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SHAMURAILATPAM
SUSHIL SHARMA
SHAMURAILATPAM SUSHIL SHARMA
Date: 2023.04.21 11:59:00 +05'30'
Page |1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
WP(C) No. 818 of 2019
1. Shri Jonah Chawang aged about 49 years, S/o
Huriangbou
Chawang,
R/o
Tapon
Naga
Village, Irang Part –II, P.O T. Waichong, PS
Kangpokpi, Kangpokpi District, Manipur 795112.
2. Shri Charenamai Wisobou @ Ch. Tithobou
aged about 50 years, S/o Ch. Apingbou, R/o
Chawangkining Village, Irang Part –I, P.O &
PS Kangpokpi, Kangpokpi District, Manipur –
795129.
…Petitioners
-Versus-
1. State of Manipur, Rep. by Additional Chief
Secretary
(TA
&
Hills),
Government
of
Manipur, Secretariat Building, Babupara PO &
PS Imphal, Imphal West District, Manipur 795001.
2. Secretary (Law), Government of Manipur,
Secretariat Building, Babupara PO & PS
Imphal, Imphal West District, Manipur –
795001.
3. Manipur State Election Commission, Rep. by
its Chief Electoral Officer, Government of
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
Page |2
Manipur, PO & PS Lamphel, Imphal West
District, Manipur – 795004.
4. Shri Sagar Gewali Member of Irang Part – I
District Council Constituency, Sardar Hills
(Kangpokpi) Autonomous District Council, R/o
9-Miles Paodel Basti, P.O & PS Kangpokpi,
Kangpokpi District, Manipur – 795129.
5. Shri Bhumi Prasad Basnet Member of Irang
Part – II District Council Constituency, Sardar
Hills (Kangpokpi) Autonomous District Council,
R/o Toribari, P.O & PS Kangpokpi, Kangpokpi
District, Manipur – 795129.
….Respondents
BEFORE
HON’BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M.V. MURALIDARAN
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A. GUNESHWAR SHARMA
For the Petitioner
::
Mr. D. Julius Riamei, Advocate
For the Respondents
::
Mr. Lenin Hijam, AG
Mr. Anjan Prasad Sahu, Advocate
Date of Hearing and
reserving Judgment & Order ::
30.03.2023
Date of Judgment & Order
17.04.2023
::
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
(CAV)
(M.V. Muralidaran, Acting CJ)
This writ petition has been filed by the petitioners for
issuance of a writ of declaration declaring the word “an elector”
in Section 7 of the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Council Act, 1971
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
Page |3
shall mean “an elector belonging to a Scheduled Tribe” and/or to
issue a writ of certiorari quashing Section 7 of the Manipur (Hill
Areas) District Council Act, 1971 only to the extent that the word
“a Scheduled Tribe and” is not inserted between the words “…
unless he is …” and “… an elector …”.
2.
Brief facts are as follows:
The petitioners are residents and electors of Tapon
Naga Village and Chawangkining Village respectively and belong
to Scheduled Tribes and both the petitioners falls under the Outer
Manipur Lok Sabha Constituency. The petitioners rights and
privileges are affected, infringed and violated by the ambiguity in
the meaning and language of Section 7 of the Manipur (Hill
Areas) District Council Act, 1971 (for short, “the Act of 1971”).
Due to the ambiguity in the meaning and language of Section 7
of the Act of 1971 in 3–Irang Part-I and 5-Irang Part-II District
Council
Constituency
under
Kangpokpi
(Sardar
Hills)
Autonomous District Council, the constituencies to which the
petitioners belong, the respondents 4 and 5, who are not
Scheduled Tribes electors contested and were elected as
members of the District Council in the last election held in the
year 2015.
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
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2.1.
The Act of 1971 is meant only for the “Hill Areas” of
Manipur. The entire scheme and object and purpose of the Act
is for the protection, welfare, benefits and administration of the
Scheduled Tribes in the Hill Districts of Manipur. The Act of 1971
was enacted by the Parliament with a sole objective that tribals
in Hill Districts of Manipur can participate in the development of
the area as local autonomous Government. Allowing a person
who does not belong to a Scheduled Tribe to be Member of a
District Council under the Act of 1971 defeats the purpose of the
Act and in contrary to the objective sought to be achieved by the
enactment of the Parliament.
2.2.
The respondents 4 and 5 who belong to Nepalese
(Gurkhas) community are never a Scheduled Tribe nor an
indigenous inhabitants of the State of Manipur let alone the Hill
District of Manipur. The Nepalese community never wanted to
part of the administration or local governing of Hill Districts.
Thus, the ambiguity created by the language of Section 7 of the
Act of 1971 is arbitrary, violative of the doctrine of equality or level
playing field envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution of
India.
2.3.
The election of a non-Scheduled Tribe as members
of Sardar Hills (Kangpokpi) Autonomous District Councils from
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
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Irang Part-I where the second petitioner is an elector and illegible
to be elected as member of the District Council and Irang Part-II
to which the first petitioner is an elector and illegible to be elected
as member of District Council infringe the rights and privileges of
the petitioners. Hence, the petitioners have filed this writ petition
with the relief stated supra.
3.
The first respondent filed affidavit-in-opposition
stating that Section 7 of the Act of 1971 provides that a person
shall not be qualified to be chosen as a Member of a District
Council of any Autonomous District unless he is an elector for
any District Council Constituency in that Autonomous District
Council. Therefore, Section 7 of the Act of 1971 allows a person
who is registered in the electoral roll of the Constituency to be
qualified to be chosen as Member of a District Council
Constituency in that Autonomous District Council. Section 9(1)
of the Act of 1971 provides that persons entitled to vote at
elections of Members of a District Council shall be the persons
entitled, by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution of India and
the Representation of People Act, 1950 to be registered as voters
at elections to the House of the People. Therefore, the rights and
privileges of the petitioners is not affected, infringed and violated
as the petitioners are eligible to be chosen as Member in the
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
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Autonomous District Council Constituency in that Autonomous
District Council. Hence, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
4.
The petitioners filed a rejoinder stating that the
Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act of 1971 would
clearly meant that the special legislation is exclusively for the
welfare of the tribal people. The Nepalis (Gorkhas) or any other
non-tribal community though may be living in any parts of the Hill
Areas of Manipur not an indigenous of the State of Manipur let
alone the hill areas of Manipur. The Fifth Amendment provides
for nomination of the Members to the Autonomous District
Councils from amongst the unrepresented Tribes or Tribal
Community as some Tribal Community has very less in number
to have its representatives through democratic process.
5.
Mr. D. Julius Riamei, the learned counsel for the
petitioners submitted that due to the ambiguity in the meaning
and language of Section 7 of the Act of 1971, the constituencies
to which the petitioners belong, the respondents 4 and 5 who are
not Scheduled Tribe electors contested and were elected as
members of the District Council in the last election held in the
year 2015.
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
Page |7
6.
