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Date of reserved for orders : 07.08.2026
Date of pronouncement
: 01.10.2026
Date of uploading
: 01.10.2026
APHC010650362009
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
[3560]
THURSDAY, THE 1ST DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026.
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 1423/2009
Between:
1. KAMBHAMAPATI MADHUSUDHANA RAO, S/O. VENKATA
SUBBAIAH, BUSINESS, R/O. SERILINGAMPALLI, HYDERABAD.
...PETITIONER
AND
1. JARUGULA LOKANARAYANA, S/O. KANAKAIAH, BUSINESS, FLAT
NO.203, ROHITHI RESIDENCY, NIZAMPET, KUKATPALLY,
HYDEARBAD.
2. THE STATE OF A P, REP BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH
COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, HYDERABAD.
...RESPONDENT(S):
Revision filed under Section 397/401 of Cr.P.C praying that in the
circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the Criminal Revision
Case, the High Court may be pleased to aggrieved by the Judgment dated
30.07.2009 made in Crl.A.No. 156 of 2007 on the file of 1st Addl. District and
Sessions Judge, Machilipatnam, Krishna District, wherein confirmed the
calender and judgment dt.06.11.2007 made in C.C.No.1324/2007 on the file
of the Addl. Judicial First Class Magistrate, Gudivada, Krishna District.
IA NO: 1 OF 2009(CRLRCMP 1963 OF 2009)
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances
stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be
-2CRL.R.C. No.1423 OF 2009
pleased to suspend the operation of judgment dated 06.11.2007 made in
CC.No. 1324 of 2007 on the file of the Addl. JFCM, Gudivada, as confirmed
in Judgment dated 30.07.2009 made in Crl.A.No. 156/2007 on the file of 1st
Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Machilipatnam and to enlarge the
petitioner on bail in C.C.No.1324/2000 on the file of the Addl. Judicial
Magistrate of 1st Class, Gudivada, Krishna District, pending disposal of the
Revision Petition.
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. SREENIVASA RAO VELIVELA
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
2. VENKATA RANGADAS KANURI
-3CRL.R.C. No.1423 OF 2009
The Court made the following order:
Instant Criminal Revision has been preferred against the concurrent
finding of learned Courts below, wherein and whereunder they found
petitioner to be guilty for the offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I.
Act.
2.
Brief fact of the prosecution case:1st respondent being complainant lodged private complaint before
learned Magistrate concerned under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act (For short, The N.I.Act). In nutshell, 1st accused was a
private limited company, A2 was its managing director, A3 and A4 were
other directors. Complainant joined as a shareholder in the company of the
accused by agreement dated 10.07.1993 by investing a sum of
Rs.3,00,000/-. By the said agreement, it was fixed that A2 was having 70%
of the shares and complainant was having 30% of the shares in the said
company. However, later complainant intended to withdraw from the
company as a shareholder. A2 agreed to take over the shares of the
complainant on 03.10.1996. Accounts were looked into and verified. A1 was
found to be liable to pay a sum of Rs.5,71,000/- regarding the shares of the
complainant, A2 on behalf of A1, agreed to make part payment on or before
30.11.1996 and balance was agreed to be paid on or before 31.03.1997
with interest and gave written undertaking to that effect. The said agreed
payment date was reviewed from time to time by execution of several
-4CRL.R.C. No.1423 OF 2009
agreements and documents. However, finally it is alleged that a postdated
cheque was issued on behalf of A1 amounting to Rs.9,00,000/- dated
03.07.2000, in presence of witnesses towards full and final settlement of the
complainant’s claim regarding the surrender of Shares. Cheque was
presented by the complainant through his banker for encashment. But it
was dishonored. Hence, the private complaint was filed. Complainant has
examined himself as PW.1 and produced several documents including
share holding agreement and different agreements wherein petitioner being
A2 has agreed to take over shares of petitioner. After completion of
prosecution witnesses, A2 examined himself as RW.1 and exhibited some
documents marked as Ex.D1 to D6.
3.
On hearing both sides, learned trial Court has acquitted A3 and A4
but has found A1 and A2 to be guilty for an offence under Section 138 of
N.I.Act and convicted them. It was went upto appeal, which was dismissed
confirming the order of conviction. Hence, this revision.
4.
