. In a criminal case, different pieces
of evidence directed to establishing that the
defendant did the prohibited act with the
specified state of mind are generally
dependent. A juror may feel doubt whether to
credit an alleged confession, and doubt
whether to infer guilt from the fact that the
defendant fled from justice. But since it is
generally guilty rather than innocent people
who make confessions, and guilty rather than
innocent people who run away, the two doubts
are not to be multiplied together. The one
piece of evidence may confirm the other.”
24. ………………..
………………..
25. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of
it, cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to
be mathematically enumerated as to how many of
such units constitute proof beyond reasonable
doubt. There is an unmistakable subjective element
2026:HHC:47941
in the evaluation of the degrees of probability and
the quantum of proof. Forensic probability must, in
the last analysis, rest on a robust common sense
and, ultimately, on the trained intuitions of the
judge. While the protection given by the criminal
process to the accused persons is not to be eroded, at
the same time, uninformed legitimisation of
trivialities would make a mockery of the
administration of criminal justice. This position was
illuminatingly stated by Venkatachaliah, J. (as His
Lordship then was) in State of U.P. v. Krishna
Gopal [(1988) 4 SCC 302: 1988 SCC (Cri) 928: AIR 1988
SC 2154].
25. At this point, it may also be relevant to mention an
observation made by Lord Denning, J. in Miller v. Miller of
Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372, 373:
“That degree is well settled. It need not reach
certainty, but it must carry a high degree of
probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law
would fail to protect the community if it admitted
fanciful possibilities to deflect the court of
justice….”
26. Thus, the requirement of law in criminal trials is not to
prove the case beyond all doubt but beyond reasonable
doubt and such doubt cannot be imaginary, fanciful, trivial
or merely a possible doubt but a fair doubt based on reason
and common sense. Hence, in the present case, if the
allegations against the appellants are held proved beyond
reasonable doubt, certainly conviction cannot be said to be
illegal.”
48.
In the present case, the testimonies of police officials
are consistent. Learned Trial Court found them to be credible.
Learned
counsel
for
the
defence
pointed
out
various
contradictions, but these were not significant enough to make
2026:HHC:47941
the testimonies suspect. Hence, the learned Trial Court had
rightly accepted the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses
that the police had recovered backpacks containing charas from
the accused.
49.
SI Raj Kumar (PW12) stated that he had put the
recovered charas into the carry bag and polythene, which were
duly put in separate parcels. The parcels were sealed with seals
DPRA and DPRN, sample seal impressions were taken separately
on separate pieces of cloth, and the case property was handed
over to Tibati Ram (PW17). Tibati Ram (PW17) stated that ASI Raj
Kumar handed over the accused person, case property and case
file to him. He produced the case property, case file and the
accused before Suram Singh (PW16), who stated that Tibati Ram
(PW17) had produced two sealed parcels (Ex.MO1 and Ex.MO4)
bearing seal DPRA and DPRM along with the NCB-1 form, the
accused, and the documents. He put 03 seals bearing the
impression DPRK on each parcel. He obtained the sample seal
and put the seal impression on the NCB-1 form. He issued the
resealing certificate and handed over the case property to MHC
Pradeep Kumar. MHC Pardeep Kumar (PW5) stated that SHO had
handed over one parcel sealed with 3 seals of DPRN and DPRK
2026:HHC:47941
each, and one parcel sealed with 3 seals of DPRM and DPRK each,
along with the sample seal and NCB-1 form in triplicate. He
handed over the parcels to SHO for compliance with Section 52A.
Inspector Suram Singh stated that he had prepared an
application (Ex. P19/PW16) and inventory (Ex. P20/PW16) and
handed them over to Tibati Ram (PW17) for getting the inventory
certified. Tibati Ram (PW17) stated that he had produced the
parcels, application and inventory certificate before the Court,
and the learned Magistrate certified the correctness of the
inventory. The order (Ex. P27/PW17) passed by the learned
Magistrate mentions that the sealed parcels were produced
before her. These were weighed and were resealed with 3 seals of
‘JMIC Court No.2 Mandi’. Thus, the seals on the parcels were
intact till their analysis and till their production before the
learned Magistrate.
50.
