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* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI
+A.S.NO. 1813 OF 2018
% 13.11.2026
#Between:
Tammineni Peddi Reddy and others
…… Appellants
$And:
Medam Venku Reddy Died and others
… Respondents
!Counsel for the Appellant/D.1
: Sri Mekala Rama Murthy,
learned counsel representing
Sri Kaushik Kumbhajadala,
^Counsel for the Respondent
<Gist:
>Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1. (2017) 3 SCC 702
2. (2023) 19 SCC 448
3. (2008) 4 SCC 594
4. 2006 SCC OnLine Bom 243
5. (2024) 10 SCC 613
6. 1963 SCC OnLine SC 37
: Sri Anup Koushik Karavadi
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
***
A.S.NO. 1813 OF 2018
Tammineni Peddi Reddy and others
…… Appellants
And:
Medam Venku Reddy Died and others
….Respondents
DATE OF JUDGMENT RESERVED
:
08.10.2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED
:
13.11.2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT UPLOADED
:
16.11.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may
be allowed to see the Judgment?
Yes/No
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be marked
to Law Reporters/Journals?
Yes/No
3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the fair
copy of the Judgment?
Yes/No
__________________________
JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI
Page |1
Date of reserved for orders : 08.10.2026
Date of pronouncement
: 13.11.2026
Date of uploading
: 16.11.2026
APHC010814122018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
[3573]
FRIDAY, THE 13th DAY OF NOVEMBER 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI
APPEAL SUIT NO: 1813/2018
Between:
...APPELLANT(S)
Tammineni Peddi Reddy and Others
AND
Medam Venku Reddy Died and Others
...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Appellant(S):
1. KAUSHIK KUMBHAJADALA
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. ANUP KOUSHIK KARAVADI
2. KAUSHIK KUMBHAJADALA
The Court made the following JUDGMENT:
1.
The Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, 1908
(for short, 'C.P.C.'), is filed by the appellant / defendant No.1 challenging the
decree and Judgment, dated 17.08.2018 in O.S.No.7 of 2007 passed by the
learned VII Additional District Judge, Prakasam District at Ongole, (for short,
‘Trial Court’).
Page |2
2.
Respondents No.1 to 50, Plaintiffs, filed the suit in O.S.No.7 of 2007,
seeking declaration and injunction over the schedule property.
3.
Referring to the parties as they are initially arrayed in the suit is
expedient to mitigate confusion and better comprehend the case.
4.
The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the
contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as
follows:
(i)
Plaintiffs No.1 to 40, represented by Plaintiffs No.41 to 45,
their General Power of Attorney holders, along with Defendant
Nos.2 and 4 to 28, jointly purchased Item Nos.1 and 2 of the suit
schedule property, admeasuring Ac.4-00 cents and Ac.0-50 cents in
S.No.342/A of Kanigiri, under registered Sale Deed Nos.708 and
714 of 1980, dated 06-05-1980, and have been in continuous
possession and enjoyment thereof for more than 20 years.
(ii)
Defendant No.1, son of Peddireddy, who is Plaintiffs' vendor,
colluding with Defendant Nos.2 and 3, fraudulently instituted
O.S.No.46 of 2000 before the Senior Civil Judge's Court, Kandukur,
suppressed material facts and obtained an ex parte injunction by
falsely claiming rights under an unregistered Will dated 15.04.1963.
Taking advantage of the said proceedings, he threatened to
dispossess the Plaintiffs and Defendant Nos.2 and 4 to 28.
Page |3
(iii)
Defendant Nos.29 to 45 have been impleaded as necessary
and proper parties, being purchasers, co-purchasers or their legal
representatives under the relevant registered sale deeds bearing
Document Nos.669 and 670 of 1980, dated 06.05.1980, and as
legal heirs of the concerned defendants and deceased copurchasers.
(iv)
1st Plaintiff died on 10.06.2016, leaving behind his only
daughter, Plaintiff No.47, to succeed to his estate and represent his
interest in the suit. Defendant No.2 died on 21.08.2015, leaving
behind his wife and son, who have been impleaded as Defendant
Nos.51 and 52, respectively, as his legal representatives.
(v)
In the circumstances, having no other option, Plaintiffs are
constrained to file the suit seeking declaration of their rights and title
over the suit schedule property, consequential permanent injunction
and costs of the suit.
5.
Upon service of summons, defendant No.1 appeared through counsel,
filed his written statement, denied the material allegations of the plaint and
contested the suit. Defendant No.2 reportedly died, while defendants No.3 to
54 remained ex parte.
6.