Submissions of the petitioner’s counsel:
It is contented that learned Courts has failed to appreciate the facts
and circumstances of this case. A2 himself deposed before the learned trial
Court as RW.1 and has exhibited several documents. They are not
considered by any of the Courts below properly. It is argued that
complainant was a shareholder of the company and he had every
opportunity and scope to visit the office of the company. The documents,
-5CRL.R.C. No.1423 OF 2009
which were marked and exhibited on behalf of the prosecution, never
showed any legally enforceable debt. It is further argued that several
agreements were placed and exhibited regarding the shareholdings,
withdrawal of shareholdings and also for undertaking to make payment. But
no agreement or documentary evidence was there on the date of issuance
of cheque to show the full and final settlement of the complainant's claim
regarding handing over shares to the tune of Rs.9,00,000/- towards
settlement between the parties. The company was in huge debt thereby
concerned Bank started proceeding in the month of June, 2000, the
complainant being one of the shareholders, came to know the same thereby
used an old cheque of the company to foist this false case. He further
submits that evidence of defence demonstrated cheque in question was
misplaced from the cheque leaf of the company, thereby, they lodged the
complaint to the Bank in the year 1996 regarding misplace of the cheque.
The complainant has used the cheque which was misplaced to forge the
entire case under Section 138 of N.I.Act. He further submits that
complainant knowing the fact that State Bank of Hyderabad has initiated a
proceeding before the Debt Recovery Tribunal of Andhra Pradesh,
Hyderabad, suddenly used the misplaced cheque to lodge the false case.
5.
Submissions on behalf of the 1st respondent:It is submitted by the complainant that several documents including
agreements executed by petitioner as well as relevant arguments have
been marked before the learned trial Court as Exs.P1 to P18. It has been
-6CRL.R.C. No.1423 OF 2009
successfully proved before learned trial Court that accused/petitioner has
legally enforceable debt to the complainant for taking over shares of the
complainant from the company. Learned trial Court as well as learned
appellate Court has categorically observed that petitioner/accused failed to
rebut the statutory presumption under Section 139 read with 118 of N.I.Act.
Both the Courts below concurrent finding cannot be interfered with in this
revision case. Thus, the instant revision is liable to be dismissed.
6.
Observation of this Court:Admittedly both the Courts below has concurrent finding against
petitioner to be guilty for an offence punishable under Section 138 of NI Act.
It has to be considered whether the evidence of the petitioner as RW.1 and
documents being marked Exs.D1 to D6 are sufficient to rebut the statutory
presumption under Section 139 read with 118 of N.I.Act. Law regarding
rebuttal of statutory presumption by an accused in a case under Section
138 of N.I.Act was settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in several cases.
7.
In Rangappa v. Sri Mohan reported in (2010) 11 SCC 441, the
Hon'ble Apex Court has held in paragraphs 27, 28, 30, which reads as
follows:
27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause
that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of
improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section
138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the
dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section
-7CRL.R.C. No.1423 OF 2009
139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation.
However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable
by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence
since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil
wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties
involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of
proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of
reverse onus clauses and the defendant-accused cannot be
expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof.
28. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus
clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive
burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an
accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the
standard of proof for doing so is that of "preponderance of
probabilities". Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable
defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As clarified in
the citations, the accused can rely on the materials submitted by the
complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable
that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence
of his/her own.
30. The fact that the accused had made regular payments to the
complainant in relation to the construction of his house does not
preclude the possibility of the complainant having spent his own
money for the same purpose. As per the record of the case, there
was a slight discrepancy in the complainant's version, insofar as it
was not clear whether the accused had asked for a hand loan to
meet the construction-related expenses or whether the complainant
had incurred the said expenditure over a period of time. Either way,
the complaint discloses the prima facie existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability since the complainant has maintained
that his money was used for the construction expenses. Since the
-8CRL.R.C. No.1423 OF 2009
accused did admit that the signature on the cheque was his, the
statutory presumption comes into play and the same has not been
rebutted even with regard to the materials submitted by the
complainant.”
8.
In Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa reported in (2019) 5 SCC 418, the
Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraphs 25, 25.1 to 25.5 held as follows:
“25. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in the
above cases on Sections 118(a) and 139, we now summarise the
principles enumerated by this Court in following manner:
25.1. Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of the
Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the
discharge of any debt or other liability.
25.2. The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable
presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable
defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is
that of preponderance of probabilities.
25.3. To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely
on evidence led by him or the accused can also rely on the
materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a
probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can
be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the
parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which
they rely.
25.4. That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the
witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an
evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden.
25.5. It is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness
box to support his defence.
-9CRL.R.C. No.1423 OF 2009
9.
