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THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Civil Appellate Jurisdiction)
DATED : 7th NOVEMBER, 2016
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------S.B. : HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, JUDGE
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RFA No.01 of 2016
Appellants
:
1.
Smt. Kaushilya Minda (since deceased),
W/o Late C. M. Minda,
Minda Trade Agencies,
Verma Building,
National Highway,
Gangtok,
East Sikkim,
through her Legal Representative
Shri Umesh Minda,
S/o Late C. M. Minda,
Minda Trade Agencies,
Verma Building,
National Highway,
Gangtok,
East Sikkim.
2.
Shri Umesh Minda,
S/o Late C. M. Minda,
M/s. Minda Trade Agencies,
Verma Building,
National Highway,
Gangtok,
East Sikkim.
versus
Respondent
:
Rajesh Verma,
S/o Late Tek Chand Verma,
Verma Building,
National Highway,
Gangtok,
East Sikkim.
Appeal under Order XLI, Rules 1 and 2
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. Sudesh Joshi and Mr. Sisir Mothay, Advocates for the Appellant.
Dr. (Ms.) Doma T. Bhutia and Ms. Meena Bhusal, Advocates for the
Respondent.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
JUDGMENT
Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.
1.
Assailing the Judgment and Decree passed by the
Learned District Judge, East Sikkim, at Gangtok, in Eviction Suit
No.03 of 2014, vide Judgment dated 29-10-2015, in which the
suit was decreed in favour of the Plaintiff (the Respondent
herein), the instant Appeal has been preferred.
2.
The grounds raised in the Appeal, inter alia, were
that, the Learned Trial Court had erred in arriving at the finding
that the suit premises were required by the Plaintiff/Respondent
for his bona fide occupation, when infact, it was required for his
wife, purportedly for selling Computer spare parts and accessories
and imparting Computer Training.
That, the wife of the
Respondent was never financially dependent upon him and,
therefore, could not be considered as a „dependent‟ in terms of
the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act I of 1956 (hereinafter
referred to as the “Act of 1956”).
3.
matter
The facts may briefly be traversed to appreciate the
in
its
correct
perspective.
The
Respondent/Plaintiff
(hereinafter be referred to as the „Plaintiff‟) is the absolute owner
of the property in dispute being a shop measuring 10' x 30', i.e.,
a total of 300 sq. ft., on the southern side of the ground floor, in a
seven storied building by the name “Verma Building”, located on
the National Highway, Gangtok, East Sikkim, which fell in his
partition share along with the entire second floor in the said
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
building, vide a Partition Deed dated 15-06-2005.
His father,
Late Tek Chand Verma, had leased out the suit property to the
Appellant No.1 (Defendant No.1 since deceased), mother of the
Appellant No.2, (hereinafter “the Defendant No.2”) for a period of
ten years, vide a Lease Deed dated 19-07-1976, to run a
Hardware Shop at a monthly rent of Rs.600/- (Rupees six
hundred) only, according to the English Calendar. It is averred in
the Plaint that the suit premises is in the use of the Defendant
No.2 as his Office-cum-Shop for selling petty electrical and
hardware articles in the name of “Minda Trade Agency”, besides
which he has other business of supplying hardware and electrical
items
from
his
warehouse,
situated
opposite
the
Police
Headquarters, on the National Highway, after procuring the
articles from Siliguri.
That, the Defendant No.1 had started
residing permanently in Siliguri where both Defendants own a flat
as also a flat in Gangtok, below M. G. Marg, opposite the Police
Headquarters and a godown and therefore, do not require the suit
premises.
After the Plaintiff became the owner of the disputed
property, he informed the Defendants of his ownership on which
the Defendant No.2 started depositing the monthly rent in the
joint Savings Bank Account of the Plaintiff and his wife, Mrs.
Sunila Verma. That, the Defendant No.1 has been allowed
peaceful possession of the suit premises for the last thirty-six
years from August, 1976 but, now the situation of the Plaintiff has
completely changed as he is on the verge of retirement while his
wife has already retired. They are in occupation of Government
Quarters at Syari, Deorali, East Sikkim, which he will be required
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
to vacate. The suit premises is bona fide required by him as after
his retirement he is required to augment his income by running a
Computer spare parts and accessories shop along with his wife for
which a Trade Licence has been obtained in the name of his wife.
He has to finance the medical education of his daughter
anticipated
at
Rs.8,00,000/-
Rs.5,00,000/-
(Rupees
(Rupees
lakhs)
eight
five
only,
lakhs)
per
only,
annum
to
and
subsequently, her marriage. That apart, being a Cardiac patient,
he is likely to incur yearly medical expenditure expected to be
about Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand) only. Hence,
the prayers enumerated in the Plaint.
