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THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Civil Appellate Jurisdiction)
DATED : 31.08.2019
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SINGLE BENCH : THE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, JUDGE
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RFA No.09 of 2016
Appellant
:
Joybells School Authority,
Through Mr. P.J.S. Walia,
Chairman, Joy Bells School,
Near Khangri Petrol Pump,
Tadong, East Sikkim.
versus
Respondents
:
1. Mr. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon,
S/o Late Karma Pintso,
R/o Syari, Gangtok, East Sikkim.
2. Mrs. Althea Joy Singh,
W/o Col. S.S. Singh,
Principal of Joy Bells School,
Near Khangri Petrol Pump,
Tadong, Gangtok, East Sikkim.
3. Mr. N.D. Chingapa,
S/o T.N. Chingapa,
R/o Lucy Building,
Nam-Nang, Gangtok, East Sikkim.
4. Mrs. Tashi Dolma Kazini,
W/o Mr. N.D. Chingapa,
R/o Lucy Building,
Nam-Nang, Gangtok, East Sikkim.
Appeal under Order XLI of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. T.B. Thapa, Senior Advocate with Mr. Ranjan Chettri and
Mr. Khem Raj Sapkota, Advocates, for the Appellant.
Mr. A.K. Upadhyaya, Senior Advocate with Mr. Sonam Rinchen
Lepcha, Advocate, for the Respondent No.1.
None present for Respondent No.2.
Mr. S.S. Hamal, Advocate, for Respondents No.3 and 4.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CO No.01 of 2016
Petitioner
:
Mr. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon,
S/o Late Karma Pintso,
R/o Syari, Gangtok, East Sikkim.
versus
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
Respondents
:
1. Mrs. Althea Joy Singh,
W/o Col. S.S. Singh,
Principal of Joy Bells School,
Near Khangri Petrol Pump,
Tadong, Gangtok, East Sikkim.
2. Joybells School Authority,
Through Mr. P.J.S. Walia,
Chairman, Joy Bells School,
Near Khangri Petrol Pump,
Tadong, East Sikkim.
3. Mr. N.D. Chingapa,
S/o T.N. Chingapa,
R/o Lucy Building,
Nam-Nang, Gangtok, East Sikkim.
4. Mrs. Tashi Dolma Kazini,
W/o Mr. N.D. Chingapa,
R/o Lucy Building,
Nam-Nang, Gangtok, East Sikkim.
Cross-Objection under Order XLI Rule 22 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. A.K. Upadhyaya, Senior Advocate with Mr. Sonam Rinchen
Lepcha, Advocate, for the Petitioner.
None present for Respondent No.1.
Mr. T.B. Thapa, Senior Advocate with Mr. Ranjan Chettri and
Mr. Khem Raj Sapkota, Advocates, for Respondent No.2.
Mr. S.S. Hamal, Advocate, for Respondents No.3 and 4.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.
1.
The learned trial Court vide the impugned Judgment
dated 30.04.2016, decreed the Suit of the Plaintiff (Respondent
No.1 in this Appeal and Petitioner in the Cross Objection), on
grounds of “bona fide requirement for personal occupation” of
the Plaintiff. Arrears in rent were ordered to be paid by the
Defendant No.2 (Appellant herein and Respondent No.2 in the
Cross Objection), from April 2012, till filing of the Suit with
pendent lite and future interest, till recovery of possession. The
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
Counter-Claim of the Defendant No.2 (Appellant herein) was
dismissed. Aggrieved thereof, the Appellant assails the impugned
Judgment supra.
2.
A Cross Objection was filed by the Respondent No.1
before this Court, assailing the finding of the learned trial Court
on Issues No.1 and 2. The Appeal and the Cross Objection are
being disposed of by this Judgment.
3.
(a) The Respondent No.1 (in the Appeal herein and
the Petitioner in the Cross Objection) was the Plaintiff before the
learned trial Court;
(b) the Respondent no.2 (in the Appeal herein and
Respondent No.1 in the Cross Objection) was the Defendant
No.1 before the learned trial Court;
(c)
the
Appellant
(in
the
Appeal
herein
and
Respondent No.2 in the Cross Objection) was the Defendant
No.2 before the learned trial Court; and
(d) the Respondents No.3 and 4 (in the Appeal
herein and Respondents No.3 and 4 in the Cross Objection) were
the proforma Defendants No.3 and 4 before the learned trial
Court.
The parties shall be referred to in their order of appearance
before this Court, in the Appeal.
4.
The
facts
briefly
stated,
as
set
out
by
the
Respondent No.1, are that he had purchased two RCC buildings
viz. (i) four storeyed building measuring 48 feet x 47 feet, and
(ii) three storeyed building measuring 36 feet x 36 feet, with
surrounding
land,
standing
on
Plot
No.104/904
alongside
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
National Highway 31A, under Tadong Block at Sokeythang, East
Sikkim, from the Respondents No.3 and 4, vide a Sale Deed
dated 11.11.2011, duly registered and mutated in his name on
19.12.2011. The property in dispute is the four storeyed RCC
building at (i) supra, measuring 48 feet x 47 feet, (hereinafter
the “suit property”). The Respondent No.2 used to be the
Principal of the Appellant School, while P.J.S. Walia representing
the Appellant, is the present Chairman of the School. Vide Lease
Deed, dated 23.03.1996, the Respondent No.3 leased out the
suit property to Respondent No.2, who later left Gangtok having
handed over the suit property to the Appellant, without the
consent or knowledge of the Respondents No.3 and 4, despite
Clause 9 of the Lease Deed prohibiting subletting. That, the
Respondent No.1, aged above 50 years and being beset with
physical
ailments,
decided
to
discontinue
working
as
a
Contractor and instead sought to develop the suit property into a
hotel complex. Pursuant thereto, on 21.08.2012, he issued three
months‟ advance Legal Notice to the Appellant, requiring him to
vacate the suit property by the end of the Academic Session of
2012, which the Appellant failed to comply. This gave rise to the
Eviction Suit on the grounds of “bona fide use and occupation”
and default in payment of rent for four months continuously. It
was also asserted that the Appellant was a trespasser in the suit
property.
5.
Denying and disputing the allegations, the Appellant
in his Written Statement, expressed ignorance of the change in
ownership of the suit property from the Respondents No.3 and 4
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
to the Respondent No.1, which he learnt of, only on receipt of a
copy of the alleged Sale Deed document and khatian parcha,
appended to the summons served on him. Claiming a right of
pre-emption over the suit property being the tenant, for the
amount as indicated in the Sale Deed, he alleged that the sale
transaction was a sham transaction to cause him loss. The Lease
Deed, executed between Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3
did not bind him as the period therein had expired prior to his
taking over as the Chairman of the Appellant School, in 2002.
That, the School started in 1984 and has continued to be a
tenant under the tenancy laws of the State and the Respondent
No.2 was the Principal from 1990. Denying default in payment of
rent, it was averred that the Respondents No.3 and 4 received
rent till November, 2011, thereafter rent was remitted to the
Respondent No.1, on Legal Notice dated 18.05.2012, being
issued by him to the Appellant. That, the Respondent No.1 owns
a multi storeyed RCC building at Syari, from which he earns
sufficient income from rent, besides, a hotel could be opened in
any of the buildings purchased by him from the Respondent No.3
near the Appellant School.
6.
A Counter-Claim was filed by the Appellant, seeking
to exercise the right of pre-emption on payment of the amount
mentioned in the Sale Deed, executed between the Respondent
No.1 and Respondents No.3 and 4. In his Written Statement to
the
Counter-Claim,
the
Respondent
No.1
reiterated
that
Respondent No.2 and not the Appellant, had been originally
inducted as a tenant, rendering the Appellant a trespasser in the
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
suit property. The consideration value reflected on the Sale Deed
was due to family relations between the Respondents No.1, 3
and 4 but the market value would be much higher. Besides, the
provisions of Revenue Order No.I of 1917 prohibits the Appellant
from exercising the right of pre-emption, hence the CounterClaim be dismissed.