HC Pradeep Singh (PW5) stated that he handed over
the parcel, documents etc. to HHC Kashmir Singh with a direction
to carry them to FSL Junga vide RC No. 27/19 (Ex.PW5/A). HHC
Kashmir Singh (PW3) stated that he had carried the parcel,
sample seal, NCB-1 Form, copy of FIR and other documents to
FSL Junga vide RC No. 27/19. The statements of these witnesses
2026:HHC:47941
are duly corroborated by the report of analysis (Ex. P21/PW16) in
which it was mentioned that one sealed cloth parcel marked as
‘A’ bearing 3 seals of DPRA, DPRK and JMIC Court No.2, Mandi,
each and one sealed cloth parcel marked as ‘B’, bearing 3 seals of
DPRM, DPRK, and JMIC Court No.2, Mandi each were received
through HHC Kashmir Singh. The seals were found intact and
tallied with the specimen seals sent by the forwarding authority,
and the seal impressions of DPRA, DPRM, and DPRK were
impressed on the Form NCB1. Thus, the report of analysis proves
that the case property remained intact till its analysis in the
laboratory. It was held in Baljit Sharma vs. State of H.P. 2007 HLJ
707, where the report of analysis shows that the seals were intact,
and the prosecution's claim that the case property remained
intact is to be accepted as correct. It was observed:
“A perusal of the report of the expert Ex.PW8/A shows
that the samples were received by the expert in a safe
manner, and the sample seal was separately sent and
tallied with the specimen impression of a seal taken
separately. Thus, there was no tampering with the seal,
and the seal impressions were separately taken and sent
to the expert also.”
51.
Similar is the judgment in Hardeep Singh vs. State of
Punjab 2008(8) SCC 557, wherein it was held:
“It has also come on evidence that to date the parcels of
the sample were received by the Chemical Examiner, the
2026:HHC:47941
seal put on the said parcels was intact. That itself proves
and establishes that there was no tampering with the
previously mentioned seal in the sample at any stage, and
the sample received by the analyst for chemical
examination contained the same opium, which was
recovered from the possession of the appellant. In that
view of the matter, a delay of about 40 days in sending
the samples did not and could not have caused any
prejudice to the appellant.”
52.
In State of Punjab vs. Lakhwinder Singh 2010 (4) SCC
402, the High Court had concluded that there could have been
tampering with the case property since there was a delay of seven
days in sending the report to FSL. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court that the case property was produced in the Court,
and there was no evidence of tampering. Seals were found to be
intact, which would rule out the possibility of tampering. It was
observed:
“The prosecution has been able to establish and prove that
the aforesaid bags, which were 35 in number, contained
poppy husk and accordingly the same were seized after
taking samples therefrom, which were properly sealed.
The defence has not been able to prove that the aforesaid
seizure and seal put on the samples were in any manner
tampered with before they were examined by the Chemical
Examiner. There was merely a delay of about seven days in
sending the samples to the Forensic Examiner, and it is not
proved as to how the aforesaid delay of seven days has
affected the said examination, when it could not be proved
that the seal of the sample was in any manner tampered
with. The seal having been found intact at the time of the
examination by the Chemical Examiner and the said fact
having been recorded in his report, a mere observation by
2026:HHC:47941
the High Court that the case property might have been
tampered with, in our opinion, is based on surmises and
conjectures and cannot take the place of proof.
17. We may at this stage refer to a decision of this Court in
Hardip Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2008) 8 SCC 557
in which there was a delay of about 40 days in sending the
sample to the laboratory after the same was seized. In the
said decision, it was held that in view of cogent and reliable
evidence that the opium was seized and sealed and that the
samples were intact till they were handed over to the
Chemical Examiner, the delay itself was held to be not fatal
to the prosecution's case. In our considered opinion, the
ratio of the aforesaid decision squarely applies to the facts
of the present case in this regard.
18. The case property was produced in the Court, and there
is no evidence to show that the same was ever tampered
with.”
53.
Similar is the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Surinder Kumar vs. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563, wherein it
was held: 10. According to learned senior counsel for the appellant,
Joginder Singh, ASI, to whom Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3),
handed over the case property for producing the same
before the Illaqa Magistrate and who returned the same to
him after such production, was not examined, as such link
evidence was incomplete. In this regard, it is to be noticed
that Yogi Raj, SHO, handed over the case property to
Joginder Singh, ASI, for production before the Court. After
producing the case property before the Court, he returned
the case property to Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), with the seals
intact. It is also to be noticed that Joginder Singh, ASI, was
not in possession of the seals of either the investigating
officer or Yogi Raj, SHO. He produced the case property
before the Court on 13.09.1996 vide application Ex.P-13;
the concerned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, after
verifying the seals on the case property, passed the order
2026:HHC:47941
Ex.P-14 to the effect that since there was no judicial
malkhana at Abohar, the case property was ordered to be
kept in safe custody at Police Station Khuian Sarwar till
further orders. Since Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in
possession of the seals of either the SHO or the
Investigating Officer, the question of tampering with the
case property by him did not arise at all.
11. Further, he has returned the case property, after
production of the same, before the Illaqa Magistrate, with
the seals intact, to Yogi Raj, SHO. In that view of the
matter, the Trial Court and the High Court have rightly
held that the non-examination of Joginder Singh did not,
in any way, affect the case of the prosecution. Further, it is
evident from the report of the Chemical Examiner, Ex.P-10,
that the sample was received with seals intact and that the
seals on the sample tallied with the sample seals. In that view
of the matter, the chain of evidence was complete.”
