K. Sashidhar vs Indian Overseas Bank & Ors.

s. 30(2) and (4), 31, 33 and 61(3) – Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – Resolution plan rejected by impugned order on the ground that the plan did not garner support of not less than 75% of voting share of financial creditors constituting Committee of Creditors (COC) – On appeal, held: Upon receipt of a “rejected” resolution plan, the adjudicating authority (NCLT) is obligated to initiate liquidation process u/s. 33(1) – It does not have authority to analyse or evaluate the commercial decision of the CoC or to enquire into the justness of the rejection of the resolution plan by the dissenting financial creditors – The legislature, consciously, has not provided any ground to challenge the “commercial wisdom” of the individual financial creditors or their collective decision before the adjudicating authority – The discretion of the adjudicating authority (NCLT) is circumscribed by Section 31 limited to scrutiny of the resolution plan “as approved” by the requisite percent of voting share of financial creditors – The provisions investing jurisdiction and authority in the NCLT or NCLAT has not made the commercial decision exercised by the CoC of not approving the resolution plan or rejecting the same, justiciable – The matters or grounds u/s. 30(2) or u/s. 61(3) are regarding testing the validity of the “approved” resolution plan by the CoC and not for approving the resolution plan which has been disapproved or deemed to have been rejected by the CoC in exercise of its business decision – Therefore, neither the adjudicating authority (NCLT) nor the Appellate Authority (NCLAT) has been endowed with the jurisdiction to reverse the commercial wisdom of the dissenting financial creditors – Since none of the grounds available under Section 30(2) or Section 61(3) of the I&B Code are attracted in the fact situation of the present case, the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) as well as the Appellate Authority (NCLAT) had no other option but to record that the proposed resolution plan stood rejected – Introduction of new norm and qualifying standard for approval of a resolution plan in the amendment Act (reducing the threshold requirement of percent of voting share of financial creditors to 66%) will have prospective operation – NCLAT could not have examined the case on the basis of the amended provision – Supreme Court in exercise of powers u/Article 142 of the Constitution cannot set aside the order passed by the Tribunal and relegate the parties in both the cases, before the NCLT for considering the proceedings afresh in light of the amended provision – NCLAT has justly concluded that the resolution plan has not been approved by requisite percent of voting share of the financial creditors and in absence of any alternative resolution plan presented within the statutory period of 270 days, the inevitable sequel is to initiate liquidation process u/s. 33 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 – Regs. 25 and 39 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2017 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018 – Constitution of India – Art. 142.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. The resolution plan concerning both the corporate debtors, namely KS&PIPL and IIL was considered by the concerned Committee of Creditors (CoC) in October 2017, and was approved by less than 75% of voting share of the financial creditors. The inevitable consequences thereof are to treat the proposed resolution plan as disapproved or deemed to be rejected by the dissenting financial creditors. The expression ‘dissenting financial creditors’, is defined in Regulation 2(1)(f) of The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016, to mean the financial creditors who voted against the resolution plan approved by the Committee. This definition came to be amended subsequently w.e.f. 01.01.2018 to mean the financial creditors who voted against the resolution plan or abstained from voting for the resolution plan, approved by the Committee. [Para 24][883-F-H]

2. In the case of the corporate debtor KS&PIPL, the resolution plan, when it was put to vote in the meeting of CoC held on 27th October, 2017, could garner approval of only 55.73% of voting share of the financial creditors and even if the subsequent approval accorded by email (by 10.94%) is taken into account, it did not fulfill the requisite vote of not less than 75% of voting share of the financial creditors. On the other hand, the resolution plan was expressly rejected by 15.15% in the CoC meeting and later additionally by 11.82% by email. Thus, the resolution plan was expressly rejected by not less than 25% of voting share of the financial creditors. In such a case, the resolution professional was under no obligation to submit the resolution plan under Section 30(6) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (I&B Code) to the adjudicating authority. Instead, it was a case to be proceeded by the adjudicating authority under Section 33(1) of the I&B Code. Similarly, in the case of corporate debtor IIL, the resolution plan received approval of only 66.57% of voting share of the financial creditors and 33.43% voted against the resolution plan. This being the indisputable position, NCLAT opined that the resolution plan was deemed to be rejected by the CoC and the concomitant is to initiate liquidation process concerning the two corporate debtors. [Para 25][883-A-D]

