Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – s.14(2) vis-à-vis 14(1) – Objective and applicability of – Held: Objective of sub-sec.(2) is that there cannot be a fetter in a owner of a property to give a limited estate if he so chooses to do including to his wife but of course if the limited estate is to the wife for her maintenance that would mature in an absolute estate u/s.14(1) – Sub-sec.(2) of s.14 inter alia applies to a Will which may create independent and new title in favour of females for the first time and is not a recognition of a pre-existing right – In such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and s.14(1) of the said Act will not operate in that sphere – Further, the objective of s.14(1) is to create an absolute interest in case of a limited interest of the wife where such limited estate owes its origin to law as it stood then – The objective cannot be that a Hindu male who owned self-acquired property is unable to execute a Will giving a limited estate to a wife if all other aspects including maintenance are taken care of – In the present case, the testator had taken all care for the needs of maintenance of his second wife (‘RD’) by ensuring that the revenue generated from the estate would go to her alone – However, he wished to give only a limited life interest to her as the second wife with the son (appellant) inheriting the complete estate after her lifetime – Thus, it would be the provisions of s.14(2) of the said Act which would come into play in such a scenario and ‘RD’ only had a life interest in her favour – Hence, the respondents-third parties (claiming to be bona fide purchasers) who derived their rights from ‘RD’ cannot inherit a better title than what she had – Further, in view of the sequence of litigations, respondents can hardly be said to be bona fide purchasers – The first endeavour was by the daughter of ‘RD’ by seeking a collusive decree when she had no interest in the property – She then sought to create lease interest in the property – Both these aspects were held against ‘RD’ and her daughter right till the Supreme Court in the first round of litigation clearly opining that ‘RD’ had only a limited estate in the property – Despite having lost right till the Supreme Court, the sale deeds were intervening factors even during the pendency of the litigation which went against ‘RD’ – Also, High Court has wrongly proceeded on the basis that the first round of litigation would not create any binding precedents because there was change in law after the first round of litigation – There was, in fact, no change in law as all the judgments were much prior in time – The rights of the respondents are derived only from ‘RD’ and once the judgment is binding on her it cannot be said that she can create rights contrary to the judgment in favour of third parties and that too during the pendency of the litigation – View taken by trial court and the first appellate court is correct – Sale deeds in favour of the respondents cannot be sustained – Impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside – Decree of the trial court (in favour of the appellant decreeing his suit for declaration and injunction challenging the sale deeds executed by ‘RD’) affirmed by the appellate court is reaffirmed – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s.41 – Res judicata.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Sub-Section (2) of Section 14 of the said Act is in the nature of a proviso. It begins with a ‘non-obstante clause’. Thus, it says that “nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court....” etc. where a restricted estate in such property is prescribed. The objective of sub-Section (2) is quite clear as enunciated repeatedly by this Court in various judicial pronouncements, i.e., there cannot be a fetter in a owner of a property to give a limited estate if he so chooses to do including to his wife but of course if the limited estate is to the wife for her maintenance that would mature in an absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the said Act. The Will while conferring a limited estate on Ram Devi, Tulsi Ram had clearly stated that she will earn income from the 12 property for her livelihood. The income, thus, generated from the property is what has been given for maintenance and not the property itself. The next clarification is that after the lifetime of Ram Devi, the appellant will get the ownership of the remaining half portion also. It is specified that in case Ram Devi pre-deceases Tulsi Ram, then all the properties would go absolutely to the appellant and that the other children will have no interest in the property. [Paras 18, 19][776-G-H; 777-A-D]
1.2 There are only two real aspects to be examined in the present case - i. In the given factual scenario did Ram Devi become the absolute owner of the property in view of Section 14(1) of the said Act or in view of the Will the Explanation under Section 14(2) would apply. ii. What is the effect of the first round of litigation which came up to this Court between the appellant and Ram Devi, the two beneficiaries of the Will. Both these questions have to be answered in favour of the appellant and for that reason the impugned judgment is unsustainable. [Paras 26, 27][779-A-C]
1.3 The relevant aspect of the conclusion in the seminal judgment in V. Tulasamma & Ors. case is para 4 which opines where sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the said Act would apply and this does inter alia applies to a Will which may create independent and new title in favour of females for the first time and is not a recognition of a pre-existing right. In such cases of a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1) of the said Act will not operate in that sphere. The objective of Section 14(1) is to create an absolute interest in case of a limited interest of the wife where such limited estate owes its origin to law as it stood then. The objective cannot be that a Hindu male who owned self-acquired property is unable to execute a Will giving a limited estate to a wife if all other aspects including maintenance are taken care of. If this Court was to hold so it would imply that if the wife is disinherited under the Will it would be sustainable but if a limited estate is given it would mature into an absolute interest irrespective of the intent of the testator. That cannot be the objective. [Paras 30, 31][782-G-H; 783-A-C] V. Tulasamma & Ors. v. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by LRs. (1977) 3 SCC 99 : [1977] 3 SCR 261 – referred to.