Drawing the attention of this Court to the
Parliamentary debates in Rajya Sabha at the introduction of the
Bill; Presidential order proclaimed under Article 371-C of the
Constitution of India and the List of Scheduled Tribes in Manipur,
Mr. Julius Riamei, the learned counsel for the petitioners would
submit that the Act of 1971 is meant only for the Hill Areas of
Manipur and the entire schemes, object and purpose of the Act
is for the protection, welfare, benefits and administration of the
Scheduled Tribes in the Hill Districts of Manipur.
7.
The learned counsel further submitted that the Act
of 1971 was enacted by the Parliament with a sole objective that
tribals in Hill Districts of Manipur can participate in the
development of the area as local autonomous Government and
allowing a person who does not belong to a Scheduled Tribe to
be a member of the District Council under the Act of 1971 defeats
the purpose of the Act and it is contrary to the objective sought
to be achieved by the enactment of the Parliament.
8.
The learned counsel for the petitioners added that
the respondents 4 and 5 who belong to Nepalese community are
never Scheduled Tribes nor an indigenous inhabitants of the
State of Manipur.
Therefore, the ambiguity created by the
language of Section 7 of the Act of 1971 is arbitrary and violative
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
Page |8
of the doctrine of equality or level playing field envisaged under
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
9.
The learned counsel for the petitioners then
submitted that the election of a non-Scheduled Tribe as members
of Sardar Hills (Kangpokpi) Autonomous District Councils from
Irang Part-I where the second respondent is an elector and
illegible to be elected as member of the District Council and Irang
Part-II to which the first petitioner is an elector and illegible to be
elected as member of the District Council infringe the rights and
privileges of the petitioners.
10.
Adding further, the learned counsel for the
petitioners submitted that any candidate whose name is on the
roll should be understood / interpreted as tribal candidate.
Otherwise the clause will be ultra vires the constitutional
provisions providing for preservation and protection of the
interest of tribal people in the hill areas of Manipur and the
objects and intent of the special enactment gets defeated. If the
meaning of the statute is ambiguous, the intent of the legislature
must be gathered from the constitutional objective it seeks to
achieve. If it is meant to be read as any candidate including the
general candidate, then the object of the constitution sought to
be achieved will be nullified. It will also attract the mischief of the
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
Page |9
colourable legislation meaning thereby what cannot be done
directly cannot be done indirectly. If by virtue of being a resident
of the schedule area/hill area, a general candidate can contest
general election then he is doing indirectly which cannot be done
directly. If at all it is deemed necessary to have them represented
for want of adequate representation, it can be done by way of
nomination, but not by entitling them to contest ADC election.
11.
Arguing further, the learned counsel submitted that
the doctrine of equality will not mean treating unequal as equal.
Therefore, the word “an elector” appeared in Section 7 of the Act
of 1971 shall mean “an elector belonging to a Scheduled Tribes”
and prayed for a declaration as sought in the writ petition. In
support, the learned counsel relied upon the following decisions:
(i)
Apex Laboratories Private Limited v.
Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax,
Large Tax Payer Unit-II, (2022) 7 SCC 98.
(ii)
Bhag Mal v. Ch. Prabhu Ram and others,
(1985) 1 SCC 61.
(iii)
Sri SriSriK.C.Gajapati Narayan Deo and
others v. State of Orissa, AIR 1953 SC
375.
(iv)
State of Kerala v. Haji K. Haji K. Kutty
Naha and others etc., AIR 1969 SC 378.
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 10
(v)
State of Andhra Pradesh and another v.
Nalla Raja Reddy and others, AIR 1967
SC 1458.
(vi)
Venkateshwara Theatre v. State of
Andhra Pradesh and others, (1993) 3
SCC 677.
(vii)
Tuntanbou Guangta and another v. The
State of Manipur and others, 2017 SCC
OnLine Mani 112.
12.
Per contra, Mr. Lenin Hijam, the learned Advocate
General appearing for the official respondents submitted that
Section 7 of the Act of 1971 provides that a person shall not be
qualified to be chosen as a Member of a District Council of any
Autonomous District unless he is an elector for any District
Council Constituency in that Autonomous District Council.
Therefore, Section 7 of the Act of 1971 allows a person who is
registered in the electoral roll of the constituency to be qualified
to be chosen as member of a District Council Constituency in that
Autonomous District Council.
13.
The learned Advocate General further submitted
that Section 9(1) of the Act of 1971 provides that persons entitled
to vote at elections of Members of a District shall be the persons
entitled, by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution of India and
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 11
the Representation of People Act, 1950 to be registered as voters
at elections to the House of the People. The learned counsel
added that any elector of the District Council constituency in the
Autonomous District can be chosen as Member irrespective of
Scheduled Tribe as per the Act of 1971.
14.
The learned Advocate General urged that the rights
and privileges of the petitioners is not affected, infringed and
violated as the petitioners are eligible to be chosen as Member
in the Autonomous District Council constituency in that
Autonomous District Council. Thus, a prayer has been made to
dismiss the writ petition.
In support, the learned Advocate
General placed reliance upon the following decisions:
(i)
Public
Services
Tribunal
Bar
Association v. State of U.P. and
another, (2003) 4 SCC 104.
(ii) State of Himachal Pradesh and others
v. Satpal Saini, (2017) 11 SCC 42.
(iii) J.P.Bansal v. State of Rajasthan and
another, (2003) 5 SCC 134.
15.
This Court considered the rival submissions and
also perused the materials available on record.
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 12
16.
The petitioners seek declaration to declare the word
“an elector” in Section 7 of the Act of 1971 to mean “an elector
belonging to a Scheduled Tribe” or to quash Section 7 of the Act
of 1971 only the extent that the word “a Scheduled Tribe and” is
not inserted between the word “… unless he is …” and “… an
elector …”.
17.
Section 7 of the Act of 1971 provides:
“7. Qualifications for membership.
A person shall not be qualified to be chosen
as a member of a District Council of any
autonomous district unless he is an elector for
any District Council constituency in that
autonomous district.”
18.
Highlighting the above provision, particularly the
word “elector”, the petitioners contended that their rights and
privileges have been affected by the ambiguity in the meaning
and language of Section 7 of the Act of 1971 and due to the
ambiguity, the constituencies to which the petitioners belong, the
respondents 4 and 5 who are not even Scheduled Tribe electors
contested and were elected as members of the District Council
in the last election held in the year 2015. The petitioners further
contended that the Act of 1971 is meant only for the Hill Areas of
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 13
Manipur and the entire object and purpose of the Act of 1971 is
for the protection and welfare of the Scheduled Tribes in the Hill
Districts of Manipur. Therefore, the word ‘elector’ appearing in
the Section 7 shall be ‘an elector belonging to a Scheduled Tribe’.
19.
Section 2(m) defines “Scheduled Tribes” has the
same meaning assigned to it in Clause (25) of Article 366 of the
Constitution.
20.