3. Regulations 25 and 39 must be read in the light of Section 30(4) of the I&B Code, concerning the process of approval of a resolution plan. For that, the “percent of voting share of the financial creditors” approving vis-à-vis dissenting - is required to be reckoned. It is not on the basis of members present and voting as such. At any rate, the approving votes must fulfill the threshold percent of voting share of the financial creditors. Keeping this clear distinction in mind, it must follow that the resolution plan concerning the respective corporate debtors, namely, KS&PIPL and IIL, is deemed to have been rejected as it had failed to muster the approval of requisite threshold votes, of not less than 75% of voting share of the financial creditors. It is not possible to countenance any other construction or interpretation, which may run contrary to what has been noted herein before. [Para 29][886-G-H; 887-A, B]

4. Thus understood, no fault can be found with the NCLAT for having recorded the fact that the proposed resolution plan in respect of both the corporate debtors was approved by vote of “less than 75%” of voting share of the financial creditors or deemed to have been rejected. In that event, the inevitable corollary is to initiate liquidation process relating to the concerned corporate debtor, as per Section 33 of the I&B Code. [Para 30][887-C]

5. Upon receipt of a “rejected” resolution plan the adjudicating authority (NCLT) is not expected to do anything more; but is obligated to initiate liquidation process under Section 33(1) of the I&B Code. The legislature has not endowed the adjudicating authority (NCLT) with the jurisdiction or authority to analyse or evaluate the commercial decision of the CoC muchless to enquire into the justness of the rejection of the resolution plan by the dissenting financial creditors. [Para 33][889-D, E]

6. From the legislative history and the background in which the I&B Code has been enacted, it is noticed that a completely new approach has been adopted for speeding up the recovery of the debt due from the defaulting companies. In the new approach, there is a calm period followed by a swift resolution process to be completed within 270 days (outer limit) failing which, initiation of liquidation process has been made inevitable and mandatory. In the earlier regime, the corporate debtor could indefinitely continue to enjoy the protection given under Section 22 of Sick Industrial Companies Act, 1985 or under other such enactments which has now been forsaken. Besides, the commercial wisdom of the CoC has been given paramount status without any judicial intervention, for ensuring completion of the stated processes within the timelines prescribed by the I&B Code. There is an intrinsic assumption that financial creditors are fully informed about the viability of the corporate debtor and feasibility of the proposed resolution plan. They act on the basis of thorough examination of the proposed resolution plan and assessment made by their team of experts. The opinion on the subject matter expressed by them after due deliberations in the CoC meetings through voting, as per voting shares, is a collective business decision. The legislature, consciously, has not provided any ground to challenge the “commercial w isdom” of the individual financial creditors or their collective decision before the adjudicating authority. That is made non-justiciable. [Para 33][889-E-H; 890-A, B]

7. In the report of the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee of November 2015, primacy has been given to the CoC to evaluate the various possibilities and make a decision.The report also highlights that having timelines is the essence of the resolution process. It then refers to the principles driving the design of the new insolvency bankruptcy resolution frame work. [Para 34][890-B, G]

8. The discretion of the adjudicating authority (NCLT) is circumscribed by Section 31 limited to scrutiny of the resolution plan “as approved” by the requisite percent of voting share of financial creditors. Even in that enquiry, the grounds on which the adjudicating authority can reject the resolution plan is in reference to matters specified in Section 30(2), when the resolution plan does not conform to the stated requirements. Reverting to Section 30(2), the enquiry to be done is in respect of whether the resolution plan provides : (i) the payment of insolvency resolution process costs in a specified manner in priority to the repayment of other debts of the corporate debtor,

(ii) the repayment of the debts of operational creditors in prescribed manner, (iii) the management of the affairs of the corporate debtor, (iv) the implementation and supervision of the resolution plan, (v) does not contravene any of the provisions of the law for the time being in force, (vi) conforms to such other requirements as may be specified by the Board. The Board referred to is established under Section 188 of the I&B Code. The powers and functions of the Board have been delineated in Section 196 of the I&B Code. None of the specified functions of the Board, directly or indirectly, pertain to regulating the manner in which the financial creditors ought to or ought not to exercise their commercial wisdom during the voting on the resolution plan under Section 30(4) of the I&B Code. The subjective satisfaction of the financial creditors at the time of voting is bound to be a mixed baggage of variety of factors. To wit, the feasibility and viability of the proposed resolution plan and including their perceptions about the general capability of the resolution applicant to translate the projected plan into a reality. The resolution applicant may have given projections backed by normative data but still in the opinion of the dissenting financial creditors, it would not be free from being speculative. These aspects are completely within the domain of the financial creditors who are called upon to vote on the resolution plan under Section 30(4) of the I&B Code. [Para 35][892-D-H; 893-A, B]