7.
On
account
of
her
non-appearance
before
the
learned trial Court despite service of summons, the Respondent
No.2 was proceeded ex parte.
8.
The learned trial Court initially struck the following
four issues for settlement;
“1. Whether the Defendants No. 1 and 2 are liable
to be evicted from the Suit Premises allegedly being
trespassers in the Suit Premises and the Plaintiff requiring
the same for his bona fide use and occupation? (Onus on
the Plaintiff)
2. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to arrears of rent
from the Defendants No.1 and 2 from November, 2011 till
decision in the Suit? (Onus on the Plaintiff)
3. Whether the Defendant No.2 has a right of preemption over the Suit Premises from Plaintiff and the
Proforma Defendants No.3 and 4? (Onus on the
Defendant No.2)
4. Whether the Defendant No.2 has the right to
purchase the Suit Property in view of the provisions of
Revenue Order No.1 of 1917? (Onus on the Defendant
No.2)”
Later in time, on the Suit being transferred to the Court of the
learned District Judge, Special Division-II, East Sikkim at
Gangtok from that of the learned District Judge, (East) Sikkim,
the learned Presiding Officer of this Court, in his wisdom, vide
Order dated 21.04.2016, opined that although Issue No.2 supra
was framed regarding arrears of rent but the issue of default had
not been specifically framed and proceeded to re-frame Issue
No.2 as follows;
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
“2.Whether defendants have defaulted in payment
of monthly rent from November, 2011 up to December,
2012 and are liable to be evicted from the suit premises?
Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to arrears of rent from the
defendant No.1 and 2 from November, 2011 till decision
in the suit?”
9.
Before the learned trial Court, the Respondent No.1
examined two witnesses including himself. The Appellant also
examined two witnesses including P.J.S. Walia (representing the
Appellant School). On behalf of Respondents No.3 and 4,
Respondent No.3 was examined. Each party filed documents in
support of their respective contentions. On consideration of the
evidence and documents furnished before it, the learned trial
Court in Issue No.1, concluded as follows;
“… 65. It is seen in the evidence that the plaintiff in
the instant suit is suffering from blood pressure and
backache. Undoubtedly the suit premises is required for
the bonafide reason for the “personal occupation” of the
plaintiff, i.e., for the establishment of hotel business at
the fag end of his life for his livelihood.
………………………………………………………………………………………………
71. ……Therefore, in my humble view the defendant
No. 2 cannot use and occupy the suit premises unless
expressly consented in written or oral by the plaintiff.
However, considering the future of the students who are
studying in the said School and are in the mid session,
the defendant No. 2 should be allowed to run the School
till the end of this session. Thus, this Issue is decided in
affirmative.”
In Issue No.2, the learned trial Court went into an elaborate
discussion of the words “willful default” while relying on a
decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in a matter dealing with
the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 and
inter alia concluded that;
“82. ……I hold that there is no willful default of rent
on the part of the defendants. However, the plaintiff
entitled (sic) to recover the arrear rent from the
defendants from the month of April, 2012 till disposal of
this case at the rate of ₹12,000/- per month since there is
no fresh or new agreement of enhancement of rents with
the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff has stepped into the
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
shoes of the original owner but he cannot take the benefit
of the earlier Lease Deed (Exhibit-1) drawn between the
proforma defendants and the defendant No. 1 in the year
1996 which has been already expired on 2001 and not
entitled to claim the enhanced rate by virtue of the said
Lease Deed as same became ineffective or nonest. Thus,
this Issue is decided accordingly.”
Issues No.3 and 4 were taken up together and the prayers of the
Respondent No.1 seeking to pay fifty times the usual registration
fees and to validate the Lease Deed of 1996, Exhibit 1, in terms
of the provisions contained in Notification No.2947/G dated
22.11.1946 was rejected by the Court with the reasoning that
the Respondent No.1 was not the original signatory to Exhibit 1.
The learned Court further concluded that the Appellant had no
right of pre-emption over the suit property, the same having
been lost by estoppel and acquiescence and the provisions of
Revenue Order No.I of 1917.
10.
Before this Court, learned Senior Counsel for the
Appellant
canvassed
the
arguments
that
contrary
to
the
ratiocination of this Court on “personal occupation” as held in
Ashok
Kumar Rai v. Girmey Goparma1,
wherein eviction was
granted to enable the grown son of the Appellant to set up a
separate establishment, and his daughter-in-law to earn an
income, the learned trial Court held that the Respondent No.1
required the suit property for his personal occupation, for the
purpose of establishing a hotel business. That, no evidence
either oral or documentary was forwarded in support of personal
occupation or bona fide requirement of the Respondent No.1.
Dwelling on the differences between the phrase “personal
AIR 2012 Sikk 29
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
occupation” as used in Notification No.6326-600-H&W-B, dated
14.04.1949, (for short the “Notification of 1949”) as opposed to
the phrase “bona fide requirement,” as emanates in the Gangtok
Rent Control and Eviction Act 1 of 1956, (for short the “Act of
1956”), it was urged that the term „personal occupation of the
landlords‟ in the Notification of 1949 connotes the idea that
accommodation is needed directly and substantially for the
occupation of the landlord as interpreted by this Court in Paul
Sangay v. Mahabir Prasad Agarwalla2. That, interpretation of the
words “personal occupation” as found in other Rent Acts cannot
be resorted to. That, the term “bona fide” suggests that the
need must be genuine and not a mere desire or motivated by
extraneous considerations in trying to recover possession from
the tenant and the terms “personal occupation” and “bona fide
requirement” are neither synonymous nor interchangeable. It
was next contended that there was collusion between the
Respondent No.1 and the Respondent No.3, who, in crossexamination,
admitted
that,
he
had
sent
a
letter
dated
16.11.2011 to the Principal, Joy Bells School, stating that he
required the suit property for running a hotel business when, in
fact, the alleged sale transaction was already executed between
the Respondent No.3 and the Respondent No.1. This collusion
was not considered by the learned trial Court. Besides, the
prohibition of Revenue Order No.I of 1917 is not applicable to
the Appellant as the suit falls outside the rural area. Prolix
arguments were advanced by learned Senior Counsel pertaining
AIR 1980 SIKKIM 13
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
to a Gift Deed, dated 22.09.1977, executed by the father of
Respondent No.4 to her, the area covered by the Gift Deed, the
Sale Deed dated 11.11.2011 executed between the Respondents
No.3, 4 and Respondent No.1, emphasizing that, the documents
supra pertaining to the same property contradict each other in
terms of details and measurements. That, the Respondent No.3,
has falsely claimed to be the owner of the building and sans
authority
granted
“No
Objection”
on
16.11.1995,
to
the
functioning of the School, when Respondent No.4 is the actual
owner. The undervaluation of the suit property, as also nonproduction of attesting witnesses to the alleged Sale Deed, was
questioned by the Appellant. That, despite determination of the
Lease Deed, Exhibit 1, on 23.03.2001, the School Management
continued to pay rents to the Respondents No.3 and 4 who
continued to accept the rents till November, 2011 and thereafter
vide Exhibit 2/S and Exhibit 2/T. That, no benefit accrues from
the default clause of the Lease Deed, to the Respondent No.1, as
afforded by the learned trial Court, vide the impugned Judgment.
That, the Lease, if any, is governed by the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 (for short the “T.P. Act”) and determination thereof
must be as per the said Act, while the Tenancy is governed by
the relevant Tenancy Act. Thus, the Respondent No.1 cannot
seek eviction of the tenant, both on grounds of determination of
the Lease Deed and under the Notification of 1949. That, the
Appellant does not challenge the title but only the alleged sham
sale transaction, shearing the Respondent No.1 of locus standi to
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
file the Suit. Hence, the impugned Judgment and Decree be set
aside and a Decree be passed dismissing the Eviction Suit.