The Act of 1971 is to provide for the establishment
of District Councils in the Hill Areas in the Union Territory of
Manipur. Section 2(f) of the Act of 1971 defines “Hill Areas” to
mean the Hill Areas determined by the President by any
notification issued under sub-section (2) of section 52 of the
Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 (20 of 1963), and in
force immediately before the commencement of this Act. The Act
of 1971 is applicable to the State of Manipur even after it ceased
to be a Union Territory.
21.
According to the petitioners, the respondents 4 and
5 belong to Nepalese community and they neither belong to
Scheduled Tribe community nor are indigenous inhabitants of the
State of Manipur, let alone the Hill District of Manipur. Therefore,
the Nepalese community can never be a part of the
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 14
administration or local governing of Hill Districts.
It is also
contended that any candidate whose name is on the roll should
be understood as tribal candidate. Here, the respondents 4 and
5 are Gurkhas (Nepalese) community and they can never be
treated as Scheduled Tribes. However, because of the ambiguity
created by the language employed in Section 7 of the Act of
1971, they were elected as members of the District Council by
virtue of their residing in the Hills Areas. Therefore, the language
of Section 7 of the Act of 1971 is violative of the doctrine of
equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
22.
On the other hand, it is the say of the learned
Advocate General that the constitutional validity can be
challenged only on two grounds, namely (i) lack of legislative
competence; and (ii) violation of any of the fundamental rights
guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution of India or of any other
constitutional provisions. Moreover, the rights and privileges of
the petitioners is not affected, infringed and violated as the
petitioners are eligible to be chosen as member in the
Autonomous District Council constituency in that Autonomous
District Council.
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 15
23.
Before dealing with the factual aspects of the issue
involved, let us deal with the decisions relied upon by learned
counsel for the petitioners:
(1) In Apex laboratories Private Limited,
supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held:
“40. Interpretation of law has two
essential purposes: one is to clarify to
the
people
governed
by
it,
the
meaning of the letter of the law; the
other is to shed light and give shape to
the intent of the lawmaker. And, in this
process the courts' responsibility lies
in discerning the social purpose which
the
specific
provision
subserves.
Thus, the cold letter of the law is not
an abstract exercise in semantics
which practitioners are wont to indulge
in. So viewed the law has birthed
various
ideas
such
as
implied
conditions, unspelt but entirely logical
and reasonable obligations, implied
limitations,
etc.
The
process
of
continuing evolution, refinement and
assimilation of these concepts into
binding norms (within the body of law
as is understood and enforced) injects
vitality and dynamism to statutory
provisions. Without this dynamism
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 16
and contextualisation, laws become
irrelevant and stale.”
(2) In Bhag Mal, supra, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held:
“30. With this background in mind and
keeping in view the other facts as
observed in the judgment of my
learned brother, the question which
we have to consider, is, whether in
view of the decision of this Court in the
case
of Jabar
Singh v. Genda
Lal [AIR 1964 SC 1200 : (1964) 6 SCR
54 : 25 ELR 323] the appellant was
disentitled from asking this Court to
take into account in his favour the
ballot papers in respect of the votes
cast in his favour which were rejected
initially, but which have now been
found as a result of recounting
directed by the High Court and done
under the supervision of the High
Court to have been improper. That
decision has been the subject-matter
of
consideration
in
several
subsequent decisions of this Court. It
is, therefore, not necessary for me to
re-examine the decisions again. I
would,
however,
express
my
respectful agreement with the view
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 17
and the observations of Ayyangar, J.
in that decision. It seems to me that
the
conclusion
and
the
views
expressed by Justice Ayyangar are in
consonance with the purpose of the
Act and would further the cause of
democratic
process,
which
the
Constitution aims. It is true that in spite
of that decision of this Court rendered
as early as December 1963, the
Legislature has not amended the
relevant provisions to make the Act
more responsive on this aspect to the
wishes of the people. The entire
purpose
of
the
constitutional
provisions as well as other provisions
of law is to ensure that true democracy
functions in this country and the will of
the people prevails. The purpose of
the Act is to safeguard that one who
obtains majority of valid votes by
proper and due process of law alone
should represent the constituency and
will of the people. All the legal
provisions and the procedures of the
enactment should be so construed as
to ensure that purpose. It would really
be a mockery to the procedure of law
if a situation where it is demonstrated
duly in the court that a person who
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 18
obtained four votes less than the other
next candidate should be declared
elected in preference to the others and
allowed to represent the constituency.
It is not an appeal to any abstract
justice nor it is an appeal to equity but
it is to emphasise that procedure
should he so construed that these
rules of procedure such as Section 97
of the Act subserve the wishes of the
voters. For this reason the view
expressed by Ayyangar, J. appeals to
me to be more reasonable though it
may strain the literal provisions of the
section a bit. Even if the Legislature
has
not
amended
the
relevant
provisions after the said decision, I am
of the opinion that in a matter of this
nature, this Court has a responsibility
to construe the procedural provisions
of the law in such manner that the
procedure
does
not
defeat
the
purpose or object of the Act. This
Court has done that on appropriate
occasions. Reference may be made to
the observations of Lord Denning as
quoted by Krishna Iyer, J. in the case
of C.I.T. v. B.N.Bhattacharjee [(1979)
4 SCC 121, 136 : 1979 SCC (Tax)
297, 312 : (1979) 118 ITR 461, 480] :
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 19
“Whenever a statute comes up for
consideration
it
must
be
remembered that it is not within
human powers to foresee the
manifold sets of facts which may
arise, and, even if it were, it is not
possible to provide for them in
terms free from all ambiguity. The
English language is not an
instrument
of
mathematical
precision. Our literature would be
much the poorer if it were. This is
where the draftsmen of Acts of
Parliament have often been
unfairly criticised. A Judge,
believing himself to be fettered by
the supposed rule that he must
look to the language and nothing
else, laments that the draftsmen
have not provided for this or that, or
have been guilty of some or other
ambiguity. It would certainly save
the Judges trouble if Acts of
Parliament were drafted with divine
prescience and perfect clarity. In
the absence of it, when a defect
appears a Judge cannot simply fold
his hands and blame the
draftsman. He must set to work on
the constructive task of finding the
intention of Parliament, and he
must do this not only from the
language of the statute, but also
from a consideration of the social
conditions which gave rise to it, and
of the mischief which it was passed
to remedy, and then he must
supplement the written word so as
to give ‘force and life’ to the
intention of the Legislature. That
was clearly laid down by the
resolution of the Judges. . .
in Heydon case [(1584) 3 Co Rep
7a : 76 ER 637] and it is the safest
guide today. Good practical advice
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 20
on the subject was given about the
same time by Plowden. . . . Put into
homely metaphor it is this: A Judge
should ask himself the question: If
the makers of the Act had
themselves come across this ruck
in the texture of it, how would they
have straightened it out? He must
then do as they would have done.
A judge must not alter the material
of which it is woven, but he can and
should iron out the creases.”