9. The remedy of appeal including the width of jurisdiction of the appellate authority and the grounds of appeal, is a creature of statute. The provisions investing jurisdiction and authority in the NCLT or NCLAT has not made the commercial decision exercised by the CoC of not approving the resolution plan or rejecting the same, justiciable. This position is reinforced from the limited grounds specified for instituting an appeal that too against an order “approving a resolution plan” under Section 31. First, that the approved resolution plan is in contravention of the provisions of any law for the time being in force. Second, there has been material irregularity in exercise of powers “by the resolution professional” during the corporate insolvency resolution period. Third, the debts owed to operational creditors have not been provided for in the resolution plan in the prescribed manner. Fourth, the insolvency resolution plan costs have not been provided for repayment in priority to all other debts. Fifth, the resolution plan does not comply with any other criteria specified by the Board. Significantly, the matters or grounds - be it under Section 30(2) or under Section 61(3) of the I&B Code are regarding testing the validity of the “approved” resolution plan by the CoC; and not for approving the resolution plan which has been disapproved or deemed to have been rejected by the CoC in exercise of its business decision. [Para 37][894-A-E]

10. The inquiry in such an appeal would be limited to the power exercisable by the resolution professional under Section 30(2) of the I&B Code or, at best, by the adjudicating authority (NCLT) under Section 31(2) read with 31(1) of the I&B Code. No other inquiry would be permissible. Further, the jurisdiction bestowed upon the appellate authority (NCLAT) is also expressly circumscribed. It can examine the challenge only in relation to the grounds specified in Section 61(3) of the I&B Code, which is limited to matters “other than” enquiry into the autonomy or commercial wisdom of the dissenting financial creditors. Thus, the prescribed authorities (NCLT/NCLAT) have been endowed with limited jurisdiction as specified in the I&B Code and not to act as a court of equity or exercise plenary powers. [Para 38][894-F-H]

11. Therefore, neither the adjudicating authority (NCLT) nor the appellate authority (NCLAT) has been endowed with the jurisdiction to reverse the commercial wisdom of the dissenting financial creditors and that too on the specious ground that it is only an opinion of the minority financial creditors. The fact that substantial or majority percent of financial creditors have accorded approval to the resolution plan would be of no avail, unless the approval is by a vote of not less than 75% (after amendment of 2018 w.e.f. 06.06.2018, 66%) of voting share of the financial creditors. The action of liquidation process postulated in ChapterIII of the I&B Code, is avoidable, only if approval of the resolution plan is by a vote of not less than 75% (as in October, 2017) of voting share of the financial creditors. Conversely, the legislative intent is to uphold the opinion or hypothesis of the minority dissenting financial creditors. That must prevail, if it is not less than the specified percent (25% in October, 2017; and now after the amendment w.e.f. 06.06.2018, 44%). The inevitable outcome of voting by not less than requisite percent of voting share of financial creditors to disapprove the proposed resolution plan, de jure, entails in its deemed rejection. [Para 39][895-A-D]

12. Concededly, the process of resolution plan is necessitated in respect of corporate debtors in whom their financial creditors have lost hope of recovery and who have turned into non-performer or a chronic defaulter. The fact that the concerned corporate debtor was still able to carry on its business activities does not obligate the financial creditors to postpone the recovery of the debt due or to prolong their losses indefinitely. Be that as it may, the scope of enquiry and the grounds on which the decision of “approval” of the resolution plan by the CoC can be interfered with by the adjudicating authority (NCLT), has been set out in Section 31(1) read with Section 30(2) and by the appellate tribunal (NCLAT) under Section 32 read with Section 61(3) of the I&B Code. No corresponding provision has been envisaged by the legislature to empower the resolution professional, the adjudicating authority (NCLT) or for that matter the appellate authority (NCLAT), to reverse the “commercial decision” of the CoC muchless of the dissenting financial creditors for not supporting the proposed resolution plan. Whereas, from the legislative history there is contra indication that the commercial or business decisions of the financial creditors are not open to any judicial review by the adjudicating authority or the appellate authority. [Para 42][896-B-E]