4.
In the Written Statement of the Defendants, it was,
inter alia, averred that prior to five years the Defendant No.2 was
supplying electrical articles to Government Departments which
has since been discontinued.
That, the Defendant No.1 mostly
resided in Gangtok, but was required to go to Siliguri for medical
treatment
due
to
her
various
ailments.
Admittedly,
the
Defendants have a residential flat below M. G. Marg, Opposite the
Police Headquarters and a rented godown space, but it is not a
shop space.
It is only the suit premises from where the
Defendants earn their living
defaults in monthly rents.
for which there have been no
Admittedly, the Plaintiff was on the
verge of retirement, but his wife had sought voluntary retirement
and they have no financial constraints as both would avail of
retirement benefits. That, selling Computer spare parts and
accessories and imparting Computer Training can be started on
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
the second floor inherited by the Plaintiff, which he has however
let out on rent.
It is admitted that although a legal Notice was
received by the Defendants from the Plaintiff, however, the same
did not merit vacation of the suit premises by the Defendant No.1
and, hence, the non-compliance.
It is denied that the Plaintiff
requires the suit for bona fide occupation.
5.
The
Learned
Trial
Court
settled
two
issues
for
determination, viz.,
6.
(i)
Whether the Plaintiff requires the suit premises for
his bona fide occupation?
(ii)
Any other reliefs.
The
Plaintiff
examined
five
witnesses
including
himself, while the Defendant No.2 examined only himself. After
considering the evidence on record and the relevant provisions of
Law, the Learned Trial Court passed the impugned Judgment and
Decree.
7.
Referring to the Act of 1956, the points canvassed
before
this
Court
by
Learned
Counsel
for
the
Appellant/
Defendant, was that the bona fide occupation of the premises
must be for the landlord or his dependents. That, in the instant
matter, it is evident that the wife who seeks to run a business,
selling Computer spare parts and accessories and imparting
Computer Training in the suit premises was never financially
dependent on the Plaintiff. He invited the attention of this Court
to the decision of Paul Sangay vs.
1.
AIR 1980 Sikkim 13
Mahabir
Prasad Agarwalla1,
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
wherein a Division Bench of this Court had held that mere desire
of the landlord is not enough but there should be an element of
need, in other words bona fide requirement. That, in the instant
case, it is merely a desire, as apparent from the statement of the
Plaintiff that it was their “dream plan” with no bona fide
requirement. Referring to Paragraphs 33 and 35 of the impugned
Judgment wherein the Learned Trial Court recorded that the
Defendant
had
not
disputed
that
they
owned
alternative
accommodation close to the suit premise, it was vehemently
contended that this finding was erroneous as the alternative
accommodation pertained to residential premises, whereas the
suit property is commercial accommodation. Basing his arguments
on Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it was
contended that the Plaintiff has two properties, of which he claims
that he requires the suit premises for himself and his dependent
wife, but he has not discharged his burden as per Law. On this
count reliance was placed on Rangammal vs. Kuppuswami and
Another2. It was also urged that a certified copy of the Sale Deed
Document dated 07-04-1996, filed by the Defendant No.1 had
been taken into consideration by the Learned Trial Court to arrive
at the finding that the Defendant No.1 had purchased two floors
(ground floor and the first floor) of RCC building from one Durga
Khati measuring 10' x 30', but the document had never been
exhibited in the Learned Trial Court. On this argument, reliance
was placed on the decision of Life Insurance Corporation of India
and Another
2.
3.
vs. Ram Pal Singh Bisen3 wherein it was held that
(2011) 12 SCC 220
(2010) 4 SCC 491
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
“Under the law of evidence also, it is necessary that contents of documents are
required to be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence.
At the
most, admission of documents may amount to admission of contents but not
its truth. Documents having not been produced and marked as required under
the Evidence Act cannot be relied upon by the court. Contents of the document
cannot be proved by merely filing in a court.”
That, the Learned Trial
Court also opined that the existence of an adjoining shop space
(with closed green shutter) would show that the said premises
could be used for business purposes with proper renovation, but
this conclusion too was drawn without any evidence being led on
this aspect, added to which the ground floor is not at the road
level and cannot be used as a shop.
Hence, the opinion of the
Learned Trial Court in the impugned Judgment in Paragraphs 33
to 35 are without any basis.
8.