A statutory provision must be so
construed, if it is possible, that
absurdity
and
mischief
may
be
avoided. Where the plain and literal
interpretation of a statutory provision
produces a manifestly absurd and
unjust result, the Court might modify
the language used by the Legislature
or even do some violence to it so as to
achieve the obvious intention of the
Legislature and produce a rational
construction and just result. See in this
connection
the
observations
Bhagwati,
J.
in
the
v.
Income Tax
of
K.P.Varghese
of
case
Officer, Ernakulam [(1981) 131 ITR
597 : (1981) 4 SCC 173 : 1981 SCC
(Tax) 293].”
(3) In Sri SriSriK.C.Gajapati Narayanan Deo,
supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held:
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 21
“9. It may be made clear at the outset
that
the
doctrine
legislation
does
of
not
colourable
involve
any
question of bona fides or mala fides on
the part of the legislature. The whole
doctrine
resolves
itself
into
the
question of competency of a particular
legislature to enact a particular law. If
the legislature is competent to pass a
particular law, the motives which
impelled it to act are really irrelevant.
On the other hand, if the legislature
lacks competency, the question of
motive does not arise at all. Whether a
statute is constitutional or not is thus
always
a
question
[Vide Cooley's
of
power
Constitutional
Limitations, Vol 1 p 379]. A distinction,
however, exists between a legislature
which is legally omnipotent like the
British
Parliament
and
the
laws
promulgated by it which could not be
challenged
on
the
ground
of
incompetence, and a legislature which
enjoys only a limited or a qualified
jurisdiction. If the Constitution of a
State distributes the legislative powers
amongst different bodies, which have
to act within their respective spheres
marked out by specific legislative
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 22
entries, or if there are limitations on
the legislative authority in the shape of
fundamental rights, questions do arise
as to whether the legislature in a
particular case has or has not, in
respect to the subject-matter of the
statute or in the method of enacting it,
transgressed
the
constitutional
limits
of
powers.
its
Such
transgression may be patent, manifest
or direct, but it may also be disguised,
covert and indirect and it is to this
latter
class
expression
of
cases
“colourable
that
the
legislation”
has been applied in certain judicial
pronouncements. The idea conveyed
by the expression is that although
apparently a legislature in passing a
statute purported to act within the
limits of its powers, yet in substance
and in reality it transgressed these
powers,
the
transgression
being
veiled by what appears, on proper
examination, to be a mere pretence or
disguise. As was said by Duff, J.
in Attorney-General
for
Ontario v. Reciprocal
Insurers [1924
AC 328 at 337] :
“Where the law making authority is of
a limited or qualified character it may
be necessary to examine with some
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 23
strictness the substance of the
legislation for the purpose of
determining what is that the legislature
is really doing.”
In other words, it is the substance of
the Act that is material and not merely
the form or outward appearance, and
if the subject-matter in substance is
something
which
is
beyond
the
powers of that legislature to legislate
upon, the form in which the law is
clothed would not save it from
condemnation. The legislature cannot
violate the constitutional prohibitions
by employing an indirect method. In
cases like these, the enquiry must
always be as to the true nature and
character of the challenged legislation
and it is the result of such investigation
and not the form alone that will
determine as to whether or not it
relates to a subject which is within the
power of the legislative authority
[Vide Attorney-General
for
Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurers, 1924
AC 328 at 337] . For the purpose of
this investigation the court could
certainly examine the effect of the
legislation and take into consideration
its
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
object,
purpose
or
design
P a g e | 24
[Vide Attorney-General
for
Alberta v. Attorney-General
for
Canada, 1939 AC 117 at 130] . But
these are only relevant for the purpose
of ascertaining the true character and
substance of the enactment and the
class of subjects of legislation to which
it really belongs and not for finding out
the
motives
which
induced
the
legislature to exercise its powers. It is
said by Lefroy in his well known work
on Canadian Constitution that even if
the legislature avows on the face of an
Act that it intends thereby to legislate
in reference to a subject over which it
has no jurisdiction; yet if the enacting
clauses of the Act bring the legislation
within its powers, the Act cannot be
considered ultra vires [ See Lefroy on
Canadian Constitution, page 75].”
(4) In Haji K. Haji K. Kutty Naha, supra, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held:
“5. But
in
enacting
the
Kerala
Buildings Tax Act no attempt at any
rational classification is made by the
Legislature. As already observed, the
Legislature
has
not
taken
into
consideration in imposing tax the class
to which a building belongs, the nature
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 25
of construction, the purpose for which
it is used, its situation, its capacity for
profitable user and other relevant
circumstances which have a bearing
on matters of taxation. They have
adopted merely the floor area of the
building as the basis of tax irrespective
of all other considerations. Where
objects,
persons
or
transactions
essentially dissimilar are treated by
the imposition of a uniform tax,
discrimination may result, for, in our
view, refusal to make a rational
classification may itself in some cases
operate as denial of equality. This
Court in a recent judgment has
decided that the levy of tax in exercise
of the power under Entry 49 List II of
the Seventh Schedule in respect of
factory buildings in a municipal area
based on floor area was illegal : New
ManekChowk Spinning and Weaving
Mills Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation
of the City of Ahmedabad [(1967) 2
SCR 679] . The Court held in that case
that the method of adopting a flat rate
for a floor area for determining the
annual
value
Corporation
adopted
of
by
the
Ahmedabad
in
exercise of the powers conferred upon
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 26
it by the Bombay Provincial Municipal
Corporation Act 49 of 1949 was
against the provisions of the Act and
the Rules made thereunder as well as
all recognised principles of valuation
for the purpose of taxation. If levy of
tax in a municipal district based on
floor area in respect of a factory
building violates Article 14 of the
Constitution when the tax is sought to
be
levied
by
the
Municipal
Corporation, we see no reason to
uphold the tax imposed under the
impugned Act when the State, in
exercise
of
legislative
authority
conferred by Entry 49 List II Schedule
VII, imposes liability to tax buildings
solely on floor area. The vice of the
Act in the present case is more
pronounced than it was in New Manek
Chowk Spinning & Weaving Mills
case [(1967) 2 SCR 679] . In that case
the Rules under which the tax was
sought to be levied on the basis of
floor area were restricted in their
operation to factory buildings within
the Corporation limits of Ahmedabad,
whereas Act 19 of 1961 which is
challenged in the present case applies
to the whole State of Kerala in respect
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 27
of buildings completed on or after
March 2, 1961, whatever may be the
nature or class of the building, the use
to which it is put, materials used in its
construction
and
the
extent
of
profitable user to which the building
may be put, its cost and its economic
rental. It is unnecessary in the
circumstances to consider whether
imposition of a tax only on buildings
constructed after March 2, 1961, and
exempting buildings completed before
that date may not violate Article 14 of
the Constitution.”
(5) In Nalla Raja Reddy, supra, the Hon’ble
Supreme court held:
“24. On the said facts the question is
whether Sections 3 and 4 of the Act
offend Article 14 of the Constitution.