Per
11.
contra,
learned
Senior
Counsel
for
the
Respondent No.1, while conceding that the Lease Deed was
executed between the Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.3,
contended on the one hand, that the School is the lessee of the
suit property by virtue of the fact that the Appellant had been
paying rent in terms of Clauses 2, 14 and 15 of the Lease Deed,
Exhibit 1. That, after the suit property was purchased by the
Respondent No.1 he has stepped into the shoes of the original
owner and thereby sought eviction of the Appellant. The refusal
of
the
Respondent
No.1
to
accept
the
rent
amount
of
Rs.12,000/- (Rupees twelve thousand) only, was for the reason
that it was less than the enhanced rent, liable to be paid in
terms of Clause 12 of the Lease Deed, resulting in a clear default
of over more than four months. That, Clause 13 of the Lease
Deed permits the Respondent No.1 to ask Respondent No.2 and
the Appellant to vacate the suit property, by issuing an advance
Notice of three months. In a contradictory argument, it was
strangely canvassed that Clause 12 of the Lease Deed is a
Renewal Clause providing for renewal of the Lease on expiry of
five years but as no such renewal was sought, the Appellant
thereby became a trespasser into the suit property, on and from
23.03.2001 and is liable to pay mesne profits by way of
damages. That, the Lease Deed cannot be impliedly renewed as
sought to be made out by the Appellant, for which support was
garnered from the ruling in Shanti Prasad Devi and Another v.
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
Shankar
Mahto
and
Others3.
That,
the
Respondent
No.1
commenced preparations for building a hotel in the suit property
as the Appellant had agreed to vacate by the end of the
Academic Session of 2012, hence, the provisions of Section 115
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 are applicable. That, the suit
property is required bona fide by the Respondent No.1 due to his
advancing age and physical ailments disabling him to work as a
Contractor and was not demolished under cross-examination. On
this count reliance was placed on Ashok Kumar Rai v. Girmey
Goparma4. That, the Notification of 1949 being dealt with herein,
is concerned only with “personal occupation” and hence the
words “bona fide” as required in the Act of 1956, is extraneous,
for which reliance was placed on Renula Bose, Srimati v. Rai
Manmatha Nath Bose and Others5. While rueing the denial of the
learned trial Court for eviction on ground of default, it was
contended that despite this finding, the Respondent No.1 was,
however, found to be entitled to arrears of rent.
12.
That, sale transaction and value thereof was due to
the family relations between the Respondents No.1, 3 and 4 and
inapplicable to the Appellant. Despite awareness of the sale
transaction, the Appellant allowed its completion and thereafter
put forth claims of pre-emption but the provisions of Revenue
Order No.I of 1917, renders the Appellant ineligible thereof.
Relying on the ratio of Lingala Kondala Rao v. Vootukuri Narayana
AIR 2005 SC 2905
AIR 2012 Sikk 29
AIR 1945 PC 108
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
Rao6, it was next contended that the tenant cannot challenge the
document conferring title on the landlord, besides, the Appellant
had accepted the Respondent No.1 as his landlord by virtue of
the rent remittance. The issue of sham transaction found no
place before the learned trial Court, as evident from the absence
of an issue struck on this aspect. That, Issues No.3 and 4 have
been discussed and decided against the Appellant, thus no
further question need arise on these.
13.
Learned Counsel for the Respondents No.3 and 4,
while supporting the contention of the Appellant, reiterated that
the question of sham transaction cannot be raised at the
Appellate stage, not having been averred or argued at trial.
That, the legality of the sale transaction between the Respondent
No.1 and the Respondents No.3 and 4, suffers no infirmity and
questions on title cannot be raised by a tenant in an Eviction
Suit. That, the provisions of Revenue Order No.I of 1917 debars
the Appellant from pre-emption, hence, the Appeal deserves to
be dismissed.
14.
In his Cross Objection to the Appeal, the Respondent
No.1 agitated that the Judgment of the learned trial Court in
respect of Issues No.1 and 2, are contrary to law and deserve to
be set aside. The conclusion of the learned trial Court at not
having held the Appellant and Respondent No.2 as trespassers,
in view of the non-renewal of the Lease Deed, was also assailed.
That, the decision of the learned trial Court to reject the prayer
(2003) 1 SCC 672
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
for validation of Exhibit 1, in terms of Notification No.2947/G,
dated 22.11.1946, was contrary to the decisions of this Court.
Pausing here for a moment, it may be pointed out that the
prayer
for
setting
aside
the
finding in
Issue
No.1, was
subsequently withdrawn at the final hearing, by learned Senior
Counsel for the Respondent No.1.
15.
Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant submitted
that the Cross-Objection deserves a dismissal as no grounds
arise to sustain it. While urging the grounds put forth in
Interlocutory Application (I.A.) No.5 of 2017 which is an
application under Order XLI Rule 27 read with Section 151 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short the “CPC, 1908”),
learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant sought admission of a
copy of the khasra records of Respondent No.1, which were not
in their possession during trial. That, the document establishes
that the property was not in the joint names of Respondents
No.3 and 4 but only of Respondent No.4, contrary to the Sale
Deed, Exhibit 2. To establish this assertion, the Appellant filed
I.A. No.7 of 2018, another application under Order XLI Rule 27
read with Section 151 of the CPC, 1908, seeking to admit and
exhibit the entire records of the registration proceedings relating
to registration of the Sale Deed dated 11.11.2011.
16.
supra,
Disputing the maintainability of both the petitions
learned
Senior
Counsel
for
the
Respondent
No.1
contended that the title of the Respondent No.1 as the landlord,
is being assailed, which was not the case of the Appellant at
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
trial, besides, the Appellant had attorned to the Respondent No.1
as his landlord, by tendering rent to him. That, the additional
evidence proposed to be brought in Appeal, was available in the
Office of the District Collector and the Appellant is seeking to
introduce fresh pleadings and evidence at this stage, which is
impermissible, hence both the petitions be dismissed.
17.
Learned Counsel for the Respondents No.3 and 4,
while, also objecting to the I.As supra, sought outright rejection
of the petitions, lacking ingredients stipulated in Order XLI Rule
27 of the CPC, 1908, and the khas records, being public
documents, were maintained in the Office of the Registrar/
District Collector, East, and therefore available, had it been
sought for. That, the title of the Respondent No.1 was never in
dispute and no issue on this aspect was framed by the learned
trial Court. That the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Lingala Kondala
Rao (supra) has held that the tenant cannot challenge the title of
the landlord. That in view of the said submissions, these
documents are not required for pronouncement of Judgment
herein, and the I.As consequently be disregarded.
18.
I.A. No.8 of 2019 was filed by the Respondent No.3
under Order XLI Rule 27 read with Section 151 of the CPC, 1908,
seeking permission of this Court to produce attested copy of
registered Gift Deed document executed on 22.09.1977, by the
father of Respondent No.4 in respect of his three storeyed RCC
building located at Tadong Block and
another Gift Deed
document executed on 01.09.1981, by Respondent No.4 in
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
favour of the Respondent No.3, with respect to the suit property
along with Construction Order issued to the Respondent No.3, by
the concerned authority. That, these documents were necessary
to abrogate the allegations made by the Appellant in the I.As
supra.
19.
Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, sought
rejection of the petition, as the Sale transaction is false, sham,
collusive and void.
20.
The rival submissions canvassed by learned Counsel
for the parties were heard and carefully considered, the
documents and evidence on record as also the impugned
Judgment were meticulously perused including the citations
made at the Bar.
21.
The questions that fall for consideration before this
Court are;
(i)
Whether there was a jural relationship between the
Appellant and the Respondent No.1?
(ii)
Whether the suit premises were required by the
Respondent No.1 for his “personal occupation” as
envisaged in Notification No.6326—600-H&W—B of the
Health and Works Department, Government of Sikkim,
dated 14.04.1949?
(iii)
Whether the finding of the learned trial Court with
regard to arrears of rent to be paid by the Appellant to
the Respondent No.1 from the month of April, 2012 till
the filing of the Suit, despite concluding absence of
default in rent payment, was correct?
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
(iv)
Whether the learned trial Court ought to have allowed
validation of the Lease Deed in terms of Notification
No.2947/G dated 22.11.1946?