In the next limb of his argument, it was urged that
although the Plaintiff during the pendency of the suit had retired
from service, no effort was made to amend the pleadings, as a
result of which there is variance in the pleadings and the evidence
of the Plaintiff, inasmuch as in his evidence before the Court he
has stated that, he retired as a Secretary to the Government of
Sikkim after having served for 35 years, but his pleadings reflect
that he would be retiring. On this point, reliance was placed on
Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta vs. New Era Fabrics Private Limited and
Others4 wherein at Paragraph 39 it was held that “In our considered
opinion, the Division Bench of the High Court was perfectly justified in holding
that unless the plaint is amended and a specific plea is taken that the Mill
Mazdoor Sabha had agreed for the proposed sale
4.
(2015) 9 SCC 755
on
certain terms and
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
conditions offered by the respondents herein, the two letters viz. Exts. P-27
and P-28 could not have been taken into consideration at all.”
Reliance was
also placed on Kashi Nath (Dead) through Lrs. vs. Jaganath5 wherein
at Paragraph 17 it was held that “As noted by the Privy Council in Siddik
Mohd. Shah v. Saran [AIR 1930 PC 57 (1)] and Trojan and Co. v. Rm. N. N.
Nagappa Chetiar [AIR 1953 SC 235] when the evidence is not in line with the
pleadings and is at variance with it and as in this case, in virtual selfcontradiction, adverse inference has to be drawn and the evidence cannot be
looked into or relied upon.”
The attention of this Court was also
drawn to the decision in Nauranglall Agarwala and Others vs. Smt.
Basant Kumari Sud6 at Paragraph 29 wherein the Court concluded
“I do not think that the plaintiff, not having pleaded such a case in her plaint
even remotely, but having pleaded some other and different case specifically
and categorically, can be allowed to found her claim on such new grounds.
…………. that in a given case relief may be granted even on a ground not
specifically pleaded, provided there can be or has been no prejudice or surprise
to the other party”.
That, in Subhash Kumar Pradhan vs. Shanti Devi7,
this Court has held that —
“12. It is almost well settled that in the absence
of pleading, evidence, if any, produced by the parties
cannot be considered. The law is well settled that no party
can travel beyond its pleadings and all necessary facts
must be pleaded in the pleadings of a party so that the
opposite party may be in a position to know as to what
case he has to defend and thus, nothing comes before
him as a surprise at the time of the evidence.”
That, in view of the arguments canvassed and the decisions
relied on, the impugned Judgment of the Learned Trial Court be
set aside.
9.
Resisting the argument of the Appellant/Defendant, it
was pointed out by Learned Counsel for the Respondent/Plaintiff
5.
6.
7.
(2003) 8 SCC 740
AIR 1981 Sikkim 22
AIR 2014 Sikkim 13
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
that in the first instance the Appeal is infructuous, the Defendant
No.1 having passed away on 03-02-2016 while the Appeal was
filed on 19-02-2016. The Defendant No.2 has no locus standi as
he was never the tenant of the Plaintiff and admittedly there is no
Tenancy Agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant No.2.
That, as the Defendant No.2 himself has denied that he is the
tenant of the Plaintiff, therefore, the question of him stepping into
his mother‟s shoes does not arise.
10.
It is next contended that the Trade Licence for the suit
premises is in the name of his deceased mother which is not
transferable, resultant, he is not even eligible to run the shop in
the suit premises. Relying on the ratio of Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani
and Another vs. Indusind Bank Ltd. and Others8
it was submitted
that the Defendant No.2 cannot depose for the Defendant No.1
since he was only four years old when the Tenancy Agreement of
1976 was entered into and merely because he is the Power-ofAttorney holder he is not eligible to depose of facts which are not
in his personal knowledge. It was further urged that the Powerof-Attorney was not exhibited and, therefore, was unproved.
11.
Arguing
Respondent/Plaintiff
on
the
attention
bona
of
fide
this
requirement
Court
was
of
the
drawn
to
Sidhharth Viyas and Another vs. Ravi Nath Misra and Others9, it was
canvassed that the object of any rent law is to balance the
competing claims of the landlord and the tenant and while
interpreting the provisions, the object of the Act has to be kept in
8.
9.
(2005) 2 SCC 217
(2015) 2 SCC 701
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
consideration. That, in the instant matter, if the object of the Act
of 1956 is to be considered in the first place, the Defendant No.2
is not a tenant of the Plaintiff, and secondly, the Act is to prevent
vagrancy. In view of the fact that Defendant No.2 has alternative
residential
accommodation,
the
question
of
him
becoming
vagrant, does not arise. That, in G. C. Kapoor vs. Nand Kumar
Bhasin and Others10 discussing the case of Raghunath G. Panhale vs.