The scope of Article 14 has been so
well settled that it does not require
further elucidation. While the article
prohibits discrimination, it permits
classification. A statute may expressly
make
a
discrimination
between
persons or things or may confer power
on an authority who would be in a
position to do so. Official arbitrariness
is more subversive of the doctrine of
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 28
equality than statutory discrimination.
In respect of a statutory discrimination
one knows where he stands, but the
wand of official arbitrariness can be
waved
in
all
directions
indiscriminately. A statutory provision
may
offend
Constitution
Article
of
the
both
by
finding
differences where there are none and
by making no difference where there
is one. Decided cases laid down two
tests
to
ascertain
whether
a
classification is permissible or not viz.
(i) the classification must be founded
on an intelligible differentia in which
distinguishes persons or things that
are grouped together from others left
out of the group; and (ii) that the
differential must
have
a
rational
relation to the object sought to be
achieved by the statute in question.
The said principles have been applied
by this Court to taxing statutes. This
Court in Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil
Nair v. State of Kerala [(1961) 3 SCR
77] held that the Travancore-Cochin
Land Tax Act, 1955, infringed Article
14 of the Constitution, as it obliged
every person who held land to pay the
tax at the flat rate prescribed, whether
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 29
or not he made any income out of the
property, or whether or not the
property was capable of yielding any
income. It was pointed out that that
was one of the cases where the lack
of classification created inequality.
In East India Tobacco Co. v. State of
Andhra Pradesh [(1963) 1 SCR 404]
though this Court again held that
taxation laws also should pass the test
of Article 14 of the Constitution gave
the caution that in deciding whether
such a law was discriminatory or not it
was necessary to bear in mind that the
State
had
a
wide
discretion
in
selecting the persons or things it
would tax. The applicability of Article
14 to taxation statute again arose for
consideration
in Khandige
Bhat v. Agricultural
Income
Sham
Tax
Officer [(1963) 3 SCR 809, 817] and
this Court affirmed the correctness of
the
decision
in K.T.
Moopil
Nair
case [(1961) 3 SCR 77] . In the
context of a taxation law this Court
held:
“Though a law ex facie appears to
treat all that fall within a class alike, if
in effect it operates unevenly on
persons or property similarly situated,
it may be said that the law offends the
equality clause. It will then be the duty
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 30
of the court to scrutinize the effect of
the law carefully to ascertain its real
impact on the persons or property
similarly situated. Conversely, a law
may treat persons who appear to be
similarly situated differently, but on
investigation they may be found not to
be similarly situated. To state it
differently, it is not the phraseology of
a statute that governs the situation but
the effect of the law that is decisive. If
there is equality and uniformity within
each group, the law will not be
condemned as discriminative, though
due to some fortuitous circumstances
arising out of a peculiar situation some
included in a class get an advantage
over others, so long as they are not
singled out for special treatment.
Taxation law is not an exception to this
doctrine…. But in the application of the
principles, the courts, in view of the
inherent
complexity
of
fiscal
adjustment of diverse elements,
permit a larger discretion to the
Legislature
in
the
matter
of
classification, so long it adheres to the
fundamental principles underlying the
said doctrine. The power of the
Legislature to classify is of ‘wide range
and flexibility’ so that it can adjust its
system of taxation in all proper and
reasonable ways.”.
It is, therefore, manifest that this Court
while conceding a larger discretion to
the Legislature in the matter of fiscal
adjustment will insist that a fiscal
statute just like any other statute
cannot infringe Article 14 of the
Constitution
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
by
introducing
P a g e | 31
unreasonable discrimination between
persons
or
property
either
by
classification or lack of classification.
Two decisions relied upon by the
learned counsel for the appellant may
now
be
noticed.
In C.V.
Rajagopalachariar v. State
of
Madras [AIR 1960 Mad 543] the facts
were : two Acts, namely, Madras Land
Revenue Surcharge Act (19 of 1954)
and
Madras
Land
Revenue
(Additional Surcharge) Act (30 of
1955), were passed by the Madras
Legislature
increasing
the
land
revenue payable by landlords to the
extent of the surcharge levied. Those
two Acts were questioned, inter alia,
on the ground that the offended Article
14 of the Constitution; but the ground
of attack was that the Acts fixed a slab
system under which the rate of
surcharge
progressively
increased
from As. -/2 to As. -/8 on each rupee
of the land revenue paid and that the
relevant provision was discriminatory
in its operation as a distinction had
been made between rich and poor
people and as the levy of the tax was
different
for
different
classes
of
owners. That contention, for the
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 32
reasons given therein, was negatived.
In the said Madras Acts a surcharge
was imposed in addition to the
previous rates and the previous rates
had been made on the basis of
ryotwari settlements which did not
offend Article 14 of the Constitution
and, therefore, a small addition to the
said rates could not likewise infringe
the said article. The present question
did not arise in that case. Nor is the
decision of the Mysore High Court
in H.H. VishwashaThirthaSwamiar of
Shri
Pejavar
Mutt v. State
of
Mysore [(1955) 1 Mays LJ 351, 359] in
regard to the Mysore Land Revenue
Surcharge Act (13 of 1961) has any
bearing on the present question.
There, as in the Madras Acts, the
revenue surcharge levied was an
additional imposition of land tax and,
therefore, the Mysore High Court held
that it did not offend Article 14 of the
Constitution. In holding that Article 14
was not infringed, the Court said:
“We have before us a temporary
measure. That is an extremely
important circumstance. The State,
not unreasonably, proceeded on the
basis that a temporary levy could be
made on the basis of existing rates.
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 33
We can think of no other reasonable
basis on which the levy could have
been made. It may be that in the result
some areas were taxed more than
others. But yet it cannot be said with
any justification that there was any
hostile discrimination between one
area and another”.
It will be seen that in that case on
existing rates based upon scientific
data a surcharge was imposed as a
temporary measure till a uniform land
revenue law was enacted for the
whole State. That decision, therefore,
does not touch the present case. But
in the instant case, as we have pointed
out earlier, the whole scheme of
ryotwari settlement was given up so
far
as
the
minimum
rate
was
concerned and a flat minimum rate
was fixed in the case of dry lands
without any reference to the quality or
fertility of the soil and in the case of
wet lands a minimum wet rate was
fixed and it was sought to be justified
by correlating it to the ayacut. Further,
the whole imposition of assessment
was left to the arbitrary discretion of
the officers not named in the Act
without giving any remedy to the
assessees
for
questioning
the
correctness of any of the important
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 34
stages in the matter of assessment,
such as ayacut, taram, rate or
classification or even in regard to the
calculation of the figures. Not only the
scheme of classification, as pointed
out by us earlier, has no reasonable
relation to the objects sought to be
achieved
viz.
fixation
and
rationalisation of rates but the arbitrary
power of assessment conferred under
the
Act
officers
enables the
to
discrimination
make
appropriate
unreasonable
between
different
persons and lands. The Act, therefore,
clearly offends Article 14 of the
Constitution.”
