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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
Case No: AA No.15/2020,
CM No.8215/2020,
CM No.4505/2024,
CM No.7630/2020
CM No.7631/2020,
CM No.7632/2020
c/w
Arb P. No. 38/2020,
CM No. 7462/2020
Reserved on: 13.02.2026
Pronounced on: 12.05.2026
Uploaded on: 12.05.2026
Whether the operative part or full
Judgment is pronounced : Full
Kanta Devi, age 50 years
W/O Shri Tara Chand,
appointed as Authorised Temporary
Dealer M/s Adhoc Chak Malal Filling
Station, HPCL Petrol Pump,
Ward No.1, Sungal Morh,
Tehsil Akhnoor, District Jammu.
…Petitioner(s)/Appellant(s)
Through: Mr. K.S.Johal, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Karman
Singh Johal, Advocate.
Vs.
1. Union of India through Secretary
Ministry of Petroleum, Government
of India, A-Wing, Shastri Bhawan,
Dr. Rajendra Prasad Road, New
Delhi-110 001.
2. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation
Ltd., Through its Chairman/
Managing Director,
Regd. Office 17, Jamshedji Tata
Road, Mumbai-400 020
Through:
…. Respondent(s)
Mr. R.P.Sharma, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Rohit
Gupta, Advocate for R- 1 to 4
AA No. 15/2020 c/w Arb.P No.38/2020
Mr. Vishal Goel, Advocate for R-5
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJNESH OSWAL, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
Arb. Pet No. 38/2020.
1. Arb. Pet. No. 38/2020 has been filed by the petitioner under Section
11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking
appointment of an Arbitrator for adjudication of the disputes and
claims raised by the petitioner through reference to arbitration.
2. Briefly stated, it is averred by the petitioner that upon termination of
retail outlet dealership of M/s Gupta Filling Station, Sungal Morh,
Tehsil Akhnoor, District Jammu, the respondent-HPCL appointed
M/s Jhandu Filling Station as an ad hoc dealer on 15.01.2016 to
operate the Petrol Pump at Sungal Morh, Akhnoor. After the tenure
of M/s Jhandu Filling Station came to an end on 16.04.2018, the
petitioner was called for interview on 18.04.2018 for a temporary
arrangement to operate the said retail outlet. Vide communication No.
JKRO/PS/ADHOC dated 18.04.2018, the retail outlet owned by the
respondent-HPCL at Sungal Morh, Akhnoor, District Jammu, was
allowed to be run by the petitioner. The arrangement was to remain in
force for a period of one year commencing from 15.05.2018, or till
the appointment of a regular dealer, or until earlier termination by the
respondent-HPCL. If necessary, the said arrangement could have
been renewed at the sole-discretion of respondent-HPCL in terms of
Clause-7. Upon expiry of the initial term on 14.05.2019, by operation
of Clause 7 of the communication dated 18.04.2018, the petitioner’s
AA No. 15/2020 c/w Arb.P No.38/2020
ad hoc arrangement was extended for another year with effect from
15.05.2019, to remain in force up to 14.05.2020, or till the
appointment of a regular dealer, or till earlier termination by the
Corporation-HPCL.
3. In para-9 of the petition, it is stated by the petitioner that as per the
policy issued by the respondent-HPCL on 03.12.2003, the tenure of
an ad hoc dealership, under no circumstances, shall exceed two years.
In the event the retail outlet needs to be operated beyond the said
period, a fresh selection of a dealer, strictly in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in the policy, is required to be undertaken.
4. Vide communication dated 27.04.2020, the respondent-HPCL
informed the petitioner that in view of the COVID-19 pandemic, the
temporary arrangement for operation of the retail outlet stood
extended up to 30.06.2020. It was clarified that the extension would
remain operative till 30.06.2020 or till appointment of a regular
dealer or till earlier termination by the respondent-HPCL. Thereafter,
vide order dated 19.06.2020, the tenure of the petitioner was further
extended up to 30.09.2020.
5. The petitioner contends that despite the prevailing abnormal
circumstances due to the pandemic as on 19.06.2020, when the last
extension was granted in her favour, the respondent-HPCL initiated
the process for selection of a new ad hoc dealer by issuing
communication No. J&KRRPS dated 08.05.2020. Subsequently, vide
communication No. JKRO/PS/ADHOC dated 11.09.2020, the
respondent-HPCL made a temporary arrangement for a period of one
year for operation of the retail outlet at Sungal Morh with Shri Ajay
AA No. 15/2020 c/w Arb.P No.38/2020
Mahajan, Proprietor of M/s Ravinder Kumar and Bros. Further, vide
communication No. JKRO/PS/Adhoc/Chakmalal dated 11.09.2020,
the petitioner was directed to hand over the possession of the retail
outlet along with HPCL assets to the Area Sales Manager of the
Corporation, Shri Sunil Kumar Digra.