Chaganlal Sundarji and Co.11, it was, inter alia, held by the Apex
Court “that it was not necessary for the landlord to prove that he had money
to invest in the new business contemplated nor that he had experience of it”.
He merely has to show a bona fide requirement which in the
instant case the Plaintiff through his evidence has clearly set out.
Reference was also made to Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. vs.
Vimalabai Prabhulal and Others12
wherein the Apex Court had
reached the finding that “It is always the prerogative of the landlord that
if he requires the premises in question for his bona fide use for expansion of
business this is no ground to say that the landlords are already having
their
business at Chennai and Hyderabad therefore, it is not genuine need.
......... It is not the tenant who can dictate the terms to the landlord and advise
him what he should do and what he should not.”
12.
Taking
her
argument
forward,
Learned
Counsel
painstakingly pointed to the provisions of the Act of 1956 and
contended that it should be so interpreted as to advance the
cause of justice instructed by the realities by life and practical
wisdom and relied on Kailash Chand and Another vs. Dharam Dass13.
In this matter while dealing with the Himachal Pradesh Urban
10.
12.
(2002) 1 SCC 610
(2005) 8 SCC 252
11. (1999) 8 SCC 1
13. (2005) 5 SCC 375
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
Rent Control Act, 1987, the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that “The rent
control legislations are generally heavily loaded in favour of the tenants and
the provision dealing with which the courts at times lean in favour of the
landlords is the one which permits the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant
on the ground of requirement for his own occupation, residential or nonresidential. ....... While the tenant needs to be protected, the courts would not
ordinarily deny the relief to the landlord, who genuinely and bona fide requires
the premises in occupation of the tenant for occupation by himself or for the
members of his family, unless they feel convinced that the so-called
requirement of the landlord was a ruse for getting rid of an inconvenient
tenant”.
13.
That, in Shrimati Shakuntala Bai vs. K. N. Dewan14 this
Court held that “The word “dependant” would mean a person who is either
living with the plaintiff or gets financial or other material support for his upkeep”
and in the instant case the Respondent and his wife live
together bring his wife within the ambit of dependant.
The
pension of the husband and wife would not suffice to pay for their
daughter‟s education and expenses besides which necessary
financial arrangements have to be made for her marriage and,
therefore, the requirement of the premises to enable them to run
a shop. That, the Defendant No.1 failed to appear before the Lok
Adalat indicating her disinterest in retaining the suit property.
That, in view of the entire grounds set out hereinabove, the
Learned Trial Court has not erred in his Judgment and, therefore,
the Appeal be dismissed.
14.
I have heard the submissions of Learned Counsel for
the parties at length and given due consideration. I have also
14. 1977 (1) Sikkim Law Journal 33
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
perused the records of the Learned Trial Court along with the
documents and provisions of the Laws relied on and perused the
impugned Judgment and the citations made at the Bar.
15.
The moot point that falls for consideration is whether
the premises are required bona fide by the landlord?
16.
Before deliberating on the above point, it would be
expedient to first deal with the other points raised by Learned
Counsel in their arguments, the first pertaining to Power-ofAttorney holder. According to Section 1A of The Powers-ofAttorney Act, 1882, a Power-of-Attorney includes any instrument
empowering a specified person to act for and in the name of the
person executing it. Power-of-attorney is also defined under
Section 2(21) of The Indian Stamp Act, 1899, and in Section 182
of The Indian Contract Act, 1872. All the definitions point to the
authority of an agent viz., his power to affect his principal‟s
position by doing acts on his behalf, such a relationship having
arisen on grounds of ailment, old age or place of residence of the
principal or other considerations. Order III Rules 1 and 2 of The
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short “CPC”), empowers the
holder of the Power-of-Attorney to „act‟ on behalf of the principal.
In Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani8 (supra) deliberating on this point the
Hon‟ble Apex Court succinctly laid down that—
“13. ......... In our view the word „acts‟ employed
in Order 3 Rules 1 and 2 CPC confines only to in respect
of „acts‟ done by the power-of-attorney holder in exercise
of the power granted by the instrument. The term „acts‟
would not include deposing in place and instead of the
principal. In other words, if the power-of-attorney holder
has rendered some „acts‟ in pursuance of power of
attorney, he may depose for the principal in respect of
such acts, but he cannot depose for the principal for the
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
acts done by the principal not by him. Similarly, he
cannot depose for the principal in respect of the matter of
which only the principal can have a personal knowledge
and in respect of which the principal is entitled to be
cross-examined.”
