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2026:HHC:23646
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal (C-SB) No. 82 of 2025
Reserved on: 21.05.2026
Date of Decision: 22.06.2026
Baldev Singh
...Appellant
Versus
State of H.P.
...Respondent
_______________________________________
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes
For the Appellant
:
Mr T.K. Verma, Advocate.
For the Respondent
:
Mr Jitender Sharma,
Advocate General.
Additional
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 20.11.2025 passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nahan, District, Sirmaur, H.P.
(learned Trial Court) vide which the appellant (accused before
learned Trial Court) was convicted of the commission of offences
punishable under Sections 307 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code
(IPC) and was sentenced as under:
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
Sections
2026:HHC:23646
Sentences
of
the The accused was sentenced to undergo
Indian
Penal rigorous imprisonment for five years, pay a
Code
fine of ₹20,000/-, and, in default of payment
of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
one year.
325 of Indian The accused was sentenced to undergo
Penal Code
rigorous imprisonment for one year, pay a fine
of ₹10,000/-, and, in default of payment of the
fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment
for two months.
Both sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
(The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same
manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for
convenience).
2.
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal
are that the police presented a challan against the accused for the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 307, 324
and 325 of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant Nikhil (PW1)
was informed on 09.12.2019 at about 8:00 a.m. that one person was
lying beneath the Jogiban bridge wrapped in a blanket. The
informant and Shezaad (PW8) went to the spot and found a person
lying wrapped in a blanket with bleeding injuries on his neck and
face. The informant telephoned Pradhan, Kamal Sharma, the Police
2026:HHC:23646
Station and the ambulance. The name of the injured was found to
be Kamlender (PW2) after enquiries. The police recorded the
informant’s statement (Ext.P1/PW1) and sent it to the Police
Station, where FIR (Ext.P27/PW11) was registered. ASI Jagir Singh
(PW7) investigated the matter. He inspected the spot and found a
white blanket with pink strips and a floral pattern. He also found a
razor in shallow water. The razor was made of plastic, and the
other part was made of steel, to which a blade was attached. ASI
Jagir Singh (PW7) prepared the sketch (Ext.P3/PW4) of the razor.
ASI Jagir Singh (PW7) also found blood drops in the grass at a
distance of about 30-40 meters away. He lifted the grass
containing blood from the spot and sealed it in a polythene bag. He
also lifted a control sample from the spot and sealed it in another
polythene bag. He put the bloodstained stone in a white carry bag
and sealed it in a cloth parcel. He found some hair strands and a
silver button. He put them in a cloth parcel and sealed the parcel.
He found a multi coloured muffler at a distance of 30-40 meters,
and he put it in a white cloth parcel. He found blood on the stones
at a distance of 10-15 meters. He lifted the stones, put them in a
polythene bag and put the bag in a white parcel. He sealed all the
parcels with six impressions of seal ‘T’. He packed the razor
2026:HHC:23646
separately, because the opinion of the Medical Officer was to be
taken about the same. All the parcels and razor were seized vide
memo (Ext.P5/PW4). Sample seal (Ext.P4/PW4) was taken on a
separate piece of cloth. ASI Jagir Singh prepared the spot map
(Ext.P16/PW7) and recorded the statements of witnesses as per
their version. He filed an application (Ext.P17/PW7) for the medical
examination of the injured. Dr Shruti Sharma (PW16) examined
Kamlender (PW2) and found that he had sustained multiple
injuries. She collected the samples, sealed them in separate parcels
and handed over the parcels to the police official accompanying the
injured. In her opinion, the injuries were caused within 12 hours of
examination by a sharp and a blunt weapon. She issued the MLC
(Ext.P31/PW16). Injured was referred to PGI Chandigarh for
treatment. Dy. SP Manvendra Thakur (PW11) investigated the
matter. He arrested the accused on 11.12.2019 based on a statement
made by the injured. The accused made a statement under Section
27 of the Indian Evidence Act that he could identify the shop from
where he had purchased the blade for use in the razor, the place
where he had assaulted the injured Kamlender (PW2) with the
razor, the place where he had thrown the razor after using it and
the place where he had concealed his motorcycle after the
2026:HHC:23646
commission of the crime. Memo (Ext.P7/PW5) was prepared. The
accused led the police to the grocery shop of Sanjay Bansal (PW9)
and identified the shop as the one from which two blades were
purchased
by
him.