1.4 The testator in the present case had taken all care for the needs of maintenance of his wife by ensuring that the revenue generated from the estate would go to her alone. He, however, wished to give only a limited lift interest to her as the second wife with the son inheriting the complete estate after her lifetime. Thus, it would be the provisions of Section 14(2) of the said Act which would come into play in such a scenario and Ram Devi only had a life interest in her favour. The natural sequittur is that the respondents cannot inherit a better title than what the vendor had and, thus, the view taken by the trial court and the first appellate court is the correct view and the sale deeds in favour of the respondents cannot be sustained. [Para 32][783-C-E]
1.5 On consideration of the second aspect, the sequence of litigations can hardly be said to classify the respondents as bona fide purchasers. The first endeavour was by the daughter of Ram Devi by seeking what is undoubtedly a collusive decree when she had no interest in the property. She then sought to create lease interest in the property. Both these aspects were held against Ram Devi and her daughter right till the Supreme Court in the first round of litigation clearly opining that Ram Devi had only a limited estate in the property. Despite having lost right till the Supreme Court, the sale deeds were intervening factors even during the pendency of the litigation which went against the vendor Ram Devi. The High Court wrongly proceeded on the basis that the first round of litigation would not create any binding precedents because there was change in law after the first round of litigation. There is, in fact, no change in law as all the judgments were much prior in time. The rights of the respondents are derived only from Ram Devi and once the judgment is binding on Ram Devi it cannot be said that she can create rights contrary to the judgment in favour of third parties and that too was done during the pendency of the litigation. The transactions in question are not only not bona fide but dubious in character to somehow deny the appellant rights conferred under the Will respondents being third parties. The repeated endeavour of Ram Devi and her daughter did not succeed earlier and cannot be permitted to succeed qua the purchasers from Ram Devi. The impugned judgment of the single Judge of the High Court is set aside and the decree of the trial court dated 13.8.2009 as affirmed by the appellate court dated 7.10.2010 is reaffirmed. [Paras 33-35][783E-G; 784-B, D-E] Jupudy Pardha Sarathy v. Pentapati Rama Krishna & Ors. (2016) 2 SCC 56 : [2015] 14 SCR 374; Shakuntla Devi v. Kamla & Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 390 –
distinguished.
Mathura Prasad Bajoo & Ors. v. Dossibai N.B.
Jeejebhoy (1970) 1 SCC 613 : [1970] 3 SCR 830;
Pankajakshi (dead) through LRs & Ors. v. Chandrika & Ors. AIR 2016 SC 1213 : [2016] 3 SCR 1018; Sadhu Singh v. Gurudwara Sahib Narike & Ors. (2006) 8 SCC
75 : [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 799; Gaddam Ramakrishna Reddy & Ors. v. Gaddam Ramireddy & Ors. (2010) 9 SCC 602 : [2010] 11 SCR 656 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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