13. In the I&B Code and the regulations framed thereunder as applicable in October 2017, there was no need for the dissenting financial creditors to record reasons for disapproving or rejecting a resolution plan. Further, there is no provision in the I&B Code which empowers the adjudicating authority (NCLT) to oversee the justness of the approach of the dissenting financial creditors in rejecting the proposed resolution plan or to engage in judicial review thereof. Concededly, the inquiry by the resolution professional precedes the consideration of the resolution plan by the CoC. The resolution professional is not required to express his opinion on matters within the domain of the financial creditor(s), to approve or reject the resolution plan, under Section 30(4) of the I&B Code. At best, the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) may cause an enquiry into the “approved” resolution plan on limited grounds referred to in Section 30(2) read with Section 31(1) of the I&B Code. It cannot make any other inquiry nor is competent to issue any direction in relation to the exercise of commercial wisdom of the financial creditors be it for approving, rejecting or abstaining, as the case may be. Even the inquiry before the Appellate Authority (NCLAT) is limited to the grounds under Section 61(3) of the I&B Code. It does not postulate jurisdiction to undertake scrutiny of the justness of the opinion expressed by financial creditors at the time of voting. To take any other view would enable even the minority dissenting financial creditors to question the logic or justness of the commercial opinion expressed by the majority of the financial creditors albeit by requisite percent of voting share to approve the resolution plan; and in the process authorize the adjudicating authority to reject the approved resolution plan upon accepting such a challenge. That is not the scope of jurisdiction vested in the adjudicating authority under Section 31 of the I&B Code dealing with approval of the resolution plan. [Para 44][896-H; 897-A-E]

14. Since none of the grounds available under Section 30(2) or Section 61(3) of the I&B Code are attracted in the fact situation of the present case, the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) as well as the Appellate Authority (NCLAT) had no other option but to record that the proposed resolution plan concerning the respective corporate debtor (KS&PIPL and IIL) stood rejected. Further, as no alternative resolution plan was approved by the requisite percent of voting share of the financial creditors before the expiry of the statutory period of 270 days, the inevitable sequel is to pass an order directing initiation of liquidation process against the concerned corporate debtor in the manner specified in Chapter III of the I&B Code. [Para 45][897-F, G]

15.1 Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2017 (No.8 of 2018) is deemed to have come into force on the 23rd day of November, 2017. Section 6 of this Act purports to substitute Section 30(4) of the principal Act. The change brought about by this amendment is insertion of words “after considering its feasibility and viability, and such other requirements as may be specified by the Board”. In addition, three provisos have been added to sub-section (4). The amendment is only to declare that the financial creditors ought to consider the feasibility and viability and such other requirements as may be specified by the Board, while exercising their option on the resolution plan - to approve or not to approve the same. It is rudimentary that the financial creditors (in most cases are national Bankers), who are called upon to consider the proposed resolution plan would take into account all the relevant materials, including the feasibility and viability and such other requirements as may be specified by the Board. Additionally, the financial creditors are also required to bear in mind that the legislative intent is to bring about resolution and revival of the corporate debtors so as to benefit not only the corporate debtor but also other stake-holders in equal measure. [Para 46, 47][898-C, H; 899-A-D]

15.2 The amended provision merely restates as to what the financial creditors are expected to bear in mind whilst expressing their choice during consideration of the proposal for approval of a resolution plan. No more and no less. Indubitably, the legislature has consciously not provided for a ground to challenge the justness of the “commercial decision” expressed by the financial creditors – be it to approve or reject the resolution plan. The opinion so expressed by voting is non-justiciable. Further, in the present cases, there is nothing to indicate as to which other requirements specified by the Board at the relevant time have not been fulfilled by the dissenting financial creditors. The Board established under Section 188 of the I&B Code can perform powers and functions specified in Section 196 of the I&B Code. That does not empower the Board to specify requirements for exercising commercial decisions by the financial creditors in the matters of approval of the resolution plan or liquidation process. Viewed thus, the amendment under consideration does not take the matter any further. [Para 48][899-D-G]

16.1 By the amendment to Section 30(4) which has come into force w.e.f. 6th day of June, 2018 vide the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018 (No.8 of 2018). A new norm and qualifying standard for approval of a resolution plan has been introduced. That cannot be treated as a declaratory/clarificatory or stricto sensu procedural matter as such. Whereas, the stated Amendment Act makes it expressly clear that it shall be deemed to have come into force on the 6th day of June, 2018. Thus, by mere use of expression “substituted” in Section 23(iii)(a) of the Amendment Act of 2018, it would not make the provision retrospective in operation or having retroactive effect. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that there is no indication in the Amendment Act of 2018 that the legislature intended to undo and/or govern the decisions already taken by the CoC of the concerned corporate debtors prior to 6-06-2018. [Para 50, 51][900-B, D-F]