22.
To address the first question formulated, it is
essential to note that contradictory arguments were variously
raised by the Respondent No.1, as regards the status of the
Appellant vis-à-vis the Respondent No.1, (i) that the Appellant
was paying rent in terms of the Lease Deed and was therefore a
lessee on the suit property; (ii) refusal by the Respondent No.1
to accept the rent of Rs.12,000/- (Rupees twelve thousand)
only, as it was less than the amount envisaged under Clause 12
of the Lease Deed, resulted in default in rent for more than four
months; (iii) contrarily, it was urged that as the Lease Deed had
expired and was not renewed, the Appellant was a trespasser on
the suit property as the Lease Deed cannot be impliedly
renewed, revealing a confusion in his stance.
23.
It is an admitted position that a Lease Deed, Exhibit
1, was executed between the Respondent No.2 and Respondent
No.3 in the year 1996, for a period of five years, from
23.03.1996 up to 22.03.2001. The School undisputedly started
running from the premises since 1984.
The Lease Deed
determined on 23.03.2001 and despite non-renewal, the School
continued to function from the same premises while rent
continued to be remitted by the Appellant and accepted by the
Respondents No.3 and 4. In 2011, the Respondents No. 3 and 4
sold the property to Respondent No.1, vide Exhibit 2, a Sale
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
Deed dated 11.11.2011, registered on 09.12.2011. The property
thus came to be mutated in the name of the Respondent No.1
vide the parcha khatiyan, Exhibit 3. Thus, after the transaction,
it is evident that the Respondent No.1 stepped into the shoes of
the Respondents No.3 and 4. Indeed, the provisions of Section
109 of the T.P. Act, which deals with the rights of the Lessor's
transferee are relevant herein. The Section is reproduced
hereinbelow for easy reference;
“109. Rights of lessor's transferee.- If the lessor
transfers the property leased, or any part thereof, or any
part of his interest therein, the transferee, in the absence
of a contract to the contrary, shall possess all the rights,
and, if the lessee so elects, be subject to all the liabilities
of the lessor as to the property or part transferred so long
as he is the owner of it; but the lessor shall not, by
reason only of such transfer cease to be subject to any of
the liabilities imposed upon him by the lease, unless the
lessee elects to treat the transferee as the person liable to
him:
Provided that the transferee is not entitled to arrears of
rent due before the transfer, and that, if the lessee, not
having reason to believe that such transfer has been
made, pays rent to the lessor, the lessee shall not be
liable to pay such rent over again to the transferee.
The lessor, the transferee and the lessee may determine
what proportion of the premium or rent reserved by the
lease is payable in respect of the part so transferred, and,
in case they disagree, such determination may be made
by any Court having jurisdiction to entertain a suit for the
possession of the property leased.”
The Section, as evident, postulates that the rights attached to a
property which arise out of the possession and control of the
property, will pass with the property. The Section does not insist
that the transfer of the landlord's rights can take effect only if
the tenant attorns. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Ambica Prasad
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
v. Mohd. Alam and Another ,
while discussing the provisions of
Section 109 of the T.P. Act, held as hereinbelow extracted;
“15. … From a perusal of the aforesaid section, it is
manifest that after the transfer of lessor's right in favour
of the transferee, the latter gets all rights and liabilities of
the lessor in respect of subsisting tenancy. The section
does not insist that transfer will take effect only when
the tenant attorns. It is well settled that a transferee of
the landlord's rights steps into the shoes of the landlord
with all the rights and liabilities of the transferor
landlord in respect of the subsisting tenancy. The section
does not require that the transfer of the right of the
landlord can take effect only if the tenant attorns to him.
Attornment by the tenant is not necessary to confer
validity of the transfer of the landlord's rights. Since
attornment by the tenant is not required, a notice under
Section 106 in terms of the old terms of lease by the
transferor (sic transferee) landlord would be proper and
so also the suit for ejectment.”
(emphasis supplied)
The evidence establishes sale vide Exhibit 2 hence, in terms of
this provision and Exhibit 2, Sale Deed, the Respondent No.1 has
unequivocally stepped into the shoes of Respondents No.3 and
4.
24.
The Sale Deed between the Respondent No.1 and
Respondents No.3 and 4 was executed on 11.11.2011 and the
property registered in the name of the Respondent No.1 on
19.12.2011. A Notice for eviction was issued to the Appellant by
the Respondent No.1 on 21.08.2012 vide Exhibit 2/Y, which is
not denied by the Appellant. Perusal of Exhibit 2/U indicates that
during August 2012, rent was being remitted by the Appellant to
the Respondent No.1.
25.
It is relevant now to consider the provisions of
Section 111 of the T.P. Act, which provides for determination of
Lease and states inter alia that a Lease of immoveable property
(2015) 13 SCC 13
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
determines by efflux of the time limited thereby. The relevant
provision is, as extracted below;
“111.Determination
of
lease.—A
immoveable property determines—
lease
of
(a) by efflux of the time limited thereby;
(b) ………………
(c) ………………
(d) ………………
(e) ………………
(f) ………………
(g) ………………
(h) ………………”
(emphasis supplied)
On the anvil of this statute, it is clear that the Lease Deed,
Exhibit 1, entered into between the Respondents No.2 and 3,
determined on 23.03.2001, the period of existence of the Lease
being from 23.03.1996 to 22.03.2001. Clause 12 of Exhibit 1,
which provides for renewal of the Lease with enhancement of
rent to the extent of 10% to 15% above the existing rent, was
not resorted to by either of the concerned parties. The
documents Exhibit 2/S (collectively) and Exhibit 2/T (collectively)
are conclusive of the fact that the amount of rent of Rs.12,000/(Rupees twelve thousand) only, continued to be paid by the
Appellant School and received by the Respondents No.3 and 4 till
November, 2011. Exhibit 2/T and Exhibit 2/U reveal that rent for
the month of December, 2011 was sent to both the Respondent
No.4 and the Respondent No.1, although it was refused by both
payees. This mode of remittance to both Respondents No.3 and
4 and to Respondent No.1, albeit separately, continued till
March, 2012 vide Exhibit 2/T. From April, 2012 vide Exhibit 2/U,
it appears that rent remittance, by Money Order, was made to
the Respondent No.1, upto April, 2013. The act of rent
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
remittance coupled with the specific admission of the Appellant
in his evidence that Joy Bells School was the tenant under
Respondents No.3 and 4, and thereafter of Respondent No.1
after the School came to learn of the alleged sale, discloses his
indubitable attornment to the Respondent No.1 as his landlord.
26.
That having been said, the provisions of Section 116
of the T.P. Act, which deals with the effect of holding over, is of
relevance here, which reads as follows;
“116. Effect of holding over.- If a lessee or underlessee of property remains in possession thereof after the
determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and the
lessor or his legal representative accepts rent from the
lessee or under-lessee, or otherwise assents to his
continuing in possession, the lease is, in the absence of
an agreement to the contrary, renewed from year to year,
or from month to month, according to the purpose for
which the property is leased, as specified in section 106.”
The provision is self-explanatory and does not necessitate
elucidation. Section 106, the provision referred to in the Section
supra, deals with duration of certain Leases in absence of written
contract or local usage, and provides as follows;
“106. Duration of certain leases in absence of
written contract or local usage.— (1) In the absence of a
contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of
immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing
purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year,
terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six
months' notice; and a lease of immovable property for
any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from
month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor
or lessee, by fifteen days' notice.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force, the period
mentioned in sub-section (1) shall commence from the
date of receipt of notice.
(3) A notice under sub-section (1) shall not be
deemed to be invalid merely because the period
mentioned therein falls short of the period specified under
that sub-section, where a suit or proceeding is filed after
the expiry of the period mentioned in that sub-section.
(4) Every notice under sub-section (1) must be in
writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and
either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such
party, or to one of his family or servants at his residence,
or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to
a conspicuous part of the property.”
(emphasis supplied)
27.