In Rajaram v. Maruthachalam reported in (2023) 16 SCCC 125, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 25 and 33 observed as follows:
25. It can thus be seen that this Court has held that once the
execution of cheque is admitted, Section 139 of the NI Act
mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of
any debt or other liability. It has, however, been held that the
presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the
onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard
of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of
probabilities. It has further been held that to rebut the presumption,
it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or the
accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the
complainant in order to raise a probable defence. It has been held
that inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not
only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by
reference to the circumstances upon which they rely.
33. After taking into consideration the defence witnesses and the
attending circumstances, the learned trial court found that the
defence was a possible defence and as such, the accused was
entitled to benefit of doubt. The standard of proof for rebutting the
presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities. Applying this
principle, the learned trial court had found that the accused had
rebutted the presumption on the basis of the evidence of the
defence witnesses and attending circumstances.
10.
This Court is holding revisional jurisdiction in dealing with concurrent
finding of conviction of petitioner under Section 139 NI Act. The power of
High Court in revision against order of conviction is very limited. The
-10CRL.R.C. No.1423 OF 2009
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah reported in (2026)
SCC Online SC 1485 has held in paragraphs 7.1, 7.3 and 7.5 as follows:
7.1. This Court, in the State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan
Singh Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659 : 2004 SCC
(Cri) 2003 observed that the High Court, in exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction, cannot embark upon an in-depth roving
re-examination of the oral evidence and medical evidence
and come to a conclusion contrary to the consistent one
reached by two courts below. In the facts of the present case,
in the impugned judgment, the High Court gravely erred in
upsetting the concurrent findings of conviction of the trial
court and the Appellate Court by substituting its own
conclusions and reasoning on the merits of the case and
thereby erred in setting aside the well-reasoned and correct
judgment and orders of the trial and appellate courts.
7.3. The contours for exercise of revisional jurisdiction has
been well settled by the judicial dicta of this Court wherein
time and again it has been observed that the High Court shall
not interfere with the orders of the lower court unless:
i. The order or finding of the lower court is perverse, grossly
erroneous, glaringly unreasonable or wholly unreliable or
untenable in law.
ii. The lower court has passed the impugned order after
considering an immaterial or irrelevant material or no material
at all.
-11CRL.R.C. No.1423 OF 2009
iii. There is a non-consideration of any relevant material or
the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or
capriciously.
7.5. In the facts of the present case, we find that the High
Court has failed to highlight any reason or material
satisfaction to the effect that there was any such glaring
contradiction or perversity apparent on the face of the record
so as to justify the exercise of the powers under revisional
jurisdiction and thereby erred in interfering with the judgment
and orders of the courts below. Therefore, the present appeal
has to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order of the
High Court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the
view that the High Court committed an error in setting aside
the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court
in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional
jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction.
11.
In view of the above ratio, this Revisional Court has to determine
whether finding of Courts below are perverse in the attending facts and
circumstances of this case or, wholly unreliable regarding the conviction
against the petitioner. There is another scope of this Court to interfere if the
Courts below have erroneously not considered any relevant materials
thereby passed an order of conviction capriciously.
12.
The narration of the present defence case is that through his
reply/notice that a blank cheque with signature of petitioner was misplaced
in the year 1996 and he gave report to the police but police did not register
-12CRL.R.C. No.1423 OF 2009
a case. He also informed the same to the Bank. It is further case that the
impugned cheque was never delivered to the complainant to discharge
liability for the payment of the share holdings.
13.
Admittedly accused under Section 138 of N.I.Act can rebut statutory
presumption under Section 139 read with 118 of N.I.Act, where standard of
proof of such rebuttal is preponderance of probabilities.
14.
To understand the principles of preponderance of the probabilities, it
is necessary to follow Wright v. Wright (1948) 77 CLR 191:
“The belief regarding the existence of a fact may be founded on a
preponderance of probabilities. A prudent man faced with conflicting
probabilities concerning a fact will act on the supposition that the fact
exists, if on weighing the various probabilities he finds that the
preponderance is in favour of the existence of the particular fact as a
prudent man. The court invariably applies this test for finding whether
a fact in issue is said to be proved. The first step in this process is to
fix the probabilities. The second is to weight them, though the two
often intermingle. The impossible is weeded out at the first stage; the
improbable at the second stage.
Within the wide range of
probabilities the Court often has a difficult choice to make, but it is
this choice which ultimately determines where the preponderance of
probabilities lies. The nature and gravity of an issue necessarily
determines the manner of attaining satisfaction of the truth of the
issue.”
15.