Memo
(Ext.P8/PW5)
and
Spot
map
(Ext.P21/PW11) were prepared. The accused led the police team to
the shop of Ramjas (PW19) and disclosed that he had kept the key
of his motorcycle, helmet and pair of gloves in the shop and had
parked the motorcycle adjacent to the shop. Ramjas (PW19)
produced the key of the motorcycle, helmet and pair of gloves. The
motorcycle was also found in the backyard of the shop adjacent to
the pharmaceutical company. These were seized vide memo
(Ext.P9/PW5). One motorcycle delivery challan (Ext.P10/PW5) was
also found in the motorcycle, which was seized vide memo
(Ext.P9/PW5). A spot memo (Ext.P22/PW11) was prepared. The
accused led the police to Jogiban Khad on 14.12.2019 and identified
the places where he had assaulted the informant and thrown the
razor in the Khad. Memo (Ext.P6/PW4) was prepared. The spot
identified by the accused matched the spot map prepared by Jagir
Singh (Ext.P16/PW7). The accused made a statement that he could
identify the shop from where he had picked the razor. Memo
(Ext.P12/PW5) was prepared. The accused led the police to the
2026:HHC:23646
saloon of Rijwan (PW3). Memo (Ext.PW2/PW3) and the site map
(Ext.P20/PW11) were prepared. The Medical Officer opined that the
injury sustained by the injured Kamlender (PW2) was dangerous to
life. The accused produced one jacket and one lower which were
worn by him at the time of the incident. These were seized vide
memo (Ext.P14/PW6). The case property was sent to the Forensic
Science Laboratory (FSL) Junga, and a report (Ext.P38/PW15) was
issued stating that human blood of group ‘A’ was detected on the
bedsheet, bloodstained stone, muffler, blood sample of Kamlender,
pants and jacket of Kamlender and blanket. Human blood was
found on bloodstained stones, but the result was inconclusive
regarding the blood group. The blood was detected on the
bloodstained grass, leaves and soil, which was disintegrated for
serological examination. Human blood was detected on the button,
hair and the razor, but it was insufficient for blood group
examination. Blood was detected on the shoe of Kamlender, but it
was insufficient for the serological examination. Blood was not
detected on the jacket or the lower of the accused. The hairs on the
bloodstained stone, bloodstained grass, and button were identified
as human head hair, which were similar to each other. Another
report (Ext.P39/PW15) was issued, mentioning that the controlled
2026:HHC:23646
soil and the soil lifted from the spot matched each other. The
buttons were found to be consistent in colour, construction, shape,
size and design. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per
their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the
challan was prepared and presented before the learned Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Sirmaur at Nahan, who committed it to the
Court of Sessions. Learned Sessions Judge assigned the case to
learned Additional Sessions Judge Nahan (learned Trial Court) for
disposal as per the law.
3.
Learned Trial court charged the accused with the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 325, and
307 of the IPC, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed
to be tried.
4.
The prosecution examined 21 witnesses to prove its
case. The informant Nikhil Kolesh (PW1) and Shezaad (PW8) found
the injured lying near Jogiban Bridge. Kamlender (PW2) is the
injured/victim. Rijwan (PW3), Sanjay Bansal (PW9), and Ramjas
(PW19) did not support the prosecution's case. Tika Ram (PW4),
HC Kunwar Singh (PW6), and HHC Chaman Lal (PW21) witnessed
the recoveries. HHC Ashok Kumar (PW5) is the witness to the
disclosure statement and subsequent recoveries. ASI Jagir Singh
2026:HHC:23646
(PW7) and Manvendra Thakur (PW11) investigated the matter.
Constable Nitish (PW10) transferred the CCTV footage to the DVD.
Constable Nitesh (PW12) proved the entry in the daily diary. Sub
Inspector Padam Singh (PW13) signed the FIR. Ram Pal (PW14)
obtained the final opinion of the Medical Officer. HC Om Pal (PW15)
entered the FIR in the Police Station. Dr Shruti Sharma (PW16)
examined the injured. HASI Virender Kumar (PW17) carried the
case property to SFSL Junga. HASI Rajeev Kumar (PW18) was
posted as Malkhana in-charge, with whom the case property was
deposited.
Subhash Chand (PW20) was the Secretary of the
Panchayat and issued the record.
5.
The accused, in his statement recorded under Section
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C), denied the
prosecution’s case in its entirety. He claimed that he was innocent
and was falsely implicated in the case. He did not produce any
evidence in his defence.
6.
The learned Trial Court held that the testimony of the
injured was duly corroborated by the medical evidence and the
recoveries. The matter was reported to the police immediately, and
there is no possibility of fabrication. The accused had made the
disclosure statements leading to the recovery of various articles.
2026:HHC:23646
Minor contradictions in the statements were not sufficient to
discard the prosecution's case. The case could not be doubted
because some of the witnesses had not supported the prosecution’s
case. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the
accused as aforesaid.
7.
Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by
the learned Trial Court, the accused has filed the present appeal
asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the
material on record. Sanjay Bansal (PW9) specifically denied that
the accused had purchased the blade from his shop. The CCTV
footage only shows a person moving alone and does not show the
crime scene or the accused moving with the victim. The
prosecution had failed to prove the motive for the commission of
the crime. The prosecution's version that the accused had stolen
the razor from the shop of Rijwan (PW3) was not supported by him.
The learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the
accused. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed
and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be
set aside.
8.
2026:HHC:23646
I have heard Mr T.K. Verma, learned counsel for the
appellant/accused, and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional
Advocate General for the respondent/State.
9.
Mr
T.K.
Verma,
learned
counsel
for
the
appellant/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in
convicting and sentencing the accused. The prosecution has failed
to prove the motive for the commission of the crime, and it is
highly unlikely that the accused would cause hurt to a stranger
without any reason. Rijwan (PW19) and Sanjay Bansal (PW9)
turned hostile, and the prosecution's version that the accused had
stolen the razor from the shop of Rijwan and purchased the blades
from the shop of Sanjay Bansal (PW9) was not proved. The CCTV
footage does not show the accused moving with the victim. The
ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 307 of the IPC were not satisfied, and the learned Trial
Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. Therefore,
he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and
order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
10.
Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State, submitted that the testimony of
the injured is duly corroborated by the medical evidence and the
2026:HHC:23646
recoveries made at the instance of the accused. The motive is not
necessary in a case of direct evidence, and the accused cannot
claim the acquittal because the motive was not proved by the
prosecution. No reason was assigned as to why the injured would
falsely implicate the accused. Learned Trial Court had rightly
appreciated the material on record, and there is no infirmity in the
judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, he
prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.
11.
I have given a considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
12.
Kamlender (PW2) stated that the accused came to his
room and asked him to go out on a morning walk. He and the
accused proceeded towards the jungle for a morning walk. He sat
on the roadside, and the accused went towards the jungle. The
accused returned after 15-20 minutes. The accused caught and
stabbed him (the informant) on the neck with a sharp weapon.
Thereafter, the accused hit him with the stone on the head. He
became unconscious. He regained consciousness and found
himself lying under the bridge. He was wearing a muffler and a
blanket. He did not know the reason why the accused had stabbed
him with a sharp weapon or hit him on the head. He stated in his
2026:HHC:23646
cross-examination that he used to go to Sarahan Kisan Bhawan to
work as a Carpenter. Accused Baldev met him through Guru Suresh
Sharma and started visiting his house. The accused had visited his
house at 4:00 am on the date of the incident. The accused had
proposed to go up to the temple in the jungle, but he declined, and
the accused went ahead. He denied that people used to walk on the
road. He denied that a quarrel had taken place between him and
Baldev two days before the incident. He denied that he and the
accused had consumed liquor on the date of the incident while
going to the temple. He admitted that it used to remain dark up to
6:00 a.m. He denied that he had received injuries from falling on a
sharp-edged weapon. He denied that he was making a false
statement.
13.
It was suggested to the injured in his cross-examination
that he had quarrelled with the accused two days before the
incident. This suggestion, even though denied by the victim, shows
the motive for the commission of the crime. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of
Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355 that the
suggestion put to the witness can be taken into consideration while
2026:HHC:23646
determining the innocence or guilt of the accused. It was observed
at page 383: “38. Thus, from the above, it is evident that the suggestion
made by the defence counsel to a witness in the crossexamination, if found to be incriminating in nature in any
manner, would definitely bind the accused, and the accused
cannot get away on the plea that his counsel had no implied
authority to make suggestions in the nature of admissions
against his client.
39. Any concession or admission of a fact by a defence
counsel would definitely be binding on his client, except for
the concession on the point of law. As a legal proposition, we
cannot agree with the submission canvassed on behalf of the
appellants that an answer by a witness to a suggestion made
by the defence counsel in the cross-examination does not
deserve any value or utility if it incriminates the accused in
any manner.
****
42. Therefore, we are of the opinion that suggestions made
to the witness by the defence counsel and the reply to such
suggestions would definitely form part of the evidence and
can be relied upon by the Court along with other evidence on
record to determine the guilt of the accused.”
14.
Thus, the submission that the motive was not proved
and the prosecution's case was doubtful cannot be accepted; even
otherwise, the absence of motive is not important in a case of direct
evidence but assumes significance in a case of circumstantial
evidence. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Subhash Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2025) 8 SCC 440: 2025
2026:HHC:23646
SCC OnLine SC 808 that failure to prove motive is not sufficient to
record acquittal. It was observed at page 449:
“29. The declaration in the cited decisions and the decisions
relied on therein is to the effect that if the case is built solely
upon circumstantial evidence, the absence of motive will be
a factor that weighs in favour of the accused. Just as a strong
motive does not by itself result in a conviction, the absence
of motive on that sole ground cannot result in an acquittal.
When the eyewitnesses are not convincing, a strong motive
cannot by itself result in conviction. Likewise, when the
circumstances are very convincing and provide an unbroken
chain leading only to the conclusion of guilt of the accused
and not to any other hypothesis, the total absence of a
motive will be of no consequence.