On the determination of Exhibit 1, the Lease of the
immoveable
property,
being
neither
for
agricultural
or
manufacturing purposes, is deemed to be a Lease from month to
month.
Although
the
purchase
and
mutation
has
been
vehemently contested by the Appellant, terming it to be a sham
transaction, however this is altogether a tangential matter and
cannot be considered in an eviction proceeding. Besides, during
the course of arguments, learned Senior Counsel for the
Appellant conceded that he had no challenge to the title of the
property, he only assailed the process of transfer. On this
aspect, appropriate reference may be made to the observation of
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Keshar Bai v. Chhunulal8, as
follows;
“…15. The High Court has expressed that the
respondent was justified in asking the appellant to
produce the documents. Implicit in this observation is
the High Court's view that the respondent could have in
an eviction suit got the title of the appellant finally
adjudicated upon. There is a fallacy in this reasoning. In
eviction proceedings the question of title to the
properties in question may be incidentally gone into, but
cannot be decided finally.
16. A similar question fell for consideration of this
Court in Bhogadi Kannababu [Bhogadi Kannababu
v. Vuggina Pydamma9. In that case it was argued that
the landlady was not entitled to inherit the properties in
question and hence could not maintain the application for
eviction on the ground of default and sub-letting under
the A.P. Tenancy Act. This Court referred to its decision
in Tej Bhan Madan v. Addl. District Judge10 in which it
was held that a tenant was precluded from denying the
title of the landlady on the general principle of estoppel
between the landlord and the tenant and that this
principle, in its basic foundations, means no more than
that under certain circumstances law considers it unjust
(2014) 11 SCC 438
(2006) 5 SCC 532
(1988) 3 SCC 137
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
to allow a person to approbate and reprobate. Section
116 of the Evidence Act is clearly applicable to such a
situation. This Court held that even if the landlady was
not entitled to inherit the properties in question, she
could still maintain the application for eviction and the
finding of fact recorded by the courts below in favour of
the landlady, was not liable to be disturbed. The position
on law was stated by this Court as under: (Bhogadi
Kannababu
case [Bhogadi
Kannababu v. Vuggina
Pydamma.]
“19. In this connection, we may also point out that
in an eviction petition filed on the ground of sub-letting
and default, the court needs to decide whether
relationship of landlord and tenant exists and not the
question of title to the properties in question, which may
be incidentally gone into, but cannot be decided finally in
the eviction proceeding.””
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, no further discussions need ensue on the title of the suit
property to finally decide it. Consequently, the requirement of
filing documents by the Respondent No.3, as depicted in I.A.
No.8 of 2019, does not arise. Neither are the documents sought
to be filed by the Appellant under I.A.5 of 2017 and I.A.7 of
2018, necessary or relevant. The Appellant cannot, in view of
the foregoing discussions, be tainted with the brush of a
trespasser, and the ambiguous stand adopted by the Respondent
No.1, on this point, finds no foothold. The finding of the learned
trial Court that “the defendant No.2 cannot use and occupy the
suit premises unless expressly consented in written or oral by
the
plaintiff”
in
my
considered
opinion,
is
an
erroneous
conclusion in view of the afore discussed provisions of law. In
conclusion, considering the action of both the Appellant and the
Respondent No.1, it cannot, but be concluded that jural
relationship exists between the Respondent No.1 and the
Appellant, which answers the first question.
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
28.
While addressing the second question formulated
hereinabove i.e. “Whether the suit premises were required by
the Respondent No.1 for his “personal occupation” as envisaged
in Notification No.6326—600-H&W—B of the Health and Works
Department, Government of Sikkim, dated 14.04.1949?,” it is
essential to reproduce the relevant provisions of the Notification
of 1949 which reads as hereunder;
”GOVERNMENT OF SIKKIM
Health and Works Department
Notification No.6326—600-H&W—B.
Under powers conferred in para 2 of Notification
No.1366-G, dated the 28th July 1947, the following Rules
have been framed to regulate letting and sub-letting of
premises controlling rents thereof and unreasonable eviction
of tenants as the scarcity of housing accommodation still
exists in Sikkim.
I The landlords can charge rent for premises either for
residential or business purposes on the basis of the rents
prevailing in locality in year 1939, plus an increase upto 50
per cent so long as the scarcity of housing accommodation
lasts.
2. The landlords cannot eject the tenants so long as the
scarcity of housing accommodation lasts, but when the
whole or part of the premises are required for their personal
occupation or for thorough overhauling the premises or on
failure by the tenants to pay rent for four months the
landlords may be permitted to evict the tenant on due
application to the Chief Court.
3- Any tenant may apply to this Department for fixing
his rent. On receipt of such application the Department will
enquire about the rent prevailing in the locality in 1939, and
fix rent as per Rule (I) above.
4- Any person acting in contravention of this Notification
will be liable to prosecution under para. 4. of notification
No.I366-066-G, dated the 28th July, 1947.
5. The tenant means those person in actual occupation.
Landlord means owners of the premises.
These rules will come into force with immediate effect.
By order of his Highness the Maharaja of Sikkim.
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
R.B. Singh
Gangtok,
The 14th, April, 1949.
Secretary,
Health and Works Department;
Government of Sikkim.”
(emphasis supplied)
29.
The
Notification
inter
alia
seeks
to
regulate
unreasonable eviction of tenants so long as the scarcity of
housing accommodation still exists in Sikkim. As per the
Notification, “Landlords means owners of the premises,” and
“The tenant means those person(sic) in actual occupation.” In
view of the discussions that have ensued in Question No.1, it
cannot be disputed that the Respondent No.1 is the owner of
the premises and thus the landlord, while the position of the
Appellant as the tenant, thereby remains undisputed. The
Notification enumerates three grounds for the eviction of a
tenant; (i) personal occupation of the landlord; (ii) thorough
overhauling of the premises; and (iii) failure by the tenants to
pay rent for four months. We may notice that the Notification
mandates that there cannot be unreasonable eviction of tenants
as the scarcity of “housing accommodation” exists in Sikkim. It
would pertinently be questioned as to whether running a School
in
tenanted
tantamount
premises
to
for
“housing
business
purposes
accommodation.”
would
Stroud’s
also
Judicial
Dictionary of Words and Phrases, Fifth Edition by John S. James,
Volume 2 D-H at page No.1188 explains the meaning of “house”
inter alia as follows;
“(12) (Public Health (London) Act 1891 (c.76),
s.141), “„house‟ includes schools, also factories and other
buildings in which persons are employed”; a building
used by day for religious exercises, and by night as a
refuge for the destitute, but which contained sleeping
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
accommodation, was a “house” within s.2(1)(e) of that
Act (R. v. Mead, 64 L.J.M.C. 108).”
30.
The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in The Tata Engineering
And Locomotive Company Ltd. v. The Gram Panchayat, Pimpri
Waghere11 inter alia held that;
“20. The weight of judicial opinion is conclusively
in favour of the view that the word “house” extends to a
building which is used for business and should not be
restricted to a mere dwelling house (see Land Law, Cases
and Materials by R.H. Mandsley and E.H. Burn, Third
Edition, p.832).”
Besides the dictionary meaning and judicial opinion supra, while
perusing the Notification of 1949, paragraph I of the Notification
mentions that “landlords can charge rent for premises either for
residential or “business purposes” on the basis of the rents
prevailing in locality in year 1939, (sic) plus an increase upto 50
per cent so long as the scarcity of housing accommodation
lasts.” Thus, the answer to the question is found in the
Notification itself, which conclusively includes accommodation
used for „business purposes‟ as also „housing accommodation.‟
31.