The only argument of the Plaintiff pivots on the point that
the Defendant No.1 was four years old when the Tenancy
Agreement was entered into and therefore, this fact was not in his
personal knowledge making him incompetent to depose on this
fact.
I find that this is not even germane to the issue at hand
since the Plaintiff himself admits that the Defendants were
allowed to be in peaceful possession for thirty-six years, thereby
admitting the Tenancy Agreement.
This point thus merits no
further discussion.
17.
That having been settled, coming to the locus standi
of the Defendant No.2, bearing in mind the argument of the
Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff which to avoid prolixity are not
being reiterated, on this count, we may refer to the decision in H.
C. Pandey vs. G. C. Paul15 wherein it was held that—
“4. It is now well settled that on the death of the
original tenant, subject to any provision to the contrary
either negativing or limiting the succession, the tenancy
rights devolve on the heirs of the deceased tenant. The
incidence of the tenancy are the same as those enjoyed
by the original tenant. It is a single tenancy which
devolves on the heirs. There is no division of the premises
or of the rent payable therefor. That is the position as
between the landlord and the heirs of the deceased
tenant. In other words, the heirs succeed to the tenancy
as joint tenants. In the present case it appears that the
respondent acted on behalf of the tenants, that he paid
rent on behalf of all and he accepted notice also on behalf
of all. In the circumstances, the notice served on the
respondent was sufficient. It seems to us that the view
taken in Ramesh Chand Bose [AIR 1977 All 38] is erroneous
where the High Court lays down that the heirs of the
deceased tenant succeed as tenants in common. In our
opinion, the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act served by the appellant on the respondent is
a valid notice and therefore the suit must succeed.”
15.
(1989) 3 SCC 77
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
Thus, this soundly quells the argument of Learned Counsel
for the Plaintiff/Respondent on the question of locus.
18.
So
far
as
the
question
of
non-appearance
of
Defendant No.1 in the Lok Adalat is concerned, it would do well to
point out that the Lok Adalat is a Forum where the parties
amicably settle the matter by arriving at a compromise, if either
party does not seek to appear before the Lok Adalat to
compromise the matter, they cannot be coerced nor on any
insinuation or conclusion be drawn from such conduct.
19.
Learned Counsel for the Defendant for his part had
argued that no amendments were made in the pleadings after the
retirement of the Plaintiff, as at the time the suit was filed the
Plaintiff was in service and he retired on 31-10-2014 during the
pendency of the suit. That, therefore, the pleadings and the
evidence are at variance.
On this count, we may refer to the
provisions of Order VI Rule 2 of the CPC, which requires that the
pleadings state the material facts. Sub-Rule (1) lays down that
every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in a
concise form, of the material facts on which the party pleading
relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the
evidence by which they are to be proved.
The object of the
Section is to avoid taking the opposite party by surprise and to
enable him to prepare his defence.
In the absence of specific
pleadings a party cannot be allowed to lead evidence.
In V.
Narayanaswamy vs. C. P. Thirunavukkarasu16 the Hon‟ble Apex Court
16.
(2000) 2 SCC 294
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
dismissed an Election Petition as it did not reveal material
particulars.
20.
In the case at hand, on perusal of the Plaint in
Paragraph 9, it has been stated “That when the Plaintiff retires from the
said Government Service, he has to vacate the Government Quarter and has to
handover the same to the Government of Sikkim. Therefore, the suit premises
which is occupied by Defendant No.2 is required by Plaintiff on a bonafide
ground”.
In Paragraph 11 it is further stated “That after retirement,
the Plaintiff will have no source of income and requires the shop suit premises
to carry out business so that he can meet expenditure towards running his
family, daughter Miss Vernica Verma higher education (sic) and subsequently
for her marriage and towards his personal medical treatment etc.”
The
records reveal that during the pendency of the suit he retired
from service. The pleadings categorically reflect that he is likely
to retire from service. Consequently, the Defendant have not
been taken by surprise and it would be too pedantic to require the
Plaintiff to amend his pleadings merely on his retirement, the
contingency of which is reflected in his pleadings.
21.
That apart, in Kedar Nath Agarwal and Another vs.
Dhanraji Devi and Another17
relied on by this Court in Subhash
Kumar Pradhan7 (supra) it was held that “In Kedarnath (supra) it was
held that the basic rule is that the rights of the parties should be determined
on the basis of institution of the suit or proceeding and the suit/action should
be tried at all stages on the cause of action as it existed at the commencing of
the suit/action.
This, however, does not mean that events happening after
institution of a suit/proceeding, cannot be considered at all. It is the power
and duty of the Court to consider changed circumstances.”