(6) Venkateshwara Theatre, supra, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held:
“23. Just as a difference in the
treatment of persons similarly situate
leads
to
discrimination,
so
also
discrimination can arise if persons
who are unequals, i.e. differently
placed, are treated similarly. In such a
case failure on the part of the
legislature to classify the persons who
are dissimilar in separate categories
and
applying
the
same
law,
irrespective of the differences, brings
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 35
about the same consequence as in a
case
where
the
law
makes
a
distinction between persons who are
similarly placed. A law providing for
equal treatment of unequal objects,
transactions or persons would be
condemned as discriminatory if there
is absence of rational relation to the
object intended to be achieved by the
law.”
(7) In Tuntanbou Guangta, supra, this Court
held as under:
“34. The Manipur (Hill Areas) District
Councils
Act,
provides
for
division of hill areas into not more than
six
Autonomous
Districts
whose
boundaries are to be notified under the
official gazette. Under Section 4 of the
District
Councils
Act
for
each
autonomous district, there shall be a
District
Council
as
the
State
Government may notify in the Official
Gazette. It has been provided under
Section 4 of the Act that the total
number of seats in the District
Councils to be filled by persons
chosen by direct election on the basis
of
adult
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
suffrage
from
territorial
P a g e | 36
constituencies shall be not more than
24.”
24.
Now let us deal with the decisions relied upon by
the learned Advocate General:
(1)
In
Public
Services
Tribunal
Bar
Association, supra, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held:
“26. The constitutional validity of an
Act can be challenged only on two
grounds viz. (i) lack of legislative
competence; and (ii) violation of any of
the fundamental rights guaranteed in
Part III of the Constitution or of any
other
constitutional
In State
of
provisions.
A.P. v. McDowell
&Co. [(1996) 3 SCC 709] this Court
has opined that except the above two
grounds there is no third ground on the
basis of which the law made by the
competent
legislature
can
be
invalidated and that the ground of
invalidation
must
necessarily
fall
within
four
corners
the
the
of
aforementioned two grounds.
27. Power to enact a law is derived by
the State Assembly from List II of the
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 37
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.
Entry 41 confers upon a
State
Legislature the power to make State
Public Services; State Public Services
Commission. Under this entry, a State
Legislature has the power to constitute
State Public Services and to regulate
their service conditions, emoluments
and provide for disciplinary matters
etc.
The
State
Legislature
had
enacted the U.P. Public Services
Tribunals Act, 1976 in exercise of the
power vested in it by Entry 41 of List II
of the Seventh Schedule. Power to
enact would include the power to reenact or validate any provision of law
in the State Legislature provided the
same falls in an entry of List II of the
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution
with
the
enactment
restriction
should
that
not
such
nullify
a
judgment of the competent court of
law. The legislative competence of the
State
to
Services
enact
the U.P.
Tribunal has
not
Public
been
questioned in these appeals. The
challenge
put
forth
to
various
amendments made is that the same
are violative of Articles 14 and 16 of
the Constitution being arbitrary as they
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 38
are onerous and work inequitably. In
the present appeals legislative action
of the State is under challenge.
Judicial system has an important role
to play in our body politic and has a
solemn obligation to fulfil. In such
circumstances it is imperative upon
the courts while examining the scope
of legislative action to be conscious to
start with the presumption regarding
the
constitutional
validity
of
the
legislation. The burden of proof is
upon the shoulders of the incumbent
who challenges it. It is true that it is the
duty of the constitutional courts under
our Constitution to declare a law
enacted by Parliament or the State
Legislature as unconstitutional when
Parliament or the State Legislature
had assumed to enact a law which is
void, either from want of constitutional
power to enact it or because the
constitutional forms or conditions have
not been observed or where the law
infringes
the
fundamental
rights
enshrined and guaranteed in Part III of
the Constitution.
28. In State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery
Ltd. [(1997) 2 SCC 453] this Court
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 39
indicated the approach which the
Court should adopt while examining
the
validity/constitutionality
of
a
legislation. It would be useful to
remind ourselves of the principles laid
down which read: (SCC p. 466, para
17)
“The approach of the court, while
examining the challenge to the
constitutionality of an enactment, is
to start with the presumption of
constitutionality. The court should
try to sustain its validity to the
extent possible. It should strike
down the enactment only when it is
not possible to sustain it. The court
should not approach the enactment
with a view to pick holes or to
search for defects of drafting, much
less inexactitude of language
employed. Indeed, any such
defects of drafting should be ironed
out as part of the attempt to sustain
the validity/constitutionality of the
enactment. After all, an Act made
by the legislature represents the
will of the people and that cannot
be lightly interfered with. The
unconstitutionality must be plainly
and clearly established before an
enactment is declared as void. The
same approach holds good while
ascertaining the intent and purpose
of an enactment or its scope and
application.”
In the same para the Court further
observed as follows:
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 40
“The court must recognize the
fundamental
nature
and
importance of legislative process
and accord due regard and
deference to it, just as the
legislature and the executive are
expected to show due regard and
deference to the judiciary. It cannot
also be forgotten that our
Constitution recognizes and gives
effect to the concept of equality
between the three wings of the
State and the concept of ‘checks
and balances’ inherent in such
scheme.”
(2) In Satpal Saini, supra, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held:
“5. The
State
Government
is
aggrieved by the mandamus which
has been issued by the High Court to
amend the provisions of law. The
submission of the State is that the
above directions trench upon the
sovereign legislative power of the
State Legislature.
6. The grievance, in our view, has a
sound constitutional foundation. The
High Court has while issuing the
above directions acted in a manner
contrary to settled limitations on the
power of judicial review under Article
226 of the Constitution. A direction, it
is well settled, cannot be issued to the
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 41
legislature to enact a law. The power
to enact legislation is a plenary
constitutional power which is vested in
Parliament and the State Legislatures
under Articles 245 and 246 of the
Constitution. The legislature as the
repository of the sovereign legislative
power is vested with the authority to
determine whether a law should be
enacted. The doctrine of separation of
powers entrusts to the court the
constitutional function of deciding
upon the validity of a law enacted by
the legislature, where a challenge is
brought before the High Court under
Article 226 (or this Court under Article
32) on the ground that the law lacks in
legislative competence or has been
enacted in violation of a constitutional
provision. But judicial review cannot
encroach upon the basic constitutional
function which is entrusted to the
legislature to determine whether a law
should
be
enacted.
Whether
a
provision of law as enacted subserves
the object of the law or should be
amended is a matter of legislative
policy. The court cannot direct the
legislature either to enact a law or to
amend a law which it has enacted for
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 42
the
simple
reason
that
this
constitutional function lies in the
exclusive domain of the legislature.
For
the
Court
to
mandate
an
amendment of a law — as did the
Himachal Pradesh High Court — is a
plain usurpation of a power entrusted
to another arm of the State. There can
be no manner of doubt that the High
Court has transgressed the limitations
imposed upon the power of judicial
review under Article 226 by issuing the
above
directions
to
the
State
Legislature to amend the law. The
Government
owes
a
collective
responsibility to the State Legislature.