That having been settled, it is now essential to
examine what “personal occupation” would include. While citing
the decision in Paul Sangay‟s case (supra), it was contended by
learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant at great length, that the
ratio interprets the said term as accommodation which is needed
directly and substantially for occupation of the landlord and is
narrower in scope than “bona fide occupation” which has already
been detailed in his arguments. Pausing here for a moment, it
(1976) 4 SCC 177
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
may be noticed that the Judgment also records that the Court is
aware of the long catena of cases of the different High Courts
construing the expression “landlord” or “for the occupation of the
landlord” or “his own occupation” and after referring to the
Judgments of several High Courts, concluded that;
“20. I can understand that if the enactment in
question providing for ejectment of tenants on the ground
of a requirement of the landlord uses the expression
“occupation of the landlord” or “his own occupation” or
other similar expressions referring to the landlord only,
like the enactments which were considered and construed
by the Calcutta High Court in Pushpalata's case and the
Patna High Court in Bidhu Bhusan's case, and the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in Balaiah's case, such expressions
may be required to be construed as not applying strictly
or exclusively to the landlord himself, but as including his
family or dependents or other normal emanations. …”
The Court observed that as the Gangtok Rent Control and
Eviction Act, 1956, uses both the expressions “landlord” and
also “his dependents,” it would neither be proper nor be
permissible to allow the expression “landlord” to expand and
emanate indefinitely and thus to include members of his family
or any other person, whether dependent upon him or not. The
Court was of the opinion that this would amount to adding
words to the provisions of the enactment and thus to redraft the
same. The Court went on to hold that it was not shown by any
clear or clinching evidence that the two sons of the Plaintiff
therein were also his dependents. Thereafter taking into
consideration the evidence on record, the Court held that it is
not the case of the plaintiff at any stage that he requires the
suit-premises as he genuinely intends to establish his sons in
business but his case all-through was that his sons have said
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
that they want to start separate and independent business and
the suit-premises are necessary therefor. The two sons were not
examined during trial. The learned Court was of the view that
unless both the sons of the Plaintiff step into the witness box,
the Plaintiff‟s case fails. Before parting with the case, the Court
went on to observe as hereinbelow;
“27. ... As I have already pointed out at the out-
set, I have proceeded on the basis that the Gangtok Rent
Control and Eviction Act, 1956 applies to this case. I have
also pointed out that this Court has both in Jokhiram's
case (1977-1 Sikkim LJ 30) and in Sakuntala Bai's
case (1977-1 Sikkim LJ 33) held that even if the said Act
of 1956 is not applicable, the suit for eviction of tenants
would be governed by the provisions of law contained in
the Notification No. 6326-600/H&WB, dated 14th Apr.
1949 and that the provisions of law as contained in the
said notification are also more or less similar. But I
should, however, point out that in Para. 2 of the
Notification of 1949, the ground of ejectment is
requirement of the premises for the “personal occupation”
of the landlord, while as I have already noted, under the
Act of 1956 the ground of ejectment is requirement of the
premises for the bona fide occupation of the landlord or
his dependents. I have already pointed out, relying on the
Supreme Court case of D.N. Sangavi v. A.T. Das (AIR
1974 SC 1026), that the expression “personal
occupation”
must
connote
the
idea
that
the
accommodation is needed directly and substantially for
the occupation of the landlord and I have already pointed
out hereinbefore that even if the occupation of the suitpremises was necessary for starting independent business
for the two sons, that would not have been a case of
requirement “for the personal “occupation” of the
landlord”. That being so, the plaintiff‟s claim for
ejectment of the tenant must also fail even if the
provisions of law contained in the aforesaid Notification
of 1949 were to apply to this case.”
(emphasis supplied)
Since the Judgment supra was dealing with the Gangtok Rent
Control and Eviction Act 1 of 1956, the Court was differentiating
between what „landlord‟ and „his dependents,‟ in the context of
the Act entailed, as already extracted supra. At best the remarks
made in the concluding portion of Paragraph 27 of the Judgment
referring to the Notification of 1949, which is highlighted, is
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
obiter dictum and the Appellant can obtain no benefit from this
observation whatsoever. Besides, it may pertinently be pointed
out that it is no more res integra that a landlord cannot be nonsuited for the purpose that he failed to examine his family
member who intends to do business in the required premises.
32.
In this context, it would be appropriate to refer to
the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mehmooda Gulshan
v. Javaid Hussain Mungloo12 wherein the Hon'ble Court was taking
into consideration an Appeal under Section (11)(i)(h) of the
Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shop Rent Control Act, 1966,
which reads as follows;
“11.(1)(h) where the house or shop is reasonably
required by the landlord either for the purposes of
building or re-building, or his own occupation or for the
occupation of any person for whose benefit the house or
shop is held.”
(emphasis supplied)
Allowing the Appeal of the landlady, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
inter alia held as follows;
“12. We fail to understand the approach made by
the High Court. It has clearly come in evidence of the
appellant that her one son is unemployed and in view of
unemployment, he was frustrated. The appellant's
husband had contracted second marriage and he had
deserted the appellant. The appellant herself was
unemployed with no source of income. The appellant,
hence, prayed that the property be returned to her so
that her son can look after the family. In crossexamination, she denied the suggestion that the son was
doing business with his father. It had also been stated
further that “except the premises and the residential
house, the plaintiff has no other property”. The trial court
has meticulously analysed and appreciated the reasonable
requirement of the premises for the business to be
(2017) 5 SCC 683
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
managed by the son of the appellant especially in her
peculiar family circumstances. In our view, the trial court
has appreciated the evidence in the right perspective and
held that it is not mere desire but genuine need. The
finding of the trial court was challenged mainly on the
ground that the son, for whose benefit the eviction is
sought, has not been examined.
13. Mere non-examination of the family member
who intends to do the business cannot be taken as a
ground for repelling the reasonable requirement of the
landlord. Under the Act, the landlord needs to establish
only a reasonable requirement. No doubt, it is not a
simple desire. It must be a genuine need. Whether the
requirement is based on a desire or need, will depend on
the facts of each case.
......................................................................................”
33.
With regard to the term “personal occupation,” in
Mst. Bega Begum and Others v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by L.Rs and
others13
the
Hon'ble
Supreme
Court
was
considering
the
provisions of Section 11(1)(h) of the Jammu and Kashmir
Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966. The landlords sought
eviction on the grounds that they required to extend their
business by running a hotel business themselves. The learned
trial Court dismissed the suit of the Plaintiffs which was
confirmed by the Hon‟ble High Court of Jammu and Kashmir on
grounds that the Plaintiffs had not proved their “personal
necessity.” Allowing the Appeal, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held
that the words “reasonable requirement” in sub-section 11(h) of
the Act postulates that there must be an element of need as
opposed to a mere desire or wish and concluded as follows;
“13. Moreover, Section 11(h) of the Act uses the
words „reasonable requirement‟ which undoubtedly
postulate that there must be an element of need as
opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction
between desire and need should doubtless be kept in
mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as
nothing but a desire as the High Court has done in this
case. It seems to us that the connotation of the term
(1979) 1 SCC 273
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
„need‟ or „requirement‟ should not be artificially extended
nor its language so unduly stretched or strained as to
make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord
to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat
the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of
eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified
grounds. This appears to us to be the general scheme of
all the Rent Control Acts prevalent in other States in the
country. This Court has considered the import of the
word „requirement‟ and pointed out that it merely
connotes that there should be an element of need.
……………………………………………………………………………………………
19. Having regard, therefore, to the circumstances
mentioned above, we are unable to subscribe to the view
that the words “own occupation” must be so narrowly
interpreted so as to indicate actual physical possession of
the landlord personally and nothing short of that. We,
therefore, overrule the argument of the respondents on
this point.”
(emphasis supplied)
It was reasoned that if the Plaintiff‟s (landlords) found that their
present business had become dull and was not yielding sufficient
income to maintain themselves and it was necessary to occupy
the house as to run a hotel business, it cannot by any stretch of
imagination be said that the plaintiffs had merely a desire rather
than a bona fide need for evicting the tenants.
34.
In Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal14, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court while interpreting “own use,” inter alia concluded
that;
“33. Our conclusions are crystallised as under:
(i) The words “for his own use” as occurring in
Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent
Restriction Act, 1949 must receive a wide, liberal and
useful meaning rather than a strict or narrow
construction.