In the written statement, defendant No.1 contended that his paternal
grandfather, T. Bodi Reddy, acquired lands in Survey Nos.342/A and 342/C
Page |4
under various registered sale deeds. T.Bodi Reddy executed a Will dated
15.04.1963, bequeathing Ac.5.00 cents in Survey No.342/A in his favour and
that, since his grandfather's death in 1964, he had been in continuous
possession and enjoyment of the said property. The remaining family
properties were allegedly partitioned among the four brothers, who
subsequently enjoyed and dealt with their respective shares. Upon
interference by defendants No.2 and 3, he filed O.S.No.46 of 2006 and
obtained a decree dated 31.07.2006. He denied that his father, Peddi Reddy,
had executed the alleged registered sale deeds dated 06.05.1980, bearing
Document Nos.708/1980 and 714/1980, and disputed their genuineness. He
further contended that plaintiffs had neither title nor possession over the suit
property and that he was in exclusive possession of Ac.5.00 cents covered by
Patta No.374 in Survey No.342/A. He also disputed the plaint schedule
extents and boundaries and contended that plaintiffs were not entitled to
declaration or permanent injunction and that the suit was barred by limitation.
7.
Based on the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues:
(1) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for declaration of title of the plaintiff to
the suit schedule property and for permanent injunction?
(2) Whether the sale deed dated 06.05.1980 said to have been executed
by the father of defendant No.1 T. Peddireddi is true and binding upon
the defendant No.1?
(3) To what relief?
Page |5
8.
During the trial, on behalf of the Plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 to 9 were examined
and marked Exs.A.1 to A.19. On behalf of the Defendants, D.Ws.1 to 3 were
examined, and Exs.B.1 to B.3 documents were marked.
9.
Upon completion of the trial and after hearing the arguments of both
sides, the Trial Court decreed the suit, declaring the plaintiffs, defendants
No.4 to 28 and the other vendees mentioned in Exs.A5 and A6 as owners of
the suit schedule property. The Trial Court also granted a decree of
permanent injunction restraining the defendant No.1 and his men from
interfering with their possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property.
10.
Heard Sri Mekala Rama Murthy, learned counsel representing Sri
Kaushik Kumbhajadala, learned counsel for appellant / defendant No.1 and
Sri Anup Koushik Karavadi, learned counsel for respondents.
11.
It is pertinent to mention here that the present appeal was preferred by
defendant No.1 against the plaintiffs as well as the other defendants, who are
the
co-purchasers
along
with
plaintiffs
or
their
respective
legal
representatives. However, during the pendency of appeal, despite granting
several opportunities, defendant No.1 failed to take effective steps to effect
service of notice on several respondents. Further, some of the defendants had
died during the pendency of the appeal, but no steps were taken to bring their
respective legal representatives on record. Defendant No.1 had also not
sought permission of this Court to dispense with service of notice on the said
respondents. In these circumstances, this Court, vide order dated 31.07.2023,
Page |6
dismissed the application filed seeking dispensation of service of notice.
Consequently, the appeal, insofar as respondent Nos.53 to 103, who are
defendant Nos.2 to 54 in the suit, is concerned, came to be dismissed for nonprosecution. Thus, the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, insofar as the
said respondents are concerned, attained finality.
12.
Concerning the pleadings in the suit, the findings recorded by the Trial
Court and in light of the rival contentions and submissions made on either side
before this Court, the following points would arise for determination:
1) Whether the Trial Court was justified in decreeing the suit
by declaring the plaintiffs, defendants No.4 to 28 and other
vendees mentioned in Exs.A5 and A6 as owners of the suit
schedule property and granting a decree of permanent
injunction in their favour?
2) Does the Judgment passed by the trial Court warrant any
interference?
POINT NOs.1 & 2:
13.
The case of plaintiffs is that the suit schedule property originally
belonged to the grandfather of appellant/defendant No.1, T. Bodi Reddy, who
acquired the land under a registered sale deed dated 04.07.1930. Defendant
No.1’s father, T. Peddi Reddy (hereinafter referred to as ‘Senior Peddi
Reddy’), executed registered sale deeds dated 06.05.1980, bearing Document
Nos.708/1980 and 714/1980, marked as Exs.A5 and A6. Pursuant to the said
sale deeds, the purchasers formed a layout and allotted plots among their
members. Subsequently, appellant/defendant No.1 filed O.S.No.46 of 2006 for
Page |7
permanent injunction against defendants No.2 and 3, who were also
purchasers under the said sale transaction. As they remained ex parte, a
decree of injunction was granted in his favour on 31.07.2006. Appellant /
defendant No.1 thereafter claimed title over the property on the basis of an
alleged Will executed by his grandfather. Aggrieved by his interference,
plaintiffs filed the present suit seeking declaration of title and permanent
injunction before the Trial Court. Appellant/defendant No.1, in his written
statement, contended that his grandfather had executed a Will dated
15.04.1963, marked as Ex.B1, bequeathing Ac.5.00 cents in his favour; the
remaining properties were partitioned among the brothers of senior Peddi
Reddy. He denied the execution and genuineness of Exs.A5 and A6,
contending that his father had no exclusive right to execute the said sale
deeds in view of the prior bequest under Ex.B1. As per the recitals in Exs.A5
and A6, the purpose of the sale was specifically mentioned, and the
purchasers were stated to have been delivered possession by senior T. Peddi
Reddy. However, since the property was ancestral and senior T. Peddi Reddy
had no exclusive right over the entire property, the validity of his conveyance
and delivery of possession under the said sale deeds becomes a matter for
consideration.
14.