6. It is contended by the petitioner in paragraph 11 of the petition that
the respondents were under an obligation to continue the ad hoc
arrangement with her until the appointment of a regular dealer,
notwithstanding that the tenure had been extended up to 30.09.2020.
According to the petitioner, she could have been replaced only by
appointment of a regular dealer or upon lawful termination of her
ad hoc arrangement in accordance with the governing terms and
policy.
7. It is further averred that the petitioner had approached the Court of
learned Additional District Judge, Jammu (Commercial Court) by
filing a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996, and vide order dated 02.09.2020, the parties were directed
to maintain status quo. Thereafter, through her counsel, the petitioner
issued a notice dated 03.10.2020 invoking arbitration and seeking
reference of the disputes to an Arbitrator in terms of Clause 66 of the
Standard Dealership Agreement read with Clause 13 of the order of
appointment issued vide communication dated 18.04.2018. It is also
stated that the said legal notice dated 03.10.2020 was responded to by
the respondent-HPCL through their counsel vide reply dated
21.11.2020.
AA No. 15/2020 c/w Arb.P No.38/2020
8. Precisely, it is the contention of the petitioner that in terms of the
policy, the tenure of two years was capable of further extension and
that, in view of Clause 7 of the communication dated 18.04.2020, the
ad hoc arrangement, once made, was to continue till the selection and
appointment of a regular dealer or till earlier termination by the
Corporation. According to the petitioner, in the present case, no valid
termination of her arrangement has taken place.
9. The respondent-HPCL has filed its response contending, inter alia,
that no arbitration agreement exists between the petitioner and the
respondent, so as to warrant appointment of an Arbitrator through the
present application and, in the absence of any such arbitration
agreement, the petition is misconceived and not maintainable. It is,
however, admitted that the petitioner was appointed as an ad hoc
dealer and that her tenure was extended beyond two years on account
of the COVID-19 pandemic. The respondent submits that the license
granted to the petitioner to operate the retail outlet stood
revoked/cancelled/terminated upon the appointment of Mr. Ajay
Mahajan as temporary ad hoc dealer for a period of one year with
effect from 01.10.2020. It is further stated that the appointment of an
ad hoc dealer by the Corporation is governed by the policy relating to
appointment of ad hoc dealers against terminated dealerships for
company-owned retail outlets where no regular dealers are in place.
As per the said policy, the tenure of an ad hoc dealership shall be one
year or till selection of a regular dealer, whichever is earlier, and may
be renewed for a further period of one year. Under no circumstances,
the said arrangement can continue beyond two years. If, for any
AA No. 15/2020 c/w Arb.P No.38/2020
reason, the retail outlet is required to be operated beyond two years, a
fresh selection of a dealer is to be undertaken in accordance with the
prescribed
procedure.
The
earlier
arrangement
terminates upon selection of a regular dealer.
automatically
According to the
respondent, upon expiry of the petitioner’s tenure by efflux of time
and appointment of a new ad hoc dealer, the petitioner’s license stood
terminated and her continued possession, if any, became unauthorized
and illegal. It is, thus, contended that the petitioner has no subsisting
legal right, nor has there been any invasion of such right, so as to
entitle her to seek any relief in the present proceedings. It is further
stated that, prior to filing the present petition, the petitioner had
instituted a civil suit seeking a declaration that communication dated
08.05.2020 issued by defendant No. 3 therein was null and void.
However, the said suit came to be dismissed vide order dated
25.09.2020 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It is also averred
that the petition filed by the petitioner under Section 9 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has been dismissed by the
Court of learned Additional District Judge, Jammu, vide order dated
14.12.2020, with an observation that no arbitration clause existed
between the parties. It is stated that, assailing the aforesaid order, the
petitioner has filed an appeal, being AA No. 15/2020, which stands
clubbed with this petition and is presently pending consideration
before this Court.
10.Mr. Karman Singh Johal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner,
submits that in terms of Clause 7 of the communication dated
18.04.2018, the petitioner was entitled to continue as ad hoc dealer
AA No. 15/2020 c/w Arb.P No.38/2020
until appointment of regular dealer. It is contended that the
respondent-HPCL has arbitrarily refused renewal of the petitioner’s
arrangement, thereby giving rise to the disputes between the parties.