17.
2004 AIR SCW 5789
It may also be
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
pointed out that even in the decision relied on by Learned
Counsel, i.e, Nauranglall Agarwala6 (supra), it has been specifically
held “that in a given case relief may be granted even on a ground not
specifically pleaded, provided there can be or has been no prejudice or surprise
to the other party”.
In view of above ratio and considering that the
material facts had been stated in the Plaint and the fact that
Defendant have obviously not been taken by surprise, I find no
force in the submissions of Learned Counsel for the Defendant on
this aspect.
22.
Having said that, I now come to the moot point, it is
essential to point out that so far as rent control and eviction is
concerned, Sikkim is governed by the Act of 1956 and the
Government of Sikkim Health and Works Department Notification
No.6326—600-H&W—B dated 14-04-1949 (in short “Notification
of 1949”) in terms of the provision of Article 371F(k) of the
Constitution of India which commences with a non obstante
clause and reads as follows;
of
“371F. Special provisions with respect to the State
Sikkim.—Notwithstanding
anything
in
this
Constitution,—
.......................................................
(k) all laws in force immediately before the
appointed day in the territories comprised
in the State of Sikkim or any part thereof
shall continue to be in force therein until
amended or repealed by a competent
Legislature or other competent authority;”
23.
We may now briefly refer to the relevant portion of
the Act of 1956. Section 4 of this Act lays down that —
“4.
A landlord may not ordinarily eject any tenant.
When, however, the whole or part of the premises are
required for the bonafide occupation of the landlord or his
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
dependents or for thorough overhauling (excluding
additions and alterations) or when the rent in arrears
amount to four months rent or more, the landlord may
evict the tenant on filing a suit of ejectment in the Court
of the Chief Magistrate. The tenant so evicted shall,
however, have the first right to re-occupy the premises,
after over-hauling, on such enhanced rent as may be
fixed by the Sikkim Darbar before it is let out to any other
tenant.”
24.
The provisions of the Notification of 1949 are not
being discussed herein as the Act of 1956 is the only relevant
enactment for the present purposes as it pertains to the area in
which the suit premises is situate, i.e., Gangtok Bazar. Learned
Counsel for the Defendant had argued that the Division Bench of
this High Court in Paul Sangay1 (supra) and the decision of the
Single Bench of this High Court in Nauranglall Agarwala6 (supra)
has clearly held that under the Act of 1956, requirement of a nondependent
family
member
will
not
amount
to
bona
fide
requirement of landlord. In this context, the facts in Paul Sangay1
(supra) were that the Respondent therein sought eviction of the
Appellant from the suit premises in view of the fact that he
wanted to settle his two sons in their own independent business
and the Court observed that “that being so, any requirement for such a
business in which the plaintiff admittedly would have no role or share or
interest cannot be regarded as a requirement for the occupation of the plaintifflandlord according to the ratio of the Supreme Court case or for “his personal
occupation” as the said expression has been used in Sakuntala Bai’s case.”
The Supreme Court case referred to supra was D. N. Shanghavi &
Sons vs. Ambalal Tribhiban Das18.
25.
In the matter at hand, the Plaintiff has laid out in his
Evidence-on-Affidavit that “Today the Defendant no.1 does not require
18.
AIR 1974 SC 1026
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
the suit premises let out to her for the simple reasons (sic) that she is staying
at Siliguri in their flat and Defendant No.2 is well established in his businesses
and they have purchased two flats i.e. ground floor and the first floor in the
vicinity of the suit premises opposite Police Headquarter out of the 6th storied
building. Whereas in my case the situation has changed that earlier me and
my wife was (sic) in Government service and staying in Government quarter at
Syari but now both of us are retired from the Government Services on 31st
October, 2014 and 31st July, 2012 and respectively, (sic) as such, we had to
vacated (sic) the government quarter occupied by us and now shifted to our
building on the second floor of the Scheduled-“A” properties of the instant suit.
Therefore the suit premise is required by me on bonafide use and occupation
and for bonafide use and occupation for my dependants.”
This evidence is
in tandem with his averments in the Plaint where he has stated
“That When the Plaintiff retires from the said Government service, he has to
vacate the Government Quarter and has to handover
Government of Sikkim.
the
same
to the
Therefore, the suit premises which is occupied by
Defendant No.2 is required by Plaintiff on a bonafide ground.”
It was also
averred that “That after retirement, the Plaintiff will have no source of
income and requires the shop suit premises to carry out business so that he
can meet the expenditure towards running his family, daughter Miss Vernica
Verma higher education (sic) and subsequently for her marriage and towards
his personal medical treatment etc.” These facts, clearly establish the
bona fide requirement of the Plaintiff.