Learned counsel for the appellant / defendant No.1 contended that, in a
suit for declaration, plaintiffs must establish their title on the basis of their own
evidence and not on the weakness of the defendant's case. He submitted that
attestors of Exs.A5 and A6 had no knowledge of payment of consideration or
Page |8
delivery of possession, and PW.2 also admitted his lack of knowledge on
these aspects. Neither the attestors nor the scribe of sale deeds was
examined. Exs.A3 and A4, relied upon to establish possession, are adangals
allegedly issued by the Gram Panchayat without any official seal, though
Tahsildar is the competent authority to maintain revenue records. In the
circumstances, plaintiffs failed to establish payment of consideration, delivery
of possession or their possession over the suit schedule property as on the
date of filing of the suit.
15.
Learned counsel for appellant / defendant No.1 further contended that
Exs.A1 and A2, General Powers of Attorney executed in favour of plaintiffs,
contain a clear recital that the suit schedule property was under
encroachment. The said recital, coupled with the averments in the plaint,
establishes that plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit property as on the
date of filing of the suit. In the absence of possession, a mere suit for
declaration without seeking recovery of possession is not maintainable.
16.
Learned counsel appearing for respondents/plaintiffs No.1 to 50
submitted that under two registered sale deeds dated 06.05.1980, marked as
Exs.A5 and A6, senior T. Peddi Reddy, father of defendant No.1, sold the suit
schedule property to 83 vendees and delivered possession on the date of
sale. PW.2, an attesting witness to both sale deeds, spoke about their
execution, while PWs.1 to 5, 6 and 8 supported the plaintiffs' case regarding
their purchases. Defendant No.1, examined as DW.1, admitted his father's
signatures on Exs.A5 and A6. As the sale deeds are registered documents,
Page |9
they carry a presumption of genuineness, and the burden lies on the party
disputing their validity. Once plaintiffs established their claim through the
registered sale deeds, it was for defendant No.1 to establish a superior or
prior title.
17.
Learned counsel for respondents / plaintiffs further submitted that the
recitals in Exs.A5 and A6 show that the properties were ancestral properties
purchased by the elders of the family. This fact is also supported by paragraph
No.4 of the written statement, wherein it is admitted that properties were
purchased by T. Bodi Reddy, grandfather of Junior Peddi Reddy (defendant
No.1) refers only to Ac.5.00 cents, while the remaining extent is stated to have
been partitioned among the family members. However, the documentary
evidence discloses nine registered conveyances in respect of land in Survey
No.342/A, covering an aggregate extent of Ac.8.11 cents. Each conveyance
contains recitals regarding the date of acquisition and the acquisition of the
property by the vendors' predecessors.
18.
Defendant No.1 admitted that his father had alienated approximately
Ac.8.31 cents; he had never questioned any of those alienations. There is no
evidence of any objection raised by him in respect of those transactions.
Ex.A9 was executed in the year 1965, one year after death of testator, by a
person who is himself named in Ex.B1, jointly with the other co-sharers,
treating the property as ancestral. This transaction assumes significance in
the context of the defence based on Ex.B1. As per defendant No.1, the
testator had bequeathed Ac.5.00 cents in the said survey number to his minor
P a g e | 10
grandson. However, the subsequent conduct of the person named in the Will,
who joined the other co-sharers in executing Ex.A9, does not indicate that the
alleged bequest was acted upon. No evidence has been placed to show that
the Will was implemented or that the property allegedly bequeathed
thereunder was treated as the exclusive property of the minor legatee.
Further, defendant No.1 never questioned the title of the vendees under
Exs.A9 to A15. His challenge is confined to the alienations made in the year
1980, although those transactions also emanated from the same vendor and
were founded upon the same ancestral title. No satisfactory explanation is
forthcoming for the same. The western and northern boundaries of the
Ac.5.00 cents claimed by defendant No.1 in O.S.No.46 of 2006 correspond to
the boundaries of Item No.1 of Exs.A5 and A6. The Cooperative Marketing
Society land lies towards the west and was alienated by the vendor himself
under Ex.A9. The land of Tammineni Pulla Reddy lies towards the north.
These boundary recitals are relevant in determining the identity and extent of
the property claimed by defendant No.1.
19.
The challenge raised by defendant No.1 is, in substance, one by a
Mitakshara coparcener against his father's alienation of ancestral property.
Article 109 of the Limitation Act prescribes a period of twelve years for the
category of claims contemplated therein. The alienee took possession
pursuant to alienation dated 06.05.1980. Defendant No.1 had attained
majority by that date, as admitted by him in his own evidence. Nevertheless,
he did not challenge the alienation. His failure to question the transaction,
P a g e | 11
despite having attained majority and being aware of the alienation, is a
relevant circumstance in considering his subsequent claim. The applicability of
Article 109, however, has to be determined with reference to the precise relief
sought and the statutory requirements.
20.
As regards the burden of proof, the party asserting a fact must establish
it. The burden of proof does not shift, though the onus may shift from one
party to the other during the trial. Plaintiffs discharged their initial burden by
producing the registered conveyances and establishing the relevant admitted
signatures. Consequently, the onus shifted to defendant No.1 to establish his
defence based on Ex.B1. Being the propounder of the alleged Will, he was
required to prove its due execution and attestation and to remove all
suspicious circumstances surrounding it.