(Emphasis supplied)
54.
Therefore, the prosecution's version is to be accepted
as correct that the case property remained intact till its analysis
at SFSL, Junga.
55.
It was submitted that there is a discrepancy in the
colour of the carry bag, which made the prosecution’s version
doubtful. This submission cannot be accepted. The rukka (Exhibit
P9/PW12) mentions the colour of the carry bag as white, which
was very dirty. The report of analysis mentions the colour of the
carrybag as brown. Very dirty white can look like brown, and
there is no discrepancy in the colour of the carry bag.
2026:HHC:47941
56.
It was submitted that the seal was not produced
before the Court, and this is fatal to the prosecution's case. This
submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Varinder Kumar Versus State of H.P. 2019 (3)
SCALE 50 that failure to produce the seal in the court is not fatal.
It was observed: “6. We have considered the respective submissions. PW10
is stated to have received secret information at 2.45 P.M.
on 31.03.1995. He immediately reduced it into writing and
sent the same to PW8, Shri Jaipal Singh, Dy.S.P., C.I.D.,
Shimla. At 3.05 P.M., PW7, Head Constable Surender
Kumar, stopped PW5, Naresh Kumar and another
independent witness, Jeevan Kumar, travelling together,
whereafter the appellant was apprehended at 3.30 P.M.
with two Gunny Bags on his scooter, which contained
varying quantities of ‘charas’. PW8, Shri Jaipal Singh,
Dy.S.P., C.I.D., Shimla, who had arrived by then, gave
notice to the appellant and obtained his consent for
carrying out the search. Two samples of 25 gms. each were
taken from the two Gunny Bags and sealed with the seal
‘S’, and given to PW5. PW2, Jaswinder Singh, the
Malkhana Head Constable, resealed it with the seal ‘P’. The
conclusion of the Trial Court that the seal had not been
produced in the Court is therefore perverse in view of the
two specimen seal impressions having been marked as
Exhibits PH and PK. It is not the case of the appellant that
the seals were found tampered with in any manner.”
57.
In the present case, sample seals of the Court, DPRN,
DPRA and DPRK were produced before the Court. Sample seals of
DPRA, DPRM and DPRK were also put on the NCB-1 form.
Therefore, the Court had specimen impressions to compare the
2026:HHC:47941
integrity of the seals. Learned Trial Court noticed while recording
the statement of Raj Kumar (PW12) that the first parcel was
sealed with 3 seals of DPRA, DPRK, 3 seals of JMIC-2 Mandi and
03 seals of SFSL-2; another parcel was sealed with 3 seals of
DPRM, DPRK, JMIC-2 and SFSL-2. Thus, the learned Trial Court
had satisfied itself regarding the integrity of the seal and the
submission that failure to produce the seal before the Court is
fatal cannot be accepted.
58.
The report of FSL (Ex. P21/PW16) mentions that the
weight of charas in one parcel was 268 grams and the weight of
charas in the second parcel was 97 grams. Therefore, it was duly
proved on record that Rajesh Kumar was found in possession of
268 grams of charas and Pradeep Kumar was found in possession
of 97 grams of charas.
59.
The learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 read with
Section 29 of the NDPS Act. However, no charge was framed for
the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 read
with Section 29 of the NDPS Act, and the charge was framed for
possessing charas punishable under Section 20 of the NDPS Act.
Accused Rajesh Kumar was charged with the possession of 288
2026:HHC:47941
grams and Pradeep Kumar was charged with the possession of
under 102 grams of charas. Therefore, it was impermissible to
convict the accused of possession of charas by invoking Section
29 of the NDPS Act.
60.
Learned Trial Court had sentenced each of the accused
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 05 years and pay a fine of
₹70,000/-. The Central Government has notified 1 kg of charas as
a commercial quantity, which means that a person possessing 1
kg of charas can be sent to imprisonment for 10 years. It was laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Uggarsain v. State of
Haryana, (2023) 8 SCC 109: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 755, that the
Courts have to apply the principle of proportionality while
imposing a sentence. It was observed at page 113:
10. This Court has, time and again, stated that the
principle of proportionality should guide the sentencing
process. In Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed v. State
of Gujarat [Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed v. State of
Gujarat, (2009) 7 SCC 254 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 368 : (2009) 8
SCR 719], it was held that the sentence should “deter the
criminal from achieving the avowed object to (sic break
the) law,” and the endeavour should be to impose an
“appropriate sentence.” The Court also held that imposing
“meagre sentences” merely on account of lapse of time
would be counterproductive. Likewise, in Jameel v. State of
U.P. [Jameel v. State of U.P., (2010) 12 SCC 532 : (2011) 1 SCC
(Cri) 582: (2009) 15 SCR 712] while advocating that
sentencing should be fact dependent exercises, the Court
also emphasised that: (Jameel case [Jameel v. State of U.P.,
2026:HHC:47941
(2010) 12 SCC 532: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 582: (2009) 15 SCR 712],
SCC p. 535, para 15)
“15. … the law should adopt the corrective
machinery or deterrence based on a factual matrix.