16.2 Even the report of the Insolvency Law Committee of March, 2018 report does not mention about introducing the amendment to Section 30(4), regarding the threshold requirement with retrospective or retroactive effect. Indeed, the report has noted about the necessity to alter the low threshold level of 25% of voting share for rejection of the resolution plan which, it felt, should be increased to 44%. [Para 52][901-G, H]

16.3 The Amendment Act of 2018 having come into force w.e.f. 6 th day of June, 2018, therefore, will have prospective application and apply only to the decisions of CoC taken on or after that date concerning the approval of resolution plan. [Para 53][903-F]

16.4 In the present case, however, the amendment under consideration pertaining to Section 30(4), is to modify the voting share threshold for decisions of the CoC and cannot be treated as clarificatory in nature. It changes the qualifying standards for reckoning the decision of the CoC concerning the process of approval of a resolution plan. The rights/obligations crystallized between the parties and, in particular, the dissenting financial creditors in October 2017, in terms of the governing provisions can be divested or undone only by a law made in that behalf by the legislature. There is no indication either in the report of the Committee or in the Amendment Act of 2018 that the legislature intended to undo the decisions of the CoC already taken prior to

6 th day of June, 2018. It is not possible to fathom how the provisions of the amendment Act 2018, reducing the threshold percent of voting share can be perceived as declaratory or clarificatory in nature. In such a situation, the NCLAT could not have examined the case on the basis of the amended provision. For the same reason, the NCLT could not have adopted a different approach in these matters. Hence, no fault can be found with the impugned decision of the NCLAT. [Para 58][907-D-F]

16.5 Prior to the amendment of Regulation 39 which has come into force with effect from 4th July, 2018, Regulation 39(3) merely provided that the Committee may approve any resolution plan with such modifications as it deems fit. In the first place, amendment to regulation cannot have retrospective effect so as to impact the decision of the CoC of the concerned corporate debtor – taken before the amendment of the said regulation. There is no indication in the Code as amended or the regulations to suggest that as a consequence of this amendment the decisions aleady taken by the concerned CoC prior to 3rd July, 2018 be treated as deemed to have been vitiated or for that matter, necessitating reversion of the proposal to CoC for recording reasons, that too beyond the statutory period of 270 days. A new life cannot be infused in the resolution plan which did not fructify within the statutory period, by such circuitous route. [Para 59 and 60][907-H; 908-C, D]

16.6 Assuming that this provision was applicable to the present cases, non-recording of reasons for approving or rejecting the resolution plan by the concerned financial creditor during the voting in the meeting of CoC, would not render the final collective decision of CoC nullity per se. Concededly, if the objection to the resolution plan is on account of infraction of ground(s) specified in Sections 30(2) and 61(3), that must be specifically and expressly raised at the relevant time. For, the approval of the resolution plan by the CoC can be challenged on those grounds. However, if the opposition to the proposed resolution plan is purely a commercial or business decision, the same, being non-justiciable, is not open to challenge before the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) or for that matter the Appellate Authority (NCLAT). If so, non-recording of any reason for taking such commercial decision will be of no avail. In the present case, admittedly, the dissenting financial creditors have rejected the resolution plan in exercise of business/commercial decision and not because of non-compliance of the grounds specified in Section 30(2) or Section 61(3), as such. Resultantly, the amended regulation pressed into service, will be of no avail. [Para 61][908-E-H]

16.7 In the present case, in terms of Section 30 of the I&B Code, the decision is taken collectively after due negotiations between the financial creditors who are constituents of the CoC and they express their opinion on the proposed resolution plan in the form of votes, as per their voting share. In the meeting of CoC, the proposed resolution plan is placed for discussion and after full interaction in the presence of all concerned and the resolution professional, the constituents of the CoC finally proceed to exercise their option (business/commercial decision) to approve or not to approve the proposed resolution plan. In such a case, non-recording of reasons would not per se vitiate the collective decision of the financial creditors. The legislature has not envisaged challenge to the “commercial/business decision” of the financial creditors taken collectively or for that matter their individual opinion, as the case may be, on this count. [Para 62][910-F-H; 911-A]