21.
Under Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, a Will must be
attested by two or more witnesses in the manner prescribed therein. Its
execution must be proved in accordance with Section 68 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, by examining at least one attesting witness, subject to the
exceptions provided by law. The presumption under Section 90 of the
Evidence Act, relating to documents of thirty years old, cannot be invoked to
dispense with proof of the due execution and attestation of a Will. Therefore,
mere fact that Ex.B1 is an old document does not establish its genuineness.
Section 69 of the Evidence Act permits proof of a document as required by
law to examine at least one attestor, when no attesting witness can be found.
However, its requirements must be strictly satisfied by establishing the
P a g e | 12
handwriting of at least one attesting witness and the signature of the
executant must be proved in the manner prescribed by that provision.
22.
In the present case, the scribe of alleged Will had deposed in an earlier
ex parte suit and died on 12.03.2015. Plaintiffs herein were not parties to
those proceedings and had no opportunity to cross-examine him. Therefore,
his earlier deposition cannot automatically be treated as substantive piece of
evidence in the present suit. Its admissibility must independently satisfy the
requirements governing former testimony under the Evidence Act. In any
event, the testimony of scribe cannot substitute the statutory proof of
attestation required for a Will. Defendant No.1 merely contended that the
attesting witnesses had died. He did not produce any evidence to establish
their death or to show that they could not be found. Thus, the essential
condition for invoking Section 69 of the Evidence Act was not established.
23.
The evidence of DW.2, daughter of the scribe, does not cure this
deficiency. She was born in 1997 and could not have had personal knowledge
of the execution of the alleged Will. She did not produce any admitted
handwriting of her father for comparison. It is also significant that Ex.B1 was
shown to her immediately before the filing of her affidavit. Her evidence,
therefore, does not independently establish the execution or attestation of
Ex.B1. Further, admitted signatures of Bodi Reddy, dating back to 1940–1950,
are available on record under Ex.A18. Despite the availability of those
admitted signatures, defendant No.1 did not seek comparison of the disputed
signature appearing on Ex.B1 by invoking Sections 45, 47 and 73 of the
P a g e | 13
Indian Evidence Act. Thus, no satisfactory evidence has been adduced to
establish that the signature appearing on Ex.B1 is that of the alleged testator,
T. Bodi Reddy.
24.
The Will is surrounded by several suspicious and unexplained
circumstances. The beneficiary was a minor grandson of the testator, and
Defendant No.1, who was the executor, was the beneficiary's own father and
guardian. The executor's own sale transactions are also irreconcilable with the
claim now set up under the Will. Defendant No.1 contends that the Will
remained with his father until 1970 and that it came into his custody only in
1987. However, the Will was never acted upon or reflected in the revenue
records and surfaced for the first time in 2006 in an ex parte suit, after the
property had already been sold in favour of the respondents-plaintiffs. These
circumstances cast serious doubt on the genuineness and credibility of the
Will.
25.
In any event, even assuming that the Will is duly proved, it cannot
confer title to any specific extent of the coparcenary property. A coparcener
can bequeath only his undivided interest and not any specific portion of the
joint family property. Therefore, the party claiming a specific extent under the
Will must establish the testator's actual share in the property. In the present
case, the sale deeds of 1939, 1941 and 1944, relied upon in paragraph 4 of
the written statement to establish the alleged partition, were never produced.
Further, Defendant No.1 admitted that no written document evidencing the
alleged partition existed. Consequently, neither the alleged partition nor the
P a g e | 14
testator's entitlement to the specific extent claimed under the Will has been
established.
26.
In the written statement in O.S.No.46 of 2006, Defendant No.1 pleaded
that Ac.5.00 cents covered by the Will and the remaining Ac.11.48½ cents had
been partitioned among the four brothers under three deeds. However, none
of the alleged partition deeds was produced, nor was the partition otherwise
established by documentary evidence. Consequently, the respective shares of
the brothers remained unproved. Further, the judgment in O.S.No.46 of 2006
does not establish the genuineness of the Will or bind plaintiffs on the
question of title. The only issue framed was whether plaintiff therein was
entitled to permanent injunction, which was granted on the basis of Defendant
No.1's possession.
27.
The judgment and decree in O.S.No.46 of 2006 (Ex.B3) does not record
any finding that Ex.B1 Will was executed or duly proved. On the contrary, it
records that the adangals for Fasli 1410 and 1411 did not reflect the name of
defendant No.1 in Column No.13. Defendant No.1 himself admitted as DW.1
that Ex.B3 contains no finding regarding proof of execution of the Will. Further,
the adangals relied upon therein do not advance his claim. Significantly, Ex.B3
is an ex parte judgment, and defendants No.2 and 3 in the present suit
remained ex parte in the earlier proceedings. Therefore, the said judgment
cannot be relied upon either to establish the Will or to bind plaintiffs on the
question of title.
P a g e | 15
28.