26.
At the same time, it may be pointed out although
Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff relied upon Sakuntala Bai14
(supra) for interpretation of the word „dependant‟, the said
Judgment is prior in time to Paul Sangay1 (supra) and pertains to a
Judgment by a Single Judge.
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
27.
vs.
Rajesh Verma
From the evidence of the Plaintiff and his witnesses, it
is clear that both the Plaintiff and his wife have retired from
Government service.
She may have taken voluntary retirement
but this does not change the position. They require the premises
for the purposes of selling Computer spare parts and accessories
and imparting Computer Training to augment their income on
account
of
the
medical
preparation for her future.
education
of
their
daughter
and
The yearly medical expenses of the
Plaintiff is another concern. Indubitably the Defendant No.2 has
alternative residential accommodation and a godown in Gangtok.
Defendant No.2 also owns accommodation in Siliguri and clearly
would not be out in the streets or without a shelter over his head
if evicted. In Sait Nagjee Purushotham12 (supra) the Apex Court has
laid down that it is always the prerogative of the landlord that if
he requires the premises in question for his bona fide use for
expansion of business the tenants cannot be heard to say that the
landlord already have their business at other places. The tenant
cannot dictate terms to the landlord and advise him what he
should do and what he should not. It is for the landlord to choose
the nature and place of business. With regard to the argument of
Learned Counsel for the Defendant that the contents of the
documents have not been proved, I find that it is not even
essential for the facts and purposes of the instant case.
28.
In the circumstances as set out in the matter at hand,
can the Defendant pick and choose the accommodation he
desires?
I am afraid the answer has to be in the negative.
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
Another question that arises is when Plaintiff requires the
premises for himself, would it be fair to say that it is the
commercial accommodation of the Defendant. Further, if a wife is
financially independent would it mean that she has to live in a
separate establishment apart from her husband?
Then what of
the bond of marriage or is dependency to be confined only to
financial dependency, would it not be as arbitrary interpretation of
the Act of 1956?
29.
While thus on the question of interpretation of rent
control legislations, we may usefully refer to the ratiocination in
Yadvendra Arya and Another vs. Mukesh Kumar Gupta19, the
Apex
Court in Paragraph 13 held as follows;
“13. In Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal [(2002)
5 SCC 397] it was held as follows:
“6. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State
of Maharashtra [(1998) 2 SCC 1] this Court
emphasised the need of social legislations like the
Rent Control Act striking a balance between rival
interests so as to be just to law. „The law ought
not to be unjust to one and give a disproportionate
benefit or protection to another section of the
society.‟ (SCC p.22, para 29) While the shortage of
accommodation makes it necessary to protect the
tenants to save them from exploitation but at the
same time the need to protect tenant is coupled
with an obligation to ensure that the tenants are
not conferred with a benefit disproportionately
larger than the one needed. Socially progressive
legislation must have a holistic perception and not
a short-sighted parochial approach. Power to
legislate socially progressive legislations is coupled
with a responsibility to avoid arbitrariness and
unreasonability. A legislation impregnated with
tendency to give undue preference to one section,
at the cost of constraints by placing shackles on
the other section, not only entails miscarriage of
justice but may also in constitutional invalidity.
*
*
*
……………………………………………………………………..
32.
……… If we do not meaningfully
construe the concept of requirement the provision
may suffer from the risk of being branded as
unreasonable, arbitrary or as placing uncalled-for
19.
(2008) 2 SCC 144
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
and unreasonable restrictions on the right of the
owner to hold and use his property. We cannot
place a construction on the expression „for his own
use‟ in such a way as to deny the landlord a right
to evict his tenant when he needs the
accommodation for his own son to settle himself
well in his life. We have to give colour and content
to the expression and provide the skin of a living
thought to the skeleton of the words, which the
Legislature has not itself chosen to define. The
Indian society, its customs and requirements and
the context where the provision is set in the
legislation are the guides leading to acceptance of
the meaning which we have chosen to assign to
the words „for his own use‟ in Section 13(3)(a)(ii)
of the Act.
33. (i)-(iv)
*
*
*
(v) In the present case, the requirement of
landlord of the suit premises for user as office of
his chartered accountant son is the requirement of
landlord „for his own use‟ within the meaning of
Section 13(3)(a)(ii).
(SCC pp.413-14, paras 31-33)”
This lays down that the concept of requirement must be
construed meaningfully and, in my considered opinion in the case
at hand, the requirement of the husband and his wife cannot be
bifurcated on grounds of financial independence. There has to be
a holistic approach and interpretation of the concerned provision.