According to learned counsel, the said disputes fall within the ambit
of Clause 66 of the Standard Dealership Agreement and are,
therefore, required to be adjudicated by an Arbitrator in accordance
with the terms and conditions governing the Standard Dealership
Agreement. He has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in “M/s Inox Wind Ltd. vs. M/s Thermocables Ltd.,
2018 INSC 4”.
11.Per contra, Mr. R.P. Sharma, learned Senior counsel appearing for
the respondent-HPCL, has submitted that the petitioner herself has
admitted, in paragraph 9 of the petition, the applicability of the
governing policy. He contends that Clause 9 of the said policy
categorically stipulates that, under no circumstances, can an ad hoc
dealership continue for more than two years. He has further submitted
that with the appointment of a new ad hoc dealer, the petitioner’s ad
hoc dealership stood automatically terminated in terms of Clause 9 of
the policy. Learned Senior counsel has further argued that, despite the
clear mandate restricting the tenure of an ad hoc arrangement to a
maximum period of two years, the petitioner continued to operate the
retail outlet for more than five and a half months, beyond the
stipulated period and, therefore, cannot claim any subsisting right to
continue or seek renewal of the arrangement. It is further submitted
that the terms and conditions contained in the standard dealership
agreement are applicable only for the purpose of operation of the said
AA No. 15/2020 c/w Arb.P No.38/2020
outlet and only to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the
temporary nature of the petitioner’s appointment on ad hoc basis.
12.Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the
record.
13.The petitioner, in paragraph 9 of the petition, has reproduced Clause
9 of the policy dated 03.12.2003. The same is extracted hereunder:“9. Tenure:
Tenure of the ad hoc dealership will be one year or till
a regular dealer is selected whichever is earlier, to be
renewed for a period of another one year. Under no
circumstances, the contract can be for more than two
years. If for any reason, the RO needs to be operated
beyond two years fresh selection of dealer as per the
procedure stipulated above will be followed. The
contract will automatically be terminated on selection of
a regular dealer.”
14.A bare perusal of the aforesaid clause makes it manifestly clear that
the tenure of an ad hoc dealership is for a period of one year or till
selection of a regular dealer, whichever is earlier. The ad hoc
arrangement may be renewed for a further period of one year;
however, under no circumstances can such arrangement continue
beyond a maximum period of two years. It further provides that if, for
any reason, the retail outlet is required to be operated beyond the
period of two years, a fresh selection of a dealer, in accordance with
the prescribed procedure, is mandatory, and the contract stands
automatically terminated upon selection of a regular dealer.
AA No. 15/2020 c/w Arb.P No.38/2020
15.The communication dated 18.04.2018 was issued to the petitioner in
terms of the aforesaid policy only. Clause-7 of the communication
dated 18.04.2018 is extracted as under:
“7. The said arrangement shall remain in force for a
period of one year commencing from May 15,2018 or till
appointment of a regular dealer or till terminated earlier
by the Corporation as hereinafter stated. If felt necessary,
the said agreement can be renewed at the sole discretion
of the Corporation for a period of another one year.”
16.The Clause 7 of the communication dated 18.04.2018 aligns squarely
with Clause 9 of the Corporation’s policy. In terms of these clear
stipulations, the petitioner’s tenure as an ad hoc dealer was strictly
capped at a maximum period of two years. Any continuation of
operation of the retail outlet beyond the said period necessarily
required a fresh selection process in accordance with the prescribed
procedure.
17.The petitioner acknowledges that respondent-HPCL initiated a new
appointment process, resulting in the appointment of Shri Ajay
Mahajan as an ad hoc dealer effective from 01.10.2020. Clause 7 of
the communication dated 18.04.2018, allows for a one-year renewal at
the Corporation's sole discretion following the initial term; this
provision is entirely consistent with the aforementioned policy.
18.The issue that arises for consideration is whether any arbitration
agreement exists between the parties or not.
19.It is evident that the communication dated 18.04.2018 does not
contain any arbitration clause. While Clause 13 incorporates the terms
AA No. 15/2020 c/w Arb.P No.38/2020
and conditions of the Standard Dealership Agreement, such
incorporation is only for the purpose of operation of the said outlet
and only to the extent that such terms and conditions are not
inconsistent with the petitioner’s appointment as a temporary dealer.