Learned counsel for respondents / plaintiffs submits that, in the case of
a vacant site, possession follows title. The vendees had the land measured
and boundary stones fixed at all four corners in 1980 itself. The Advocate
Commissioner's report dated 19.06.2007 also confirmed the existence of
boundary stones at all four corners. On the other hand, DW.1 admitted that his
name was not reflected in the revenue records, that he had never sought
mutation, and that the adangals reflected his name only in respect of Ac.0.25
cents. Defendant No.1 produced no evidence to establish his title or
possession over the disputed land. It is further submitted that, though plaintiffs
claim possession, Defendant No.1 has set up a rival title under Ex.B1 Will,
obtained an ex parte decree and threatened their possession. Therefore,
plaintiffs were justified in seeking declaration of title with consequential relief
of permanent injunction. His conduct, including the filing of a caveat, further
demonstrates that he disputes the plaintiffs' title.
29.
Exs.A1 and A2 bind only the parties thereto, and Defendant No.1, being
a stranger to those documents, cannot rely upon their recitals to defeat the
title conveyed under the registered sale deeds. The recital dated 29.11.2006
regarding alleged encroachment by certain persons does not establish title in
Defendant No.1. His claim rests solely on the ex parte decree dated
31.07.2006. A recital in a power of attorney cannot create, transfer or
extinguish title conveyed under registered sale deeds. The suit was instituted
on 24.01.2007, when all the principals represented under the power of
attorney were alive. The subsequent death of a principal terminates the
P a g e | 16
agency prospectively and does not invalidate acts already lawfully performed.
Since all the co-vendees are parties to the suit, the provisions of Order I Rule
8 CPC are not attracted. Defendant No.1 first set up a claim adverse to
plaintiffs' title by obtaining the ex parte decree dated 31.07.2006. The present
suit, instituted on 24.01.2007, was therefore filed within six months from the
accrual of the cause of action. The suit was valued at half the market value
under Section 24(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Court-fees and Suits Valuation
Act. Significantly, no objection regarding valuation under Section 11(2) of the
said Act was raised in the written statement.
30.
Learned counsel for respondents-plaintiffs submits that a co-owner is
entitled to maintain a suit for declaration and injunction without seeking
partition, particularly when Defendants No.4 to 28 are also co-owners/covendees under the same sale deeds. The adangals relied upon by defendant
No.1 do not constitute sufficient evidence to defeat the plaintiffs' title. Further,
the Will allegedly executed by T. Bodi Reddy, grandfather of defendant No.1,
has not been proved in accordance with law. On the other hand, the sale
deeds marked as Exs.A5 and A6 stand proved and establish plaintiffs' title.
Consequently, plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration of title, with possession
following title in respect of the vacant land. Learned counsel, therefore, prays
for dismissal of the appeal.
P a g e | 17
31.
Learned counsel for appellant placed reliance on the judgment of
Hon’ble Apex Court in Arulmigu Chokkanatha Swamy Koil Trust v.
Chandran1, wherein it held as follows:
31. One of the submissions made before the courts
below, on behalf of the defendant, was that the suit for mere
declaration when the plaintiff was not in possession of the
property, was not maintainable and hit by Section 34 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963, the plaintiff having not sought for
recovery of possession.
33. Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides as
follows:
“34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or
right.—Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right
as to any property, may institute a suit against any person
denying or interested to deny, his title to such character or right,
and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration
that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask
for any further relief:
Provided that no court shall make any such declaration
where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere
declaration of title, omits to do so.”
34 [Ed. : Para 34 corrected vide Official Corrigendum
No. F-3/Ed.B.J./52/2017 dated 4-9-2017.] . In the present case,
the plaintiff having been found not to be in possession and
having only sought for declaratory reliefs, the suit was clearly not
maintainable and has rightly been dismissed by the trial court. In
this context the reference is made to the judgment of this Court
in Ram Saran v. Ganga Devi [Ram Saran v. Ganga Devi, (1973)
2 SCC 60 : AIR 1972 SC 2685] , wherein in paras 1 and 4
following was stated : (SCC pp. 60-61)
(2017) 3 SCC 702
P a g e | 18
“1. This is a plaintiffs' appeal by special leave. Ram Saran
and Raghubir Saran, the plaintiffs are brothers. They jointly
owned suit property with Chhabili Kuer, widow of Lalita Prasad.
After the death of Chhabili Kuer on 8-2-1971, Ganga Devi, the
defendant in the suit came forward as the legal representative of
Chhabili Kuer and got the mutation effected in her name in the
place of the deceased ChhabiliKuer. In 1958, the plaintiffs
brought this suit for a declaration that they are the sole owners of
the suit properties. They did not claim possession of either the
entire or even any portion of the suit properties.
***
4. We are in agreement with the High Court that the suit is
hit by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. As found by the factfinding courts, Ganga Devi is in possession of some of the suit
properties. The plaintiffs have not sought possession of those
properties. They merely claimed a declaration that they are the
owners of the suit properties. Hence the suit is not maintainable.”