30. We extract para 17 from a three-Judge Bench decision,
Jan Mohammad v. State of Bihar [Jan Mohammad v. State of
Bihar, (1953) 1 SCC 5], which also is of vintage flavour,
succinctly putting forth the proposition: (SCC p. 12)
“17. Motive is a relevant fact under the Evidence Act
(Section 8). It is an important element in a chain of
presumptive proof where the evidence is purely
circumstantial, but it may lose importance in a case
where there is direct evidence by witnesses implicating
the accused. In a case such as the present, where the
prosecution evidence itself shows that the relations
between the deceased and the appellants were cordial, the
absence of an apparent motive, though not necessarily
fatal to the prosecution case, may reasonably be regarded
as a fact in favour of the accused. We think, therefore,
that the attempt to prove a motive against any of the
appellants has failed. [sic]”
31. Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar [Suresh Chandra
Bahri v. State of Bihar, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 80: 1995 SCC (Cri) 60]
held that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, proof of
motive would “supply a link in the chain of circumstances”
but all the same, absence of motive cannot be a ground to
2026:HHC:23646
altogether reject the prosecution case. Para 21 reads as
follows: (SCC p. 95)
“21. At the very outset, we may mention that sometimes
motive plays an important role and becomes a compelling
force to commit a crime, and therefore, the motive
behind the crime is a relevant factor for which evidence
may be adduced. A motive is something that prompts a
person to form an opinion or intention to do a certain
illegal act or even a legal act, but with illegal means, with
a view to achieving that intention. In a case where there is
clear proof of motive for the commission of the crime, it
affords added support to the finding of the court that the
accused was guilty of the offence charged with. But it has to
be remembered that the absence of proof of motive does not
render the evidence bearing on the guilt of the accused
nonetheless untrustworthy or unreliable because most often
it is only the perpetrator of the crime alone who knows as to
what circumstances prompted him to a certain course of
action leading to the commission of the crime.” (emphasis
supplied)
32. Sukhpal Singh v. State of Punjab [Sukhpal Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2019) 15 SCC 622 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 460] found that
if prosecution establishes motive, it will undoubtedly
strengthen the prosecution case, but to say that absence of
motive will be fatal to the prosecution, irrespective of other
material before the court in the form of circumstantial
evidence is far-fetched. Para 15 reads as follows: (SCC p. 627)
“15. The last submission that we are called upon to deal
with is that there is no motive established against the
appellant for committing murder. It is undoubtedly true
that the question of motive may assume significance in a
prosecution case based on circumstantial evidence. But
the question is whether, in a case of circumstantial evidence,
the inability on the part of the prosecution to establish a
motive is fatal to the prosecution's case. We would think that
while it is true that if the prosecution establishes a motive for
the accused to commit a crime it will undoubtedly strengthen
the prosecution version based on circumstantial evidence, but
that is far cry from saying that the absence of a motive for the
2026:HHC:23646
commission of the crime by the accused will irrespective of
other material available before the court by way of
circumstantial evidence be fatal to the prosecution. In such
circumstances, on account of the circumstances which
stand established by evidence as discussed above, we find
no merit in the appeal and the same shall stand
dismissed.” (emphasis supplied)
33. Motive remains hidden in the inner recesses of the mind
of the perpetrator, which cannot, oftener than ever, be
ferreted out by the investigation agency. Though in a case of
circumstantial evidence, the complete absence of motive
would weigh in favour of the accused, it cannot be declared
as a general proposition of universal application that, in the
absence of motive, the entire inculpatory circumstances
should be ignored and the accused acquitted.”
15.
The testimony of the injured was corroborated by the
medical evidence. Dr Shruti Sharma (PW16) examined the injured
and found incised wounds on the neck, and behind the right Pinna,
multiple abrasions on the left eye and lacerations on the right side
of the parietal region, right side of the temporal parietal region,
parieto-occipital region of the scalp, mouth and face. These
injuries could have been caused by means of a razor and a stone.
She denied in her cross-examination that injuries could be caused
by a fall on a hard surface, but admitted that the injuries could be
caused by a fall on a sharp object like an iron rod, glass, etc. The
admission made by this witness in the cross-examination that the
injury could be caused by a fall on a sharp object like an iron rod,
glass, etc., is an alternative hypothesis and will not make the
2026:HHC:23646
prosecution's case suspect. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai, (2003) 12 SCC 395:
2003 SCC OnLine SC 1086, that when the testimonies of the
witnesses are found credible, the medical evidence pointing to
alternative
possibilities
is
not
sufficient
to
discard
the
prosecution’s case. It was observed at page 404:
“22. It is trite that where the eyewitnesses' account is found
credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to
alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive.
Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice.
Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial
process. Eyewitnesses' accounts would require a careful
independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility,
which should not be adversely prejudged, making any other
evidence, including the medical evidence, the sole
touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must
be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent
probability of the story; consistency with the account of
other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with
the undisputed facts; the “credit” of the witnesses; their
performance in the witness box; their power of observation,
etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes
eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.”
16.
Thus, the prosecution's case cannot be discarded
because of the alternate hypothesis accepted by the Medical
Officer.
17.
The statement of the victim that the accused had caused
injuries to him by means of a razor and a stone is corroborated by
the medical evidence. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
2026:HHC:23646
Neeraj Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 125: 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 13 that the testimony of the injured witness has to be
accepted as correct unless there are compelling circumstances to
doubt his testimony. It was observed:
“22. The importance of an injured witness in a criminal trial
cannot be overstated. Unless there are compelling
circumstances or evidence placed by the defence to doubt
such a witness, this has to be accepted as extremely valuable
evidence in a criminal trial.
23. In Balu Sudam Khaldev.State of Maharashtra [Balu Sudam
Khalde v.State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365: 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 355], this Court summed up the principles which
are to be kept in mind when appreciating the evidence of an
injured eyewitness. This Court held as follows: (SCC para 26)
“26. When the evidence of an injured eyewitness is to be
appreciated,
the
under-noted
legal
principles
enunciated by the Courts are required to be kept in
mind:
26.1. The presence of an injured eyewitness at the
time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted
unless there are material contradictions in his
deposition.
26.2. Unless it is otherwise established by the
evidence, it must be believed that an injured
witness would not allow the real culprits to escape
and falsely implicate the accused.
26.3. The evidence of the injured witness has greater
evidentiary value, and unless compelling reasons exist,
their statements are not to be discarded lightly.