(ii) The expression—landlord requires for “his own
use”, is not confined in its meaning to actual physical
user by the landlord personally. The requirement not
only of the landlord himself but also of the normal
“emanations” of the landlord is included therein. All the
cases and circumstances in which actual physical
occupation or user by someone else, would amount to
occupation or user by the landlord himself, cannot be
(2002) 5 SCC 397
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
exhaustively enumerated. It will depend on a variety of
factors such as interrelationship and interdependence —
economic or otherwise, between the landlord and such
person in the background of social, socio-religious and
local customs and obligations of the society or region to
which they belong.
(iii) The tests to be applied are: (i) whether the
requirement pleaded and proved may properly be
regarded as the landlord's own requirement; and, (ii)
whether on the facts and in the circumstances of a given
case, actual occupation and user by a person other than
the landlord would be deemed by the landlord as “his
own” occupation or user. The answer would, in its turn,
depend on (i) the nature and degree of relationship
and/or dependence between the landlord pleading the
requirement as “his own” and the person who would
actually use the premises; (ii) the circumstances in
which the claim arises and is put forward; and (iii) the
intrinsic tenability of the claim. The court on being
satisfied of the reasonability and genuineness of claim,
as distinguished from a mere ruse to get rid of the
tenant, will uphold the landlord's claim.
(iv) While casting its judicial verdict, the court shall
adopt a practical and meaningful approach guided by the
realities of life.
(v) In the present case, the requirement of the
landlord of the suit premises for user as office of his
chartered accountant son is the requirement of landlord
“for his own use” within the meaning of Section
13(3)(a)(ii).”
(emphasis supplied)
35.
In the same vein, in Kailash Chand and Another v.
Dharam Dass15 an application seeking an order of eviction under
Section 14(3)(a)(i) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control
Act, 1987 (hereinafter the “Act”) was allowed by the Rent
Controller and the tenant was ordered to be evicted. The order
was maintained in Appeal by the Appellate Authority. The
Hon'ble High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside
the order of eviction. Before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, the
aggrieved landlords urged that the residential accommodation on
the first floor which was in occupation of the tenants was
required by them to accommodate their large family. The
Hon‟ble Supreme Court, set aside the Order of the Hon‟ble High
(2005) 5 SCC 375
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
Court and upholding that of the Rent Controller and the
Appellate
Authority,
dealt
with
the
expression
“his
own
occupation” and inter alia observed as follows;
“24. The expression “his own occupation” as
occurring in sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of sub-section
(3) is not to be assigned a narrow meaning. It has to be
read liberally and given a practical meaning. “His own
occupation” does not mean occupation by the landlord
alone and as an individual. The expressions “for his own
use” and “for occupation by himself” as occurring in two
other Rent Control Acts, have come up for the
consideration of this Court in Joginder Pal v. Naval
Kishore Behal16and Dwarkaprasad v. Niranjan17. It was
held that the requirement of members of the family of
the landlord or of the one who is dependent on the
landlord, is the landlord's own requirement. Regard will
be had to the social or socio-religious milieu and
practices prevalent in a particular section of society or a
particular region to which the landlord belongs, while
interpreting such expressions. The requirement of the
family
members
for
residence
is
certainly
the
requirement by the landlord for “his own occupation” .
(emphasis supplied)
36.
others18,
In Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel and
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court considered the terms
reasonable and bona fide requirement in the Bombay Rents,
Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (57 of 1947) and
inter alia held as follows;
“7. Now, the decision of the District Judge was
based on two findings recorded by him in favour of the
appellant. One was that the appellant reasonably and
bona fide required the ground floor premises for his own
use and occupation, and the other was that greater
hardship would not be caused to the first respondent by
passing a decree for eviction than what would be caused
to the appellant by refusing to pass it. Both these findings
were interfered with by the High Court and the question is
whether the High Court was within its power in doing so.
Taking up first for consideration the finding that the
appellant reasonably and bona fide required the ground
floor premises for his own use and occupation, it may be
pointed out straight away that this finding was clearly one
of fact. The District Judge did not misdirect himself in
(2002) 5 SCC 397
(2003) 4 SCC 549
AIR 1974 SC 1059
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
regard to the true meaning of the word “requires” in
Section 13(1)(g) and interpreted it correctly to mean that
there must be an element of need before a landlord can
be said to “require” premises for his own use and
occupation. It is not enough that the landlord should
merely desire to use and occupy the premises. What is
necessary is that he should need them for his own use
and occupation. This was the correct test applied by the
District Judge to the facts found by him. If he had applied
a wrong test on a misconstruction of the word “requires”,
the finding recorded by him would have been vitiated by
an error of law. But the correct test having been applied,
the finding of the District Judge that the appellant
reasonably and bona fide required the ground floor
premises for his own use and occupation was
unquestionably a finding of fact and it was not competent
to the High Court, in the exercise of its revisional power
under Section 29, sub-section (3), to interfere with this
finding by reappreciating the evidence. …”
37.
The plethora of decisions interpreting the terms “for
himself,” “for his own occupation,” “by himself,” “for his own
use,” are all, in my considered opinion, to be construed as
“personal occupation of the landlord.” “Personal occupation”
would, therefore, on the cornerstone of the ratiocinations supra,
include not only the landlord but all normal emanations of the
landlord, including his dependents and kith and kin, while also
duly considering the social milieu in the Indian context and
cannot be constricted only to the landlord. Thus, the intention of
the enactment is not to deprive the landlord of his premises
when it is indeed required for his personal occupation, be it for
himself or anyone dependent on him. The interpretation of these
words „personal occupation‟ as emanates in the Notification of
1949, would therefore be covered by the umbrella of the
interpretations supra. The argument of learned Senior Counsel
for the Appellant that the Respondent No.1 is well to do, has
sufficient property whereby he derives sufficient income, is of no
consequence. In any event, no evidence was led by the
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
Appellant to establish ownership of property and sufficiency of
income thereof. Further, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has inter
alia held in Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. v. Vimalabai
Prabhulal and Others19 as follows;
“4. … It is true that the landlords have their
business spreading over Chennai and Hyderabad and if
they wanted to expand their business at Calicut it cannot
be said to be unnatural thereby denying the eviction of
the tenant from the premises in question. It is always the
prerogative of the landlord that if he requires the
premises in question for his bona fide use for expansion
of business this is no ground to say that the landlords are
already having their business at Chennai and Hyderabad
therefore, it is not genuine need. It is not the tenant who
can dictate the terms to the landlord and advise him
what he should do and what he should not. It is always
the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature of the
business and the place of business. However, the Trial
Court held in favour of the tenant-appellant. But the
appellate court as well as the High Court after scrutinizing
the evidence on record reversed the finding of the trial
court and held that the need of establishing the business
at Calicut by the landlords cannot be said to be lacking in
bona fides.”
(emphasis supplied)
38.
Thus, as observed in the Judgment supra it is always
the prerogative of the landlord that if he requires the premises in
question for his bona fide use for expansion of business, the
tenants cannot be heard to say that the landlords already have
their business at other places. The tenant cannot dictate terms
to the landlord and advise him about what he should do and
what he should not. It is for the landlord to choose the nature
and place of business, as also earlier held in Mst. Begum and
Others supra. Although learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant
sought to make it appear as though the learned trial Court had
arrived at the finding that the Appellant required the premises
(2005) 8 SCC 252
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
for his personal occupation, on account of his hypertension and
backache but on a reading of the Judgment, it is clear that the
learned trial Court while considering “personal occupation” held
that the suit property is required for “the bonafide reason for the
“personal occupation” of the plaintiff, i.e., for the establishment
of hotel business at the fag end of his life for his livelihood.” On
this point, the finding of the learned trial Court cannot be
faulted.
39.