The State Legislature is comprised of
elected
representatives.
The
law
enacting body is entrusted with the
power to enact such legislation as it
considers necessary to deal with the
problems faced by society and to
resolve issues of concern. The courts
do not sit in judgment over legislative
expediency or upon legislative policy.
This position is well settled. Since the
High Court has failed to notice it, we
will briefly recapitulate the principles
which emerge from the precedent on
the subject.
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 43
7. In Mallikarjuna
Rao v. State
of
A.P. [Mallikarjuna
Rao v. State
of
A.P., (1990) 2 SCC 707 : 1990 SCC
(L&S) 387] and in V.K. Sood v. Deptt.
of Civil Aviation [V.K. Sood v. Deptt. of
Civil Aviation, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 9 :
1993 SCC (L&S) 907] this Court held
that the court under Article 226 has no
power to direct the executive to
exercise its law-making power.
8. In State of H.P. v. Parent of a
Student of Medical College [State of
H.P. v. Parent of a Student of Medical
College, (1985) 3 SCC 169 : AIR 1985
SC 910] this Court deprecated the
practice of issuing directions to the
legislature to enact a law : (SCC p.
174, para 4)
“4. … The direction given by the
Division Bench was really nothing
short of an indirect attempt to
compel the State Government to
initiate legislation with a view to
curbing the evil of ragging….”
The same principle was followed
in Asif Hameed v. State of J&K [Asif
Hameed v. State of J&K, 1989 Supp
(2) SCC 364: 1 SCEC 358] where this
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 44
Court observed that : (SCC p. 374,
para 19)
“19. … The Constitution does not
permit the court to direct or advise
the executive in matter of policy or
to sermonise qua any matter which
under the Constitution lies within
the sphere of the legislature or
executive….”
In Union
of
Democratic
India v. Assn.
India v. Assn.
for
Reforms [Union
of
for
Democratic
Reforms, (2002) 5 SCC 294 : AIR
2002 SC 2112] this Court observed
that : (SCC p. 309, para 19)
“19. … it is not possible for this
Court to give any directions for
amending the Act or the statutory
Rules. It is for Parliament to amend
the Act and the Rules.”
……
12. The judiciary is one amongst the
three branches of the State; the other
two being the executive and the
legislature. Each of the three branches
is co-equal. Each has specified and
enumerated
constitutional
powers.
The judiciary is assigned with the
function of ensuring that executive
actions accord with the law and that
laws and executive decisions accord
with the Constitution. The courts do
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 45
not frame policy or mandate that a
particular policy should be followed.
The duty to formulate policies is
entrusted to the executive whose
accountability is to the legislature and,
through it, to the people. The peril of
adopting an incorrect policy lies in
democratic
accountability
to
the
people. This is the basis and rationale
for holding that the court does not
have the power or function to direct
the executive to adopt a particular
policy or the legislature to convert it
into enacted law. It is wise to remind
us of these limits and wiser still to
enforce them without exception.”
(3)
In
J.P.Bansal,
supra,
the
Hon’ble
Supreme Court held:
“14. Where, however, the words were
clear, there is no obscurity, there is no
ambiguity and the intention of the
legislature is clearly conveyed, there is
no scope for the court to innovate or
take upon itself the task of amending
or altering the statutory provisions. In
that situation the Judges should not
proclaim that they are playing the role
of a law-maker merely for an exhibition
of judicial valour. They have to
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 46
remember that there is a line, though
thin, which separates adjudication
from legislation. That line should not
be crossed or erased. This can be
vouchsafed by “an alert recognition of
the necessity not to cross it and
instinctive,
as
well
reluctance
to
do
as
so”.
trained
(See
:
Frankfurter : Some Reflections on the
Reading of Statutes in “Essays on
Jurisprudence”,
Columbia
Law
Review, p. 51.)
……
16. Where, therefore, the “language”
is clear, the intention of the legislature
is to be gathered from the language
used. What is to be borne in mind is as
to what has been said in the statute as
also what has not been said. A
construction which requires, for its
support, addition or substitution of
words or which results in rejection of
words, has to be avoided, unless it is
covered by the rule of exception,
including that of necessity, which is
not the case here. [See : Gwalior
Rayons
Silk
Ltd. v. Custodian
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
Mfg.
(Wvg.)
of
Co.
Vested
P a g e | 47
Forests [1990 Supp SCC 785 : AIR
SC
1747]
1752), ShyamKishori
(AIR
at
p.
Devi v. Patna
Municipal Corpn. [AIR 1966 SC 1678]
(AIR
at
Antulay
p.
1682)
and
v.
Ramdas
A.R.
Sriniwas
Nayak [(1984) 2 SCC 500 : 1984 SCC
(Cri) 277] (SCC at pp. 518, 519).]
Indeed, the Court cannot reframe the
legislation as it has no power to
legislate.
[See
: State
of
Kerala v. Mathai Verghese [(1986) 4
SCC 746 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 3] (SCC at
p. 749) and Union of India v. Deoki
Nandan Aggarwal [1992 Supp (1)
SCC 323 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 248 :
(1992) 19 ATC 219 : AIR 1992 SC 96]
(AIR at p. 101).]”
25.
From the narration of facts and in the light of the
decisions relied upon by learned counsel appearing on either
side, when this Court considered the relief of declaration sought
by the petitioners, prima facie, there appears to be no ambiguity
in Section 7 of the Act of 1971. The reason for arriving at such a
conclusion is on the following reasons:
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P a g e | 48
Hill areas of Manipur is inhabited not
only by Scheduled Tribes, but also
others.
There is no valid ground mentioned in
the writ petition for challenging the
provision
and/or
the
language
employed in Section 7 of the Act of
1971.
It is settled law that a legislation can be
challenged only on the ground of
incompetency
or
violation
of
the
fundamental rights of the citizens or on
the ground of manifest arbitrariness,
etc.
26.
Section 9(1) of the Act of 1971 provides that the
persons entitled to vote at elections of members of a District
Council shall be the persons entitled by virtue of the provisions
of the Constitution and the Representation of the People Act,
1950 (43 of 1950) to be registered as voters at elections to the
House of the People. The petitioners themselves admitted that
persons other than Scheduled Tribes are also residing in Hills
Areas of Manipur and their names find place in the electoral roll
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
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of the respective constituencies.
In view of the above, the
contention of the petitioners that if by virtue of being a resident of
the Schedule Area/Hill Area, a general candidate can not contest
the general election, but permitted in the District Council, cannot
be countenanced for the simple reason that persons entitled to
vote at elections of the members of a District Council shall be the
persons entitled by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution of
India and the Representation of People Act, 1950.
27.