In a Rishi Kesh Singh v. The State reported in AIR 1970 Allahabad
51, it is held that preponderance of probability means “an outweighing in the
-13CRL.R.C. No.1423 OF 2009
process of balancing however slight may be the tilt of the balance or the
preponderance”.
16.
Learned trial Court in dealing with the defence of petitioner has
categorized that petitioner being DW.1 has testified his execution of
agreement with complainant whereunder complainant intends to surrender
his share holdings and petitioner being A2 intends to take said share
holdings. Learned appellate Court has also observed that petitioner has not
filed any document, especially police report, to show the theft of the cheque.
Learned appellate Court has also pointed out that DW.1, during evidence,
has admitted that he did not file any suit for cancellation of the said
document.
17.
Let me consider, whether the defence as raised by the petitioner
before the learned trial Court has sufficient to rebut statutory presumption of
this case. Ex.D5 is a letter dated 11.10.1995, by which accused informed
the Chief Manager of State Bank of Hyderabad that a particular cheque has
been misplaced. The cheque bearing No.0800670 was missed. The said
cheque is impugned herein, which alleged to have been issued on
03.07.2000. Though it is true that A1 or A2 have not filed complaint
regarding theft of cheque, but document suggests that they informed the
concerned Bank regarding theft of cheque. On that score, version of
defence, though not conclusive but it placed a reasonable circumstance in
support of his case.
-14CRL.R.C. No.1423 OF 2009
18.
It further appears that all the terms and conditions between
complainant and A1 and A2 were documented through different agreements
vide Ex.P1, Ex.P5, Ex.P6, Ex.P8 etc. The private complaint has alleged that
A2 on behalf of A1 did not follow terms and conditions of agreements.
Thereafter, when complainant forced petitioner/A2 in terms of legal action,
A2 came to Gudivada on 18.06.2000 and met with the complainant in his
house in presence of mediators. He tried to convince complainant that he
should pay the entire amount subject to sometime be given. But the
complainant refused, accordingly, in presence of mediators, a cheque for an
amount of Rs.9,00,000/- was given towards full and final settlement.
19.
Surprisingly, though several documents/agreements are prepared to
show readiness and willingness of petitioner to take over shares of
complaint, but there is no document or agreement regarding the full and
final settlement which was said to have arrived at in presence of mediators.
When all the documents in respect of price of share holdings were properly
documented, full and final settlement regarding value of entire share of
complainant was not documented.
20.
Let me consider, whether above two points in favour of the defence is
sufficient to prove their case under principle of preponderance of
probabilities. In proving the case in rebutting statutory presumption under
Section 139 read with Section 118 of N.I.Act, accused required to raise
points which are of such a nature of fact, existence of which can raise a
-15CRL.R.C. No.1423 OF 2009
question to the mind of a Court to disbelieve existence of prosecution case.
These are not mere denial or creating confusion of prosecution case. But it
was lead to a particular query suggesting by some facts which may slightly
lean to the mind of the Court to believe the defence. 50% tilting is sufficient
to raise such a probability.
21.
In the present facts and circumstances of the case, the probabilities
of believing defence case have sufficiently narrated on following points;
i) while the cheque was missed in the year 1996 and it was duly informed to
the Bank, ii) complainant has initiated the proceedings, after the Bank has
started recovery proceedings against A1/company and iii) there is no
documentation on the date of issuance of the cheque regarding full and final
settlement of the claim of complainant.
22.
Under the above discussion, I am of the view that learned trial Court
as well as learned appellate Court has lost sight regarding the value of
evidence of RW.1 as well as documents marked. Basically, when Bank
stated recovery proceeding against A1, company, A2 being a shareholder,
shall never purchase any share of that company from anyone. Thus, the
circumstance of issuance of impugned cheque at that relevant point of time
is doubtful. There are sufficient documents to hold that petitioner has
sufficiently rebutted the statutory presumption under Section 139 read with
Section 118 of N.I.Act. In this case, in my view, the appellate Court as well
as learned trial Court has committed error in assessing the entire facts and
-16CRL.R.C. No.1423 OF 2009
circumstances of this case. Thereby, order of conviction and sentence
against petitioner appears to be illegal and improper. Thus, the same is
hereby set aside.
23.
In view of the above, the instant Criminal Revision Case is allowed.
There shall be no order as to costs.
24.
Accordingly, the petitioner/accused is hereby acquitted from this
case.
25.
The sureties standing in favour of the petitioner are also released.
Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this criminal revision case
shall stand closed.
____________________________
JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
Date : 01.10.2026
SPP
-17CRL.R.C. No.1423 OF 2009
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 1423 of 2009
Dated 01.10.2026
SPP
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