Learned counsel for appellant / defendant No.1 submits that, plaintiffs,
being out of possession, ought to have sought the consequential relief of
recovery of possession. Having failed to seek such relief, they cannot maintain
a suit for declaration of title coupled with mandatory injunction, particularly
when they are not in possession of the suit property.
32.
Learned counsel for respondents / plaintiffs placed reliance on the
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ashutosh Samanta v. Ranjan Bala
Dasi2, wherein it held as follows:
13. In view of the above decision, wills cannot be proved only on
the basis of their age — the presumption under Section 90 as to
(2023) 19 SCC 448
P a g e | 19
the regularity of documents more than 30 years of age is
inapplicable when it comes to proof of wills, which have to be
proved in terms of Section 63(c) of the Succession Act, 1925, and
Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
Learned counsel submits that the presumption under Section 90 of
Evidence Act is not applicable to a Will, even if the attesting witnesses are no
longer alive. In such circumstances, the Will must be proved in accordance
with Section 69 of the Evidence Act. Since defendant No.1 failed to satisfy the
requirements of the said provision, the Will cannot be relied upon and must be
held to be not proved.
33.
Learned counsel for respondents / plaintiffs placed reliance on the
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi
Reddy3, wherein it held as follows:
16. But what if the property is a vacant site, which is not
physically possessed, used or enjoyed? In such cases the
principle is that possession follows title. If two persons claim to
be in possession of a vacant site, one who is able to establish
title thereto will be considered to be in possession, as against the
person who is not able to establish title. This means that even
though a suit relating to a vacant site is for a mere injunction and
the issue is one of possession, it will be necessary to examine
and determine the title as a prelude for deciding the de jure
possession. In such a situation, where the title is clear and
simple, the court may venture a decision on the issue of title, so
as to decide the question of de jure possession even though the
suit is for a mere injunction. But where the issue of title involves
(2008) 4 SCC 594
P a g e | 20
complicated or complex questions of fact and law, or where court
feels that parties had not proceeded on the basis that title was at
issue, the court should not decide the issue of title in a suit for
injunction. The proper course is to relegate the plaintiff to the
remedy of a full-fledged suit for declaration and consequential
reliefs.
21. To summarise, the position in regard to suits for prohibitory
injunction relating to immovable property, is as under:
…………
(b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only
with possession, normally the issue of title will not be
directly and substantially in issue. The prayer for
injunction will be decided with reference to the finding on
possession. But in cases where de jure possession has
to be established on the basis of title to the property, as
in the case of vacant sites, the issue of title may directly
and substantially arise for consideration, as without a
finding thereon, it will not be possible to decide the issue
of possession.
……….
Placing reliance on the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel for plaintiffs
submits that possession follows title and, in respect of vacant land,
possession is to be determined primarily with reference to title. In the present
case, the suit schedule property is admittedly vacant land. Respondents /
plaintiffs claim title under Exs.A5 and A6, registered sale deeds, which were
duly proved before the Trial Court through cogent evidence. Having
established their title, respondents / plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration of
title and the consequential relief of permanent injunction.
P a g e | 21
34.
Learned counsel for respondents placing reliance on paragraph Nos.12
and 13 of the judgment of Bombay High Court in Govind Anant Goltekar v.
Dasharath DeobaGoltekar 4 , submitted that registered document carries
presumption of validity and possession in favour of the purchasers, unless the
same is rebutted. In the case on hand, appellant / defendant No.1 failed to
rebut the same by placing cogent evidence on record. In view of the same, the
presumption operates in favour of respondents / plaintiffs.
35.
Learned counsel for respondents / plaintiffs further placed reliance on
the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in A.B. Govardhan v. P.
Ragothaman5, wherein it held as follows:
22. Another factor is that the appellant was not heard in the
appeal, as recorded in the first impugned order [P. Ragothaman
v. A.B. Govardhan, 2017 SCC OnLine Mad 11918 : (2017) 3
CTC 777 : (2017) 4 LW 421] itself. Undoubtedly, in the face of
non-appearance by the appellant before it, the Division Bench
was free to proceed with final hearing of the appeal, as it did.
However, what seems to have transpired is that in the absence
of the appellant, what was averred by the respondent in the
appeal was accepted as correct by the Division Bench. Fact
remained that the respondent admitted to having executed Ext.
P-1 (the agreement) and that the signature(s) thereon were his,
in the proof affidavit dated 1-3-2010 as also cross-examination
dated 8-3-2010. No doubt, he (respondent) has denied its
voluntary execution and contended that it was under coercion
and threat, but no evidence was brought or led by him to support
this plea. The Division Bench opined, correctly, that “It is true
that there was no supporting evidence adduced by him to show
as to how he was threatened and forced to execute Ext. P-1.”
2006 SCC OnLine Bom 243
(2024) 10 SCC 613
P a g e | 22
Pausing here, we may emphasise that for every fact which is
pleaded, there has to be evidence, either oral or documentary, to
substantiate the same. A bald averment or mere statement by a
defendant bereft of evidentiary material to back up such
averment/statement takes such defendant's case nowhere.