20.Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, relied upon the terms
and conditions of the Standard Dealership Agreement to contend that
an arbitration clause i.e. Clause 66 of the Standard Dealership
Agreement is incorporated in communication dated 18.04.2018. In
M/S Inox Winds Ltd. (supra), the purchase order was issued by the
appellant in which it was categorically mentioned that the supply
would be as per the terms mentioned therein and in the attached
standard terms and conditions. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
concurred with the earlier judgment in case titled M/s M.R.Engineers
& Contractors Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Som Datt Builders Ltd. reported in
(2009) 7 SCC 696 with the modification that a general reference to
standard form of contract of one party along with those of trade
associations and professional bodies will be sufficient to incorporate
the arbitration clause. In this context, it would be apposite to take note
of M.R Engineers’ case (supra) and the relevant paras are extracted
as under:
24. The scope and intent of Section 7(5) of the Act may therefore be
summarised thus:
(i) An arbitration clause in another document, would get incorporated
into a contract by reference, if the following conditions are fulfilled:
(1) the contract should contain a clear reference to the documents
containing arbitration clause,
(2) the reference to the other document should clearly indicate
an intention to incorporate the arbitration clause into the
contract,
(3) the arbitration clause should be appropriate, that is capable
of application in respect of disputes under the contract and
should not be repugnant to any term of the contract.
AA No. 15/2020 c/w Arb.P No.38/2020
(ii) When the parties enter into a contract, making a general reference to
another contract, such general reference would not have the effect of
incorporating the arbitration clause from the referred document into the
contract between the parties. The arbitration clause from another
contract can be incorporated into the contract (where such reference
is made), only by a specific reference to arbitration clause.
(iii) Where a contract between the parties provides that the execution
or performance of that contract shall be in terms of another contract
(which contains the terms and conditions relating to performance
and a provision for settlement of disputes by arbitration), then, the
terms of the referred contract in regard to execution/performance
alone will apply, and not the arbitration agreement in the referred
contract, unless there is special reference to the arbitration clause
also.
(iv) Where the contract provides that the standard form of terms and
conditions of an independent trade or professional institution (as for
example the standard terms and conditions of a trade association or
architects association) will bind them or apply to the contract, such
standard form of terms and conditions including any provision for
arbitration in such standard terms and conditions, shall be deemed to be
incorporated by reference. Sometimes the contract may also say that the
parties are familiar with those terms and conditions or that the parties
have read and understood the said terms and conditions.
(v) Where the contract between the parties stipulates that the conditions
of contract of one of the parties to the contract shall form a part of their
contract (as for example the general conditions of contract of the
Government where the Government is a party), the arbitration clause
forming part of such general conditions of contract will apply to the
contract between the parties.”
(emphasis added)
21. It would also be apt to take note of the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in Maharashtra State Electricity
Distribution Co. Ltd. v. R Z Malpani, reported in 2026 SCC
OnLine SC 553 and the relevant para is extracted as under:
“38. Reference in this respect has also been made to the judgment of this
Court in NBCC (India) Ltd. (Supra). In the said judgment, this Court dealt
with facts which are somewhat similar to the instant appeal; the arbitration
clause was contained in the ‘Request for Proposal’ in the tender
documents and the contract was awarded to the Respondent therein by
means of issuance of a letter of intent which made the terms and
conditions of the said tender documents applicable to the letter of intent as
well. This Court drew a distinction between ‘reference’ and
‘incorporation’ of an arbitration clause, and after discussing the decisions
in M.R. Engineers & Contractors (P) Ltd. v. Som Datt Builders Ltd.,
and Inox Wind Ltd. v. Thermocables Ltd., found that the arbitration
clause contained in some document may be incorporated in the
contract between the parties only by a specific reference to the
arbitration clause. The intent of the parties to incorporate the
arbitration clause has to be explicitly clear and a mere general
‘reference’ to the tender conditions would not suffice.”
(emphasis added)
AA No. 15/2020 c/w Arb.P No.38/2020
22. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India,
this Court has no hesitation in holding that the terms and conditions
of the Standard Dealership Agreement were not ipso facto
incorporated into the communication dated 18.04.2018; rather, they
were made applicable solely for the purpose of the outlet's operation.
Consequently, the arbitration clause contained in Clause 66 of the
Standard Dealership Agreement did not form part of the
communication dated 18.04.2018. Had the parties intended to settle
disputes through arbitration, they would have explicitly stated so in
the 18.04.2018 communication. Instead, by limiting the application of
the Standard Agreement to operational matters, the parties indicated a
clear intent to exclude the arbitration clause. This leads to the
inescapable conclusion that no arbitration agreement exists between
the parties and, therefore, no Arbitrator can be appointed under
Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
23. Accordingly, the present petition is found to be misconceived and is,
therefore, dismissed along with all connected CM(s).
24. A copy of this judgement be placed on the file of AA No.15/2020.
AA No.15/2020
Registry to list this appeal before the Commercial Appellate Division
of this court on 15.05.2026.
(Rajnesh Oswal)
Judge
Jammu
12.05.2026
Madan Verma-Secy
Whether order is speaking?
Whether order is reportable?
AA No. 15/2020 c/w Arb.P No.38/2020
Yes.
Yes.
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