16.8 It is enough for the dissenting financial creditors to disapprove the proposed resolution plan by voting as per its voting share, based on commercial decision. Indeed, if the opposition of the dissenting financial creditors is in regard to matter(s) within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal ascribable to Sections 30(2) or 61(3), then the situation may be somewhat different. But that is not in issue in these cases. Therefore, it cannot be said NCLAT committed manifest error in not calling upon the dissenting financial creditors to respond to the applications filed in the concerned appeals pending before it. [Para 63][911-B-C]

16.9 It is not open to the Adjudicating Authority to entertain a revised resolution plan after the expiry of the statutory period of 270 days. Accordingly, no fault can be found with the NCLAT for not entertaining such application. [Para 64][911-D]

16.10 In both the cases, the vote of approval exceeded more than 66% of the voting share of the financial creditors and yet the benefit of the amended provision could not be availed, as it came only during the pendency of the appeal before the NCLAT. This Court in exercise of powers u/Article 142 of the Constitution cannot set aside the order passed by the Tribunal and relegate the parties in both the cases, before the NCLT for considering the proceedings afresh in light of the amended provision reducing the threshold requirement of percent of voting share of financial creditors to 66%. This will result in issuing directions in the teeth of the provisions as applicable to the present cases. [Para 65][911-F-H]

17. The NCLAT has justly concluded in the impugned decision that the resolution plan of the concerned corporate debtor(s) has not been approved by requisite percent of voting share of the financial creditors; and in absence of any alternative resolution plan presented within the statutory period of 270 days, the inevitable sequel is to initiate liquidation process under Section 33 of the Code. [Para 66][912-A, B]

Thirumalai Chemicals Limited v. Union of India and Ors. (2011) 6 SCC 739 : [2011] 4 SCR 838 ; Purbanchal Cables & Conductors (P) Ltd. v. Assam SEB and Anr. (2012) 7 SCC 462 : [2012] 6 SCR 905 ; CIT v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd. (2015) 1 SCC 1 : [2014] 12 SCR 1037 ; Vijayalakshmi Rice Mills, New Contractors Co. and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1976) 3 SCC

37 : [1976] 3 SCR 775 - relied on

Mardia Chemicals limited and Others v. Union of India and Others (2004) 4 SCC 311 : [2004] 3 SCR 982 distinguished Gottumukkala Venkata Krishamraju v. Union of India (2018) SCC Online SC 1386 ; Government of India v. India Tobacco Association (2005) 7 SCC 396 : [2005]

2 Suppl. SCR 859 ; Zile Singh v. State of Haryana (2004)

8 SCC 1 : [2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 400 ; Mithilesh Kumari & Another v. Prem Behari Khare [1989] 2 SCC 95 : [1989] 1 SCR 621 ; Dahiben (Widow of Ranchnodji Jivanji) & Ors. v. Vasanji Kevalbhai (dead) & Others (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 295 ; B.K. Educational Services Private Ltd. v. Parag Gupta & Associates (2018) SCC Online SC 1921 ; State Bank of India v. Ramakrishnan (2018) SCC Online SC 963 ; Rustom & Hornby (I) Ltd. v. T.B. Kadom (1976) 3 SCC 71 : [1976] 1 SCR 119 ; Bharat Singh v. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi (1986) 2 SCC 614 : [1986] 2 SCR

169 ; Padfield and Others v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (1968) 2 WLR 924 ; Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Others (2007) 8 SCC 338 : [2007] 10 SCR 245 ; Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1996) 6 SCC 651 : [1987] 2 SCR 841 ; Union of India and Another v. Cynamide India Ltd. and Another (1987) 2 SCC 720 : [1987] 2 SCR 841 ; Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited and Another v. Union of India and Others (1990) 3 SCC 223 : [1990] 1 SCR

909 ; United Bank of India, Calcutta v. Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and Others (2000) 7 SCC 357 : [ 2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 153 ; Karan Singh and Others v. Bhagwan Singh (Dead) By Lrs. And Others (1996) 7 SCC 559 : [1996]

1 SCR 924 ; Arcelormittal India Private Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Others (2018) SCC Online 1733 ; Karnataka State Industrial Investment & Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Cavalet India Ltd. and Others (2005) 4 SCC 456 : [ 2005] 2 SCR 1183 ; S.L. Srinivasa Jute Twine Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and Another (2006) 2 SCC 740 : [2006] 2 SCR 235 ; Rajeev Chaudhary v. State (NCT) of Delhi (2001) 5 SCC

34 : [2001] 3 SCR 508 ; Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Others (1994) 4 SCC 602 : [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 360 ; Innoventive Industries Limited v. ICICI Bank and Another [2018] 1 SCC 407 : [2017] 8 SCR 33 - referred to