26.4. The evidence of the injured witness cannot be
doubted on account of some embellishment in
natural conduct or minor contradictions.
26.5. If there be any exaggeration or immaterial
embellishment in the evidence of an injured
2026:HHC:23646
witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or
embellishment should be discarded from the
evidence of the injured, but not the whole evidence.
26.6. The broad substratum of the prosecution
version must be taken into consideration, and
discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of
memory with the passage of time should be
discarded.” (emphasis supplied)
18.
This position was reiterated in Rajan v. State of Haryana,
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, wherein it was observed:
“33. When the evidence of an injured eye-witness is to be
appreciated, the undernoted legal principles enunciated by
the Courts are required to be kept in mind:
“(a) The presence of an injured eye-witness at the time
and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless
there are material contradictions in his deposition.
(b) Unless it is otherwise established by the evidence, it
must be believed that an injured witness would not allow
the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the
accused.
(c) The evidence of an injured witness has greater
evidentiary value, and unless compelling reasons exist,
their statements are not to be discarded lightly.
(d) The evidence of an injured witness cannot be doubted
on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or
minor contradictions.
(e) If there be any exaggeration or immaterial
embellishments in the evidence of an injured witness,
then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment
should be discarded from the evidence of the injured, but
not the whole evidence.
(f) The broad substratum of the prosecution version must
be taken into consideration, and discrepancies which
normally creep due to loss of memory with passage of
time should be discarded.”
2026:HHC:23646
34. In assessing the value of the evidence of the
eyewitnesses, two principal considerations are whether, in
the circumstances of the case, it is possible to believe their
presence at the scene of occurrence or in such situations as
would make it possible for them to witness the facts deposed
to by them and secondly, whether there is anything
inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence. In
respect of both these considerations, circumstances either
elicited from those witnesses themselves or established by
other evidence tending to improbabilise their presence or to
discredit the veracity of their statements, will have a bearing
upon the value which a Court would attach to their evidence.
Although in cases where the plea of the accused is a mere
denial yet the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to
be examined on its own merits, where the accused raise a
definite plea or put forward a positive case which is
inconsistent with that of the prosecution, the nature of such
plea or case and the probabilities in respect of it will also
have to be taken into account while assessing the value of
the prosecution evidence. (See: Balu Sudam Khaldev.State of
Maharashtra:(2023) 13 SCC 365).
19.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State
of Punjab vs. Hari Singh 1974 (3) SCR 725 that a person speaking on
oath should be presumed to be a truthful witness unless there is
something inherently improbable in his testimony. It was
observed:
“The ordinary presumption is that a witness speaking under
an oath is truthful unless and until he is shown to be
untruthful or unreliable in any particular respect. The High
Court, reversing this approach, seems to us to have assumed
that witnesses are untruthful unless it is proved that they
are telling the truth. Witnesses, solemnly deposing on oath
in the witness box during a trial upon a grave charge of
murder, must be presumed to act with a full sense of
responsibility for the consequences of what they state. It
2026:HHC:23646
may be that what they say is so very unlikely or unnatural or
unreasonable that it is safer not to act upon it or even to
disbelieve them.”
20.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State
of U.P. Versus Smt. Noorie Alias Noor Jahan and Others, (1996) 9 SCC
104, that while assessing the evidence of an eyewitness, the Court
must
adhere
to
two
principles,
namely,
whether,
in
the
circumstances of the case, the eyewitness could be present and
whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable. It
was observed: “7. The High Court having acquitted the accused persons on
appreciation of the evidence, we have ourselves scrutinised
the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3. The conclusion is irresistible
that their evidence on material particulars has been brushed
aside by the High Court by entering into the realm of
conjecture and fanciful speculation without even discussing
the evidence, more particularly the evidence relating to the
basic prosecution case. While assessing and evaluating the
evidence of eyewitnesses, the Court must adhere to two
principles, namely, whether, in the circumstances of the case, it
was possible for the eyewitness to be present at the scene and
whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable.
The High Court, in our opinion, has failed to observe the
aforesaid principles and, in fact, has misappreciated the
evidence, which has caused a gross miscarriage of justice.
The credibility of a witness has to be decided by referring to
his evidence and finding out how he has fared in crossexamination and what impression is created by his evidence,
taken insofar as the context of the case, and not by entering
into the realm of conjecture and speculation. On scrutinising
the evidence of PWs. 1, 2 and 3, we find they are consistent
with one another so far as the place of occurrence, the
manner of assault, the weapon of assault used by the
2026:HHC:23646
accused persons, the fact of dragging of the dead body of the
deceased from the place to the grove and nothing has been
brought out in their cross-examination to impeach their
testimony. The aforesaid oral evidence fully corroborates the
medical evidence. In that view of the matter, we
unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that the prosecution
has been able to establish the charge against the accused
persons and the High Court committed an error in acquitting
the three respondents, namely Inder Dutt, Raghu Raj and
Bikram.” (emphasis supplied)
21.
The injuries on the body of the victim established his
presence on the spot, and his testimony is entitled to a great
weight, which cannot be rejected without any cogent reason.
22.