At this juncture, it is worth to mention Section 19 of
the Representation of People Act, 1950, which reads thus:
“19. Conditions of Registration – Subject to
the foregoing provisions of this part, every
person who (a) Is not less than eighteen years of
age on the qualifying date, and
(b) Is
ordinarily
resident
in
the
constituency, shall be entitled to be
registered in the electoral roll for
that constituency.”
28.
In view of the above and upon analyzing the
provisions of the Constitution of India and the Representation of
People Act, giving voting rights of the voters not only elections
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
P a g e | 50
relating to Parliamentary Constituency, State Legislative
Assembly, but also in other elections like District Council, the
qualification for membership has been fixed. Accordingly, the
Legislators while enacting the Act in question, have rightly stated
that “a person shall not be qualified to be chosen as a member
of a District council of any autonomous district unless he is an
elector for any District Council constituency in that autonomous
district”, as Section 9 of the Act of 1971 stipulates the persons
entitled to vote at elections of members of a District Council shall
be the persons entitled by virtue of the provisions of the
Constitution of India and the Representation of People Act, 1950.
29.
In the light of the provision of Section 9, coupled
with the provision of Section 7 of the Act of 1971, when this Court
analyses the grievance expressed by the petitioners, being
voters of the Hill Area in question, the respondents 4 and 5 are
entitled to contest in District Council election and the objects and
intent of the special enactment have not been defeated in any
manner. Considering the issue involved herein and taking note
of the ground reality of fact that in Hill Areas not only the
Scheduled Tribe community but also other community people are
living, the Legislators while enacting the Act in question has
rightly said “unless he is an elector for any District Council
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
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constituency” instead of particularly saying “a Schedule Tribe”.
Thus, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that
the provision in question attracts the mischief of the colourable
legislation meaning thereby what cannot be done directly cannot
be done indirectly, cannot be appreciated. The further argument
of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the other
community like Gurkhas as in the instant case wants to have
them represented for want of adequate representation in the
District Council which can be done by way of nomination but not
by entitling them to contest the Autonomous District Council
election, cannot also be countenanced.
Therefore, the next
argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the
ambiguity created by the language of Section 7 of the Act of 1971
is arbitrary and in violation of the doctrine of equality envisaged
under Article 14 of the Constitution of India cannot stand in the
eye of law.
30.
In view of the above, the language employed in
Section 7 of the Act of 1971 or the provision Section 7 of the Act
of 1971 does not offend Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
The scope of Article 14 of the Constitution of India has been well
settled and it does not require further elucidation.
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31.
It is pertinent to note that as per Section 10(1) of the
Act of 1971, coupled with the provision of Section 19 of the
Representation of People Act, 1950, the petitioners are eligible
to be chosen as members in the Autonomous District Council
constituency and, therefore, the rights and privileges of the
petitioners are not affected, infringed and violated because of the
language employed in Section 7 of the Act of 1971, more
particularly, the word “elector”. Any “elector” of the District
Council constituency in the Autonomous District can be chosen
as member irrespective of Scheduled Tribe as per the Act of
1971. That apart, hill areas of Manipur is inhabited not only by
Scheduled Tribes, but also others, which fact was not disputed
by the petitioners.
32.
While examining the challenge made by the
petitioners to the constitutionality of the enactment of Section 7
of the Act of 1971, this Court finds that there is no arbitrariness
or violation of fundamental rights of the citizens or incompetency.
Admittedly, the petitioners have failed to prove the aforesaid
three aspects alleged by them. When the petitioners have failed
to establish the aforesaid three aspects, it is the duty of the Court
to sustain the validity of the provision to the extent possible.
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33.
It is settled law that the Court should strike down the
enactment only when it is not possible to sustain it. The Court
should not approach the enactment with a view to pick holes or
to search for defects of drafting, much less inexactitude of
language employed. Indeed, any such defects of drafting should
be ironed out as part of the attempt to sustain the
validity/constitutionality of the enactment. After all, an Act made
by the legislature represents the will of the people and that
cannot be lightly interfered with. The unconstitutionality must be
plainly and clearly established before an enactment is declared
as void. The same approach holds good while ascertaining the
intent and purpose of an enactment or its scope and application.
In the case on hand, as stated supra, there is no valid ground to
declare Section 7 of the Act of 1971 as unconstitutional or to hold
that the language employed in the said Section affects the
fundamental rights of the petitioners.
34.
Time and again, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that the Court has very limited role and in exercise of that, it is
not open to have judicial legislation.
Neither the Court can
legislate, nor has it any competence to issue directions to the
legislature to enact the law in a particular manner.
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35.
The judiciary is assigned with the function of
ensuring that executive actions accord with the law and that laws
and executive decisions accord with the Constitution. The Courts
do not frame policy or mandate that a particular policy should be
followed. The duty to formulate policies is entrusted to the
executive whose accountability is to the legislature and, through
it, to the people.
36.
The Manipur (Hill Areas) District Council Act, 1971
came into effect way back on 26.12.1971 and from 1971, it is in
operation and nobody questioned Section 7 of the Act or the
language employed in the said Section. Now all of a sudden in
the year 2019, the petitioners woke up from the slumber and
state that because of the language employed in Section 7 of the
Act of 1971 and the election of non-Scheduled Tribes, namely
the respondents 4 and 5 as members of Sardar Hills (Kangpokpi)
Autonomous District Councils from Irang Part-I where the second
petitioner is an elector and illegible to be elected as Member of
the District Council and Irang Part-II to which the first petitioner
is an elector and illegible to be elected as Member of the District
Council, their rights and privileges have been affected. There
may not be any infringement of rights and privileges of the
petitioners as alleged by them in the light of the discussions held
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supra. There is also no question of treating the unequals as
equal. Admittedly, the selection/election of respondents 4 and
5, who are non-Scheduled Tribes, as members of the District
Council in the last election held in the year 2015 was in the
wisdom of the people of the Hill Areas in question. That apart,
the election held in the year 2015, cannot be cited in the year
2019 as the basis for the challenge made in the writ petition. No
shred of material has been produced by the petitioners to show
that since the enactment came into force, only Scheduled Tribe
personnel were elected and, for the first time, respondents 4 and
5, who do not belong to the Scheduled Tribe community, have
been elected.
37.
In view of the above, this Court is of the considered
view that the language employed in Section 7 of the Act of 1971
is clear, the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the
language used in the said Section. Addition or substitution of the
words has to be avoided. As stated supra, the Court cannot
reframe the legislation as it has no power to legislate.
38.
At the end, it is to be pointed out that in the entire
writ petition of the petitioner speaks “The Manipur (Hill Areas)
District Council Act, 1972”.
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
The year of the Act is 1971.
P a g e | 56
However, the petitioners have not taken steps to amend the year
of the Act in the writ petition.
39.
For all the reasons stated above, this Court is of the
view that there is no valid ground for challenging Section 7 of the
Act of 1971 by the petitioners and, therefore, the writ petition fails.
Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.
JUDGE
FR/NFR
Sushil
W.P.(C) No.818 of 2019
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