By deft modulation, the sentencing process be stern
where it should be, and tempered with mercy where
it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances
in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in
which it was planned and committed, the motive for
commission of the crime, the conduct of the
accused, the nature of weapons used and all other
attending circumstances are relevant facts which
would enter into the area of consideration.”
(emphasis supplied)
11. Again, in Guru Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka [Guru
Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 734: (2012) 4
SCC (Civ) 594: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 972: (2012) 8 SCR 189] the
Court stressed that: (SCC p. 744, para 33)
“33. … It is the duty of the court to see that an
appropriate sentence is imposed, regard being had
to the commission of the crime and its impact on the
social order” (emphasis supplied)
and
that
sentencing
includes
“adequate
punishment”. In B.G. Goswami v. Delhi Admn. [B.G.
Goswami v. Delhi Admn., (1974) 3 SCC 85: 1973 SCC
(Cri) 796: (1974) 1 SCR 222], the Court considered the
issue of punishment and observed that punishment
is designed to protect society by deterring potential
offenders as well as prevent the guilty party from
repeating the offence; it is also designed to reform
the offender and reclaim him as a law-abiding
citizen for the good of the society as a whole.
Reformatory, deterrent and punitive aspects of
punishment thus play their due part in judicial
thinking while determining the question of
awarding appropriate sentences.
12. In Sham Sunder v. Puran [Sham Sunder v. Puran, (1990) 4
SCC 731: 1991 SCC (Cri) 38: 1990 Supp (1) SCR 662], the
2026:HHC:47941
appellant-accused was convicted under Section 304 Part I
IPC. The appellate court reduced the sentence to the term
of imprisonment already undergone, i.e. six months.
However, it enhanced the fine. This Court ruled that the
sentence awarded was inadequate. Proceeding further, it
opined that: (SCC p. 737, para 8).
8. … The court, in fixing the punishment for any
particular crime, should take into consideration the
nature of the offence, the circumstances in which it
was committed, and the degree of deliberation
shown by the offender. The measure of punishment
should be proportionate to the gravity of the
offence. The sentence imposed by the High Court
appears to be so grossly and entirely inadequate as
to involve a failure of justice. We are of the opinion
that to meet the ends of justice, the sentence has to
be enhanced.” (emphasis supplied)
This Court enhanced the sentence to one of rigorous
imprisonment for a period of five years. This Court
has emphasised that sentencing depends on the
facts, and the adequacy is determined by factors
such as “the nature of crime, the manner in which it
is committed, the propensity shown and the
brutality reflected” [Ravada Sasikala v. State of A.P.
(2017) 4 SCC 546 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 436 : (2017) 2 SCR
379]. Other decisions, like: State of M.P. v. Bablu
[State of M.P. v. Bablu, (2014) 9 SCC 281 : (2014) 6 SCC
(Cri) 1 : (2014) 9 SCR 467]; Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar
[Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar, (2013) 9 SCC 516 : (2014)
1 SCC (Cri) 159 : (2013) 5 SCR 979] and State of Punjab
v. Saurabh Bakshi [State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi,
(2015) 5 SCC 182 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751 : (2015) 3 SCR
590] too, have stressed on the significance and
importance of imposing appropriate, “adequate” or
“proportionate” punishments.
2026:HHC:47941
61.
If the principle of proportionality is applied to the
present case, the sentence of 5 years is excessive and requires
interference.
62.
Accused Rajesh Kumar was found in possession of 268
grams of charas and, applying the principle of proportionality, he
is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and 6
months and pay a fine of ₹26,000/- and in default of payment of
fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for 03 months. Accused
Pradeep Kumar was found in possession of 97 grams of charas.
He is sentenced to undergo Rigorous imprisonment for 1 year,
pay a fine of ₹10,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, to
undergo simple imprisonment for 1 month. The accused will be
entitled to set off the period of imprisonment undergone by them
during the trial and appeal, if any.
63.
In view of the above, the present appeals are partly
allowed and the sentence imposed by learned Trial Court is
modified as aforesaid. Subject to this modification, the rest of the
judgment and order are upheld. A modified jail warrant be
prepared accordingly.
2026:HHC:47941
64.
The record of the learned Court below be sent back
with a copy of this judgment for the information of the learned
Trial Court.
65.
Appeals stand disposed of along with pending
miscellaneous application(s), if any.
2nd November, 2026
(Chander)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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