The police arrested the accused, and he made a
disclosure statement that he could show the shops from where he
had stolen the razor and purchased the blades. Rijwan (PW3) stated
that the accused identified his shop and disclosed that he had taken
the razor from his shop. He did not know whether the accused had
visited his shop for a haircut. He was permitted to be crossexamined. He denied that the accused had visited his shop for a
haircut and taken the razor from the shop. He denied the previous
statement recorded by the police. Thus, this witness has not
supported the prosecution's case that the accused had visited his
shop and stolen the razor from the shop.
23.
The accused claimed in his statement recorded under
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act that he had purchased the
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blades from the shop of Sanjay Bansal (PW9). Sanjay Bansal (PW9)
stated that the police had brought the accused to his shop and told
him that the accused had purchased the blades from the shop. He
did not remember the identity of the person who was with the
police. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied, for
want of knowledge, that the accused had identified his shop and
told the police about the purchase of two blades from the shop. He
denied the previous statement recorded by the police. He stated in
the cross-examination by learned counsel for the defence that he
did not remember the brand of the blades purchased from his shop.
No proceedings were conducted in his presence. Nobody had
visited the shop to purchase any kind of blades.
24.
It was submitted that the statements of these witnesses
make the prosecution's case doubtful. This submission is not
acceptable. Rizwan is a hairdresser by profession, and Sanjay is a
shopkeeper. Many people visit their shop, and they would have no
reason to remember the identity of their customers. Hence, the fact
that they could not identify the accused as their customer will not
make the prosecution’s case doubtful.
25.
The police had not discovered any article pursuant to
the disclosure statement made by the accused. It was laid down by
2026:HHC:23646
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in H.P. Admn. v. Om Prakash, (1972) 1
SCC 249: 1972 SCC (Cri) 88, that pointing out the place from where
the accused had purchased the weapon of offence does not amount
to the fact discovered within the meaning of Section 27 of the
Indian Evidence Act. It was observed:
“13. Thereafter, on the information furnished by the accused
that he had purchased the weapon from Ganga Singh, PW 11
and that he would take them to him, they went to the thari of
PW 11, where the accused pointed him out to them. It is
contended that the information given by the accused that he
purchased the dagger from PW 11, followed by his leading the
police to his thari and pointing him out, is inadmissible under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act. In our view, there is force in
this contention. A fact discovered within the meaning of
Section 27 must refer to a material fact to which the
information directly relates. In order to render the
information admissible, the fact discovered must be relevant
and must have been such that it constitutes the information
through which the discovery was made. What is the fact
discovered in this case? Not the dagger, but the dagger hid
under the stone, which is not known to the Police (See
Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor [AIR 1947 PC 67: 74 IA 65].)
But thereafter, can it be said that the information furnished
by the accused that he purchased the dagger from PW 11 led to
a fact discovered when the accused took the police to the thari
of PW 11 and pointed him out? A single Bench of the Madras
High Court in Public Prosecutor v. India China Lingiah, [AIR
1954 Mad 433: 1953 MWN 918: 1954 Cri LJ 583] and in Re
Vallingiri, [AIR 1950 Mad 613 : (1950) 1 MLJ 467: 1950 MWN 297]
seems to have taken the view that the information by an
accused leading to the discovery of a witness to whom he had
given stolen articles is a discovery of a fact within the
meaning of Section 27. In Emperor v. Ramanuja Ayyangar,
[AIR 1935 Mad 528: 1934 MWN 1479: 36 Cr LJ 1442: 42 MLW 124]
a Full Bench of three Judges by a majority held that the
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statement of the accused “I purchased the mattress from this
shop and it was this woman (another witness) that carried
the mattress” as proved by the witness who visited him with
the police was admissible because the word “fact” is not
restricted to something which can be exhibited as a material
object. This judgment was before the Pulukuri Kotayya case
when, as far as the Presidency of Madras was concerned, the
law laid down by the Full Bench of that Court, in Re Athappe
Goundan, [ILR 1937 Mad 695: AIR 1937 Mad 618] prevailed. It
held that where the accused's statement connects the fact
discovered with the offence and makes it relevant, even
though the statement amounts to a confession of the offence,
it must be admitted because it is that which has led directly to
the discovery. This view was overruled by the Privy Council in
the Pulukuri Kotayya case, and this Court had approved the
Privy Council case in Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. State of
Bombay [AIR 1955 SC 104: (1955) 1 SCR 903].