Placing reliance on the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel submits
that a mere pleading, unsupported by evidence, cannot advance defendant's
case. In the present case, though Defendant No.1 pleaded that a Will had
been executed in his favour by his grandfather, he failed to adduce legally
admissible evidence to prove its execution. Consequently, the mere assertion
of the Will in the written statement cannot establish any right or title in his
favour. It is settled that evidence without pleadings is of no consequence, just
as pleadings without supporting evidence cannot be accepted.
36.
Learned counsel for respondents / plaintiffs further placed reliance on
the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in A. Raghavamma v. A.
Chenchamma6, : wherein it held as follows:
12. Learned Advocate-General contends that the learned
Subordinate Judge as well as the High Court did not draw the
appropriate presumptions arising from the fact that the
transactions were old ones; nor did they give sufficient weight
to the entries in the revenue records, the admissions made by
the parties and to the conduct of the parties and such other
important circumstances and, therefore, their findings are liable
to be questioned in this appeal. This argument in effect and
substance means that the courts below have not given due
weight to particular pieces of evidence. There is an essential
distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof : burden
of proof lies upon the person who has to prove a fact and it
never shifts, but the onus of proof shifts. The burden of proof in
the present case undoubtedly lies upon the plaintiff to establish
1963 SCC OnLine SC 37
P a g e | 23
the factum of adoption and that of partition. The said
circumstances do not alter the incidence of the burden of proof.
Such considerations, having regard to the circumstances of a
particular case, may shift the onus of proof. Such a shifting of
onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. The
criticism levelled against the judgment, of the lower Courts,
therefore, only pertain to the domain of appreciation of
evidence. We shall, therefore, broadly consider the evidence
not for the purpose of revaluation, but to see whether the
treatment of the case by the courts below is such that it falls in
the category of exceptional cases where this Court, in the
interest of justice, should depart from its usual practice.
Placing reliance on the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel submits
that the burden of proof never shifts, whereas the onus of proof keeps shifting
during the course of trial. The burden lies on the party who asserts a particular
fact and must establish it by adducing cogent evidence. In the present case,
appellant / defendant No.1, having claimed title and possession on the basis
of the Will, was required to discharge the initial burden of proving its due
execution and his entitlement thereunder. Unless the said burden is
discharged, the onus cannot shift to respondents / plaintiffs. Only after the
foundational facts are established, the onus shift to the opposite party to rebut
the claim.
37.
The main contention of appellant / defendant No.1 is that his
grandfather, the original owner, executed an registered Will dated 15.04.1963
(Ex.B1) in his favour. Upon the death of his grandfather, the property
admeasuring Ac.5.00 cents, comprising Items 1 and 2 of the suit schedule,
devolved upon him, thereby making him the absolute owner and possessor
thereof. Appellant / defendant No.1 further relies upon the judgment and
P a g e | 24
decree dated 31.07.2006 passed in O.S.No.46 of 2000 by the learned Senior
Civil Judge, Kandukur (Ex.B3), granting a decree of permanent injunction
against respondents 2 and 3. He also places reliance on Exs.A1 and A2,
General Power of Attorney deeds executed by certain purchasers under
Exs.A5 and A6 in favour of some of plaintiffs. The recitals therein disclose that
the suit schedule property was under encroachment by third parties and that
the GPAs were executed for the purpose of instituting civil proceedings. He,
therefore, contends that plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit property
as on the date of institution of the suit.
38.
Apart from the above, defendant No.1 relies upon Exs.A3 and A4, being
the adangal records standing in the name of his father, who was the vendor
under Exs.A5 and A6 sale deeds in favour of plaintiffs. Learned counsel
contends that the said adangals were issued by the Gram Panchayat, which
was not the competent authority to issue such revenue records, and therefore,
they cannot be relied upon as evidence of possession or title.
39.
Learned counsel for appellant / Defendant No.1 further places reliance
on Ex.A16, survey report prepared by a private surveyor. However, the report
does not bear the surveyor's signature. Therefore, learned counsel contends
that Ex.A16 cannot be relied upon and that there is no cogent evidence on
record to establish plaintiffs' possession over the suit schedule property.
40.
Learned counsel for appellant / Defendant No.1, referring to the
evidence of PWs.1 to 9, submits that plaintiffs had not obtained conversion
P a g e | 25
permission from the revenue authorities or layout approval and, therefore,
their possession over the suit schedule property cannot be established. He
particularly relies on the admission of PW.1 regarding the absence of such
permissions. However, except eliciting the said admissions, defendant No.1
could not bring out any other material in the cross-examination to discredit
plaintiffs' evidence. The attesting witnesses to Exs.A5 and A6 were examined,
and PW.1 specifically denied that appellant / Defendant No.1 was in
possession of the suit property. The evidence on record further establishes
that the suit schedule property is an open site covered with bushes and trees.
41.