30.
In the same Judgment supra while relying on the
decision of Bega Begum vs. Abdul Ahad Khan20 the Court speaking in
the context of reasonable requirement of landlord as a ground for
eviction, cautioned that the Courts should guard against any
artificial extension entailing stretching or straining of language so
as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to
get a decree for eviction. The Court warned that such a course
would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility
of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified
grounds. Reference was also made to Kewal Singh vs. Lajwanti21
20.
(1979) 1 SCC 273
21.
(1980) 1 SCC 290
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
wherein it was held that while the rent control legislation has
given a number of facilities to the tenants, it should not be
construed so as to destroy the limited relief which it seeks to give
to the landlord. That the concept of bona fide necessity should be
meaningfully construed so as to make the relief granted to the
landlord real and meaningful.
Behal22
In Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore
it was, inter alia, held that the Court has to strike a
balance
between
the
need
of
protecting
the
tenant
from
unjustified evictions and the need for eviction when ground for
eviction is one such as the requirement of the landlord. It went
on to emphasise that construction on the expression “for his own
use” cannot be made in such a way as to deny the landlord a
right to evict his tenant when he needs the accommodation for his
own son to settle himself well in his life.
31.
What must be culled out from all of the above is that
the Courts ought to have a reasonable and balanced approach
while
interpreting
rent
control
legislations
starting with an
assumption that an equal treatment has been meted out to both
sections of the society.
32.
In Kailash Chand13 (supra) while interpreting the
provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987
it was observed that rent control legislations are generally heavily
loaded in favour of the tenants and the provision dealing with
which the Courts at times lean in favour of the landlords is the
one which permits the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant on
22.
(2002) 5 SCC 397
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
the ground of requirement for his own occupation, residential or
non-residential.
33.
Recently, in the decision of Sidhharth Viyas9 (supra)
the Hon‟ble Apex Court referred to the decision of Joginder Pal22
(supra), Malpe Vishwanath Acharya vs. State of Maharashtra23 and
again reiterated that the rent control legislations are heavily
loaded in favour of the tenants treating them as weaker sections
of the society requiring legislative protection against exploitation
and unscrupulous devices of greedy landlords and legislative
intent has to be respected by the Courts while interpreting the
Laws.
But, it is being uncharitable to legislatures if they are
contributed with an intention that they lean only in favour of the
tenants and while being fair to the tenants, go to the extent of
being unfair to the landlords. The legislature is fair to the tenants
and to the landlords. In Paragraph 10 of Sidhharth Viyas9 (supra)
it was held that—
“10. The object of rent law is to balance the
competing claims of the landlord on the one hand to
recover possession of building let out to the tenant and of
the tenant to be protected against arbitrary increase of
rent or arbitrary eviction, when there is acute shortage of
accommodation. Though, it is for the legislature to resolve
such competing claims in terms of statutory provisions,
while interpreting the provisions the object of the Act has
to be kept in view by the Court. Unless otherwise
provided, a tenant who has already acquired alternative
accommodation is not intended to be protected by the
Rent Act.”
34.
All the above Judgments squarely lays down that
although tenants have to be dealt with favourably in rent control
legislations to ensure that they are not left without a roof over
their heads and to guard them against unscrupulous landlords,
23.
(1998) 2 SCC 1
RFA No.01 of 2016
Kaushilya Minda (since deceased) and Another
vs.
Rajesh Verma
but at the same time when the landlord puts forth the grounds of
bona fide use the Courts have to be circumspect and interpret the
law accordingly to mete out even handed justice.
35.
Thus, in the case at hand, it would do well to apply
the principles enunciated in the decisions referred to hereinabove.
Although it was argued that burden of proof has not been
discharged by the Plaintiff, I find that this argument of Learned
Counsel for the Defendant has no legs to stand since the evidence
on record would prove otherwise. It is specific from the evidence
the purposes for which the premises are required and it is not for
the Defendant to dictate terms to the landlord as to which place
and how he should use his premises if bona fide requirement is
established.
36.
There is no difference in the spirit and object of the
Act of 1956 from all of the above decisions. It is obviously based
on justice equity and good conscience which all Courts are
required to abide by.
Therefore, in view of all of the reasons
enumerated hereinabove, the decision of the Learned Trial Court
warrants no interference.
37.
In the result, the Appeal is dismissed.
38.
No order as to costs.
Sd/-
( Meenakshi Madan Rai )
Judge
07-11-2016
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