14. In the Full Bench Judgment of Seven Judges in Sukhan v.
Crown [ILR (1929) 10 Lah 283] which was approved by the
Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya case, Shadi Lal, C.J., as he
then was speaking for the majority pointed out that the
expression “fact” as defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act
includes not only the physical fact which can be perceived by
the senses but also the psychological fact or mental condition
of which any person is conscious and that it is in the former
sense that the word used by the Legislature refers to a
material and not to a mental fact. It is clear, therefore, that
what should be discovered is the material fact, and the
information that is admissible is that which has caused that
discovery so as to connect the information and the fact with
each other as the “cause and effect”. That information which
does not distinctly connect with the fact discovered, or that
portion of the information which merely explains the
material thing discovered, is not admissible under Section 27
and cannot be proved. As explained by this Court as well as by
the Privy Council, normally, Section 27 is brought into
operation where a person in police custody produces from
some place of concealment some object said to be connected
with the crime of which the informant is the accused. The
concealment of the fact which is not known to the police is
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what is discovered by the information, and lends assurance
that the information was true. No witness with whom some
material fact, such as the weapon of murder, stolen property
or other incriminating article is not hidden, sold or kept and
which is unknown to the Police, can be said to be discovered
as a consequence of the information furnished by the
accused. These examples, however, are only by way of
illustration and are not exhaustive. What makes the
information leading to the discovery of the witness
admissible is the discovery from him of the thing sold to him,
hidden or kept with him, which the police did not know until
the information was furnished to them by the accused. A
witness cannot be said to be discovered if nothing is to be
found or recovered from him as a consequence of the
information furnished by the accused, and the information
that disclosed the identity of the witness will not be
admissible. But even apart from the admissibility of the
information under Section 27, the evidence of the
Investigating Officer and the panchas that the accused had
taken them to PW 11 and pointed him out and as corroborated
by PW 11 himself, would be admissible under Section 8 of the
Evidence Act as conduct of the accused.”
26.
The
prosecution
also relied
upon
the
disclosure
statement leading to the recovery of the motorcycle and the keys.
No person has deposed that the accused was riding a motorcycle at
the time of the incident. Thus, the recovery of the motorcycle, keys
and the documents will not connect the accused to the commission
of the crime.
27.
The prosecution relied upon the disclosure statements
leading to the identification of the spot where he had assaulted
Kamlender (PW2) and thrown a razor in the water. ASI Jagir Singh
2026:HHC:23646
had already visited the spot and prepared the spot map before the
disclosure made by the accused. This is also evident from the
testimony of Dy. SP Manvendra Thakur (PW11), who stated that the
spots identified by the accused matched the spot map prepared by
HC Jagir Singh (Ext.P16/PW7), which means that the accused had
only shown the places that were known to the police. It was laid
down by this Court in State of Himachal Pradesh versus Sanjiv Kumar
Alias Sanju 2019 (3) ShimLC 1710, that there cannot be any
rediscovery of a fact. When the place was known to the police, the
disclosure made by the accused regarding a place without any
recovery would be inadmissible under Section 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act. It was observed: “(j) Disclosure statement of accused Sanjay Kumar alias
Sanjjan regarding the place from where the dead body was
thrown: The prosecution examined Constable Narpat Ram
(PW-16 in ST No.3/95) to prove the disclosure statement
(Ext. PM) of accused Sanjay Kumar alias Sanjjan in ST No.
3/1995. However, the accused Sanjay Kumar is dead;
therefore, this evidence is also not going to arrive at any
conclusion. Even otherwise, his testimony is also cryptic and
leads to no conclusion because it points out to the place from
where the accused had thrown the dead body. Whereas the
police had already recovered the dead body from that place.
Therefore, in the absence of recovery, such a confession does not
fall within the exception of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872.
(k) In Aher Raja Khima v State of Saurashtra, AIR 1956 SC 217, a
three-member bench of the Supreme Court holds,
2026:HHC:23646
20. Then we come to the recoveries. The false beard
and mask were found buried in the grounds of
Dewayat's house, and the appellant is said to have
recovered them in the presence of panchas. But those
discoveries are inadmissible in evidence because the
police already knew where they were hidden...
(l) In Thimma v. State of Mysore, 1970 2 SCC 105, a threemember bench of the Supreme Court holds,
10. Reliance on behalf of the prosecution was also
placed on the information given by the appellant,
which led to the discovery of the dead body and other
articles found at the spot. It was contended that the
information received from him related distinctly to
the facts discovered and, therefore, the statement
conveying the information was admissible in
evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. This
information, it was argued, also lends support to the
appellant's guilt. It appears to us that when P. W. 4
was suspected of complicity in this offence, he would
in all probability have disclosed to the police the
existence of the dead body and the other articles at
the place where they were actually found. Once a fact
is discovered from other sources, there can be no fresh
discovery, even if relevant information is extracted from
the accused and Courts have to be watchful against the
ingenuity of the investigating officer in this respect so
that the protection afforded by the wholesome
provisions of Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act is
not whittled down by the mere manipulation of the
record of the case diary. It would, in the
circumstances, be somewhat unsafe to rely on this
information for proving the appellant's guilt. We are
accordingly disinclined to take into consideration
this statement. (Emphasis supplied)
28.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Thimma and Thimma Raju v. State of Mysore, (1970) 2 SCC 105: 1970
SCC (Cri) 320 that where the police had discovered some fact from
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other sources, it cannot be re-discovered at the instance of the
accused. It was observed on page 112:
“10. Reliance on behalf of the prosecution was also placed on
the information given by the appellant, which led to the
discovery of the dead body and other articles found at the
spot. It was contended that the information received from
him related distinctly to the facts discovered and, therefore,
the statement conveying the information was admissible in
evidence under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. This
information, it was argued, also lends support to the
appellant's guilt. It appears to us that when PW 4 was
suspected of complicity in this offence, he would, in all
probability, have disclosed to the police the existence of the
dead body and the other articles at the place where they were
actually found. Once a fact is discovered from other sources,
there can be no fresh discovery even if relevant information is
extracted from the accused, and courts have to be watchful
against the ingenuity of the investigating officer in this respect
so that the protection afforded by the wholesome provisions of
Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act is not whittled
down by mere manipulation of the record of the case diary. It
would, in the circumstances, be somewhat unsafe to rely on
this information to prove the appellant's guilt. We are
accordingly disinclined to take into consideration this
statement.” (Emphasis supplied)
29.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Vijender v. State of Delhi, (1997) 6 SCC 171: 1997 SCC (Cri) 857 that
where the fact was within the knowledge of the police, it cannot be
discovered at the instance of the accused. It was observed at page
179:
“17. Another elementary statutory breach which we notice in
recording the evidence of the above witnesses is that of
Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Evidence was led through the
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above three police witnesses that, in consequence of
information received from the three appellants on 30-61992, they discovered the place where the dead body of
Khurshid was thrown. As already noticed, the dead body of
Khurshid was recovered on 27-6-1992, and therefore, the
question of the discovery of the place where it was thrown
thereafter could not arise. Under Section 27 of the Evidence
Act, if information given by the accused leads to the
discovery of a fact which is the direct outcome of such
information, then only it would be evidence, but when the
fact has already been discovered, as in the instant case,
evidence could not be led in respect thereof.”