PW.3, being the neighbouring owner of suit schedule property,
specifically deposed that defendant No.1 was never in possession and
enjoyment of the suit schedule property. Further, the evidence of DW.2, who
is the daughter of the scribe of the Will allegedly executed by grandfather of
defendant No.1, reveals that she was not even born as on the date of
execution of the said Will. She further admitted that there is no documentary
evidence to establish that the signature appearing on the Will belongs to its
alleged scribe. Furthermore, from the evidence of DW.1, it is evident that
Exs.A5 and A6 bear the signatures of the father of Defendant No.1. However,
defendant No.1 has not taken any steps to challenge Exs.A5 and A6 or to
establish that the said documents were not executed by his father. Thus, the
oral and documentary evidence on record, particularly the admissions elicited
from DW.1 and DW.2, materially weaken the defence set up by defendant
P a g e | 26
No.1 regarding his alleged possession and claim over the suit schedule
property.
42.
On a careful consideration of the evidence of PWs.1 to 9 and DWs.1 to
3, it is evident that the suit schedule property is a vacant piece of land covered
with bushes and trees. The execution of sale deeds under Exs.A5 and A6 by
the father of appellant / defendant No.1 has been disputed. However, no
evidence has been placed on record to establish that the said sale deeds
were not executed by father of Defendant No.1. So far as possession is
concerned, the recitals in Exs.A5 and A6 specifically indicate that possession
of the property was delivered to the purchasers on the date of execution of the
respective sale deeds. Since the property is an open and vacant piece of land,
as contended by learned counsel appearing for respondents, possession
follows title, in support of which reliance has been placed on the judgment
referred to supra. Though defendant No.1 claims right over an extent of
Ac.5.00 cents out of the total extent of Ac.17.21 cents comprised in
Sy.Nos.342/A (Ac.13.46 cents) and 342/C (Ac.3.75 cents), the alleged Will
does not specify the boundaries of the said Ac.5.00 cents. Further, the recitals
of the Will indicate that the said extent of Ac.5.00 cents is carved out of
Ac.13.46 cents. It is also significant to note that, though the Will was marked
in evidence by examining the daughter of the scribe, none of the attesting
witnesses to the Will were examined to prove its due execution, as required by
law. Further, the other legal heirs/successors of the executant of the Will were
excluded from the alleged bequest, without assigning any reason for such
P a g e | 27
exclusion. In these circumstances, the absence of specific boundaries
identifying the alleged bequeathed extent, coupled with the failure to examine
the attesting witnesses and the absence of any explanation for excluding the
other successors, raises serious doubts regarding the genuineness and due
execution of the alleged Will.
43.
Leaving that apart, when an unspecified extent of Ac.5.00 cents is
claimed to have been set apart in favour of defendant No.1 under the alleged
Will, without specifying the boundaries identifying the said extent, the burden
lies upon defendant No.1 to establish not only the due execution and
genuineness of the Will but also his physical possession and enjoyment of the
property allegedly bequeathed to him thereunder. However, no cogent
evidence has been placed on record by defendant No.1 to establish either of
these aspects. At the same time, since plaintiffs are claiming right and title
over the suit schedule property and seeking the consequential relief of
permanent injunction, the initial burden is undoubtedly upon them to establish
their title over the property and, thereafter, their possession and enjoyment
thereof. As plaintiffs have purchased the properties from the father of
defendant No.1 and the said sale deeds were proved and the said evidence
was not rebutted.
44.
So far as possession is concerned, the suit schedule property is a
compact block of vacant land covered with bushes and trees. Having regard to
the nature and physical features of the property, independent proof of actual
physical possession may not be possible in the ordinary course, except by
P a g e | 28
establishing title over the property. In such circumstances, the settled principle
that possession follows title assumes significance.
45.
In the present case, as stated above, plaintiffs have established their
title over the property covered under Exs.A5 and A6 by examining the
witnesses and producing documentary evidence. The evidence of PWs.1, 5, 6
and 8, as well as PW.7, who was arrayed as defendant No.53 in the suit,
supports the case of plaintiffs. Further, the alleged partition said to have taken
place between the brothers of defendant No.1 has also not been established
by adducing any cogent evidence. Equally, no evidence has been brought on
record to establish that father of defendant No.1 was not in possession of the
property in question. Therefore, in view of the fact that plaintiffs have
successfully established their title over the suit schedule property through oral
and documentary evidence, and having regard to the nature of the subject
property as an open and vacant piece of land, the principle that possession
follows title can be appropriately applied. Consequently, the Trial Court was
justified in decreeing the suit in favour of plaintiffs. Accordingly, the points
raised in the appeal are answered.
46.
In view of the foregoing discussion and the findings recorded
hereinabove, this Court does not find any illegality, irregularity or infirmity in
the judgment and decree passed by the learned Judge of the Trial Court
warranting interference by this Court in the present appeal.
P a g e | 29
47.
As a result, the Appeal Suit is dismissed without costs, confirming the
Judgment and Decree dated 17.08.2018, passed by the learned VII Additional
District Judge, Prakasam District at Ongole, in O.S.No.07 of 2007.
As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand
closed.
__________________________
JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI
Date: 13.11.2026
SAK
Whether the order is:
Speaking
Reportable
☑
☑
Reasoned
Non-reportable
☑
P a g e | 30
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI
APPEAL SUIT NO: 1813/2018
Date: 13.11.2026
SAK
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