The contention of the Appellant that the terms
“personal occupation” and “bona fide requirement” are neither
synonymous nor interchangeable, also appears to be a rather
restricted view of the matter, since the two terms cannot be
ensconed into water tight compartments completely isolated
from each other. When a personal necessity arises then
essentially a bona fide requirement is also to be proved. This
would be evident from a reading of the Judgment of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court in Mst. Bega Begum and Others supra, wherein,
while discussing “personal necessity,” it has been stated that the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court was in disagreement with the finding of
the Hon‟ble High Court that the Plaintiffs had not proved that
they had any bona fide need for occupation of the building in
question. Further, in Kailash Chand and Another supra, the words
were used together inasmuch as it was held as follows;
“25. ………Take the case of a landlord knocking the
doors of the court seeking its assistance for a roof over
his head or for a reasonably comfortable living, when he
is himself either in a rented accommodation or squeezing
himself and his family members in a limited space, while
the tenant protected by the rent control law is
comfortably occupying the premises of the landlord or a
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
part thereof. Provisions like Section 14(3)(a)(i) of the Act
should be so interpreted as to advance the cause of justice
instructed by the realities of life and practical wisdom. While
the tenant needs to be protected, the courts would not
ordinarily deny the relief to the landlord, who genuinely
and bona fide requires the premises in occupation of the
tenant for occupation by himself or for the members of
his family, unless they feel convinced that the so-called
requirement of the landlord was a ruse for getting rid of
an inconvenient tenant or was otherwise mala fide and
did not fall within the four corners of the ground for
eviction provided by the law.”
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, where personal necessity arises, bona fide requirement is
to be established along with an element of need as opposed to
desire. In order to prove bona fide requirement, the Respondent
No.1 herein entered the dock before the learned trial Court and
deposed that he is 50 years of age and suffering from various
physical ailments and therefore decided to purchase the suit
property along with other attached properties to develop the
same into a hotel complex. These facts went undecimated in
cross-examination. It is thus concluded that the Respondent
No.1 has proved that the premises were required for his personal
occupation which also includes occupation for business purposes.
40.
Coming to Question No.3 formulated hereinabove i.e.
“Whether the finding of the learned trial Court with regard to
arrears of rent to be paid by the Appellant to the Respondent
No.1 from the month of April, 2012 till the filing of the Suit,
despite concluding absence of default in rent payment, was
correct?,” the finding of the learned trial Court on Issue No.2 has
already been extracted hereinabove. The learned trial Court has
held that there was no wilful default of rent on the part of the
Appellant. It is further stated that the arrears of rent is to be
paid from April, 2012 till disposal of the case. In the first
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
instance, the Notification of 1949 nowhere provides for “willful
default,” the words discussed at length by the learned trial Court
is alien to the Notification of 1949, under discussion herein. It
specifically provides only for “failure by the tenants to pay rent
for four months” and bears no qualifying term such as “wilful.” It
is essential to remark here that the Notification does not specify
that the four months are to be in continuation. Be that as it may,
since this point has not been raised before this Court, it requires
no discussion. It is now appropriate to consider whether there
was default in rent payment and thereby arrears of rent. Exbt.
2/S, the rent receipts reveal that rent was received by the
Respondent No.4 for the months of December 2005, January
2006, February 2006, April 2006 to December 2006, January
2007 to December 2007, January 2008 to December 2008,
January 2009 to December 2009 and January 2011 to October,
2011. Exhibit 2/T which are Money Order Acknowledgment Cards
reveal that it was sent by the Appellant School to the
Respondent No.4 for the months of December 2011 which was
refused by her. Thereafter rent appears to have been sent for
the month of January, 2012 which was also refused by the payee
and returned to sender. This continued for the months of
February, 2012 to February, 2013. From March 2013, it was
addressed to the Respondent No.1. Thus, the documents speak
for themselves. Hence, there was no default in payment of rent
at any point in time but on the refusal of the Respondent No.1 to
accept the rent and in view of the continuing occupation of the
Appellant of the suit premises, arrears of rent have accrued. The
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
finding of the learned trial Court that the arrears of rent from
April, 2012 appears to be erroneous in view of the documentary
evidence
on
record.
The
arrears,
evidently
accrues
from
December, 2011. Thus, the finding of the learned trial Court that
there was no default of rent on the part of the Defendants, is not
erroneous except that the word “wilful” has been erroneously
employed. The finding that the Respondent No. 1 was entitled to
recover the arrears of rent, is also not erroneous. The finding of
the learned trial Court that the Respondent No.1 cannot take the
benefit of the Lease Deed, Exhibit 1 which had already expired,
is also not erroneous, in view of the detailed discussions in
Question No.1 supra.
41.
With
regard
to
the
last
question
formulated
hereinabove i.e. “Whether the learned trial Court ought to have
allowed validation of the Lease Deed in terms of Notification
No.2947/G dated 22.11.1946?,” it is an admitted position that
the Lease Deed was entered into on 23.03.1996 and determined
on 23.03.2001. As discussed supra in Question No.1, the
provisions of the T.P. Act fell into place. Neither the Respondent
No.1 nor the Appellant were the original parties to the Lease
Deed. The Notification No.2947/G dated 22.11.1946 reads as
follows;
“SIKKIM STATE
GENERAL DEPARTMENT
Notification No. 2947/G
Amendment of para 2 of Notification No: 385/G dated the
11th April, 1928.
An unregistered document (which ought in the
opinion of the court to have been registered) may
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
however be validated and admitted in court to prove title
or other matters contained in the document on payment
of a penalty upto fifty times the usual registration fee.
Issued by order of H.H. the Maharaja of Sikkim.
Gangtok
The 22nd Nov., 46
T. Tsering
(Offs) General Secretary to
H.H. The Maharaja of Sikkim.
Copy of memo No. 2553/C&F dated the 18th Sept.,
1949, from the Dewan, Sikkim State to the Tahasildar,
East Sikkim.
A copy of Rule regarding registration of document
(1930) is sent herewith.
The seals of registration fees is one rupee fee every
Rs.100/- or fraction thereof on the value of property or
properties.”
How validation of the document would have helped the case of
the Appellant is beyond comprehension.
42.
So far as I.A. No.05 of 2017, I.A. No.07 of 2018 and
I.A. No.08 of 2019 are concerned, since the matters pertaining
to title cannot be taken up in an Eviction Suit and since all the
documents sought to be filed by the parties vide the I.As pertain
to title, I am of the considered opinion that it is not necessary
for a just decision in the matter. I.A. No.05 of 2017, I.A. No.07
of 2018 and I.A. No.08 of 2019 stand rejected and disposed of
accordingly.
43.
In the end result, it is ordered as follows;
(i)
the Appellant shall vacate the suit premises within
six months from today and hand over vacant
possession to the Respondent No.1;
(ii) the Respondent No. 1 is entitled to arrears of rent
from December, 2011 till the Appellant vacates the
suit property in terms of the orders supra;
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
(iii) the amount of rent deposited by the Appellant with
effect from September, 2016 till August, 2019 in
terms of the undertaking given by the Appellant on
28.10.2016, in the State Bank of Sikkim Account
bearing No.502672, maintained in the name of the
Registrar General, High Court of Sikkim, be released
to the Respondent No.1 with the interest accrued on
the deposit, if any; and
(iv) the sum of Rs.6,84,000/- (Rupees six lakhs and
eighty four thousand) only, (along with the interest
accrued on the deposit, if any), deposited vide
Cheque of the IDBI Bank bearing No.035162, dated
28.09.2016, by the Appellant, in compliance of the
Orders
of
this
Court,
dated
22.09.2016,
and
presently deposited in the State Bank of Sikkim
Account bearing No.502672, maintained in the name
of the Registrar General, High Court of Sikkim, also
be released to the Respondent No.1. This shall be on
completion of the period of Appeal.
44.
Appeal dismissed.
45.
Cross Objection allowed to the extent as discussed
hereinabove.
46.
Copy of this Judgment be sent to the learned trial
Court for information.
47.
In the circumstances, no order as to costs.
RFA No.09 of 2016 and CO No.01 of 2016
Joy Bells School Authority vs. Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon and Others
and
Tsewang Gyatso Kaleon vs. Joy Bells School Authority and Others
48.
Records of the learned trial Court be remitted
forthwith.
( Meenakshi Madan Rai )
Judge
31.08.2019
ml
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