30.
A similar view was taken in Allarakha Habib Memon Etc.
v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1910, wherein it was
observed:
“41. We find that these so-called confessions are ex facie
inadmissible in evidence for the simple reason that the
accused persons were presented at the hospital by the police
officers after having been arrested in the present case. As
such, the notings made by the Medical Officer, Dr Arvindbhai
(PW-2), in the injury reports of Mohmedfaruk @ Palak and
Amin @ Lalo would be clearly hit by Section 26 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter being referred to as
‘Evidence Act’). As a consequence, we are not inclined to
accept the said admissions of the accused as incriminating
pieces of evidence relevant under Section 21 of the Evidence
Act. The circumstance regarding the identification of the place of
incident at the instance of the accused is also inadmissible
because the crime scene was already known to the police, and no
new fact was discovered in pursuance of the disclosure
statements.” (Emphasis supplied)
31.
Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the
statements made by the accused pointing out the places.
32.
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The police had also recovered the jacket and the lower of
the accused and sent them to the SFSL. The report (Ext.P38/PW15)
mentions that blood was not detected on the lower and jacket of
the accused. Therefore, the report does not connect the articles
belonging to the accused to the commission of the crime.
33.
It was submitted that the CCTV footage shows the
accused alone and does not corroborate the prosecution's case. The
CCTV footage shows the time of 3:40 A.M. The victim stated that
the accused had visited his house at about 4:00 A.M. Therefore, the
accused would have been alone at 3:40 A.M., and the absence of the
victim in the CCTV footage does not make the prosecution's case
doubtful.
34.
The testimony of the informant Kamlender (PW2) was
duly corroborated by the medical evidence. It is natural and
inspires confidence. There is nothing in his cross-examination to
show that he has any motive to depose against the accused. The
suggestion made to him in the cross-examination that he and the
accused had consumed liquor on the way to the temple establishes
the presence of the accused and the victim. Therefore, the learned
Trial Court had rightly accepted the informant’s testimony.
35.
2026:HHC:23646
It was submitted that no independent witness was
examined, and the prosecution's case is highly doubtful. This
submission will not help the accused. The incident had taken place
in the morning, and the victim specifically stated that it remained
dark till 6 a.m. Therefore, the movement of the people cannot be
expected at that time, and the prosecution's case cannot be faulted
for the non-examination of an independent person.
36.
Dr Shruti Sharma (PW16) stated that the injuries were
grievous and dangerous to life. The injury was caused by means of
a razor on the neck, a vital part of the body. Had the death been
caused, the accused would have been liable for murder because he
had caused multiple injuries to the neck, showing his intent.
Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the
accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section
307 of the IPC.
37.
The learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and pay a fine of
₹20,000/-, and in the default of payment of the fine to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for one year. The accused had caused
multiple incised wounds on the victim’s neck and had also caused
lacerated wounds to him. He was known to the accused and had
2026:HHC:23646
taken advantage of his acquaintance to cause injuries. Therefore,
he had breached the trust placed by the victim in him. Considering
the nature of injuries and the relationship between the accused and
the victim, the punishment of five years cannot be said to be
excessive, requiring any interference from the Court.
38.
The injuries were caused to Kamlender (PW2). Section
307 of the IPC is a graver form of Section 325 of the IPC, and the
accused could not have been punished for the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 325 of the IPC when he was
punished of the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 307 of the IPC as per Section 71 of the IPC, and the learned
Trial Court erred in sentencing the accused for the commission of
an offence punishable under Section 325 of the IPC.
39.
No other point was urged.
40.
Therefore, in view of the above, the present appeal is
partly allowed, and the order of sentence for the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 325 of the IPC is set aside. The
fine amount, if deposited, be refunded to the accused after the
expiry of the period of appeal in case no appeal is preferred, and in
case of appeal, the same be dealt with as per the orders of the
2026:HHC:23646
Hon’ble Supreme Court. Subject to this modification, the rest of the
judgment and order are upheld.
41.
A copy of this judgment, along with the record of the
learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. Pending applications, if
any, also stand disposed of.
22nd June, 2026
(Nikita)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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